Deonte James, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Deonte James (“James”) was convicted of possession of methamphetamine ¹ as a Level 3 felony, resisting law enforcement ² as a Level 6 felony, and driving while suspended ³ as a Class A misdemeanor and was sentenced to a nine-year aggregate sentence. James appeals only his conviction for Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, arguing that, at his jury trial, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 18, 2022, around 7:30 p.m., Morgan County Sheriff's Deputy Kyle Seward (“Deputy Seward”) was parked in his fully marked patrol vehicle on the median of Interstate 69 ⁴ in Morgan County. Deputy Seward observed an orange Dodge Charger driving southbound that was following the car in front of it too closely, so he decided to conduct a traffic stop. Deputy Seward pulled into southbound traffic to pursue the Charger, but several vehicles, including a semi-truck, separated Deputy Seward from the Charger and obstructed his view of the Charger. It took about thirty seconds for Deputy Seward to catch up to the Charger, which had turned on its flashers and pulled over to the shoulder before Deputy Seward could initiate a traffic stop. State's Ex. 12 at 00:00–00:34. After coming to a stop, James pulled the Charger forward slightly. James, who was the sole occupant of the Charger, immediately exited the vehicle when Deputy Seward pulled up behind him. After exiting the Charger, James opened the car door again and reached into the car, which caused Deputy Seward to be suspicious and have concern for officer safety.

[3] Deputy Seward then had a conversation with James in front of the deputy's car. James claimed he pulled over because he heard rattling or shaking like a problem with his car's belt, but Deputy Seward did not hear any noises coming from the Charger's engine. James also told Deputy Seward that he was headed to Monroe County for court and to pay probation, which Deputy Seward found odd given it was 7:30 in the evening. When Deputy Seward told James that he intended to stop him because James was following the car ahead of him too closely, James replied that he had not purposely done anything illegal because he noticed Deputy Seward's parked police vehicle when he drove past it. During their interaction, James appeared “extremely nervous” and kept looking in the direction where deputies later found methamphetamine on the shoulder of the road. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 24. After running James's information, Deputy Seward discovered that James's driver's license was suspended, and he handcuffed James and placed him in the patrol vehicle. Deputy Seward then called Deputy Levi App (“Deputy App”) to the scene.

[4] Deputy App arrived with his K-9 partner Draco, and Draco alerted on James's Charger, indicating the presence of the odor of narcotics, which indicated that contraband was or had been recently in the Charger. A search of the Charger revealed loose floor carpeting on the passenger side covering a freshly-cut hole in the floorboard measuring two to three inches wide by four to six inches long. The hole provided a clear view of the road below and “would have been easily accessible from the driver's seat to lean over and drop something out.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 221. The deputies also found that several areas of the Charger's plastic molding were “extremely” loose and contained tool marks consistent with narcotics trafficking, and the passenger window was rolled down. Id. at 223. Loose plastic moldings like these are consistent with transporting narcotics because the areas behind these moldings contain empty cavities large enough to hide drugs and other contraband.

[5] No drugs were found in James's Charger, so Deputy Seward issued him a summons for driving while suspended, and Deputy App transported him to a gas station so that James could arrange for someone to come get the Charger due to his suspended license. Shortly after Deputy App left with James, Deputy Seward discovered a frayed, ripped plastic bag containing 46.11 grams of methamphetamine on the shoulder of the road near where the Charger had been parked. The methamphetamine had a street value exceeding $2,000. Deputy Seward contacted Deputy App and told him to arrest James. When Deputy App informed James about finding “the stuff that you threw out” and attempted to arrest him, James resisted, while yelling “You all don't got me on camera throwing sh*t out.” State's Ex. 5 at 00:39–00:40, 1:10–1:12.

[6] On August 19, 2022, the State charged James with Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, and a Class A infraction for driving while suspended. Prior to trial on October 31, 2023, James pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. Following a jury trial on October 31, and November 1, 2023, the jury found James guilty of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement but acquitted him of battery resulting in injury to a public safety officer. The trial court sentenced James to an aggregate term of nine years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. James now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] James argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.” Id. It is not necessary that the evidence “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016). Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017). “[E]vidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Sallee, 51 N.E.3d at 133.

[8] In order to convict James of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine without a valid prescription or practitioner's order and that the amount he possessed was at least twenty-eight grams. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d)(1). The only element that James claims the State did not prove was his possession of the methamphetamine found on the side of the road. A conviction for possession of contraband may be founded upon actual or constructive possession. Young v. State, 244 N.E.3d 950, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). Actual possession of contraband occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item. Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004). Here, James did not have the methamphetamine on his person when it was discovered. The methamphetamine was found on the side of the road near where the Charger had pulled over.

[9] Although James was not in actual possession of the methamphetamine, “a conviction for a possessory offense does not depend on catching a defendant red-handed.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). In cases where the State cannot show actual possession, a conviction for the possession of contraband may rest instead on proof of constructive possession. Pimentel v. State, 181 N.E.3d 474, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “A person constructively possesses contraband when the person has (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.” Id. The capability element is met when the State shows the defendant is able to reduce the contraband to his personal possession. Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). To show the intent element, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Id. This knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive control over the premises containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the contraband's presence. Id. Some possible examples of such circumstances include (1) incriminating statements; (2) attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns. Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175.

