IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of D.G. and L.G. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this consolidated appeal, A.H. (“Mother”) and D.H. (“Father”) challenge the termination of their parental rights to two of their children, L.G. and D.G. (“Children”). They raise one issue for our review: Is the trial court's termination order clearly erroneous? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) are married and have four children together: L.G., born in November 2019; D.G., born in January 2021; I.G., born in February 2022; and X.G., born in November 2023. Mother also has a child (“Sibling”) with another man. Sibling was born in 2017. This proceeding concerns only L.G. and D.G. (collectively, “Children”).

[3] In January 2020, Father, Mother, Sibling, L.G., and Mother's pregnant sister (“Aunt”) were residing in a home together. Parents were unemployed; Aunt's SSI disability payments were the only source of income. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Sibling and L.G.’s safety and well-being were endangered by the conditions of the home. DCS investigated and found clutter and trash everywhere, including in L.G.’s bassinet. The home had a foul odor, the kitchen was not safe for cooking, and the toilet and sink were dirty. L.G. and Sibling were removed briefly from Parents’ care due to “deplorable housing conditions.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 50. The children were returned to Parents’ care within a few days, but DCS filed a petition alleging L.G. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”).¹ After Mother and Father admitted to the allegations of the petition, L.G. was adjudicated a CHINS on February 24, 2020. The trial court issued a dispositional order on June 29, requiring Parents to maintain contact with the caseworker; enroll in and participate in reunification services recommended by DCS; maintain suitable housing and “keep the family residence in a manner that is structurally sound, sanitary, clean, free from clutter and safe for the child”; secure and maintain a stable source of income; participate in individual and/or family therapy; participate in home-based case management and/or the fatherhood engagement program; complete a psychological parenting evaluation; and “demonstrate the ability to appropriately parent and supervise the child.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 19–22.

[4] Stephanie Hostetler was assigned as the family case manager (“FCM”) in February 2020. When she first became involved with the family, they were at risk of being evicted. DCS paid their back rent and helped them clean up the apartment to avoid an eviction proceeding. But the family still had to move because the landlord sold the home. They moved first to a hotel, but when Aunt moved out, Parents were unable to afford the room. They moved in with another of Mother's sisters—but only after that home was cleaned to meet DCS’ minimum standards.

[5] Father got a job, and the family moved to an extended-stay hotel while they looked for permanent housing. Aunt had her baby, and they moved into the hotel room as well. The arrangement initially went well—they had appropriate bedding for everyone and kept the room clean, went to food pantries for food, and used fatherhood engagement services. But after about a month, things started to fall into disarray. Mother was pregnant and her personal hygiene declined as did the cleanliness of the room. Parents’ relationship was strained—there were “a lot of verbal altercations between the two of them.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 67. The family was eventually asked to leave the hotel in part because of complaints about the smell and condition of their room. When maintenance came to clean the room after the family vacated it, the room “was absolutely disgusting.” Id.

[6] Father took L.G. and went to a shelter. DCS thought Mother and Sibling were living with Mother's other sister, but then learned they were living in the sister's car. DCS intervened and Mother's father agreed she could live with him. Father and L.G. joined them, and the family stayed there for three or four months until they secured housing in December 2020. At that time, neither Parent was employed, so Mother's father gave them money for the security deposit and the first few months of rent. D.G. was born on January 8, 2021.

[7] While Mother was in the hospital giving birth to D.G., a report was made to DCS that Father had raped Aunt. DCS investigated: Father said they had consensual sexual relations but Aunt “didn't want to disclose anything” to DCS. Id. at 72. Because there were no safety concerns for Children, DCS did not intervene. Then Aunt told Mother that Father “had taken advantage of her” and Mother became angry. Id. A domestic violence report was made to the police because Mother confronted Father and slapped or hit him while she was holding D.G. Police investigated and called in a report to DCS.

[8] Soon after the domestic violence report was made, Father contacted DCS to report unexplained marks on L.G.’s back. The FCM went to the family's home and observed all three children.² She saw L.G. had multiple bruises on his back that looked “like they were [made by] fingers. Somebody had picked him up and was either holding him very, very hard or very tightly to leave those specific kinds of marks.” Id. at 75. The bruises were various colors, indicating some were new and some were healing. L.G. also had scratches on his body, the number and depth of which were “really concerning.” Id. And he had a bruise on his forehead, a mark on his cheek, and red marks on the side of his eye. Father told the FCM he was concerned about Mother's discipline of the children because she had started yelling at them more and being a little rougher with them. The FCM consulted her supervisor and then called in a report. The next day, the FCM and an assessment worker took all three children to the hospital for an exam. The skeletal exams showed no broken bones and no evidence of healing fractures. But the nurse who conducted the forensic exam said the bruises were suspicious—they were not from children randomly falling; instead, “[s]omebody had to inflict these bruises.” Id. at 78.

