Darion D. Whitehead, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Darion Whitehead was involved in the premeditated shooting of two people. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Whitehead pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder and two counts of aggravated battery. He now appeals his convictions, claiming the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He also appeals his aggregate sentence of 30 years, claiming it is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

Facts

[2] The day after he engaged in an argument with Lance Parr, Whitehead and three companions drove to an apartment complex where Parr had recently been seen. They waited for Parr to return, and when a car belonging to Parr arrived, Whitehead and his group opened fire. Twenty-four rounds were fired at the car by at least two guns. The car then crashed into a tree while Whitehead and his group fled the scene.

[3] But Parr was not in his car at the time of the shooting. He had loaned the car to two friends, both of whom were struck by the gunfire. The driver was shot in the back, causing paralysis, and the passenger was wounded in the leg. Later at the hospital, the driver told police she saw Whitehead shoot at the car.

[4] The State charged Whitehead with six crimes: two counts of Level 1 felony attempted murder, two counts of Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit murder, and two counts of Level 3 felony aggravated battery. Whitehead and the State then entered into a plea agreement by which Whitehead agreed to plead guilty to both counts of attempted murder and both counts of aggravated battery in exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining charges and a 30-year sentencing cap.

[5] At a guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked Whitehead a series of questions to confirm his intent to enter into the plea agreement. The court advised Whitehead of his rights, and Whitehead confirmed that he wished to waive them by pleading guilty. He responded affirmatively when asked whether he had reviewed the agreement with his counsel, understood the agreement's terms before signing it, and had entered into the agreement “of [his] own free choice and decision.” Tr. Vol. I, p. 9. Whitehead then admitted to the attempted murder and aggravated battery charges, responding “yes” after the trial court read each count. Id. at 10.

[6] The trial court also advised Whitehead of the sentencing implications of his plea: while the statute provided that the minimum sentence that could be imposed was 20 years, the plea agreement capped the maximum at 30 years. Whitehead acknowledged that his criminal history could be used to enhance his sentence. Later in the proceedings, the court revisited this penalty range again, to “make sure that it [was] clear” and that Whitehead understood “fully what he [was] agreeing to.” Id. at 10.

[7] The court concluded by asking Whitehead if he had “anything else to tell the Court,” to which he responded: “No, Ma'am.” Id. at 12. The court then accepted Whitehead's guilty pleas and set the matter for a sentencing hearing.

[8] But before sentencing, Whitehead changed his mind. He filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, against advice of counsel, in which he claimed he felt “pressured,” “confused,” and “overwhelmed” at the plea hearing. App. Vol. II, p. 217. The trial court denied the motion, finding its colloquy at the plea hearing was thorough and that Whitehead showed no hesitation in answering the court's questions. The court also observed that Whitehead was familiar with the plea process and criminal justice system, having previously entered into plea agreements.

[9] The trial court then conducted a sentencing hearing. There, the State introduced two videos posted to social media by Whitehead in the weeks following the shooting. In the first, he mimics shooting a firearm, accompanied by a song with gunshot sound effects and text reading: “when you see yo opp in traffic.”¹ Exh. 2. The second video depicts Whitehead rapping about shooting the wrong people. Exh. 3. A pre-sentence investigation report documented Whitehead's lengthy history of serious juvenile and adult offenses.

[10] At the end of the sentencing hearing, during his allocution statement, Whitehead revisited his guilty plea and claimed—for the first time—that his plea should be withdrawn because he was intoxicated when he signed it. The trial court rejected this claim and observed that it was not raised in his earlier motion to withdraw the plea, after which the court again determined that his plea was knowing and voluntary.

[11] For each of Whitehead's attempted murder convictions, the trial court sentenced him to 30 years in prison, with 5 years suspended. The court also sentenced Whitehead to 9 years in prison for each of his aggravated battery convictions. All four sentences were ordered to run concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of 30 years.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Whitehead appeals his convictions and 30-year sentence. First, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Second, he contends his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character alone. We affirm.

I. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

[13] After a guilty plea is entered, but before the sentence is imposed, the Indiana Code provides two potential avenues for withdrawal of a guilty plea. The trial court “shall” allow the withdrawal of the plea upon proof that it is “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(c). Absent such showing, the court “may allow” the defendant to withdraw their guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b).

[14] An appellant seeking to overturn a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea faces a “high hurdle” and a “presumption in favor of the ruling.” Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995)). We conclude that Whitehead has failed to overcome this presumption under either avenue for withdrawal provided in Indiana Code § 35-35-1-4.

A. No Manifest Injustice

[15] Whitehead claims his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary and, therefore, that it constitutes a manifest injustice requiring withdrawal. See generally Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that manifest injustice occurs when a guilty plea is not knowing or voluntary). He cites his confusion during the plea hearing process, alleged intoxication, and eventual claim of innocence as the basis for the manifest injustice. But the record provides ample evidence that Whitehead understood his agreement. Accordingly, Whitehead has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. See Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(e) (requiring grounds for relief be proven by preponderance of evidence).

