J.V., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.V. challenges his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent and corresponding sanction for possession of a machine gun, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] J.V. raises three issues for our review, namely:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it authorized the State to file the delinquency petition when J.V. had been adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”).

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his adjudication.

3. Whether the Level 5 felony punishment for possessing a machine gun violates the proportionality clause of the Indiana Constitution.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 19, 2024, Officer Caitlin Yanis with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department received a dispatch for a “possible overdose[.]” Tr. at 18. Officer Yanis responded to the call and discovered a male “on the ground, not awake.” Id. The male's pulse was “very faint,” and he had “pinpoint pupils.” Id. The officer spoke with another individual at the house in an attempt to discover the identity of the male, but the individual was only able to provide the male's first name. Officer Yanis began searching the male's pockets for identification and to ensure that he did not possess “anything that's gonna harm [officers] or medics.” Id. at 19. During the search of the male's front left pocket, Officer Yanis felt something “like a rock[.]” Id. at 20. Officer Yanis removed a “bag,” which contained “a machine gun conversion device.” Id. at 19. Officer Yanis was ultimately able to identify the male as J.V., and J.V. was transported to a hospital for treatment.

[4] The State filed a petition alleging that J.V. was a juvenile delinquent for having possessed a machine gun, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult. In particular, the State alleged that J.V. had “knowingly or intentionally own[ed] or possess[ed] a machine gun, to wit: machine gun conversion device[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. The court thereafter issued an order finding that “it is in the best interest of the child and/or the public that the petition be filed.” Id. at 28.

[5] The court held a bench trial on March 20, during which Officer Yanis testified. When asked if she “had any training in identifying a machine conversion device,” she responded that she had attended the training hosted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) “on the machine[ ] gun conversion devices,” which consisted of “[h]ow to identify one and what they do when placed on a semiautomatic weapon.” Tr. at 20. She then testified that the “one [device] in particular that [she] came into contact with” was black with a “knob on the side.” Id. She also testified that, to use the device, a person would “remove the back plate, place [the device] on there and that is what convert[s] the semiautomatic to a machine gun.” Id. at 24. She then testified that, once the device is on the firearm, a person can “[h]old the trigger down and it will dispense the entire magazine [in] seconds.” Id. at 20.

[6] At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found the allegation in the petition to be true and adjudicated J.V. a delinquent. Following a dispositional hearing, the court placed J.V. on formal probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Delinquency Petition

[7] We first address J.V.’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion when it authorized the State to file the delinquency petition. As this Court has recently stated:

The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which allows the court to step into the shoes of the parents. The parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile courts power to further the best interests of the child, which implies a broad discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system. The goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation so that the youth will correct his behavior and not become a criminal as an adult.

R.G. v. State, 212 N.E.3d 720, 722-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Further, “filing a delinquency petition requires the trial court's approval—a discretionary finding of ‘probable cause to believe that: (A) the child is a delinquent child; and (B) it is in the best interests of the child or the public that the petition be filed.’ ” State v. I.T., 4 N.E.3d 1139, 1142 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-10-2(2)).

[8] On appeal, J.V. contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it authorized the filing of the delinquency petition because J.V. “was already receiving services from DCS” after having been adjudicated a CHINS, because he “was suffering from mental health issues and was struggling with substance abuse,” and because “he merely possessed a piece of metal and no firearm.” Appellant's Br. at 24.

[9] However, Officer Yanis found fifteen-year-old J.V. to be in possession of what she believed to be a device that converts a semiautomatic weapon into an automatic weapon and that allows the user to “dispense the entire magazine [in] seconds.” Tr. at 20. Further, Officer Yanis found J.V. unconscious due to a drug overdose. Stated differently, despite any service J.V. may have received through the CHINS action, he still engaged in delinquent behavior by improperly possessing a machine gun component and consuming illegal substances. The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that J.V. was a delinquent child. Based upon this finding, the court exercised its discretion and determined that it was in the best interests of those affected to authorize the filing of the delinquency petition. We therefore cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it authorized the filing of the delinquency petition.

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Next, J.V. contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent. Our standard of review is well settled:

We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the charged offense. We examine only the evidence most favorable to the judgment along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. We will affirm if there exists substantive evidence of probative value to establish every material element of the offense. Further, it is the function of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in testimony and to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

J.C. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation omitted).

[11] To support J.V.’s adjudication, the State was required to prove that J.V. had knowingly or intentionally owned or possessed a machine gun. See I.C. § 35-47-5-8. On this issue, J.V. first contends that the State failed to prove that he possessed a machine gun.

[12] Our legislature has defined a “machine gun” as follows:

(a) “Machine gun” means a weapon that:

(1) shoots;

(2) is designed to shoot; or

(3) can be readily restored to shoot;

automatically more than one (1) shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.

(b) The term includes:

(1) the frame or receiver of a weapon described in subsection (a);

(2) a:

(A) part designed and intended solely and exclusively; or

(B) combination of parts designed and intended;

for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun; and

(3) any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.

I.C. § 35-31.5-2-190 (2024).²

[13] J.V. asserts that the State presented “cursory evidence” to support his adjudication based only on Officer Yanis’ testimony and that the State did not present any evidence “to prove that th[e] piece of metal was specifically ‘designed’ to convert a weapon into a machine gun.” Appellant's Br. at 16. And he maintains that his adjudication is based only on “one officer's contention that she knew what a conversion device ‘looked like[.]’ ” Id. at 17.

