IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.T. and A.T. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] F.T. (“Mother”) and G.T. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of K.T. and A.T. (collectively, “the Children”). The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with Parents and K.T. in May of 2020, after receiving reports of drug use by Parents and an allegation that K.T. had exhibited signs of methamphetamine withdrawal at birth. K.T. was determined to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”), but the matter was closed and he was reunified with Parents in August of 2021. Eight months later, DCS became involved with Parents and the Children following reports of neglect and domestic violence in the home. Children were subsequently determined to be CHINS. After reunification efforts failed, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Children. The juvenile court granted DCS's petitions following an evidentiary hearing. Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in taking judicial notice of the cases detailing Parents’ prior interactions with DCS. Parents also contend that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the termination of their parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother ¹ and Father are married and the biological parents of the Children. Each Parent has a lengthy drug-related criminal history and has exhibited a habitual pattern of substance abuse. Both have been diagnosed with ADHD.

[3] Parents entered into a Program of Informal Adjustment (“IA”) with DCS regarding K.T. on May 20, 2020, after K.T. exhibited signs of methamphetamine withdrawal at birth. At the time, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and Father admitted to methamphetamine use. The IA was unsuccessful, and K.T. was subsequently alleged and found to be a CHINS. The CHINS proceedings eventually ended, and K.T. was returned to Parents’ care.

[4] Approximately eight months later, Parents entered into another IA with regard to both K.T. and A.T. following reports alleging neglect due to lack of a sober caregiver, medical neglect, and domestic violence between Parents. The IA was unsuccessful and, on September 27, 2022, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS.

[5] On December 15, 2022, following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found that the Children were CHINS. In its dispositional order, issued January 18, 2023, the juvenile court ordered parents, inter alia, to keep in contact with their Family Case Manager (“FCM”) and to notify the FCM of any arrests or criminal charges or changes in address, household composition, employment or telephone number within five days; allow the FCM and other service providers to make announced or unannounced visits to the home; enroll in any program recommended by the FCM or other service providers within thirty days; maintain suitable, safe and stable housing with adequate bedding, functional utilities, adequate supplies of food; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; refrain from use of alcohol and all illegal controlled substances; obey the law and follow any applicable probation terms; complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; meet with medical/psychiatric personnel and take all prescribed medications as specified in the prescriptions; meet all personal medical and mental-health needs; refrain from committing any acts of domestic violence; complete all recommendations made as a result of any domestic-violence assessments or programs; and attend all scheduled visitations with the Children.

[6] While Parents engaged in some services, they did not consistently comply with the dispositional order. For instance, while Mother completed some assessments, she failed to follow through with recommendations, failed to maintain sobriety, and experienced periods of incarceration. Father participated in random drug screens but had numerous positive screens. Father experienced periods of both homelessness and incarceration during the CHINS proceedings. Father admitted that he had been incarcerated “[m]ultiple separate times” during the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings. Tr. Vol. II p. 75.

[7] DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children on August 15, 2023. The juvenile court conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing, during which DCS presented evidence demonstrating that Parents had failed to remedy the conditions that had led to the Children's removal from Parents’ care and Parents presented evidence which they claimed demonstrated progress towards reunification. FCM Amber Hedges testified that the Children had been removed from Parents’ home for “[a] little shy of twenty-two months,” were doing well, and were bonded with their foster parents. Tr. Vol. III p. 17.

[8] FCM Hedges further testified that if Parents’ parental rights were to be terminated, DCS's plan for the Children's care was adoption. FCM Hedges indicated that she did not believe that the conditions that had led to the Children's removal from Parents’ care had been remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship between Parents and the Children would pose a threat to the Children's well-being. FCM Hedges stated that the Children required stability and that she did not believe that Parents should be given any additional time to complete services.

[9] Court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Sarah Noel outlined the Children's growth since being placed in their current foster home and testified that, in her opinion, “it's in the best interest of the [C]hildren for them to remain in their ․ foster home and eventually be adopted by” foster parents. Tr. Vol. III p. 34. CASA Noel further testified that Parents have demonstrated a “cycle” during which “[s]ometimes they do better [and] sometimes they do worse, it's just, very unfair to the [C]hildren [to] be put through that.” Tr. Vol. III p. 37. CASA Noel indicated that while it had “been hard to watch” Parents “struggle so much[,]” she believed it would be “an injustice” to the Children to deny them permanency and make them wait for Parents “to get their act together.” Tr. Vol. III p. 38. On August 2, 2024, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Parents’ parental rights to the Children.

