IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.B. (Minor Child); C.W. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.W. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, E.B. (“the Child”). Father argues that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Father raises the following two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.

II. Whether the trial court clearly erred by terminating Father's parental rights.

Facts

[3] The Child was born in October 2020 to Father and S.B. (“Mother”), who were dating but not married. Father engaged in domestic violence during this relationship. Father broke Mother's nose on two occasions and also bit her finger, leaving a scar. While Mother was pregnant with the Child, Father hit Mother in the stomach and face and, on another occasion, beat and choked Mother at a rest stop. Father then took the car and left Mother at the rest stop without a phone. Father sexually assaulted Mother twice. According to Mother, Father's temper goes from “zero to a hundred quick.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25.

[4] Father and Mother separated, and Father subsequently dated D.H. from August 2021 to June 2023. Father and D.H. had a daughter, Y.H., in August 2022. As with Mother, Father engaged in domestic violence during his relationship with D.H. Sometime in 2021, Father grabbed D.H.’s head, leaving her with a “busted” head and lip. Id. at 62. On another occasion, Father kicked D.H. in the jaw. In July 2022, while D.H. was pregnant with Y.H., Father punched D.H. in the face. Two days before D.H. gave birth to Y.H., Father “ripped” a door off the hinges and threw it at D.H. Id. at 63. In December 2022, when D.H. was holding Y.H., Father “swung” at D.H. Id. at 64. And in June 2023, Father “physically restrain[ed]” D.H. from leaving the house while Y.H. was present. Id. at 65.

[5] In January 2021, Mother was experiencing homelessness, and the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that the Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The Child was removed and placed with a foster family in Zionsville. Mother admitted that the Child was a CHINS, Father waived his right to a fact-finding hearing, and on April 14, 2021, the trial court adjudicated the Child to be a CHINS. Father did not voluntarily engage in services until the trial court issued its June 2, 2021 dispositional order, which required Father to engage in home-based therapy and complete domestic violence and Fatherhood Engagement programs. Father completed Fatherhood Engagement but did not complete therapy services. Father eventually completed a domestic violence program after initially “dropp[ing] out[.]” Id. at 231.

[6] DCS had difficulty facilitating Father's visits with the Child throughout the case. During the CHINS proceedings, Father lived in Illinois and various locations in northwest Indiana. Father's driver's license was suspended, and he did not have a vehicle. Because DCS could not refer services in Illinois, DCS arranged to have service providers pick up Father at agreed-upon locations in northwest Indiana and drive him to visits. Roshanta Buggs-Ware was Father's service provider from February 2021 to October 2021 and transported Father for supervised in-person visits on Saturdays. Buggs-Ware picked up Father at six different locations in northwest Indiana during her referral.

[7] After picking up Father, Buggs-Ware would drive Father to Zionsville, pick up the Child, and then drive the two to Indianapolis for a supervised visit at the facility. Buggs-Ware would then drop the Child back off in Zionsville and drive Father back to the pickup location. These days would involve several hours of travel plus three hours for the visit. Father cancelled numerous visits with the Child during this time frame because Father was ill, failed to communicate with Buggs-Ware, was unprepared, or was not present at the agreed-upon pickup location.

[8] In February 2022, DCS worked on a plan to start overnight visits in Father's home in Illinois with “pop-ins” by service providers. Id. at 234. Before these overnight visits could begin, DCS wanted Father to stay for a weekend with the Child at a hotel in Indianapolis where he would be closer to service providers and DCS could “see that [Father] could appropriately parent unsupervised without a visit facilitator right there with him at all times.” Id. DCS would pay for the hotel. Father, however, did not agree to the arrangement.

[9] The record does not reveal any visits taking place in 2022, and Father was incarcerated during January 2023. After he was released, Father reached out to DCS regarding visits. Father had virtual visits beginning in February 2023; however, Father missed numerous visits. He blamed service providers for failing to remind him of the scheduled visits. Meanwhile, on February 22, 2023, the trial court modified the permanency plan from reunification to adoption based on Mother's and Father's lack of engagement in services and visits. Mother consented for the Child to be adopted by the foster family.

