RIFKIN v. PAYNE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jordan Rifkin (“Rifkin”) appeals the small claims court's judgment that awarded $8,230.89 in favor of Gail Payne (“Payne”). Rifkin argues that multiple findings of the small claims court constituted clear error. We restate the issue as whether the small claims court clearly erred when it entered judgment in favor of Payne. Concluding that the small claims court did not clearly err when it entered judgment in favor of Payne, we affirm the small claims court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the small claims court clearly erred when it entered judgment in favor of Payne.

Facts

[3] In 2010, Rifkin, as tenant, and Payne, as landlord, entered into a rental agreement (“the lease”) for a property (“the property”) in Marion County. In June 2013, Rifkin and Payne executed a renewal of the lease. Rifkin and Payne did not execute a subsequent extension of the lease, but the lease provided that “should the [t]enant remain in possession of the [p]remises with the consent of the [l]andlord after the natural expiration of this lease, a new tenancy from month to month will be created between the [l]andlord and the [t]enant which will be subject to all of the terms and conditions of this lease[.]” (Ex. 1). The lease also provided that:

30. The [t]enant will, at its sole expense, keep and maintain the [p]remises and appurtenances in good and sanitary condition and repair during the term of this [l]ease and any renewal of this [l]ease.

* * * * *

32. The [t]enant will promptly notify the [l]andlord of any damage, or of any situation that may significantly interfere with the normal use of the [p]remises.

* * * * *

38. The [l]andlord will use reasonable efforts to maintain the [p]remises in such a condition as to prevent the accumulation of moisture and the growth of mold, and to promptly respond to any written notices from the [t]enant in relations to accumulation of moisture and visible evidence of mold.

39. The [t]enant will use reasonable efforts to maintain the [p]remises in such a condition as to prevent the accumulation of moisture and the growth of mold, and to promptly notify the [l]andlord in writing of any moisture accumulation that occurs or of any visible evidence of mold discovered by the [t]enant.

40. At the expiration of the [l]ease term, the [t]enant will quit and surrender the [p]remises in as good a state and condition as they were at the commencement of this [l]ease, reasonable use and wear and damages by the elements excepted.

(Ex. 1).

[4] In March 2023, Rifkin returned from an out-of-state trip. About a week after Rifkin had returned home, he noticed that the basement was wet. On March 11, 2023, Rifkin sent a text message to Payne informing her that “the basement [had] got[ten] really wet the past week[.]” (Ex. 2). Rifkin also informed Payne that he did not go into the basement often and that, the previous day, the basement carpets had been “pretty wet[.]” (Ex. 2). The next day, Rifkin and Payne spoke on the phone. In this conversation, Rifkin notified Payne that he “was not sure” how long the carpets had been wet and told Payne that the water in the basement “just sort of puddles whenever it rains.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). Two days later, a remediation company (“the remediation company”) came to the property to assess the damage. The remediation company discovered black mold and significant water damage to the basement flooring. The remediation company removed all of the carpets in the basement, an entire foot of drywall along the walls, and nearly an entire wall of the basement area. The remediation company also remediated the black mold from the basement.

[5] At the end of June 2023, Rifkin moved out of the property. In July 2023, Payne hired a contractor to replace the basement carpets, replace the drywall, and repaint the basement. In August 2023, Payne filed with the small claims court her notice of claim against Rifkin. In her notice of claim, Payne argued that she was entitled to damages from Rifkin under the lease in the amount of $8,265.89 for the cost of mold remediation and replacement of the basement carpets and drywall. Payne also requested her reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to the lease.

[6] The small claims court held a hearing in December 2023. At the hearing, Payne was represented by counsel, and Rifkin appeared pro se. Payne testified that the water damage in the basement had damaged the carpets, one foot of drywall along the walls, and an entire section of a wall that was “about 8 feet by 8 feet tall[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). Payne also testified that the water damage had caused black mold to develop in the basement. Payne testified that aside from an unrelated water heater pipe bursting somewhere else in the property, Rifkin had not contacted her about any other water damage at the property. Payne testified that she had begun repairing the water damage within three days of Rifkin's notice and further testified that she did not believe that Rifkin had timely notified her of the water damage. Payne explained that she believed that Rifkin's notice of water damage was not timely because he had told her that the water “had been pooling for a while[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18). When Payne's counsel asked her if she believed that Rifkin had made reasonable efforts to inspect the property, she replied, “[n]o.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21).

[7] During Payne's testimony, Payne moved to admit the lease as Exhibit 1 and her text message communications with Rifkin as Exhibit 2. Payne also moved to admit photos of the damage as Exhibit 3, estimates for remediation from the remediation company as Exhibit 4, and the remediation company's final invoice as Exhibit 5. Payne also moved to admit receipts showing the cost of the remediation, materials for the basement, and installation of those materials as Exhibit 6. Payne also moved to admit an affidavit of attorneys fees as Exhibit 7 and a total list of damages as Exhibit 8. Rifkin did not object to the admission of Exhibits 1 through 8, and the small claims court admitted those exhibits.