Discussion and Decision

[10] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[11] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[12] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

I. Judicial Notice

[13] In challenging the termination of his parental rights to the Children, Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of the cases detailing Parents’ prior interactions with DCS. “[W]e review a trial court's decision to take judicial notice of a matter, like other evidentiary decisions, for abuse of discretion.” Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016). “The trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision regarding the admission of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[14] During the evidentiary hearing, at DCS's request and with no objection from either of Parents’ counsel, the juvenile court took judicial notice of a prior CHINS action involving K.T. (Cause Number 06C01-2003-JC-107), a prior IA involving K.T. (Cause Number 06C01-2005-JM-221), and another CHINS action involving K.T. (Cause Number 06C01-2009-JC-360). (Tr. Vol. II p. 32) The juvenile court, again at DCS's request and with no objection from either of Parents’ counsel, also took judicial notice of the underlying CHINS case involving K.T. (Cause Number 06C01-2209-JC-315), the underlying CHINS case involving A.T. (Cause Number 06C01-2209-JC-316), the related IA involving K.T. (Cause Number 06C01-2204-JM-119), and the IA involving A.T. (Cause Number 06C01-2204-JM-118). Father's failure to object to the admission of these records during the evidentiary hearing results in waiver and precludes appellate review.² See In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[15] Parents contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of their parental rights to the Children. DCS was required to prove the following:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree․

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS]․

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).³ Parents argue that the evidence is insufficient to prove subsection (B).

[16] It is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find that one of the conditions listed therein has been met. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines that one of the factors has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court's determination, it is not necessary for DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, the other factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882.

[17] When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

A. Mother

[18] With regard to Mother, the juvenile court made numerous findings to support its conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from Mother's care would not be remedied. The juvenile court's findings outlined prior DCS proceedings involving K.T. and an older child, S.H., to whom Mother's parental rights had been terminated in August of 2018. The juvenile court also made extensive findings relating to Mother's history of drug abuse; failure to participate in individual therapy; and failure to successfully complete court-ordered services, including completing domestic-violence, mental-health, or substance-abuse assessments and following all recommendations. During the pendency of the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings, Mother was also incarcerated, having been released from jail in February of 2024. The juvenile court noted that Mother had made some progress in her services since her release from incarceration, but found that Mother “has an established pattern of failing to maintain long term sobriety outside of incarceration, failing to complete services as Ordered to assist with reunification, and failing to consistently and effectively address her mental health, a pattern which prevents her from providing a safe stable home and sober caregiver for her children.” Appellant F.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 57.

[19] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Mother “does not specifically challenge the facts found by the [juvenile] court, but rather whether those findings support the conclusions.” Appellant F.T.’s Br. p. 9. We therefore accept the juvenile court's factual findings as true. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as true), trans. denied.

[20] During the evidentiary hearing, Mother acknowledged her past shortcomings but presented evidence that she had improved her situation. Mother asserts that the juvenile court “failed to take into consideration the substantial evidence presented that Mother had improved in virtually all areas by the time [of] the termination hearing.” Appellant F.T.’s Br. p. 9. Specifically, Mother presented evidence that, in the six months since her release from incarceration, she had obtained part-time employment; no longer shared a residence with Father, which she claimed alleviated any risk of domestic violence; had participated in drug-treatment programs and had made strides in her sobriety; had attended visitation; and had participated in home-based casework. Mother acknowledged that she had not yet met the goals set forth by DCS for reunification, but claimed that her progress indicated that, with time, she could remedy the situation that had resulted in the Children's removal from her care.

[21] In considering the evidence of changed circumstances, the juvenile court also considered Mother's habitual patterns of conduct. Habitual conduct may include a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The juvenile court may also consider the services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id.

[22] The juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was in the best position to weigh the evidence of Mother's habitual patterns together with her claimed progress. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (providing that the trier-of-fact is best positioned to judge the credibility of the witnesses, is free to discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence). In doing so, the juvenile court gave more weight to Mother's habitual conduct than to her recent improvements. This was within the juvenile court's discretion. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). Mother's argument on appeal amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. Father

[23] For his part, Father challenges a number of the juvenile court's findings and one of the juvenile court's conclusions.