[10] On May 3, 2023, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Father's parental rights to the Child. DCS attempted to facilitate virtual visits in August 2023, but Father continued to miss many visits. The service provider observed that Father was “not connected” with the Child during visits and that there was no bond between Father and the Child. Id. at 192. Father's last visit with the Child was October 30, 2023.

[11] The trial court held hearings on the termination of parental rights petition on October 31, 2023, January 25, 2024, and February 21, 2024. Father joined the first hearing virtually several hours late. The trial court ordered that Father appear at the subsequent hearings in person. The day before the second hearing, however, Father informed his counsel that he could not attend the hearing in person, and Father's counsel sent Father a link to attend virtually. Father was not in attendance at the start of the hearing, so Father's counsel contacted Father. Father replied, “I tried to join the video conference three times and it kicked me out every time.” Id. at 144. Father then texted, “It said session ended, my phone's off.” Id. at 145. Counsel and court staff confirmed that the link was correct, but Father's counsel was unable to contact Father thereafter. Due to the delay in attempting to facilitate Father's attendance, the hearing commenced over forty-five minutes late. Father joined the third hearing virtually after his counsel contacted him to remind him of the hearing.

[12] During the hearings, Mother and D.H. testified regarding Father's domestic violence during their relationships. Father's service providers testified regarding Father's inconsistent visits and poor communication. Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Kim Reid, who managed Father's case during 2022, testified that DCS did “all [they] could to try and have [Father] and [the Child] reunited,” but Father was the “hinderance.” Id. at 236.

[13] FCM Limene Pierrevil, who took over for FCM Reid, testified that Father never provided DCS with proof of a “stable residence and legal source of income.” Tr. Vol. III p. 28. FCM Pierrevil further testified that Father and the Child have no bond. FCM Pierrevil was concerned about the Child's safety with Father based on Father's history of domestic violence, and she recommended termination of Father's parental rights so the Child could have a “safe and stable” home. Id. at 33.

[14] The Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) also recommended termination of Father's parental rights. The GAL testified that Father was given “adequate time” to reunify with the Child and additional time would not result in “any increased likelihood of his success[.]” Id. at 74. The GAL had concerns about the Child's safety with Father based on Father's history of domestic violence against women and his failure to complete therapy services.

[15] Father testified that his work schedule, winter weather, and his lack of transportation impaired his ability to visit with the Child. He claimed that DCS provided him with only one gas card and handled his transportation issues “poorly.” Id. at 112. When asked how he “support[s]” himself, Father stated that he “got a settlement” for a work injury. Id. at 111-12. On cross-examination, Father explained that the settlement “hasn't went through yet, like I haven't got the money.” Id. at 113. Father denied engaging in domestic violence against Mother and D.H. He claimed that he completed the domestic violence program only because “DCS told [him]” and “there was nothing for [him] to learn from those classes.” Id. at 117.

[16] On April 16, 2024, the trial court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to the Child. In support, the trial court issued 121 findings of fact and conclusions thereon.¹ Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[17] Father argues that several of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions thereon are clearly erroneous and that the trial court clearly erred by terminating Father's parental rights to the Child. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[18] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.² Here, the trial court entered such findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[19] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.[3]

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

I. The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

[20] We first address Father's challenge to several of the trial court's findings.

A. Findings regarding Father's attendance at the January 25, 2024 hearing

[21] Father challenges the trial court's findings that Father “failed to appear at all for [the January 25, 2024 hearing] without explanation or excuse.” See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 16, 26, 28. The trial court ordered Father to appear at the January 25, 2024 hearing in person, but Father did not attend the hearing at all. Father claimed that he could not join the hearing virtually because the link was not working, but Father's counsel and court staff confirmed that the link sent to Father was correct. Father then informed his counsel that his phone was off and, inexplicably, Father stopped responding to his counsel. Father did not attend the hearing, and this finding is not clearly erroneous.

B. Finding No. 28 regarding Father's CHINS dispositional hearing

[22] In Finding No. 28, the trial court found that Father “was unwilling to voluntarily do services in the CHINS case and requested a contested disposition.” Id. at 19. The record indicates that CHINS dispositional hearings were originally set for May 12, 2021, for both Father and Mother. The Chronological Case Summary indicates that these hearings were “contested” hearings. Ex. Vol. p. 9. Father, however, requested that his dispositional hearing be continued “in order for DCS to prepare a predispositional report with recommended services.” Id. at 35. The trial court granted this continuance and set Father's dispositional hearing for June 2, 2021.

