Jayden Pittman, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] While on probation for a Level 6 felony battery conviction, Jayden Pittman was charged with and pleaded guilty to additional criminal offenses. The trial court found that Pittman had violated his probation and ordered him to serve the entire one-and-a-half-year suspended portion of his sentence. Pittman appeals this sanction as too harsh. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2020, Pittman battered a fellow inmate in the Miami Correctional Facility. The State charged him with Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury.¹ Pittman pleaded guilty to the offense. In June 2021, the trial court sentenced him to two years in the Department of Correction (“the DOC”), with six months executed and the rest suspended to probation, to be served consecutive to sentences that he was serving in two other causes. The probation order states, “You will not commit any acts which would be a crime, either felony or misdemeanor.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 93.

[3] In September 2021, Pittman was released from the DOC to serve the executed portion of his sentence in the Miami County Jail. Pittman was released from jail on Friday, December 10, and was supposed to report to probation in Miami County the following Monday, but on Saturday he was arrested and jailed in Shelby County. The State charged Pittman with escape ² in cause number 73D02-2204-F6-149 (“F6-149”), strangulation ³ and battery in cause number 73D02-2204-F6-154 (“F6-154”), and three counts of battery by bodily waste in cause number 73D02-2204-CM-397 (“CM-397”).⁴

[4] In June 2022, Pittman pleaded guilty to three counts of Class B misdemeanor battery ⁵ in CM-397. In February 2023, the State filed a notice of probation violation and a petition to modify or revoke Pittman's probation based on his commission of the offenses in the three causes mentioned above. In May 2023, Pittman agreed to plead guilty to Level 6 felony escape in F6-149, and the State agreed to dismiss the charges in F6-154. Later that year, Pittman was placed in Logansport State Hospital for several months and was diagnosed with schizophrenia and PTSD. He was hospitalized again in March 2024. Pittman was prescribed several medications, including Zoloft, Zyprexa, and Lithium.

[5] In July 2024, the trial court held a revocation hearing and found that Pittman had violated the rules and conditions of probation by committing escape and battery. As a sanction, the trial court ordered Pittman to serve the entire suspended portion of his sentence. Pittman now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Pittman does not challenge the trial court's finding that he violated his probation, but he argues that the court erred in ordering the execution of his suspended sentence. Probation “is ‘a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.’ ” State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 777 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999)). We review probation violation sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Id. (citations omitted).

[7] A probation revocation proceeding is a two-step process. Id. First, the trial court must determine whether the preponderance of the evidence showed that a probation violation occurred. Id.; I.C. § 35-38-2-3. Second, the trial court must determine whether the probation violation warrants revocation of probation or some lesser sanction. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616. In making the latter determination, the trial court may consider such factors as the defendant's criminal history. See, e.g., Slater v. State, 223 N.E.3d 298, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding the defendant's criminal history supported the sanction for probation violation), trans. denied.

[8] Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Our Supreme Court has held that this statute “permits judges to sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind. 2007). And, while probationers must be given the opportunity to present mitigating factors, Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008), the trial court is not required to consider aggravating and mitigating factors when deciding whether to revoke probation, Porter v. State, 117 N.E.3d 673, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Moreover, a single violation of a condition of probation is sufficient to permit the trial court to revoke probation. Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[9] Here, the trial court noted that Pittman was serving a sentence for a felony conviction and was convicted of another offense, “being one of a violent nature[,]” that he committed against another inmate. Tr. Vol. 2 at 31. The court further noted that, “after being placed on probation, he committed two new offenses.” Id. Finally, the court observed that it “must also look at protecting society as a whole” and opined, “I think it's clearly appropriate in this situation for imposition of the balance of the suspended portion of the sentence.” Id. at 31-32.

[10] Pittman notes that he pleaded guilty to the new offenses, but we observe that he received a substantial benefit in return, i.e., the dismissal of the charges in F6-154. Pittman also asserts, “Testimony established that incarceration would negatively affect his mental issues and result in not getting medication which would result in psychotic episodes where he would see things and hear voices.” Appellant's Br. at 7 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 19). The cited transcript page says nothing about Pittman's ability to get his medications while incarcerated, only that the symptoms that arise when he does not take them (“hearing voices and seeing stuff”) are “made worse” by being in “confined spaces that are closed.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. Pittman's mother, with whom he lived after he was discharged from Logansport State Hospital, testified that both she and her mother monitored Pittman's medications and that “he [wouldn't] always” take them even under their supervision. Tr. Vol. 2 at 25. Thus, it appears that Pittman will have only himself to blame if his mental condition worsens during his incarceration.

[11] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted well within its discretion in ordering Pittman to serve the entire suspended portion of his sentence. Therefore, we affirm.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-4.

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9.

4.   The facts underlying these offenses are not in the record before us.

5.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.