[10] Here, the methamphetamine was found on the side of the road in close proximity to where James stopped the Charger. As to James's capability to maintain dominion and control over the methamphetamine, although the contraband was not located in a place where James had possessory interest in the premises where the drugs were found, James did have the ability to reduce the drugs to his personal possession as they were simply sitting on the side of the road where he could later come back to grab them after the police left the area.

[11] As to James's intent to maintain dominion and control over the methamphetamine, because James did not have exclusive control over the premises where the drugs were found, we must determine if there were additional circumstances pointing to James's knowledge of the methamphetamine's presence. See Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6. The evidence presented at trial revealed that James saw Deputy Seward's police car parked in the median when he passed, and approximately thirty seconds later, James pulled over to the shoulder. While Deputy Seward drove to catch up to the Charger, he could only see it from a distance because several vehicles and a semi separated them on the roadway. James was the sole occupant in the Charger. As Deputy Seward approached the Charger, he saw James “pull[ ] up forward a little bit further.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 242. After James exited the Charger, he was “extremely nervous” during his interaction with Deputy Seward and was looking “to his right” in the direction of where the methamphetamine bag was later found. Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 16, 24.

[12] Additionally, Draco, the K-9, alerted on James's Charger, indicating that drugs were in the Charger or had been in the vehicle recently. Although drugs were not found in the Charger, there was pulled-up carpeting on the Charger's passenger-side floorboard, under which was located a freshly cut hole that was two to three inches wide and four to six inches long, and through which the road below was visible. This area “would have been easily accessible from the driver's seat to lean over and drop something out.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 221. Numerous pieces of the Charger's plastic molding were “extremely” loose, and the trunk molding had tool marks on it, which Deputy App testified are consistent with transporting narcotics. Id. at 223. Additionally, the passenger-side window was rolled down, which would have allowed James to throw the drugs from the vehicle before Deputy Seward was able to pull up behind him. When the methamphetamine was discovered, it was lying in the rocks on the side of the road several feet behind and to the right of the passenger side of the Charger, and the plastic bag was ripped and frayed. Such location and condition of the bag were consistent with the bag being dropped or tossed out of the Charger before it pulled up farther. Further, when Deputy App told James that the police had found the stuff that he threw out of the car and attempted to arrest him, James resisted arrest, while yelling “You all don't got me on camera throwing sh*t out.” State's Ex. 5 at 00:39–00:40, 1:10-1:12. Based upon these circumstances, a reasonable jury could infer James's knowledge of the methamphetamine's presence and his ability to control it. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that James constructively possessed the methamphetamine.

[13] James relies on Brent v. State, 957 N.E.2d 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, in his argument that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he constructively possessed the methamphetamine. In that case, police officers observed what they believed to be a drug transaction and pursued a vehicle containing two occupants. Id. at 648–49. The driver initially drove slowly away from police while the defendant sat in the front passenger seat. Id. at 649. During the pursuit, officers witnessed the driver throw what appeared to be a marijuana “blunt” from the driver's window. Id. The vehicle then made a brief stop unusually close to a parked car before continuing on and finally coming to a complete stop. Id. When approaching the stopped vehicle, officers detected the smell of fresh marijuana, and upon returning to the location where the vehicle had briefly stopped, they discovered a baggie of marijuana on the ground. Id. No officer directly witnessed the defendant throw anything from the vehicle, but one officer testified that he “just felt like since they stopped and they were close to a vehicle,” the baggie of marijuana had “to have come out the passenger's side window.” Id. On appeal, this court reversed defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana, finding insufficient evidence to support either actual or constructive possession and reasoning that suspicious activity by the driver, including the brief stop where the bag of marijuana was eventually found, could not be attributed to the defendant as a passenger. Id. at 650–51. This court also emphasized that an officer's gut feeling, and deduction alone did not amount to evidence that the defendant possessed marijuana. Id. at 651–52.

[14] However, we find that Brent is distinguishable from this case. In the present case, unlike the defendant in Brent, James was the sole occupant of the Charger, and therefore, all suspicious activity can be attributed to him. He was therefore the only person at the location where the methamphetamine was located immediately before Deputy Seward was able to catch up to the Charger. The fact that James had sole possession of the Charger also permitted the inference that the indications of narcotics trafficking found in the vehicle, such as the hole in the floorboard and loose moldings with tool marks, were attributable to him and that he discarded the drugs after seeing Deputy Seward. Further, in the present case, there was evidence that James acted extremely nervous, and when speaking to Deputy Seward near where the methamphetamine was located, he looked in the direction of the drugs multiple times. Additionally, Draco alerted to the passenger side of the Charger, indicating that drugs were present or had been recently present in the vehicle. Based upon these circumstances, a reasonable jury could infer that James constructively possessed the methamphetamine. See Smith v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding sufficient evidence that defendant possessed contraband where, although the police did not observe the defendant discard the contraband, the contraband was found on the side of the road near where the defendant had briefly stopped, the passenger window was lowered, and the contraband had indications of being recently thrown across the concrete); Womack v. State, 738 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence to prove possession of contraband where the defendant, while running from the police, made a throwing motion, and contraband was found in that area that was free of snow although it was snowing at the time). We, therefore, conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of methamphetamine as a Level 3 felony.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1), (c)(1)(B)(ii).

3.   I.C. § 9-24-19-2.

4.   At the time these events occurred, the roadway was under construction and commonly referred to as both Interstate 69 and State Road 37.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Bradford concur. Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.