Gina Black, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Kaytlin N. Shaffer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., and DoorDash, Inc., Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Gina Black sued Kaytlin Shaffer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (“State Farm”), and DoorDash, Inc. (“DoorDash”) after Black's and Shaffer's vehicles collided near an intersection in Munster, Indiana. Black sought to hold DoorDash vicariously liable for injuries caused by Shaffer's alleged negligence. The trial court granted DoorDash summary judgment. Black now appeals, raising the following dispositive issue: did the trial court err in granting DoorDash summary judgment? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the afternoon of July 15, 2020, Black's and Shaffer's vehicles collided after Shaffer allegedly turned in front of Black. At the time, Shaffer was a full-time college student enrolled at Purdue University Northwest and had been delivering for DoorDash for about six weeks. DoorDash is “a company that provides an online marketplace connection using web-based technology that connects contractors, restaurants and/or other businesses, and consumers.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 85. DoorDash's software “permits registered users to place orders for food and/or other goods from various restaurants and businesses,” “notifies contractors that a delivery opportunity is available,” and “facilitates completion of the delivery.” Id.

[3] Before she was eligible to deliver for DoorDash, Shaffer had to sign an “Independent Contractor Agreement” (the “Agreement”). Under the Agreement's terms, Shaffer was free to select timeframes in which she wanted to receive delivery opportunities from DoorDash and could accept or reject opportunities as she saw fit. Upon accepting a delivery opportunity, Shaffer had “the sole right to control the manner in which deliveries [were] performed and the means by which those deliveries [were] completed,” including the manner of pickup, delivery, and route selection. Id. The Agreement did not limit Shaffer's ability to work for other companies—including DoorDash's competitors—when she was not delivering for DoorDash. Nor did the Agreement require Shaffer to use a particular mode of transportation, wear certain clothing, display DoorDash signs or logos, have a specific personal appearance, or pass performance evaluations. Shaffer was, however, required to provide any equipment needed to facilitate deliveries, procure her own car insurance, and maintain a satisfactory consumer rating and completion rate. DoorDash agreed to pay Shaffer per accurate delivery, but did not withhold income taxes. The Agreement expressly classified Shaffer as an independent contractor.

[4] In 2021, Black sued Shaffer, State Farm, and DoorDash, seeking to recover damages for injuries stemming from her collision with Shaffer. Relevant here, Black sought to hold DoorDash vicariously liable for Shaffer's alleged negligence, claiming Shaffer was acting as an employee of DoorDash at the time of the accident. After discovery, DoorDash moved for summary judgment, contending it could not be vicariously liable for Shaffer's actions because Shaffer was an independent contractor and not a DoorDash employee. Alternatively, DoorDash claimed it was entitled to summary judgment even if Shaffer was its employee because Shaffer was not delivering for DoorDash at the time of the accident.

[5] In support of its summary judgment motion, DoorDash designated, among other things, an affidavit of the Manager of Analytics for Trust and Safety at DoorDash, several deposition transcripts, and a copy of the Agreement. The affidavit described activity logs collected by DoorDash purporting to show Shaffer was not logged onto the DoorDash app when she crashed with Black. Shaffer made a similar point during her first deposition, claiming she was not using the DoorDash app when she pulled in front of Black, even though she had delivered for DoorDash earlier that day. And Shaffer recalled speaking to a law enforcement officer at the crash scene but could not remember what she said to him. When asked if she might have told police she was working for DoorDash at the time, Shaffer replied, “I could have possibly said that, but I was not.” Id. at 133.

[6] Shaffer was deposed for a second time about a year later. During this deposition, Shaffer was asked whom she spoke with after the accident. Shaffer responded, “I can't really remember much right before the accident and I can't remember much right after[.] ․ It ․ all happened really quick and it kind of created a big blur in my head. All I remember is the impact ․ that's it.” Id. at 236. Shaffer could not say “100 percent for certain” whether she was making a delivery for DoorDash at the time of the accident because the accident was “kind of fuzzy” in her head. Id. at 244.

[7] In opposition to DoorDash's summary judgment motion, State Farm and Black designated, among other things, the deposition testimonies of Officer Bradley Riemerts and Scott Lescynski. Officer Riemerts spoke with Shaffer after the accident at the crash scene. Officer Riemerts shared that Shaffer told him she was “using her phone to accept a Doordash order” during the accident. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 55. Lescynski—Shaffer's boyfriend at the time of the accident—texted with Shaffer soon after the crash. According to Lescynski, Shaffer messaged him she was “doing Doordash” when she and Black crashed. Id. at 113.¹

[8] The trial court held a hearing on DoorDash's summary judgment motion. During the hearing, the trial court stated it thought the case turned on whether there was “a question of fact whether or not [Shaffer] was actually making a delivery for [DoorDash],” because “the whole issue of whether [Shaffer is] an independent contractor or an employee really is only addressed if there's some question of fact if she was making a delivery.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 23–24. The trial court granted DoorDash summary judgment, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether Shaffer was delivering for DoorDash at the time of the crash. Black now appeals, contending the trial court improperly granted DoorDash summary judgment.

