Jordan Page Bey, Appellant v. Fifth Third Bank National Association, Appellee (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jordan Page Bey ¹ appeals the trial court's Entry of Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in favor of Fifth Third Bank National Association. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Tamara S. Green and Brooke R. Page (together, “Borrowers”) executed a promissory note dated April 11, 2023, in favor of Fifth Third Bank National Association (“Fifth Third” or “Lender”) in the original amount of $142,274 and a mortgage granting Fifth Third a security interest in real property in Allen County commonly referred to as 1148 Division Street in Fort Wayne (the “Property”). The mortgage provided that, “[i]f all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred ․ without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument.” Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 106. A Quitclaim Deed was recorded on May 30, 2023, stating that Borrowers conveyed the Property to “Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple, Jordan Page Bey, Trustee, residing at 1148 Division Street, Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana 46803.”² Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 26.

[3] On November 16, 2023, Fifth Third filed a Complaint on Note and for Foreclosure of Mortgage against Borrowers and Temple (collectively, “Defendants”). Fifth Third alleged that payments due on June 1, 2023, and thereafter had not been paid according to the terms of the note and mortgage and requested a judgment in its favor and an order of foreclosure. Entries in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) indicate, for each Defendant, “Summons Returned Served by Allen County Sheriff. Delivered at Residence.” Id. at 5.

[4] On December 4, 2023, Temple filed a “Plea of Abatement Notice of Interest and Title” providing:

COMES NOW, the natural flesh and blood living man who houses the divine spirit of the most high God Allah within him and acts under his divine accord. I, Jordan Michael family of Page, tribe of Bey, do state the following as Grand Sheik (Trustee) on behalf of the MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA #27 SOL TEMPLE (Ecclesiastical Irrevocable Trust):

On November 28, 2023 A.D.; A bill was found at a private property of Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple, questioning the interest we may have in Real Estate. The Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple (“MSTA 27”) holds title to a private ministerial dwelling referred to as 1148 Division street; Fort Wayne, Indiana [46803] in an Ecclesiastical Irrevocable Trust, document number N202200380. Title was lawfully granted to us through Quit Claim Deed by grantors, May 29, 2023 A.D. and recorded May 30, 2023 A.D. as Document Number 2023021735 in accord with our customs. Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple is the holder and possessor of equtible [sic] and legal title in due course and hereby asserts, retains and accepts equitable and legal title and equitable and legal interest in the said property forever until the Great God do ordain we relinquish it. ․

Wherefore I pray the Chancellor of this Court of equity abates and dismiss this suit.

Id. at 22. The document was signed “/s/ Jordan Page Bey Grand Sheik of the MSTA 27 SOL TEMPLE, AKA, Jordan M. Page Bey, et Alia, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED,” and a fingerprint appears next to the signature. Id. Borrowers each filed a “Plea of Abatement Affidavit of Fact” stating:

On November 26, 2023 A.D.; A bill was found at a private dwelling that i take up housekeeping at. The bill is a suit for an alleged debt of an Ens Legis defendant, whom my parents and the State of Indiana seems to have created for my benefit. i demand that this suit be abated do [sic] to the fact that i am a private civilian, sui juris and never was noticed as surety to any promise or performance between the Defendant and Plaintiff. As implied surety and subrogee, i am not the owner, creator or trustee of the public nuisance ․

Id. at 27, 29.³

[5] On March 14, 2024, Defendants filed a “Motion for Dismissal Affidavit of Fact” which provided in part:

The Temple holds legal and equitable title to said property. We have responded to this petition to clear up confusion, as the said complaint attempts to create colorable persona's under colorable law by the misnomer of capital name misrepresentations of real parties of interest who are men and women, such as B-R-O-O-K-E, R period, capital P-A-G-E and capital T-A-M-A-R-A, S period, capital G-R-E-E-N, Et al. The Beneficiaries of these various living trust are creditors, not liable for payment obligations according to Public Law 73-10 HJR 192 because they are commercial principals created by the U.S. or its agents and the creditors are simply the card holders and endorsers of the principals and their derivatives. Jordan Page (Bey) is an authorized representative of those beneficiaries principals. The beneficiaries give an accommodation endorsement as authorized representatives of the Principal from time to time to be able to credit the Principal to execute commercial contracts on the beneficiaries behalf to convey their private equity.

Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 31-32. The motion was signed by “Green: Tamara-S/Beneficiary 2150,” “Bey Page; Jordan-M/Beneficiary 1675,” and Bey Page: Brooke-R/Beneficiary 1481,” and a fingerprint appears next to each signature. Id. at 38. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

[6] On May 23, 2024, Fifth Third filed a motion for summary judgment together with designated evidence including the note, the mortgage, and an affidavit of debt. On June 13, 2024, the court issued an order stating “[t]he Court reminds all parties that any and all pleadings and/or documents filed in this case shall be in compliance with the statutes of the State of Indiana and the Indiana Trial Rules, as well as the Allen County Local Rules.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 51. On July 23, 2024, the court issued an order stating that Defendants filed documents which did not comply with its June 13th order and that the documents were stricken from the record.

[7] On July 2, 2024, the trial court issued an Entry of Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. The court found that Defendants were “properly before the Court by service of process pursuant to Trial Rule 4 of the Indiana Rules of Procedure.” Id. at 16. The court granted judgment against Borrowers in favor of Fifth Third in the amount of $155,915.32 plus $185 for court costs, and ordered that the mortgage lien of Fifth Third be foreclosed and the Property sold by the Allen County Sheriff.

Discussion

[8] Defendants, in their summary of argument section, assert “we believe that the trial Court made a decision that it did not have the Constitutional power to make according to law.” Appellants’ Brief at 7. They argue “Tamara, Brooke and Jordan are sureties to the principal debtors with similar names, entitled to the benefit and not the penalty.” Id. They state, “[e]nforcing our Constitutionally secured rights seemed to turn the Courts actions adverse to ours and our challenges were never honored, which only made us suspicious of a possible attempt to liquidate our estate and escheat our equity for unjust enrichment.” Id. at 7-8. They assert:

In this great country, we can create almost any business, by any name we choose so as long as we follow the laws that correspond with starting that particular business. For example, we could create a fried chicken restaurant called “Federal Fried Chicken”, this does not mean that our chicken is ordained from the Federal Government of the USA. The same applies to a business calling itself a Court. That does not mean they have been given Article III powers from Congress to treat or hear cases from any matter that comes across their docket, especially when they are asked to prove it and do not. The trial Court is a private enterprise with a Duns & Bradstreet number, while we are beneficiaries of estates that are apart of a private religious body politic and subrogee to certain estates.

Finally, due to the fact that we did not understand the jurisdictional ability of the Court we did not understand the mode or type of law they were operating under. Whether the trial Court is operating under admiralty/maritime law, common-law or equity law we still do not know and do not understand the trial Court. Seeing that the trial Court has access to use other private enterprises such as the police department and sheriff department, etc, who will enforce their orders with violence, we proceeded under threat, duress and coercion, while reserving our rights in the hope to appeal the trial Court decision and retain the interest in our equity as the sureties and beneficiaries.

Id. at 8.

[9] In their argument section, Defendants assert “[t]he Summary Judgement is void because the trial Court was challenged to prove its Jurisdiction and was defaulted.” Id. at 9. They argue that “[t]he Moorish Science Temple of America is a Body Politic and cannot be divested by another private organization.” Id. at 11. In their conclusion section, Defendants state, “[b]ased on the fact that the trial Court has not proven they have original Jurisdiction over Brooke, Tamara, Jordan or the Temple and its property, lack of due process which alludes to attempted unjust enrichment by neglect to recognize equity, we seek for this Court of Appeals to dismiss the bank[’]s claim without prejudice for relief so that the Bank may seek the proper venue to make its claim.” Id. at 12.

[10] Fifth Third argues that Temple's brief does not set forth a cogent argument on any point and cites no Indiana caselaw. It further argues that the trial court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction and that Defendants did not contest personal jurisdiction and participated in the case through the entry of judgment against them. In their reply brief, Defendants argue “[o]ur merits should be considered because the Moorish Science Temple of America is a national government with its own laws and Jordan, Brooke and Tamara are proclaimed citizens of it.” Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5.

[11] We note that Defendants have elected to proceed pro se. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. at 983-984. These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal. Id. at 984. While we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. Id. We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood. Id.