[14] The evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment supports J.V.’s adjudication. Indeed, Officer Yanis testified that the item she had removed from J.V.’s pocket was a “machine[ ] gun conversion device,” and that she was able to identify it based on training she had attended “by the ATF on the machine[ ] gun conversion devices.” Tr. at 20. She further testified that the training consisted of “[h]ow to identify” a conversion device and “what they do when placed on to a semiautomatic weapon.” Id. She then described the device she had recovered as black with “a knob on the side” that is placed onto the slide of the firearm that then allows the firearm to “dispense the entire magazine [in] seconds.” Id. And she reiterated that the item she had found on J.V.’s person “is what convert[s] the semiautomatic to a machine gun.” Id. at 24. Based on that evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could infer that J.V. had possessed a “part designed and intended solely and exclusively” for converting a weapon into a machine gun, such that he possessed a machine gun. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-190(b)(2)(A).

[15] Still, J.V. also contends that the State failed to prove that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a machine gun. As our Supreme Court recently stated:

Admittedly, it is hard to get inside [the] head of the defendant: [k]nowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence[.] So given this real-world constraint, a defendant's mens rea may be proven by circumstantial evidence,—that is, it may be reasonably inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points. Reasonable inferences are foundational to criminal law. In Indiana, courts have found that exclusive possession of contraband supports an inference that the person knows of the contraband's presence and of its forbidden character. Rightfully so.

A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064-65 (Ind. 2024) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, some alterations in original); see also Bailey v. State, 131 N.E.3d 665, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that, when “a person has exclusive possession of the premises in which contraband is found, he is assumed to know about the presence of the contraband and be capable of controlling it.”), trans. denied.³

[16] To support his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, the State was required to prove both that J.V. possessed the conversion device and that he knew that what he possessed was illegal. But in A.W., our Supreme Court in effect said that, in the case of exclusive possession, the State need only prove that an individual knew he was in possession of contraband and that the actual possession, in itself, leads to an inference that the person knew that it was illegal for him to possess the contraband.⁴ Stated differently, the State can meet its burden to prove both possession of the contraband and knowledge of the nature of the contraband if it can show that a person has exclusive control over it.

[17] Here, there is no dispute that J.V. had actual and exclusive possession of the machine gun conversion device. Indeed, Officer Yanis found the device in the front left pocket of J.V.’s pants. Yet, despite his exclusive possession, J.V. maintains that nothing in the record suggests that “he knew what the pieces of metal were or what they could do.” Appellant's Br. at 18. Based upon the holding in A.W. however, we may infer J.V.’s knowledge about the nature of the contraband based upon his exclusive possession of it. We therefore affirm his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent.

Issue Three: Proportionality Clause

[18] Finally, J.V. contends that it is “disproportionate to impose a level 5 [felony] penalty for possession of a machine gun conversion device[.]” Appellant's Br. at 23. Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Kelly v. State, 236 N.E.3d 716, (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).⁵ “Article 1, Section 16’s proportionality requirement ‘goes beyond’ the Eighth Amendment's protections and permits us to review the duration of a sentence because it is possible for a sentence within a statutory range to be unconstitutional as applied in a particular instance.” Id. at 728-29 (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1289 (Ind. 2014)). The provision is “violated ‘only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of the offense.’ ” Id. at 729 (quoting Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1289) (emphasis removed).

[19] On appeal, J.V. contends that the Level 5 felony penalty is disproportionate as applied because “he would have received a lesser punishment if he had an actual firearm, including a loaded firearm, instead of a conversion device by itself.” Appellant's Br. at 23. Stated differently, J.V. contends that possession of the conversion device standing alone should not subject an individual to the penalty for a Level 5 felony and that the Level 5 felony punishment violates the proportionality clause of the Indiana Constitution because there are other firearm offenses that receive lesser penalties.

[20] However, in Indiana, “juvenile delinquency is not a crime[,] and juvenile dispositions are not criminal sentences.” M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, cert. denied. Rather, the goal is rehabilitation for juvenile offenders, and a juvenile delinquency petition is not about the State seeking to punish a young offender. Id. Additionally, our General Assembly has codified the goal of the juvenile system by requiring juvenile courts to consider the needs of the child, to make efforts to prevent removal from the parents, and to offer various services to juvenile offenders. I.C. § 31-37-18-9. Furthermore, our legislature has imposed strict requirements on juvenile facilities to provide recreation, education, counseling, and health care that must be operated by qualified staff to provide such programs and treatment. See I.C. § 31-37-19-21. Hence, delinquency actions are designed to rehabilitate and correct, and they encourage juveniles to “straighten out [their lives] before the stigma of criminal conviction and the resultant detriment to society is realized.” Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. 1987). Therefore, the juvenile court's dispositional order was not a penalty or punishment within the meaning of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, and the proportionate penalties clause under the Indiana Constitution is not implicated. See M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 464.

Conclusion

[21] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to file the delinquency petition. Additionally, the State presented sufficient evidence to support J.V.’s adjudication as a juvenile delinquent. And Article 1, Section 16 does not apply to the court's dispositional decree. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-5-8 (2024).

2.   The Indiana General Assembly amended the statute in 2023 to add subsection (b).

3.   On the other hand, when possession is not exclusive, the inference of intent to maintain dominion and control over an illegal item “must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the [the item] and [its] presence.” Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. 2004).

4.   We acknowledge that the Supreme Court in A.W. relied on more than A.W.’s exclusive possession of the firearm to support his adjudication because it also noted A.W.’s “corresponding conduct” of flight away from officers. 229 N.E.3d at 1065 (emphasis removed). However, following that Court's declaration that exclusive possession “[r]ightfully” supports an inference that the person knows both of the contraband's presence and its forbidden character, we interpret the Court's holding not to require additional evidence such as flight, but that the additional evidence simply provided additional support for the inference that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a machine gun.

5.   J.V. does make any argument under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.