Summary Judgment Standard of Review

[9] We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 684 (Ind. 2024). A party seeking summary judgment must establish “the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). In doing so, the movant must affirmatively negate the nonmovant's claim. See Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). So, “summary judgment is not a summary trial” and “it is not appropriate merely because the non-movant appears unlikely to prevail at trial.” Id. at 1003–04 (quotations omitted).

[10] When deciding whether the movant has carried its burden, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Cave Quarries, 240 N.E.3d at 685. “And ‘[a]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.’ ” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003 (quoting McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 909–10 (Ind. 2009)). We can affirm a trial court's grant of summary judgment on any basis supported by the record. See Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 408–09 (Ind. 2011).

Shaffer was an independent contractor as a matter of law.

[11] DoorDash argues it was entitled to summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Shaffer was an independent contractor, not DoorDash's employee.² Generally, a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Moberly v. Day, 757 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (Ind. 2001). Although whether one acts as an employee or an independent contractor is a question of fact, a court may properly determine a worker's classification as a matter of law if the “significant underlying facts are undisputed.” Id. Courts consider ten factors to distinguish employees from independent contractors:

(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;

(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;

(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;

(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;

(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;

(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;

(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;

(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and

(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.

Id. at 1010. We must consider all ten factors, and no single factor is dispositive. Id.; see also Palmer v. Ake, 181 N.E.3d 421, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (describing this analysis as akin to a balancing test, not a mathematical formula), trans. denied.

a. Extent of Control Over Details of the Work

[12] An employee is a person who, while performing services in the affairs of another, is subject to the other's control or right to control. See Moberly, 757 N.E.2d at 1010. Conversely, an independent contractor generally “controls the methods and details of [their] task and is answerable to the principal as to results only.” Pfadt v. Wheels Assured Delivery Sys., Inc., 200 N.E.3d 961, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation omitted). Control or right to control is “important and in many situations ․ determinative.” Moberly, 757 N.E.2d at 1010 (citation omitted); see also Wishard Mem'l Hosp. v. Kerr, 846 N.E.2d 1083, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (describing the “right to control the manner and means by which the work is to be accomplished [as] the single most important factor in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship”). Some considerations relevant to this factor include the degree to which the worker is instructed as to the particulars of how to accomplish assigned tasks, the extent to which the worker controls the methods and details of the tasks, and the degree to which the employer determines the location to perform the work and dictated the worker's schedule. See Palmer, 181 N.E.3d at 427.

[13] While delivering for DoorDash, Shaffer exclusively controlled the method and means of her work. Shaffer decided when, where, and how often she worked. And after selecting a delivery to complete, Shaffer chose the route to take to the drop-off location. She could adhere to the route provided in DoorDash's app, disregard the route, or forego GPS guidance entirely. Because DoorDash had no control over how Shaffer accomplished her work, this factor supports classifying Shaffer as an independent contractor. See Walker v. Martin, 887 N.E.2d 125, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining the evidence supported independent contractor classification of a truck driver when details like how to load his truck and which route to take when delivering logs were left to the driver's discretion), trans. denied.

b. Occupation or Business of One Employed

[14] The second factor considers whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct business or occupation. See Fam. Christian World, Inc. v. Olds, 100 N.E.3d 277, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. That is, “[i]f the employed person performs the same type of work for multiple employers, that fact weighs in favor of finding the person to be an independent contractor.” Pfadt, 200 N.E.3d at 974.

[15] At the time of the accident, Shaffer was a college student who delivered for DoorDash about twice a week. And under the Agreement's terms, Shaffer could work other jobs—including for DoorDash's competitors—when not delivering for DoorDash. This factor points toward Shaffer being an independent contractor. See Fam. Christian World, 100 N.E.3d at 284 (concluding a full-time college student who took babysitting jobs if she lacked other commitments weighed “significantly in favor” of independent contractor status).

c. Kind of Occupation

[16] “If the work is done by a specialist without supervision, this factor weighs in favor of independent contractor status.” Pfadt, 200 N.E.3d at 975. Although Shaffer performed her work without supervision, she is not a specialist. This factor is neutral.

d. Skill Required

[17] “Unskilled labor is usually performed by employees, while skilled labor is often performed by independent contractors.” Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 132. Delivering for DoorDash requires no special skill. This factor favors classifying Shaffer as an employee.

e. Supplier of Equipment, Tools, and Work Location

[18] “[I]t is particularly significant if an employer provides tools or instrumentalities of substantial value, and the same would presumably be true if the workman is the provider.” Moberly, 757 N.E.2d at 1012. This factor points toward independent contractor status if the worker provides the equipment, tools, and workplace. See Pfadt, 200 N.E.3d at 976.