[23] Father argues that, contrary to the trial court's finding, “nothing in the record [indicates] that [Father] requested a contested disposition” and that Father merely “wanted to see what DCS's recommendations” for services were. Appellant's Br. p. 24. The record, however, supports an inference that Father requested a contested hearing because he was unwilling to engage in services until they were ordered by the trial court at the dispositional hearing. The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous.

C. Finding No. 46 regarding Father's missed visits

[24] Finding No. 46 provides, “[f]rom February to October 2021, [Father] cancelled 12 opportunities to spend time with his daughter.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. The record indicates that the following visits were cancelled during this period due to Father:

March 23 Father claimed he was ill. April 10 Father did not have stable housing. May 1 Father was “partying” and “drinking and smoking” the night before and cancelled the visit in the morning. Tr. Vol. II p. 116. May 29 Father did not respond to the service provider after she left to pick him up. June 5 Father did not respond to the service provider after she left to pick him up. June 12 Father was out of town. September 4 Father claimed he was ill. September 11 Father was not at the designated location on time. September 25 Father claimed he was ill. October 9 Father was not at the designated location on time. October 16 Father did not respond to the service provider.

[25] Father claims that he only missed ten visits, and he argues that his failure to attend the October 9, 2021 visit should not count against him. On that date, the service provider cancelled the visit after she arrived at the designated location in northwest Indiana on time and texted Father. Father informed the service provider that he was still in Chicago, he planned to leave in thirty minutes, and that his girlfriend would be driving slowly because she hurt her arm. Clearly, Father was at fault for the cancelled visit.

[26] Moreover, the gist of the trial court's finding was that Father did not prioritize spending time with the Child because he frequently missed visits, and this is clearly supported in the record. Father missed numerous in-person and virtual visits, and there were extended periods of time during which no visits took place. The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous.

D. Finding No. 113

[27] Finding No. 113 provides,

DCS and the team attempted to implement multiple different options to relieve at least [Father's] financial burden of traveling from Chicago to Zionsville. The first option, which [Father] failed to consistently take advantage of, was essentially having a personal driver take [Father] from his home to Zionsville and back.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. Father argues that, contrary to the trial court's finding, the service provider did not “drive to [his home in] Chicago to pick him up, drive him all the way to Indianapolis, and then back to Chicago.” Appellant's Br. p. 25.

[28] The record indicates that, in 2021, Father lived in various locations in northwest Indiana and in Illinois. Father would meet the service provider in northwest Indiana, and the service provider would drive Father several hours to Indianapolis to visit the Child. The service provider would then drive Father several hours back to northwest Indiana. DCS went to enormous lengths to facilitate in-person visits with Father because Father lacked transportation and had his driver's license suspended. Father, however, missed many visits and was inconsistent, uncooperative, ungrateful, and rude. The fact that the service provider did not drive all the way to Father's residence is insignificant. The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous.⁴

II. The trial court did not clearly err by terminating Father's parental rights to the Child.

[29] Next, Father argues that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of Father's parental relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Child and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interests. We disagree.

A. Threat to the Child

[30] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parental relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child, “[a] trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015). Clear and convincing evidence need not demonstrate that custody with the parent is “wholly inadequate for the child's very survival.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005). “Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child's emotional and physical development are threatened by the respondent parent's custody.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148

[31] In making this determination, “[t]he trial court must consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. at 152. “At the same time, however, a trial court should judge a parent's fitness to care for his child as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Id.

[32] Here, the trial court found that there was a reasonable probability that continuation of Father's parental relationship posed a threat to the Child. The trial court's finding was based on Father's history of domestic violence and his claim that he learned nothing from his domestic violence services. Father engaged in multiple instances of domestic violence against his former partners, Mother and D.H. Several of these instances occurred while the women were pregnant, and several occurred when D.H.’s child was present. Father, however, denied engaging in any domestic violence. Furthermore, although Father completed domestic violence services, he claimed that he only participated in the services because “DCS told [him]” and that “there was nothing for [him] to learn from those classes.” Tr. Vol. III p. 117. FCM Pierrevil and the GAL both had concerns about the Child's safety in Father's care based on his history of domestic violence.

