D.B. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] K.B.-P. and W.B.-P. (collectively, the “Children”) are the biological children of D.B. (“Mother”) and B.P. (“Father”).¹ Petitions alleging the Children were each a child in need of services (“CHINS”) were filed because of Mother's substance abuse and domestic violence in her relationship with Father. Mother admitted the Children were CHINS, and a dispositional order was entered. Mother failed to sufficiently comply with that order, termination of parental rights petitions were filed, and those petitions were later granted. Mother now challenges that termination and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] K.B.-P. was born on December 31, 2017, and W.B.-P. was born on July 27, 2021. On October 1, 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that the Children were being neglected, specifically that Mother was under the influence of illegal substances while attempting to leave a residence with at least one of the Children. Five days later, the Children were removed from Mother's care and placed with their great-grandmother (“Great-Grandmother”). On October 11, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children were CHINS. In particular, DCS alleged in relevant part as follows: “Between September 28 and October 4, 2022, Mother was observed at the family home with the children and Mother was visibly impaired”; “Mother has reported use of opiates and marijuana but denies recent use despite being visibly impaired”; and “Mother and [Father] have a history of domestic violence.” Tr. Vol. IV at 69, 104.

[4] On October 28, Mother admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition. The trial court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS, and after a dispositional hearing, it ordered Mother to, among other things, (1) maintain weekly contact with the FCM; (2) notify the FCM within five days of any changes in address, contact information, household composition, or employment; (3) allow the FCM and service providers to make announced or unannounced visits; (4) enroll in all programs and obtain all assessments recommended by the FCM or service providers, including a parenting assessment and substance abuse assessment; (5) keep all CHINS-related appointments or otherwise give advance notice with good cause for any missed appointments; (6) sign any necessary releases; (7) maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; (8) secure and maintain a legal and stable income that is adequate to support all household members; (9) refrain from using or consuming illegal substances and take prescription medications according to the current, valid prescription; (10) refrain from consuming alcohol; (11) submit to random drug screens; (12) refrain from committing acts of domestic violence; and (13) attend all scheduled visitations with the Children and comply with all visitation rules and procedures.

[5] On July 11, 2023, the trial court changed the Children's permanency plan from reunification to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. On August 16 and 17, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. Also on August 16, Mother admitted herself to a substance abuse treatment program at Avenues Recovery Center in Fort Wayne, Indiana, which she completed and was discharged from on September 15.

[6] On December 14, DCS filed motions to dismiss the termination petitions because “pursuing termination of parental rights is not appropriate at this time.” Tr. Vol. V at 89, 111. The trial court granted those motions to dismiss. Later that month, Mother got into a physical altercation with Great-Grandmother during a visit with the Children, resulting in law enforcement involvement and an agency being brought in to supervise Mother's visits with the Children.

[7] On February 12, 2024, DCS again filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. On July 15, after an evidentiary hearing on those petitions, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to the Children. In support, the trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

[Mother]’s motivation to participate in Avenues was likely in response to the pending petitions to terminate. [Mother] has a history of improving her behaviors and participating in services when the heat is on. However, as soon as it is not, she regresses to prior behaviors and substance abuse.

* * *

[Mother] has, on occasion, shown some progress. However, any progress has been undermined by her overall conduct during the entire course of these proceedings.

Throughout these proceedings, [Mother] has moved from town to town, home to home, often without notifying the DCS as required. ․ [Mother] has lived in her mother's home, her grandmother's home (the current placement), her father's home, her sister's home in Fishers, Indiana, and has stayed with a boyfriend. She is currently back in her Mother's home despite her testimony that she previously left that home because it was a toxic environment. She claims to have moved from her father's home because it was also a toxic environment. She further testified that she left her sister's residence because of the way she was being treated by another male in the household. Notably, [Mother] has a contentious personality. She has cursed the former Family Case Manager and got into an altercation with placement. The common denominator in all of the above is [Mother].

* * *

[Mother] is in individual counseling but she is not in any substance abuse programming, despite her February relapse. She is currently testing negative for most illegal substances although she is testing positive for THC which she attributed to CBD․ While of less concern than heroin or methamphetamine, [Mother] is still self-medicating.

[Mother] has not even been able to consistently call in for drug screens over the course of the last few months. [Mother] recently missed a meeting with her skills coach because she forgot.

[Mother]’s housing situation is not stable. She does not have reliable transportation and she is unemployed. [Mother] is in no position to take care of herself, let alone a child or children. Her contact with the children is limited to one supervised visit per week. The family case manager did offer [Mother] two supervised visits per week but [Mother] did not take her up on that offer due to transportation issues. While at some point she did ask her family case manager to allow unsupervised visits, she was rightfully denied that based upon her own conduct.

[Mother] spoke the mantra about changing “people, places and things,” in an effort to overcome her addiction. Not much has really changed. ․

[Mother]’s credibility is suspect. As for conflicts between her testimony and the testimony of the other witnesses, their credibility was far superior to hers.

[The Children] are doing well in their current placement. Understandably, there is concern about placement's ability to raise two younger children given her age. However, this Court has seen, on numerous occasions, grand-parents and great grand-parents rise to the challenge of raising young children despite their age. The Court believes that placement is up to the challenge.

* * *

Reunification was the goal and it was pursued, to no avail. The DCS went to great lengths to assist [Mother] and attempted to give her a second chance. She failed that opportunity.