[9] DCS detained the children on March 30, 2021, because Parents blamed each other for the bruises, so “[t]here was no determination of who the perpetrator was.” Id. at 79. In addition, the domestic violence report had been made around this time and the home conditions “were god awful.” Id. In particular, the apartment was not safe because one of the two available exits was a back stairway Parents used as a “storage catch-all” and it would have been “very difficult to get out of that exit” if there were a fire or other emergency. Id. at 175. L.G.’s CHINS case was still ongoing. On March 31, DCS filed a petition alleging D.G. was a CHINS. Father admitted the allegations of the petition and a factfinding hearing was held as to Mother. D.G. was adjudicated a CHINS on May 20, and the trial court issued a dispositional decree on June 17. In addition to the things Parents were already ordered to do under L.G.’s dispositional order, Parents were ordered to complete a domestic violence assessment and follow all recommendations.

[10] Children were placed in the same foster home in April 2021.³ Children both have special needs, take numerous medications, and have many medical appointments. L.G. has a history of febrile seizures brought on by fever, symptoms of fetal alcohol syndrome, a speech delay, and needs help regulating his emotions at times. He is under the care of a neurologist, and it has been recommended he see a speech therapist. D.G. has developmental delays addressed by First Steps. He wears braces on his legs because his feet turn in. He was hospitalized twice for respiratory illnesses, and he was diagnosed with oral dysphagia, which requires special feeding procedures.⁴ He was also diagnosed with partial fetal alcohol syndrome. The foster parents coordinate all of Children's appointments and apprise Parents of those appointments. The foster mother estimated Parents attended fewer than forty percent of Children's appointments. Transportation was an issue for Parents because they did not have a car and many of the appointments were some distance from where Parents lived. But foster mother believed attending the appointments and understanding Children's conditions was critical so the Children “can stay healthy and they can grow up and ․ overcome some of their obstacles.” Id. at 34.

[11] Parents’ relationship continued to be unstable after Children were removed, as did their housing. Parents would break up, the FCM and fatherhood engagement worker would help Father find a place to live, and then Parents would reconcile, and Father would move back in with Mother. Parents improved the organization of their homes but there was “a continued concern in terms of the pest control.” Id. at 177. At some point, they were evicted from a house and Mother had a judgment for past due rent entered against her. Parents moved to Hope Ministries in mid-2022. By this time, I.G. had been born.

[12] Parents originally had supervised visitation with Children. Visitation supervisors said Mother's parenting improved over time when she was in a one-on-one setting, but “when you start adding, you know, two, three boys into the equation, then it's kind of like all bets are off ․ [S]he's able to kind of focus on one track at a time, but she struggles with kind of multitasking and adapting to unexpected situations that arise.” Id. at 188. L.G. was described as a “magnet for danger․ [W]hatever the most dangerous thing is in any situation, he just seems to gravitate right toward that. And unless you're very observant and proactive, and you're thinking a step ahead, he just goes right into harm's way.” Id. A “developing concern” was D.G. mimicking whatever L.G. did. Id.

[13] In early 2023, the trial court approved a visitation step-down plan to begin with at least six weeks of unsupervised visits. DCS believed this was appropriate because of how long the CHINS cases had been open and the number of services that had been provided. But Parents still had to rely on DCS for transportation, which is unusual for unsupervised visits; they exhibited escalating dynamics of domestic violence; and they struggled to keep track of and attend appointments. And Children suffered several injuries while in Parents’ care—D.G. hit his head on a tile floor and had a “significant bump” and L.G. had a busted lip but Mother had no “understanding of how the injury occurred.” Id. at 192. Most notably, L.G. broke open a laundry detergent pod and the contents flew into his eye and caused a corneal abrasion. L.G. was able to access the pod because of Mother's “poor judgment” in storing the pods in I.G.’s stroller to transport them to the laundry facilities. Id. The step-down plan was “a glaring failure,” and within about two months, fully supervised visits were reinstated. Id. at 196.

[14] DCS filed petitions for termination on March 23, 2023. During the two-day factfinding hearing, DCS elicited testimony from DCS employees and service providers about Parents’ compliance with services and progress in parenting. Mother and Father also testified.