[33] Father argues that he was not abusive with the Child during visits and that domestic violence against his former partners does not signify that he would be abusive toward the Child in the future. He also points out that D.H. testified that Father's temper improved after he engaged in domestic violence services. But Father himself claimed that he learned nothing from the domestic violence services. Moreover, Father's refusal to even acknowledge his extensive history of domestic violence suggests he has not truly confronted and changed his behavior. The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that the continuation of Father's parental relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Child. See In re O.G., 159 N.E.3d 13, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that Father's history of domestic violence, in part, supported conclusion that Father's parental relationship posed a threat to the child).

B. Best interests

[34] In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[35] The trial court concluded the following regarding the Child's best interests:

111. It is not in the best interests of [the Child] to allow [Father] more time to work toward reunification. [The Child] has been removed from the care of [Father] for over three years. In that time [Father] never had the recommendation of any provider that he should have [the Child] placed in his care. The record is clear that repeated and continuous efforts were made to ensure that [Father] could spend time with his daughter. [Father] has failed to take advantage of the services offered to allow him to bond with his daughter. The fact that [Father] has chosen to not visit with his daughter, even virtually during the pendency of this TPR, speaks volumes regarding his lack of interest in his daughter's life.

* * * * *

121. Termination of the parent child relationship between [Father] and [the Child] is in the best interests of the child. Termination of the parental relationship will allow [the Child] to be adopted into the only home she has ever known. Adoption will allow [the Child] to find permanency in a safe, stable home free from violence and abuse, and that is in her best interest.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 27, 29.

[36] Father argues that DCS mismanaged his case by failing to address his transportation issues. We are not persuaded. Although facilitating in-person visits was difficult due to Father's habitation in northwest Indiana and in Illinois, DCS went to enormous lengths to facilitate visits for Father. From February through October 2021, DCS service providers agreed to meet Father close to his residence and then drive him to Indianapolis for the visits. Despite this opportunity, numerous visits were cancelled because Father did not communicate with the service provider, was not ready on time, and was rude and uncooperative. Father declined the opportunity to stay at a hotel with the Child in Indianapolis to demonstrate his fitness to host visits in his own home, and the record reveals no visits by Father in 2022. Father then declined DCS's efforts to facilitate in-person visits in 2023. Visits were made virtual to assure a minimum amount of contact between Father and the Child, but service providers often had to remind Father of visits, and Father still missed many virtual visits. Due to Father's failure to consistently visit the Child, Father and the Child did not form a bond.

[37] Moreover, Father did not visit with the Child at all during the termination of parental rights proceedings. And his failure to consistently attend the hearings—even virtually—demonstrates his failure to prioritize his relationship with the Child. In sum, although Father blames DCS and his transportation issues for his failure to visit the Child, Father squandered numerous opportunities to spend time with the Child and demonstrate his fitness as a parent regardless of transportation issues.

[38] Father also argues that the mere fact that termination of his parental rights “would allow [the Child] to be adopted into the only home she has known” cannot alone support the trial court's order. Appellant's Br. p. 31; see, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that parental rights cannot be terminated “solely because there is a better home available for the child”), trans. denied. But the trial court's order was not based merely on this fact. The trial court was also concerned with Father's failure to prioritize the Child, his lack of employment and stable housing, and his history of domestic violence. FCM Pierrevil and the GAL both testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interests based, in part, on Father's history of domestic violence. Father has not shown that he will be fit to safely parent the Child, and the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[39] The trial court's termination of parental rights order is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[40] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We quote the specific findings that Father challenges as inappropriate below.

2.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

3.   Our General Assembly amended Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. See Ind. Legis. Serv. Pub. L. 70-2024. Because the amended statute took effect after the petition for termination of parental rights was filed in this case, we apply the previous version of the statute. Moreover, the trial court found that “DCS met their burden in this matter by clear and convincing evidence under both the original statute and the later amended statute,” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17, and our result in this case would likewise be the same under both versions of the statute.

4.   Father does not challenge the trial court's remaining factual findings, and we, therefore, accept those findings are true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges May and DeBoer concur. May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.