1. Findings Numbers 53, 55, 58–60, 65, and 78–81

[24] Father challenges the juvenile court's findings numbers fifty-three, fifty-five, fifty-eight through sixty, sixty-five, and seventy-eight through eighty-one, which provide as follows:

53. DCS sent referrals for Dispositional services for Father following Disposition.

****

55. Father engaged in homebased services throughout the case. He was responsive and compliant with homebased services; however, he was unable to maintain stability and sobriety and could not successfully apply what he learned outside of the sessions. (Testimony [Shila] Kuhling, [Darryl] Woods)

****

58. Father did not complete mental health related services. (Testimony FCM [Raven] Money)

59. Father's ADHD concerns were specifically included in the DCS referrals made following Disposition. (Testimony FCM Money)

60. Father's ADHD concerns were additionally addressed during his homebased casework throughout the case. (Testimony Father)

****

65. DCS completed new referrals upon Father's release.

****

78. During Father's final homebased casework session at the jail on June 13, 2024, Father set specific goals to be achieved on the day of his release: being picked up by the caseworker, going to get his certificates of completion of jail classes printed, setting up an appointment with Aspire to address his ADHD and other mental health needs, and setting up an appointment with VocRehab for services. (Testimony [Jerome] Cheat[h]am)

79. Mr. Cheat[h]am picked Father up upon release from Boone County Jail on July l7, 2024, and Father declined to engage in any of the goals planned for the day. Father instead requested he be dropped off at the home of a friend. (Testimony Cheat[h]am)

80. Father has been homeless, had unstable housing, or incarcerated throughout the entire pendency of these matters.

81. Father is unemployed.

Appellant F.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 57–58, 60.

[25] In challenging these findings, Father argues that his ADHD was not recognized as an inhibitor to progress until late in the proceedings and, as a result, the juvenile court did “not have a sufficient record to know whether [he] can reasonably remedy the CHINS conditions, or reasonably represents a danger to the Children's well-being, without this condition actually being addressed in services.” Appellant G.T.’s Br. p. 23. For its part, DCS asserts that while the service providers prior to Cheatham might not have used the term “ADHD” in their testimony, it is clear that they addressed the behaviors and mental state that accompany the condition. For instance, service provider Kuhling testified that she had worked with Parents on “structure in the home,” with goals focused “on being consistent with everything, following through, budgeting, and sobriety and free of like domestic violence.” Tr. Vol. II p. 130. DCS indicates, “[w]orking on structure is key when helping an individual who struggles with ADHD” and the fact that Kuhling “did not use the acronym ADHD [in her testimony] does not mean that she did not help Father with that issue.” Appellee's Br. p. 23. FCM Money testified that she had referred Father for individual therapy to help improve his mental health and, if necessary, for services that would help him with both medication management as well as substance-abuse concerns. FCM Money indicated that while she had not made any ADHD-specific referrals for Father, his ADHD was included, and would be addressed, in the mental-health referrals that were made for Father. When asked about FCM Money's testimony that she had put in service referrals relating to Father's ADHD, Father responded “[y]ou're asking me questions that I don't really feel like answering.” Tr. Vol. III p. 72.

[26] In addition, Father admitted that he had spoken to a DCS representative about his ADHD condition “[i]n the very beginning” of the underlying CHINS case. Tr. Vol. III p. 61. While Father claims that services largely focused on his substance-abuse issues and not his ADHD, the record reveals that service providers were aware of Father's condition. Importantly, when service provider Cheatham attempted to address Father's ADHD, Father did not follow through with services. Father's assertion that his ADHD was not recognized by service providers until near the end of the proceedings is not supported by the record. Father was offered services aimed at improving his mental health, including treatment for his ADHD, but did not complete the services. Father's challenge to these findings effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.⁴ See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

2. Findings Numbers 68 and 88 and Conclusion 4

[27] Father also challenges the juvenile court's findings numbers sixty-eight and eighty-eight, as well as conclusion number four, which provide as follows:

68. During the case Father engaged in supervised visitation with Children when he was not incarcerated. Father was engaged with Children and had no inappropriate interactions with them. Father occasionally struggled with accepting redirection from visitation supervisors. Father had some escalated personal interactions between himself and visitation supervisors, causing multiple supervised visitation provider changes.

****

88. Children have received multiple services through DCS referrals including First Steps evaluations, medical and dental care, occupational therapy for [A.T.], homebased therapy for [K.T.] including play therapy specifically in relation to behaviors before and after visitation.

