Robert Farmer, Appellant-Petitioner v. Nicole Farmer, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Robert Farmer (“Father”) challenges the trial court's contempt findings based on his violation of a provisional child custody order in dissolution proceedings with Nicole Farmer (“Mother”). We address the following three issues:

I. Whether Father's appeal is moot;

II. Whether Father had adequate notice of Mother's contempt allegations; and

III. Whether sufficient evidence supported the trial court's contempt findings premised on violations of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (“the Guidelines”).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 4, 2023, Father petitioned to dissolve his marriage to Mother, of which there were three minor children. The trial court held a preliminary hearing and, on June 1, 2023, entered a provisional order (“the Order”) granting Father primary physical custody of the children. The Order stated: “Mother shall have parenting time at any time the parties can agree. If the parties are unable to agree, Mother shall have parenting time pursuant to the ․ Guidelines.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 19 (emphasis removed). The Order also required Father to pay certain medical expenses for the children. Id. at 21.

[4] On February 6, 2024, Mother filed a verified petition for rule to show cause, alleging Father was in contempt because he (1) failed to pay required medical expenses despite receiving notice of the bills; (2) refused to offer Mother opportunities for additional parenting time when he was working, choosing instead to have his girlfriend watch the children; and (3) failed to allow reasonable communication between Mother and the children. Father moved to dismiss the contempt petition, arguing that Mother was not specific enough in her allegations. The trial court denied Father's motion on March 14, 2024.

[5] After an evidentiary hearing on March 15, 2024, the trial court entered a written order finding Father in contempt. In that order, which was entered on March 20, 2024, the trial court specifically found that Father failed to pay required medical expenses. The trial court ordered Father to reimburse Mother and directed that, as a sanction, Father would not be reimbursed for “any portion of the 2023 medical bills he paid directly since he failed to properly inform Mother.” Id. at 10. The trial court also determined that Father violated the Guidelines by failing to offer Mother additional parenting time opportunities and improperly restricting Mother's communication with one of the children by allowing contact only when the child called from the school bus. As to Father's violation of the Guidelines, the trial court stated that it would “withhold[ ] imposing any sanctions so that Father ha[d] the opportunity to purge the contempt by getting in compliance with the [Order] and complying with the provisions contained in the ․ Guidelines.” Id. at 13.

[6] Father filed a motion to correct error on April 19, 2024. Before the court ruled on Father's motion, the parties reached a dissolution settlement agreement on April 30, 2024, resolving issues of child custody, parenting time, and division of expenses. See id. at 34 (“The consideration recited herein, when paid or transferred, shall be in complete discharge of the legal obligations of both Father and Mother arising out of the marital relationship.”). On May 1, 2024, the trial court denied Father's motion to correct error. On that date, the court also approved the settlement agreement and entered a final order dissolving the marriage. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mootness

[7] We begin by addressing Mother's contention that this appeal is moot. As our Supreme Court has explained, an appeal is moot only if we can no longer provide effective relief to the parties. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991). When a court order carries collateral consequences, the appeal is not moot because reversal might lead to the elimination of those consequences. See C.P. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 219 N.E.3d 142, 147–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (collecting cases discussing the collateral consequences doctrine).

[8] Mother points out that the only contempt sanction imposed against Father by the trial court was to pay certain uninsured medical expenses. See Appellee's Br. p. 8. According to Mother, because Father was already obligated to pay those medical expenses, Father does not face any collateral consequence from the contempt findings. We disagree.

[9] A contempt finding for interfering with parenting time rights can impact future custody and parenting time matters presented to the trial court. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nation, 615 N.E.2d 141, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“While a custodial parent's interference with the noncustodial parent's visitation rights may be something less than total blockage, it is nevertheless a serious matter and may be a factor relevant to the issues of both a change in circumstances and the child's best interests”). Moreover, a contempt finding may affect the trial court's assessment of future contempt allegations, potentially subjecting Father to enhanced sanctions as a repeat contemnor. Cf. MacIntosh v. MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that it is proper to fashion coercive sanctions “designed to compel future compliance with a court order”), trans. denied. These types of collateral consequences persist regardless of whether the court imposed sanctions. Therefore, because substantial rights remain at stake despite the parties’ settlement of other matters, we must address the merits of the appeal.

II. Adequacy of Notice

[10] Father challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss Mother's contempt petition. Although Father refers to due process, his argument focuses on the statutory notice requirements in Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5(b). It is possible to present constitutional arguments about notice requirements in the context of contempt proceedings, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832–33 (Ind. 2016), however, Father has declined to develop any constitutional claim. We therefore analyze Father's appellate argument through the lens of the statutory requirements. Where, as here, we are reviewing whether a party had adequate notice of contempt allegations, our review is de novo. See Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[11] Here, Mother alleged that Father engaged in indirect contempt, i.e., conduct outside the court's presence that violated a court order. See Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1; see also I.C. § 34-47-3-5(b). Under Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5(b), the trial court's show cause order must (1) “clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the contempt” and (2) “specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable certainty” to inform the alleged contemnor of the “nature and circumstances” of the claim. However, “strict compliance with the statute may be excused” if the alleged contemnor had “clear notice” of the contempt allegations against him. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 833. Examples of “this ‘clear notice’ exception” include when the alleged contemnor “receive[d] a copy of an original contempt [petition] that contain[ed] detailed factual allegations of contempt” or the alleged contemnor “admit[ted] the factual basis for a contempt finding.” Id. Therefore, the statutory notice requirements can be met through a combination of (1) the factual allegations in the contempt petition, (2) the content of the trial court's show cause order, and (3) the alleged contemnor's demonstrated understanding of the allegations. See id. at 833–34.