[12] Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) states the requirements for the argument section of an appellant's brief and provides, “[t]his section shall contain the appellant's contentions why the trial court ․ committed reversible error,” “[t]he argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning,” “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on,” “[t]he argument must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review,” and “the argument must include a brief statement of the procedural and substantive facts necessary for consideration of the issues presented on appeal, including a statement of how the issues relevant to the appeal were raised and resolved by any ․ trial court.”

[13] We note that most of the statements and assertions by Defendants lack cogency and that Defendants do not cite Indiana statutes or caselaw. As for their references to jurisdiction, their brief refers to subject matter jurisdiction one time to state that, “[w]ithout subject-matter jurisdiction, all of the orders and judgments issued by a judge are void under law, and are of no legal force or effect.” Appellants’ Brief at 10. Defendants do not refer to “personal jurisdiction” at all. Also, Defendants do not present intelligible argument related to the note, the mortgage, Borrowers’ indebtedness, or the judgment and foreclosure ordered by the court. Defendants have failed to develop cogent argument to support their allegations of error, and accordingly they have waived review of their claims. See Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 985 (“Appellants have failed to develop cogent argument to support any of their assertions of error. As such, they have waived review of these issues.”).

[14] Even if Defendants’ claims were not waived, we would not find that reversal is warranted. Indiana trial courts possess two kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter and personal. Taylor-Bey v. State, 53 N.E.3d 1230, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006)). Subject matter jurisdiction is “the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” Id. An Indiana court obtains subject matter jurisdiction through the Indiana Constitution or a statute. Id. Personal jurisdiction “requires that appropriate process be effected over the parties.” Id. (citing K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 540 (“K.S. was a Marion County resident who submitted himself to the authority of the court”)).

[15] With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, Ind. Code § 33-29-1.5-2 provides that “[a]ll superior courts have ․ original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases ․” Ind. Code § 33-33-2-5 provides the Allen Superior Court is a superior court. Ind. Code § 32-30-10-3 provides that, “if a mortgagor defaults in the performance of any condition contained in a mortgage, the mortgagee or the mortgagee's assigns may proceed in the ․ superior court ․ of the county where the real estate is located to foreclose the equity of redemption contained in the mortgage.” The Property is located in Allen County, and the Allen Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction in the foreclosure action initiated by Fifth Third. See Indiana Suburban Sewers, Inc. v. Hanson, 166 Ind. App. 165, 170, 334 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1975) (“In the foreclosure action the court had personal jurisdiction of the parties and the mortgaged property was located in Allen County. The Allen Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction of the action to foreclose a mortgage.”), reh'g denied.

[16] As for personal jurisdiction, the trial court found that Defendants were “properly before the Court by service of process pursuant to Trial Rule 4 of the Indiana Rules of Procedure.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 16. The CCS indicates “Summons Returned Served by Allen County Sheriff” for each Defendant. Id. at 5. In their respective “Plea of Abatement” filings, Borrowers acknowledged receipt of a “bill” notifying them of the lawsuit and did not state a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 27, 29. Also, in its “Plea of Abatement Notice of Interest and Title,” Temple acknowledged receipt of such a “bill” and claimed an interest in the Property. Id. at 22. The trial court had personal jurisdiction over the parties.

[17] Based on our review of the record and Defendants’ arguments, we conclude that the trial court did not err in issuing its Entry of Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure.

[18] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jordan Page Bey is named as the appellant on the caption page of the appellant's brief. The appellant's brief is signed:/s/ Bro. J. Page BeyBro. J. Page Bey, Grand Sheik of MSTA 27U.C.C. 1-308, Without PrejudiceAll rights reservedAuthorized RepresentativeEx Relatione: BROOKE R. PAGE and TAMARA S. GREENAppellants’ Brief at 12. The notice of appeal contains a similar signature, indicates that the “initiating party to this matter is JORDAN PAGE BEY aka Bro. J. Page-Bey of the MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA 27 SOL TEMPLE, care of 1148 Division Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana,” and also mentions “Appellants Green, Tamara S; Page, Brooke R; [and] Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple.” Notice of Appeal at 1.

2.   We refer to the grantee as “Temple.”

3.   One of the documents was signed “/s/ Bey Page: Brooke-R/Beneficiary Ex Relatione of BROOKE R. PAGE,” and the other was signed “/s/Green: Tamara-S/Beneficiary Ex Relatione of TAMARA S. GREEN.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 27, 29. A fingerprint appears next to each signature.

Brown, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Tavitas concur. Altice, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.