[8] Rifkin also testified at the hearing. Rifkin testified that he had been out of town in the spring of 2023. Rifkin testified that he had gone into the basement about a week after he had returned from his trip and noticed that the carpets were wet. Rifkin further testified that while he had been away, there had been a “rain storm of a significant amount” and that was “probably when the basement [had] got[ten] wet.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28). Rifkin testified that he had told Payne about the wet basement “probably a week or two” after the storm. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28). Rifkin also testified that at some point during his rental of the property, he had informed Payne that water had pooled in the concrete-floored laundry room in the basement, but he had told Payne that it had not “really affect[ed] the carpet.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27). Rifkin did not recall exactly when this conversation had taken place, but he noted that it had been “many years ago[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27).

[9] In March 2024, the small claims court issued an order including its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which stated in relevant part, as follows:

25. [Rifkin] failed to provide proper notification to [Payne] of water penetration.

26. A lay witness may testify as to an opinion or inference which is rationally based on the perception of the witness. Expert opinion is not required for matters within the “common knowledge and experience of ordinary” people.

27. The court finds that it is within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary person to conclude that the mold described in the leased premises could not have developed in three days.

28. [Rifkin] failed to provide the proper notification to [Payne] about the development of mold.

29. [Rifkin] failed to maintain the property in good repair.

30. [Rifkin] failed to return the leased premises in the same condition it was in at the time [that] [Rifkin] [had] moved into the leased premises.

(App. Vol. 2 at 20-21). The small claims court found that Rifkin was liable to Payne in the amount of $8,265.89 in damages, subtracted the $900 security deposit, and added $865 in reasonable attorneys fees. The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Payne in the amount of $8,230.89.

[10] Rifkin now appeals.

Decision

[11] Rifkin argues that multiple findings of the small claims court constituted clear error, and we restate the issue as whether the small claims court clearly erred when it entered judgment in favor of Payne. Judgments in small claims actions are “ ‘subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.’ ” Hetty Incorporated v. Weems, 237 N.E.3d 701, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A)), reh'g denied. “We review facts from a bench trial under the clearly erroneous standard.” Hetty, 237 N.E.3d at 704 (cleaned up). “The small claims court is the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and on appeal we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Heartland Crossing Found., Inc. v. Dotlich, 976 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[12] “This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are designed to speedily dispense justice by applying substantive law between the parties in an informal setting.” Berryhill v. Parkview Hosp., 962 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Although the method of proof may be informal, the party bearing the burden of proof must demonstrate that he is entitled to the recovery sought. Spainhower v. Smart & Kessler, LLC, 176 N.E.3d 258, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), reh'g denied, trans. denied. “To the extent that the judgment is based on erroneous findings, those findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment.” Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[13] Rifkin challenges multiple findings in the small claim court's order. Specifically, Rifkin argues that the small claims court clearly erred when it found that: (1) Rifkin had failed to properly notify Payne about the development of mold; (2) the mold in the property could not have grown in three days;¹ (3) Rifkin had failed to return the property to Payne in the same condition that it had been in at the time that he had moved in;² and (4) Rifkin had failed to maintain the property in good repair. Our review of the record reveals that the small claims court's findings and judgment were not clearly erroneous. Critically, the small claims court's finding that Rifkin had failed to properly notify Payne of water penetration was not challenged by Rifkin on appeal. This finding supports the small claims court's judgment in favor of Payne. Moreover, the evidence presented during the small claims hearing showed that Rifkin had not checked the condition of the basement for one to two weeks after a large storm. Rifkin also admitted that he did not go into the basement often. In March 2023, Rifkin sent a text message to Payne informing her that “the basement [had] got[ten] really wet the past week[.]” (Ex. 2). The next day, Rifkin told Payne that he “was not sure” how long the carpets had been wet and told Payne that the water in the basement “just sort of puddles whenever it rains.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). Payne testified that the water damage in the basement damaged the carpets, one foot of drywall along the walls, and damaged an entire section of a wall that was “about 8 feet by 8 feet tall[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). Ultimately, the small claims court awarded Payne damages in order to compensate her for the remediation of mold and the replacement and installation of the carpet, drywall, and paint. The small claims court did not clearly err when it entered judgment in favor of Payne because there was ample evidence supporting its findings. Therefore, we affirm the small claims court's judgment.

[14] Affirmed.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rifkin argues that the small claims court clearly erred when it “appeared” to have taken “judicial notice” of a fact “outside [of] the record.” regarding the time period for mold growth. (Rifkin's Br. 10-11). However, Rifkin then backtracks on his judicial notice argument in his reply brief when he stated that “it's not even clear [that] the [small claims] court intended to take judicial notice[.]” (Rifkin's Reply Br. 5) (emphasis deleted). In any case, Rifkin's challenged finding, which dealt with the rate of mold growth, is superfluous and not fatal to the judgment where the judgment is supported by the remaining valid findings and conclusions. See Lasatar, 809 N.E.2d at 397.

2.   We are not convinced that it is necessary to review this finding because it was not a factor in the judgment. Further, this finding is superfluous and not fatal to the judgment because the judgment is supported by the remaining valid findings and conclusions. See Lasatar, 809 N.E.2d at 397.

3.   Rifkin included a FEMA publication concerning mold in his appellant's appendix. This publication was not offered at trial, and we will not consider it on appeal.

Pyle, Judge.

May, J., and Brown, J., concur.