[12] Father filed his motion to dismiss before the hearing, arguing that Mother's petition lacked the statutory specificity requirements. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 28. This argument misapprehends Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5(b), which speaks only to the contents of the show cause order, not the contents of the underlying petition. In any case, on appeal, Father maintains he was not adequately apprised of the time and place of the alleged violations. Mother responds that strict statutory compliance was unnecessary because Father never contested the factual basis for the allegations. The trial court's contempt order supports Mother's view, as the court characterized Father's position at the hearing as not disputing the underlying facts but arguing that “even if Mother's arguments are true, he cannot be held in contempt because the ․ Order did not adopt these ancillary provisions of the [Guidelines].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 10–11. Further, although neither party provided a transcript of the hearing, we note that Father does not challenge the trial court's characterization on appeal.

[13] Although Mother's petition was not specific as to dates and times, the petition alleged three categories of contemptuous conduct: (1) Father's failure to pay the first $1,089 in uninsured medical expenses despite receiving specific bills; (2) Father's pattern of having his girlfriend provide childcare without first offering Mother additional parenting time; and (3) Father's ongoing restriction of Mother's communication with the children, including preventing phone access and ignoring requests for calls. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 24–25. These allegations were sufficiently specific to allow Father to prepare a defense, as demonstrated by Father's arguments at the hearing, where he apparently challenged whether the Order incorporated the Guidelines. See id. at 10–11.

[14] In light of both the specificity of the allegations in Mother's contempt petition and the nature of Father's arguments at the contempt hearing, we conclude that Father had adequate notice of Mother's contempt allegations such that Father has not identified error. Cf. Stanke v. Swickard, 43 N.E.3d 245, 248–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (vacating contempt findings due to a lack of notice, observing that the alleged contemnor had not received factually detailed allegations of contemptuous conduct).

III. Contempt Findings

[15] Father challenges the two contempt findings related to violating provisions of the Guidelines concerning additional parenting time and phone calls. Father does not challenge the contempt finding based on unpaid medical expenses.

[16] To be held in indirect contempt, a person “must have willfully disobeyed the court order.” City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005). If the order is “ambiguous or indefinite,” there can be no willful disobedience. Id. Rather, to support a contempt finding, the order must have been “so clear and certain” that “there could be no question as to what the party must do, or not do,” and therefore, “no question regarding whether the order is violated.” Id. “We review the trial court's judgment for an abuse of discretion and will reverse a contempt finding ‘only if there is no evidence or inference to support the finding.’ ” Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265, 1269 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 832); see also, e.g., City of Gary, 822 N.E.2d at 171.

[17] Father focuses on the following language in the Order: “Mother shall have parenting time at any time the parties can agree. If the parties are unable to agree, Mother shall have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 19 (emphasis removed). Father claims the Order was not specific enough to support a contempt finding based on either (1) failing to offer Mother additional parenting time opportunities and (2) limiting phone access. Father asserts that the Order can be fairly read to apply only those portions of the Guidelines related to parenting time, which Father narrowly reads to mean schedule-related matters for transitioning the children between households. Father asserts: “The Guidelines contain many sections with guidance on how the parties are to behave in relationship to each other and their children, however, the court only ordered Father to comply with the parenting time provisions of the Guidelines.” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[18] Father points out that “[t]he only section of the Guidelines that provides a parenting time schedule is Section II,” but he was found in contempt for violating Section I of the Guidelines. Id.; see Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § I(C)(4) (specifying that, if household members are unavailable, the parent needing child care generally must “first offer the other parent the opportunity for additional parenting time”); id. § I(A)(2)–(3) (requiring that children be entitled to private communications with parents without interference and that both parents have reasonable phone access to their children). Father claims that the court “did not include in [the] order that all provisions of the Guidelines apply,” so the Order was not specific enough to support the contempt findings. Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[19] Father's argument that the Order incorporated only scheduling provisions of the Guidelines is unpersuasive. The Order unambiguously stated that “Mother shall have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 19. Nothing in this plain language suggested a limited incorporation of certain provisions of the Guidelines. Rather, the Order incorporated the Guidelines in their entirety, including provisions governing additional parenting time and parent-child communication. Because the Order gave Father clear notice of his obligations under the Guidelines, we conclude that the Order was sufficiently specific to support the instant contempt findings.

Conclusion

[20] Because Father's contempt findings carried collateral consequences for postdecree matters, this appeal is not moot. However, because the Order was specific enough to support contempt findings, and Father received adequate notice of the contempt allegations, we affirm the challenged contempt findings.

[21] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Bradford concur. Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.