GREEN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After twice being convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVWI), Michael Green drank and drove again. He crashed his car into both a tree and his neighbor's truck while his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was about three times the legal limit. Green again was convicted of OVWI and now appeals, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his drunk driving endangered anyone. He also challenges his sentence, which was enhanced from one year to a total of eight years imprisonment based on the trial court's finding that he was a habitual vehicular substance offender. Finding sufficient evidence of endangerment and that his eight-year sentence was not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Carl and Paige Stutsman heard a loud noise outside their Elkhart County home around 9:00 p.m. one August evening. Upon investigation, the Stutsmans found a Ford Escape in their front yard and their next-door neighbor, Green, behind the wheel. Green appeared to be sleeping, given that he was slumped back with his eyes closed. But his foot was on the gas pedal, and the vehicle's wheels were spinning. When roused, Green seemed unaware he had crashed.

[3] The Stutsmans helped Green out of the car and called 911. An officer responded and saw two vehicles: a white Ford Escape with front-end damage lodged against a tree and the Stutsmans’ white pickup truck parked crookedly in the driveway. Based on the tire tracks and footprints, the officer determined that the Ford Escape had hit both the pickup truck and a tree in the Stutsmans’ front yard. When paramedics arrived, Officer Clements told them that he believed Green was intoxicated rather than injured. Green responded, “What he said—I'm intoxicated.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 47. When a paramedic asked Green whether he was drunk, Green responded affirmatively.

[4] Green failed field sobriety tests conducted at the scene, and his breath smelled of alcohol. Green consented to a blood draw, which revealed a BAC of 0.246 grams per 100 milliliters, more than three times the legal limit of 0.08. After being advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived, Green admitted to drinking three large beers.

[5] Green was charged with two Class A misdemeanors: OVWI and operating a vehicle with BAC of 0.15 or more. The State later alleged that Green was a habitual vehicular substance offender.

[6] At Green's bench trial, he accused another man of drugging and assaulting him and thereby causing him to crash the car. But the trial court found Green's account neither “credible nor reasonable” and that it was contradicted by the other evidence, including Green's own statements on the night of the incident. App. Vol. II, p. 141. The court concluded that Green was not involuntarily intoxicated and found him guilty as charged. Based on double jeopardy concerns, the court declined to enter judgment of conviction for operating a vehicle with BAC of 0.15 or more. After determining that Green was a habitual vehicular substance offender based on his two prior OVWI convictions, the court sentenced Green to one year imprisonment, enhanced by seven years imprisonment based on the habitual vehicular substance offender finding.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Green contends the evidence was insufficient to support his OVWI conviction and that his sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Finding no merit to either claim, we affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Green does not dispute that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. He merely argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he endangered anyone. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm unless no reasonable fact finder could conclude the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jordan v. State, 244 N.E.3d 445, 453 (Ind. 2024).

[9] To convict Green of Class A misdemeanor OVWI, the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Green operated a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that “endanger[ed] a person.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b). Evidence that he was intoxicated could not, by itself, prove endangerment. Lehman v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1097, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[10] Green contends the endangerment evidence was inadequate because the record contains no direct evidence that his manner of driving endangered any person. But such direct, observational evidence of dangerous driving is not required to prove endangerment. This element may be established by evidence “showing that the defendant's condition or operating manner could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant.” Outlaw v. State, 918 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), affirmed and adopted by 929 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 2010). It may even be met when the evidence fails to show that a person other than the defendant was in the path of the defendant's vehicle or even in the same area. See A.V. v. State, 918 N.E.2d 642, 646 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding evidence of endangerment sufficient when defendant simply drove 16 miles per hour over the speed limit).

[11] The evidence showed that Green crashed his vehicle into a parked truck and then into a tree in his neighbors’ yard. When found, his foot was still on the gas pedal with the wheels spinning. In other words, Green crashed into stationary objects on his neighbors’ property without removing his foot from the accelerator, even after the collisions. Based on this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Green's intoxicated operation of the vehicle endangered himself and potentially others. See Staley v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding endangerment when defendant's intoxication resulted in unsafe driving practices).

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[12] Green also contends that his aggregate eight-year sentence is inappropriate. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if, after considering the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. We conduct this review with “substantial deference” to the trial court because the “principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers, and not to achieve a perceived correct sentence.” Scott v. State, 162 N.E.3d 578, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014)). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[13] Our 7(B) review starts with a consideration of the statutory sentencing range for the subject class of offense. Green was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor OVWI, which carries a sentence of up to one year imprisonment. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. But Green's status as a habitual vehicular substance offender allowed the trial court to enhance the sentence imposed by an additional one to eight years. Ind. Code § 9-30-15.5-2(d). Thus, Green's ultimate sentence of eight years was less than the nine-year maximum that he faced.

[14] As to the nature of the offense, this was not a “run-of-the-mill” OVWI case, contrary to Green's claim. Appellant's Br., p. 20. Green chose to drive while intoxicated despite having two prior convictions for the same conduct. In addition, Green's BAC was more than three times the legal limit. Although no one was seriously injured, Green crashed into a parked vehicle and then a tree on his neighbor's property, causing property damage. Green's actions in driving so erratically while highly intoxicated posed a significant risk to public safety.

[15] As for Green's character, his criminal history is substantial and closely related to the present offense. See generally Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that significance of criminal history depends on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense). Green has two prior OVWI convictions, which formed the basis for the habitual vehicular substance offender enhancement and prompted an expansion of his sentence from one year to seven years imprisonment. The remainder of his criminal history—including convictions for reckless homicide and criminal recklessness involving a vehicle—demonstrates a pattern of dangerous behavior involving vehicles and substances, reflecting poorly on Green's character.

[16] Given the nature of the offense and Green's character, we cannot say that his eight-year executed sentence is inappropriate. The sentence is within the statutory range and reflects the seriousness of Green's ongoing pattern of substance-related vehicular offenses.

[17] We therefore affirm Green's conviction and sentence.

affirmed

Weissmann, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.