George Payne, Jr., Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana Employees’ Appeals Commission and Indiana Department of Correction, Appellees-Respondents (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] George Payne, Jr. (“Payne”) appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review, alleging dismissal was improper despite his failure to timely file the administrative record in violation of the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (“AOPA”). Concluding dismissal was proper, we affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Payne was employed with the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) when the DOC demoted him on August 22, 2022. Payne challenged the employment action through administrative proceedings before the State Employees’ Appeals Commission (“the Commission”). On October 6, 2023, the Commission granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC. On October 30, 2023, Payne petitioned for judicial review of the administrative decision, naming both the DOC and the Commission as respondents. Under AOPA, Payne was obligated to file the administrative record or seek an extension of time to do so within thirty days of his petition. On November 22, 2023, the Attorney General appeared on behalf of the DOC and the Commission.

[3] On December 22, 2023, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss itself as a party, alleging the Commission was not a proper respondent under AOPA. On the same date, the DOC filed a response to Payne's petition for judicial review, noting that it “anticipate[d] proposing a briefing schedule after [Payne] file[d] the agency record[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 29. The DOC also “expressly reserve[d] all rights and defenses under AOPA,” asserting that its “response should not be construed in any manner as an admission of any facts alleged in the [p]etition or a waiver of [the DOC's] rights and defenses under AOPA or other applicable law.” Id. By the time the DOC filed its response, Payne's deadline under AOPA had passed. The trial court granted the Commission's motion on December 26, 2023, dismissing the Commission from the action. Eventually, Payne filed the administrative record on February 1, 2024. The DOC moved to dismiss on April 25, 2024. The DOC's motion was based on Payne's failure to timely file the administrative record or obtain an extension of time to do so. Following briefing and a hearing regarding the effect of the statutory deadline, the trial court granted the DOC's motion on July 8, 2024. In its written order, the trial court concluded that the Indiana Supreme Court “laid down [a] ․ bright-line rule” regarding the deadline and that, because Payne failed to timely file the administrative record or seek an extension of time to do so, the trial court “lack[ed] authority to extend the filing deadline and, consequently, to consider [Payne's] [p]etition.” Id. at 11. Payne now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Payne claims the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for judicial review. We review dismissal de novo where—as here—(1) the reason for dismissal was the petitioner's “failure to timely file necessary agency records” and (2) the trial court “ruled on a paper record” in deciding to dismiss. Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 20 N.E.3d 149, 151 (Ind. 2014) [hereinafter TOPS].

[5] To resolve this appeal, we must engage in statutory interpretation. We interpret statutes de novo. ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012). The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory text itself, and when that language is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply its plain and ordinary meaning. Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 796 (Ind. 2019). We read the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word and phrase. ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1195. Further, we avoid interpretations that would render any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous. Id. at 1999.

[6] In AOPA, our legislature prescribed procedures for seeking judicial review of administrative decisions. See Ind. Code art. 4-21.5. The provisions of AOPA in effect when Payne petitioned for judicial review required him to either (1) file the administrative record within thirty days of the petition or (2) obtain an extension of time within that same period.¹ Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-13(a).

[7] In Indiana Family and Social Services Administration v. Meyer, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that, although AOPA “allows a petitioner to seek extensions of time” to file the agency record, AOPA “does not excuse untimely filing or allow nunc pro tunc extensions.” 927 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ind. 2010). Building on Meyer, in the TOPS case, our Supreme Court endorsed a “bright-line approach” and determined that, under AOPA, a trial court “lack[s] authority to extend the filing deadline for an agency record that was not filed within the required statutory period or an authorized extension thereof.” 20 N.E.3d at 155. The Court explained that it furthered public policy to strictly enforce the deadline, in part because the deadline “ensure[d] that review of agency action proceeds in an efficient and speedy manner[.]” Id. (quoting Meyer, 927 N.E.2d at 370). Applying the bright-line approach to the facts of the case, the Court determined that, “because [the petitioner] did not file the agency record as anticipated by AOPA, the trial court properly dismissed [the] petition for judicial review.” Id.

[8] Payne points out that TOPS involved the trial court's decision to grant a belated request for an extension of time. Payne focuses on language in TOPS stating that “a trial court lacks authority to extend the filing deadline for an agency record that was not filed within the required statutory period or an authorized extension thereof,” id., suggesting that this language limits the holding to cases involving belated extensions, which was not the scenario here. Payne also maintains that the timing of the DOC's motion—after he belatedly submitted the administrative record and after the Attorney General had already filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of the Commission—resulted in waiver of the issue. In the alternative, Payne argues that, based on the types of issues presented in his petition for judicial review, “the trial court should not have dismissed [the petition] but rather, at the worst, ruled on the [p]etition and accompanying exhibits while ignoring the untimely agency record.” Appellant's Br. p. 10.

[9] In First American Title Insurance Company v. Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757 (Ind. 2014), which was handed down the same day as the TOPS decision, our Supreme Court rejected similar attempts to make end-runs around AOPA. There, the petitioner “acknowledge[d] that it [had] not transmit[ted] the agency record to the trial court as anticipated by AOPA,” but “insist[ed] ․ that the documents presented to the trial court”—which were “attached to [the] petition for judicial review”—were “sufficient to decide” the merits. Id. at 762. Referring to TOPS, the Court explained that, by “declaring a ‘bright line’ rule,” it was “effectively abrogating” caselaw that took a relaxed approach to the filing requirement. Id. Later, in Allen County Plan Commission v. Olde Canal Place Association, 61 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), we interpreted this line of Indiana Supreme Court precedent to mean that, if the administrative record reaches the trial court in a way that violates AOPA, the procedurally defective record “is not, and will never be, properly before the trial court.” Olde Canal Place Ass'n, 61 N.E.3d at 1270. We ultimately held that dismissal was warranted because, “[w]ithout the [r]ecord, [the] petition cannot be considered.” Id. (citing TOPS); see also TOPS, 20 N.E.3d at 155 (“[B]ecause [the petitioner] did not file the agency record as anticipated by AOPA, the trial court properly dismissed[.]”).

[10] At one point, Payne directs us to a Tax Court opinion that would require a litigant to raise the AOPA issue “before the merits of a case have been furthered,” else the issue is waived. Lake Cnty. Tr. Co., Tr. No. 6 v. St. Joseph Cnty. Assessor, 66 N.E.3d 630 at 631 (Ind. T.C. 2016). However, we ultimately adhere to Olde Canal, which strictly applied our Supreme Court's bright-line approach and recognized the fatal nature of belatedly filing the administrative record. 61 N.E.3d at 1270. In short, a belatedly filed record “is not, and will never be, properly before the trial court.” 61 N.E.3d at 1270. Thus, because there is no dispute that Payne belatedly filed the administrative record, we conclude that the trial court did not err granting the DOC's motion to dismiss.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Effective July 1, 2024, the General Assembly amended the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act to place the burden of transmitting the agency record on “the office or ultimate authority” rather than the petitioner. See P.L. 128-2024 § 13(a). There is no contention that the amended statute applies here.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Bradford concur. Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.