DCS’[s] plan for the children is adoption. Adoption is the only chance that they will get to have the permanency they deserve now. [Mother] appears to believe the current placement provides the children with permanency. However, the children should not be left to twist in the wind until, if ever, [Mother] gets her life straightened out. That is selfish on [Mother]’s behalf.

The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that ․

b. There is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in [the Children's] removal or their continued removal will never be remedied. In fact, it's a virtual certainty;

c. Termination of the parent-children relationship is in their best interests and continuation thereof would be detrimental to their physical and/or mental well-being; and

d. The DCS has satisfactory plans for their care and treatment. Those plans include adoption and pre-adoptive services.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 54–57 (footnotes omitted). Mother now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights to the Children Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[8] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over the Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied. To terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that, among other things, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of Mother's relationship with the Children poses a threat to their well-being, termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests, and there is a satisfactory plan for the Children's care and treatment. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023); id. § 31-37-14-2.

[9] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[10] Mother contends the trial court erred in concluding that (1) she has not and likely will not remedy the reasons the Children were removed from her care, (2) the continuation of her parent-child relationship with the Children threatened their well-being, (3) terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children was in the Children's best interests, and (4) adoption is a satisfactory plan for the Children's care and treatment. We address each contention in turn.

Remediation of Reasons for Removal or Placement

[11] Mother first challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In reviewing the trial court's findings on these issues, we first “identify the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

In the second step, the trial court must judge parental fitness as of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions. The trial court is entrusted with balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

J.S., 133 N.E.3d at 715 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting and citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

[12] Mother's overarching argument is that “a review of the trial court record would demonstrate that she was mostly compliant with what she was ordered to undertake, but she had a couple setbacks.” Appellant's Br. at 17 (citing Tr. Vol. II at 52–54). Notably, Mother does not challenge any of the trial court's findings supporting its conclusion that Mother has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for the Children's removal from her care, so we take all those findings as true, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). Moreover, Mother's arguments are merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For example, Mother concedes she “was a little ‘hit or miss’ at the beginning of the case” with her participation in meetings and skills coaching but argues she “was fully engaged while living at her sister's house. Mother felt she was fully compliant.” Appellant's Br. at 18 (internal citations omitted). The record shows that Mother lived with her sister for approximately two months in mid-2023 during the underlying CHINS case. The record further shows that Mother only ever partially complied with the dispositional order, and more often than not, she was not substantially complying. Based on the unchallenged findings and considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Mother has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for the Children's removal or placement outside of Mother's care.³

Best Interests of the Child

[13] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights over the Children is in the Children's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013)). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of the child's physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[14] Mother contends termination of her parental rights is not in the Children's best interests because she “had demonstrated that she had current ability to provide for the Children's needs and had made substantial changes to correct the historical record of issues with housing, substance abuse and domestic violencey [sic].” Appellant's Br. at 20–21. Mother does not provide any cogent argument or citations to the record in support of this argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

[15] To the extent Mother implicitly relies on her previous arguments regarding her alleged compliance with the dispositional decree, those arguments do not challenge specific findings, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687), and are improper requests for us to reweigh evidence and reassess witness credibility, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). Based on the unchallenged findings and considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination is in the Children's best interests.

Satisfactory Plan

[16] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children. This Court has previously determined that “adoption is a ‘satisfactory plan’ for the care and treatment of a child.” In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

[17] Mother argues that “maintaining the status quo, i.e. the Children remaining in kinship placement care while Mother continues services is a very satisfactory plan.” Appellant's Br. at 21. Indiana Code section 31-35-4-2(b)(2)(D) (2023) does not require DCS to present and prove a particular plan is the best plan or more satisfactory than alternative plans; instead, that provision requires only that DCS present and prove a particular plan is “satisfactory.” In fact, DCS's plan does not even need to “be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added) (citing In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[18] First, the Children have a recognized need for permanency, see P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235)), which Mother's proposed plan would not provide. Second, Mother does not explain how the plan for adoption is not satisfactory other than to claim Great-Grandmother “is not an appropriate selection” because she was 72 years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Appellant's Br. at 22. In making this argument, Mother assumes that the plan the trial court approved is for Great-Grandmother to adopt the Children. The trial court made no such finding, conclusion, or order. Furthermore, the appropriateness of a particular adoptive placement is within the purview of the adoption court, not the termination court. See C.D., 141 N.E.3d at 856 (citing A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007). Based on the foregoing, Mother has not shown that the plan for the care and treatment of the Children is not satisfactory, so we cannot say that the trial court's conclusion that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Children is clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[19] In sum, Mother has not shown that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that she has not and likely will not remedy the reasons the Children were removed from her care, terminating her relationship with the Children is in the Children's best interests, and adoption is a satisfactory plan for the Children's care and treatment. We therefore affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to the Children.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father relinquished and consented to termination of his parental rights to the Children, so he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   We remind Mother's counsel that all relevant facts must be included in the Statement of Facts. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). For instance, Mother's substance abuse, her frequent relocations, and the domestic violence in her relationship with Father are not mentioned until the Argument section of her brief.

3.   Mother also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to each of the Children's well-being. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii). The trial court was required to find only that one prong of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) has been established. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. Because we agree with the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children's removal from Mother's care would not be remedied, we need not address her argument directed at the “threat” prong of Section 4(b)(2)(B). See id.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur. Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.