[16] “[W]e examine the statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered freely and knowingly.” Garcia v. State, 193 N.E.3d 1046, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). Whitehead gave direct, unequivocal answers with “no hesitation” at his plea hearing. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 23-24. He admitted to the charges to which he pleaded guilty and testified that he understood the effect of the plea, reviewed it with counsel, and entered into it “of [his] own free choice and decision.” Id. at 9.

[17] The trial court even revisited the sentencing ramifications of the plea and asked Whitehead if he had anything else to tell the court. This suggests an “attempt to probe beneath the surface of the plea agreement and ․ determine that the plea was knowing and voluntary.” Coomer, 652 N.E2d at 62. Additionally, this was not the first time Whitehead had entered a guilty plea and was far from his first interaction with the criminal justice system. Whitehead does not point to any contrary evidence to support his claimed confusion.

[18] As to his allegation that he was intoxicated when he signed the plea, Whitehead points to no evidence other than his own self-serving testimony given during the sentencing hearing. The trial court was not obligated to believe him. See Knight v. State, 202 N.E.3d 475, 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). This allegation was also absent from Whitehead's motion to withdraw his plea.

[19] Finally, Whitehead fails to demonstrate that his claim of innocence constituted a manifest injustice. Withdrawal of a guilty plea is not necessarily required when a claim of innocence follows a prior admission of guilt. See Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ind. 2000). Whitehead emphasizes that his admissions at the plea hearing were minimal and his later claim of innocence was more detailed. He then attempts to distinguish his case from Carter, where our Supreme Court found no error in a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because the defendant's admission of guilt was detailed and his later claim of innocence was vague. Id. at 131. But Whitehead's claim of innocence was not as specific as he asserts: he merely suggested the evidence did not prove that he was the one to pull the trigger, without offering further explanation or detail.

[20] Also significant is the fact that this claim was first raised more than eight months after Whitehead entered into the plea agreement, at the end of the sentencing hearing and outside the context of his plea agreement. See Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ind. 2000) (finding no manifest injustice in trial court's denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea where defendant first claimed innocence at sentencing).

[21] Considering his prior admissions of guilt, the trial court did not find Whitehead's claim of innocence to be credible. Because “[a]dmissions of guilt and assertions of innocence come in many shades of gray, and the trial judge is best situated to assess the reliability of each,” we will not reweigh the conflicting evidence. Carter, 739 N.E.2d at 130. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Whitehead's alleged innocence did not constitute manifest injustice.

B. No Abuse of Discretion

[22] Absent a showing of manifest injustice, the decision whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw of guilty plea rests solely within the trial court's discretion. Knight, 202 N.E.3d at 480. The court “may allow” the defendant to withdraw their guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b).

[23] Whitehead argues that, because the State made no claim of prejudice, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But the absence of prejudice does not itself mean the trial court must grant the motion. Asher v. State, 128 N.E.3d 526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Instead, it means “only that the court retained discretion to grant his motion for any fair and just reason.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). And Whitehead makes no argument as to the fair and just reasons for the trial court to have permissively granted his motion.

[24] As previously discussed, the record supports the trial court's finding that Whitehead fully understood the plea agreement, that he entered into it knowingly and voluntarily, and that his claims to the contrary were not credible. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to permit withdrawal of the plea. See id. at 531 (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea where defendant understood nature and effect of plea agreement).

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[25] Whitehead appeals his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). When evaluating the appropriateness of a sentence, we give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentence and attempt only to leaven the outliers rather than achieve a perceived “correct” sentence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014).

[26] We first consider the statutory range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. Whitehead pleaded guilty to two counts of Level 1 felony attempted murder and two counts of Level 3 felony aggravated battery. The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is 20 to 40 years with an advisory sentence of 30 years, while the sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is 6 to 20 years with an advisory sentence of 10 years. Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-4, -5. Though Whitehead's 30-year aggregate sentence was the maximum allowed by his plea agreement, it was equivalent to the advisory sentence for a single Level 1 felony.

[27] As to the nature of the offense, Whitehead admits that it is “grave.” Appellant's Br., p. 15. The shooting occurred in a residential area and multiple bullets entered nearby apartments. Two people were shot, and the driver of the car remained paralyzed at the time of sentencing.

[28] Whitehead instead focuses his argument on his character. He first cites his self-reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder from a “rough upbringing.” Id. at 16. However, no evidence of diagnosis or treatment for such disorder was presented, and Whitehead does not explain how the alleged disorder played a role in the crime. Whitehead also argues that he is remorseful and wants to rehabilitate himself. But the videos posted by Whitehead in the weeks after the shooting, in which he made light of the violence, indicate the opposite.

[29] His lengthy record of serious offenses does not shed positive light on his character either. See generally Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). Though he was 22 years old at the time of the offense, he already had a criminal record of more than 20 juvenile adjudications and 15 adult convictions, including multiple firearm offenses. See generally Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that significance of criminal history depends on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses).

[30] Over the course of this juvenile and criminal history, Whitehead was given opportunities to reform his character. He has been placed on probation and home detention and has had both revoked. He was also on probation at the time of the shooting.

[31] Given the nature of Whitehead's offenses and his character, we cannot say his 30-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[32] Whitehead has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He has also failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate. We therefore affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   When explaining the exhibit, the State rephrased “yo opp” as “your opponent.” Tr. Vol. I, p. 128.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Felix concur. Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.