[15] Father did not complete any of the services to which DCS referred him. Father did not finish a parenting instruction course, and his most recent visitation supervisor said she would not recommend moving to unsupervised visitation because Father did not have appropriate control over Children to keep them from being in danger. Parents began couple's counseling, but the therapist recommended putting the sessions on hold because they “started getting pretty heated” and she felt they were “escalating the situation more than helping.” Id. at 199. Father completed a domestic violence assessment as required, but he did not enroll in the recommended batterers’ intervention program for nearly a year and then did not complete it. Father participated in individual counseling so sporadically his counselor would not make a recurring appointment for him—if he came to an appointment, then he could make his next appointment. The counselor testified Father had not successfully completed counseling services and she had concerns about Father's ability to meet all of Children's needs.

[16] Father's psychological evaluation revealed he had a “low average range of intellectual functioning” which was relevant to DCS only because it impacts his ability to retain information, such as remembering “essential parenting strategies, safety components, [and] protective factors[.]” Id. at 202. “A parent needs to be able to understand all of their child's needs and be able to organize services and supports to meet those needs.” Id. Father had “an addiction to meth in 2018” and overdosed several times. Id. at 41. He began using methamphetamine again in 2022, and in May 2023, Father was asked to leave his residence at Hope Ministries because he used methamphetamine. He attended a month-long rehabilitation program in August and claimed to be sober since then but did not consistently provide drug screens. Several witnesses testified Father was “very good at getting jobs [but] not great at keeping jobs.” Id. at 106. He was not employed at the time of the hearing. On the first day of the hearing, Father testified he was living in recovery-based housing. By the second day of the hearing a month later, Father had left that facility because he was “starting to feel unsafe there” and had gone to the Center for the Homeless. Id. at 258.

[17] Mother completed her recommended services, and her housing situation and housekeeping had improved at the time of the hearing. But she was only allowed to stay at Hope Ministries for two years, which meant she would need to obtain stable housing of her own and income to pay for it by August 2024. Mother intended to file for SSI disability. Donna Pangburn, a parent instructor, met with Parents once a week from February through June 2023, and with Mother alone until August 2023. She covered safety and age-appropriate activities with Parents but felt the instruction was ultimately unproductive because the techniques were not being implemented and they were covering the same issues repeatedly. Parker Zimmerman, Mother's home-based caseworker and visit supervisor, had concerns about Mother's ability to monitor the safety of all her children at one time. Zimmerman noted Mother was pregnant and another baby would exacerbate the concerns he already had.⁵ Mother's psychological evaluation revealed she has an “extremely low range of cognitive functioning,” which is relevant to her ability to adapt and respond, to process information, and to understand, manage, and follow through on the “complexity of [Children's] needs.” Id. at 207, 210. A teacher in the infant room at Hope Ministries testified she had no concerns about Mother's parenting of I.G. But a medical professional had called in a report to DCS about I.G. not being cared for properly. The concerns were two-fold: (1) Parents had not followed through on getting I.G. enrolled in First Steps, and (2) I.G. suffered recurrent ear infections because Mother would lay him flat and prop up a bottle to feed him despite repeated reminders not to feed him that way.

[18] Matthew Dubach, the current FCM, said Children “require a parent who's as close to 100% on top of everything as possible[.]” Id. at 205. He described Mother as “successful at ․ completing coursework and ․ getting through different services[,]” but she is “a textbook example of a parent that's willing but not able.” Id. at 195. He believed termination and adoption was in Children's best interest. Terrence Wilkerson, Father's fatherhood engagement worker since March 2020, observed Father “wants to be a good father, but we need more of the action piece.” Id. at 231. Michael Popielski, the court-appointed special advocate, testified Parents had been given good guidance through every service available but still had not attained the ability to reunify with Children. He said,

I believe that it's not in the best interest of [Children] to be parented by [Father] and [Mother]. I believe a lot of the testimony already heard today indicates their inconsistency in services or inability to retain the information that they learned in services. I'm concerned about the safety of [Children] under their care without any kind of overlapping ․ supervision that we have in place right now. To let them parent [Children] on their own concerns me greatly.

Id. at 155.

[19] The trial court issued orders terminating the parent-child relationships on April 29, 2024.⁶

Standard of Review

[20] In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the trial court must enter findings of fact that support its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c) (2012). On review, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but will only consider the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We give “due regard” to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and only set aside the trial court's findings or judgment if clearly erroneous. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). “In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, ‘we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.’ ” Id. at 1229–30 (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). In addition, trial court findings not challenged on appeal must be accepted as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

The trial court's termination decision is not clearly erroneous.

[21] As Indiana Courts have repeatedly recognized, “parental rights are precious and protected by our Federal and State constitutions.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 641–42. A parent's interest in the upbringing of their child is perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by courts, but parental rights are not absolute. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230. Parental rights may be terminated if parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities by “failing to provide for the child's immediate and long-term needs.” Id.

[22] When seeking to terminate parental rights, DCS must file a petition alleging:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied [“remediation prong”].