****

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

****

4. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children's wellbeing:

a. Mother and Father continued to use illegal substances throughout the life of the case and cannot provide a sober caregiver for Children.

b. Mother and Father were arrested multiple times during the life of the case for illegal substance related and domestic violence related charges.

c. Mother and Father's incarcerations during this case created long periods of time between their visitations with the Children. Children suffered mental and physical stress related behaviors and harm at the reintroduction of parents back into their life when visitation was reinstated upon parents release from jail.

d. Mother and Father do not have safe, stable secure housing for the Children.

e. Mother and Father do not have stable reliable employment to provide financial stability for the Children.

Appellant F.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 59, 61, 64 (emphasis in original).

[28] In challenging these findings and conclusion, Father argues that the record does not support the juvenile court's determination that his behavior negatively affected visitation with the Children. With regard to visitation, service provider Lissa Connell testified that Father required some redirection and had stated something to the effect of “he didn't need anyone to tell him how to parent.” Tr. Vol. II p. 159. The record also supports the juvenile court's finding that accusations, although ultimately determined to be false, regarding Father's conduct toward a service provider required a change in service providers and location for visitation. As to the Children's negative reaction to visitation with Father, service provider Connell testified that the Children “didn't really acknowledge” Father when they would arrive for visitation. Tr. Vol. II p. 159. Service provider Steve Center testified that K.T. suffered “sematic reactions” to visitations with father, stating that K.T. would suffer “stomach aches, and then things associated with that with really severe diarrhea and-and he doesn't have any problem with accidents, but right before the day before he was supposed to see his dad the last time, we-we came very close to having a really bad diarrhea accident.” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. Center explained that such reactions are “really common” for young children who “don't have the words to say, you know, ․ I'm scared, I'm nervous, I'm sad, whatever.” Tr. Vol. III p. 117. Again, Father's challenge to these findings effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. Likewise, the findings support the challenged portion of conclusion number four.⁵

3. Findings Numbers 54, 56–57, 64, 66–67, 74–75, 77, and 81

[29] Father next challenges the juvenile court's findings numbers fifty-four, fifty-six through fifty-seven, sixty-four, sixty-six through sixty-seven, seventy-four through seventy-five, seventy-seven, and eighty-one, which provide as follows:

54. Father completed a substance use assessment intake in January 2023 and was sporadic with compliance with recommended services. (Testimony Woods)

****

56. Father did not maintain consistent contact with DCS. (Testimony FCM Money, FCM Young, FCM Hedges)

57. Father did not complete a Domestic Violence assessment or services. (Testimony FCM [Natasha] Young, FCM Hedges)

****

64. Father was released from jail in November 2023 to attend inpatient at Hickory Recovery.

****

66. Father completed a new parenting assessment (and an earlier parenting assessment in 2020 through the prior case). He did not complete any recommended services. (Testimony FCM Money, [Steve] Center)

67. Father completed a new substance use assessment in January 2024, however he had engaged in no substance use services as of March 2024. (Testimony [Ambia] Dorsey)

****

74. Father complies with the Dispositional services that are available to be provided under the Boone County Jail parameters while he is incarcerated. (Testimony FCM Money, FCM Young, Woods, Cheat[h]am)

75. Father actively engaged in services while incarcerated, however cannot apply what he learns upon release. (Testimony Cheat[h]am)

****

77. Father was released from jail on June 17, 2024.

****

81. Father is unemployed.

Appellant F.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 57–60.

[30] In challenging these findings, Father asserts that “[t]his series of findings asserts essentially that [he] either did not comply with or complete ordered services or cannot apply lessons learned from services. The record does not support these findings.” Appellant G.T.’s Br. p. 24. Father claims that prior to the final day of the evidentiary hearing, he had “completed all ordered services except the ongoing obligation to continue drug screens, and to obtain housing and employment.” Appellant G.T.’s Br. p. 24. The record reveals, however, that although Father claimed to have completed the ordered services while incarcerated, he had not provided any verification or proof of completion. Service provider Cheatham testified that Father had informed him that “while he was in jail, he was doing various programs that the jail offered that would have to do [with] Domestic Violence, Anger Management, [and] Parenting.” Tr. Vol. II p. 228. While Father had informed Cheatham that he had certificates verifying his completion of these programs, Father had failed to provide the verification to Cheatham upon Father's release from incarceration.

