KACHIKA v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kayla Kachika became upset with her roommate one night and told him to leave the apartment. When he did not comply, she stabbed him with scissors. Kachika was charged with several counts, but convicted of only domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. She appeals her conviction, alleging the evidence was insufficient to rebut her claim that she was defending her dwelling. Finding the evidence sufficient to sustain her conviction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Kachika allowed her long-time friend, Jerry Jennings, to stay in one of the bedrooms of her apartment where she lived with her young child. Although Jennings was not on the lease, he paid rent to Kachika, received mail at the apartment, and listed the apartment as his residence on his state identification card.

[3] One morning, in the wee hours, Kachika and Jennings got into an argument, and she told him to leave the apartment. Jennings refused to leave. Kachika went to the electric box, turned off the electricity in the apartment so it was dark, and went to Jennings’ bedroom brandishing a hammer. Jennings was able to wrestle the hammer away from Kachika. She then left the room, turned the electricity back on, and returned to Jennings’ room with a large pair of scissors. Kachika stabbed Jennings in the abdomen, thigh, and calf with the scissors and ordered Jennings to give her his phone or she would “slit [his] f***ing wrist.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 153. Jennings gave Kachika his phone, and she destroyed it with the hammer.

[4] The State charged Kachika with domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony;¹ attempted domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; intimidation, a Level 5 felony; attempted obstruction of justice, a Level 5 felony; and criminal mischief, a Class A misdemeanor. A jury found her guilty of only domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon. The court sentenced Kachika to 1,095 days, suspended 1,091 days, and placed her on probation for 730 days. Kachika now appeals her conviction.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Kachika contends the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut her claim that she was defending her dwelling. Indiana's defense-of-dwelling statute provides, in pertinent part:

A person:

(1) is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, against any other person; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry of or attack on the person's dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle.

Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d) (2019).

[6] A defense-of-dwelling claim is “analogous” to a claim of self-defense. Ervin v. State, 114 N.E.3d 888, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “ ‘When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State bears the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.’ ” Id. at 896 (quoting King v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied). “ ‘The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.’ ” Id.

[7] “ ‘Whether a defendant acted in self-defense is generally a question of fact, and on appellate review the finder of fact's conclusion is entitled to considerable deference.’ ” Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Griffin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 375, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense the same as we do for any claim of insufficient evidence. Ervin, 114 N.E.3d at 895. That is, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the jury's verdict. Id. Where a defendant is convicted despite her claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 896.

[8] The undisputed evidence shows that Jennings had Kachika's permission to reside at her apartment and, specifically, that he was in the bedroom Kachika allowed him to rent when she attacked him with the hammer and scissors. This fact negates Kachika's claim of defense-of-dwelling because Jennings was not unlawfully entering or attacking Kachika's dwelling as required by Section 35-41-3-2(d). Thus, the State met its burden to overcome Kachika's claim.

[9] Nevertheless, we further observe that the State sufficiently negated Kachika's purportedly reasonable belief that stabbing Jennings was necessary. In her brief to this Court, Kachika asserts that Jennings’ “resulting injuries were minor and demonstrated that the force exerted by [Kachika] in trying to extract [Jennings] from her property was reasonable in light of the urgency of the situation.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. We disagree.

[10] Just as we do in a claim of self-defense, we interpret the phrase “reasonably believes” in the defense-of-dwelling statute to require both a subjective and an objective belief the force is necessary. See Bennett v. State, 175 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (acknowledging interpretation of phrase “reasonably believes” as used in self-defense statute), trans. denied. Therefore, here the State was required to show either that Kachika did not actually believe the stabbing was necessary or that a reasonable person would not have believed the stabbing was necessary under the circumstances.

[11] The facts most favorable to the verdict show that Jennings was in the apartment and the specific bedroom in which he had permission from Kachika to be. When he argued with Kachika, she told him to leave, and he refused. Kachika advanced at Jennings with a hammer in the dark and then stabbed him three times with scissors. Kachika did not testify as to her subjective belief at the time of the stabbing incident. But assuming she believed such violence was necessary to motivate Jennings to leave, the jury could have found Kachika's belief objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.

Conclusion

[12] We conclude the evidence sufficiently rebutted Kachika's defense-of-dwelling claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(2) (2021).

Baker, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.