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child [“threat prong”].

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019).⁷ If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. See I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997); I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

[23] Here, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence proved the remediation prong.⁸ In making this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. First, the trial court determines what conditions led to removal or placement outside the home, then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, considering evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. Still, the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[24] Parents allege the trial court's conclusion about the remediation prong was clearly erroneous but do not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact. Here, the trial court's unchallenged findings include: Children were removed from Parents’ care due to domestic violence incidents, physical abuse of L.G. and Sibling, and unstable and inappropriate housing conditions. At the termination hearing, Father's counselor “credibly expressed concerns of Mother and Father's relationship, including domestic violence” by both. Father's App. Vol. 2 at 43. Mother completed her services and tries hard to be a successful parent but is not able to “provide care and ensure [Children's] safety” as shown by the failed step-down visitation plan after years of parenting education. Id. at 46. Father did not complete any of the services to which he was referred and lacks the follow-through necessary to meet his goal of being a good parent. “Even after close to three (3) years of supervised parenting time,” no service providers recommended anything other than fully supervised visits. Id. Father does not have stable and appropriate housing, reliable transportation, or long-term employment. Mother has found stable—albeit temporary—housing, but she does not have transportation or employment, relying on Hope Ministries to meet her and her children's basic needs. She does not have “a satisfactory plan for caring and providing for [Children] once she is required to leave Hope Ministries.” Id. at 44. In addition, Children have “extensive medical and developmental delays and special needs.” Id. at 42. But neither Parent consistently attended Children's medical appointments, and they do not understand Children's medical needs and treatment plans. The trial court summarized:

Father's failure to successfully complete [any services], and failure to consistently attend doctor's appointments for [Children], coupled with Father's failure to obtain appropriate and stable housing and employment, demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted in the removal of [Children] from Father's care will not be remedied.

* * *

Mother, on the other hand, was overall compliant with her services[.] However, this Court still finds that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for [Children's] removal and continued placement outside of Mother's care will not be remedied․ Mother is willing to parent [Children], but is unfortunately just not able to provide a safe stable environment for [them].

Id. at 45.

[25] Mother argues there is no evidence she cannot remedy the conditions; rather, she claims there is ample evidence she has been making progress, if slowly. And Father argues the evidence from the time of the termination hearing shows his successful stay in rehab has made a significant difference in his behavior and outlook. But children “cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. And trial courts have the discretion to weigh a parent's habitual patterns of conduct more heavily than improvements made only shortly before termination. Id. at 643. In short, accepting the trial court's findings as true, we conclude they are sufficient to support the trial court's judgment. See T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming termination order where unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support termination), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[26] The trial court's decision to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to Children was not clearly erroneous.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sibling was also the subject of a CHINS petition filed at the same time. He is not part of this appeal, and we include facts related to him only when necessary.

2.   Sibling was still living with the family at this time.

3.   Sibling was placed in relative care.

4.   The foster mother explained “he has a hard time controlling liquids as they go back” in his throat and they can get into his airway and cause infections. Id. at 29. This requires adding a thickener to liquids D.G. ingests and supervision while he drinks.

5.   X.G. was born between the two days of the factfinding hearing.

6.   The trial court issued two orders, one as to each child. These orders are substantially similar, and we cite herein only to the order for L.G.

7.   This statute was amended March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed these petitions before the amended version of the statute became effective, we use the version of the statute in effect at the time the petitions for termination were filed.

8.   The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence proved the threat prong. Subsection (b)(2)(B) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, so although the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of both prongs, DCS was only required to prove one. See In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.Father challenges the sufficiency of evidence proving both the remediation and threat prongs. Mother's statement of issues conflates the remediation and threat prongs of the statute: she argues there was not clear and convincing evidence that “continuation of the parent-child relationship with [Mother] would cause a threat to her children and this threat would not be remedied with further support services.” Appellant-Mother's Br. at 4 (emphasis added). From that statement, it is unclear exactly what Mother is challenging, but the cases she cites and the argument she makes clarify she is challenging proof of the remediation prong. See id. at 13 (“There is simply no direct evidence that [Mother] ․ was incapable of remedying the problems outlined by DCS․ The standard for removal is not, failure to remedy the situation fast enough[.]”).Because both Mother and Father challenge proof of the remediation prong, we begin there. And because we conclude the remediation prong was proven by sufficient evidence, we need not discuss the threat prong. Nonetheless, for many of the same reasons discussed herein, the trial court's conclusion on the threat prong was not clearly erroneous.Neither Parent challenges the other elements of the termination statute, and our review shows no evidentiary defect in the trial court's conclusion that those elements were proven by sufficient evidence.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.