[31] The only evidence that Father had completed services while incarcerated was Father's claim that he had done so. The juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was not obligated to believe Father's self-serving testimony. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). Father's argument on appeal again amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

4. Findings Numbers 62–63 and 71–73

[32] Father also challenges the juvenile court's findings numbers sixty-two through sixty-three and seventy-one through seventy-three, which provide as follows:

62. Father obtained new criminal charges in July 2023 of Domestic Battery – Defendant has prior conviction, Domestic Battery, Criminal Mischief, Possession of Marijuana, and Disorderly Conduct. (DCS Exhibit 16)

63. Father obtained new criminal charges in October 2023 for Violation of a Protective Order. (Testimony Father – Judicial Notice 06D02-23 10-CM-1922)

****

71. Father obtained new criminal charges in March 2024 for Possession of a Controlled Substance. (Testimony Father – Judicial Notice 06D02-2403-CM-371)

72. Father obtained new criminal charges in March 2024 for Cruelty to an Animal. (Testimony Father – Judicial Notice 06C01-2403-CM-508)

73. Father obtained new criminal charges in March 2024 for Violation of a Protective Order. (Testimony Father – Judicial Notice 06C01-2403-CM-550)

Appellant F.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 58–59.

[33] In challenging these findings, Father acknowledges that the juvenile court took notice of these additional charges as evidence that he had failed to follow the court's order that he “obey the law and follow all probation terms.” Appellant F.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 58. Father argues, however, that until he

is found guilty of any of these alleged offense, by right as an American citizen, he stands before those criminal courts, the [juvenile] court in the termination case, and this reviewing court clothed with the presumption of innocence, and cannot he held to have disobeyed the law merely due to an untried and unadmitted allegation made by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor's office.

Appellant G.T.’s Br. p. 26. While we acknowledge that Father had not yet been convicted of these pending charges at the time of the evidentiary hearing, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion considering the pending charges as evidence of Father's habitual pattern of violating the law. This was within the juvenile court's discretion. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (providing that it is within the juvenile court's discretion to consider habitual patterns of conduct and to weigh historical patterns of conduct more heavily than claims of changed conditions).

Conclusion

[34] Parents do not contest the juvenile court's conclusion that DCS met its burden of proving that the Children had been removed from their care for the requisite amount of time, that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the Children's best interests, and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children. Parents only challenged the juvenile court's conclusion that the evidence showed that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from Parents’ care would not be remedied. As is outlined above, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion in this regard. Parents’ claims to the contrary effectively amounted to requests for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[35] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother is the biological mother of another child, S.H., who had previously been removed from Mother's care due to concerns of drug use, multiple arrests, and criminal drug-related charges for Mother. Mother's parental rights to S.H. were terminated on August 8, 2018.

2.   Although Father has waived this issue for appellate review, we believe that it is important to note that Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) provides that a trial court may take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state[.]” See In re D.K., 968 N.E.2d 792, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that effective January 1, 2010, Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b) was amended to provide that a court may take judicial notice of records of a court of this state). The records at issue in this case are clearly records of a court of this state.

3.   We acknowledge that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended, effective March 11, 2024. To the extent that Mother cites to the doctrine of amelioration, as applied in criminal proceedings, in support of her suggestion that the revised version of the statute should apply to the instant matter, we note that the doctrine of amelioration has no bearing on these proceedings. In criminal proceedings, a defendant is generally sentenced in adherence with the statute in effect at the time the defendant committed the offense. However, under the doctrine of amelioration, a defendant may, under certain circumstances, take advantage of an amended version of the statute if the amended version offers a more lenient penalty. See Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 1085–86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Mother neither argues that the amended version of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 is more lenient nor develops an argument as to how or why the doctrine of amelioration should apply in civil cases involving the termination of a parent's parental rights as opposed to criminal cases. The petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights outlined DCS's allegations and the statutory requirements for termination of Parents’ parental rights at the time DCS initiated the proceedings. Mother has failed to convince us that the juvenile court should apply the amended version of the relevant statute, which modified what must be proven in order to terminate a parent's parental rights, should have been applied to proceedings which were initiated prior to the date that the amended version of the statute went into effect.

4.   To the extent that Father's arguments on appeal could be read as a claim that DCS failed to present him with adequate services aimed at reunification, Father has waived this claim by failing to make a cogent argument in support of his claim. See Pasha v. State, 524 N.E.2d 310, 314 (Ind. 1988) (“Bald assertions of error unsupported by either cogent argument or citation to authority result in waiver of any error on review.”).

5.   Father makes no other challenge to conclusion number four beyond the portion that indicated that the Children suffered stress-related behaviors and harm upon the reintroduction of visitation with Father.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.