[19] While completing deliveries, Shaffer drove her own car, purchased her own fuel, and maintained her own insurance. Shaffer was also responsible for obtaining any materials to aid in the delivery of orders, such as bags to keep food warm. Shaffer did not have to wear a uniform, maintain a particular personal appearance, or use DoorDash signage. Although DoorDash provided the app for accepting and managing deliveries, this factor favors Shaffer being an independent contractor.

f. Length of Employment

[20] A long-term relationship can indicate employee status, especially employment over a considerable period of time with regular hours. Moberly, 757 N.E.2d at 1012. Shaffer had been delivering for DoorDash for around six weeks by the time of the crash. Shaffer did not work regular hours, instead choosing which days to work and for how long each day. On average, Shaffer delivered food about twice per week for a couple of hours per day. This factor points toward independent contractor status.

g. Method of Payment

[21] Payment by the job rather than in the form of a salary or hourly wage is more typical of an independent contractor than of an employee. Id. Shaffer was paid per completed delivery, not by the hour. She did not have a salary, and DoorDash did not withhold income taxes. See Palmer, 181 N.E.3d at 429 (explaining an employer not withholding taxes supports a conclusion the worker was an independent contractor). True, Shaffer was typically paid weekly. Yet she had the option to be paid early for a small fee. This factor suggests Shaffer was an independent contractor.

h. Regular Business of the Employer

[22] “If the employed person is being used to further the business of the employer, this factor weighs in favor of employee status.” Pfadt, 200 N.E.3d at 977. DoorDash “provides an online marketplace connection using web-based technology that connects contractors, restaurants and/or other businesses, and consumers.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 85. Even though DoorDash's software connects restaurants and consumers, it is “not a restaurant, food delivery service, or food preparation business.” Id. At the same time, delivery is a necessary part of DoorDash's business. This factor is neutral. See Guillaume v. Hall Farms, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding this factor was neutral when harvesting melons was a necessary part of the company's melon buying and distribution business, but the company “did not engage in that endeavor” itself).

i. Belief of the Parties

[23] Whether the parties believed they were creating an employer-employee or an employer-independent contractor relationship sheds light on the relationship the parties had. Pfadt, 200 N.E.3d at 977. But “[i]t is not determinative that the parties believe or disbelieve that the relation of master and servant exists, except insofar as such belief indicates an assumption of control by the one and submission to control by the other.” Moberly, 757 N.E.2d at 1012–13 (quotation omitted). Prior to delivering for DoorDash, Shaffer signed the Agreement, the terms of which expressly consider Shaffer an independent contractor. This factor points toward classifying Shaffer as an independent contractor.

j. Whether the Principal was in Business

[24] DoorDash is in business. This factor suggests employee status. See id. at 1013.

[25] Here, the significant underlying facts related to determining whether Shaffer is DoorDash's employee or an independent contractor are undisputed. Applying these undisputed facts to all ten Moberly factors, we conclude Shaffer is properly considered an independent contractor as a matter of law. DoorDash therefore cannot be held vicariously liable for Shaffer's alleged negligence unless an exception to the general rule of nonliability applies.

No exception to the general rule of nonliability applies.

[26] Despite Shaffer's classification as an independent contractor, Black claims DoorDash should still be held vicariously liable under one of Indiana's recognized exceptions to the general rule that a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. The five exceptions are: (1) where the contract requires the performance of intrinsically dangerous work; (2) where the principal is by law or contract charged with performing the specific duty; (3) where the act will create a nuisance; (4) where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken; and (5) where the act to be performed is illegal. Bagley v. Insight Commc'ns Co., 658 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind. 1995). In Bagley, our Supreme Court explained the rationale behind these exceptions:

The duties associated with Indiana's five exceptions are considered non-delegable, and an employer will be liable for the negligence of the contractor, because the responsibilities are deemed “so important to the community” that the employer should not be permitted to transfer these duties to another. ․ The exceptions encourage the employer of the contractor to participate in the control of work covered by the exceptions in order to minimize the risk of resulting injuries.

Id. at 587–88 (citations omitted). Black argues exceptions 2, 4, and 5 apply here.

A. Specific duty by contract

[27] Black first claims DoorDash “bound itself by contract to assume responsibility for bodily injuries caused by” DoorDash delivery drivers by maintaining liability insurance policies for such injuries. Appellant's Reply Br. at 22. Black supports her contention by pointing to a provision of the insurance contracts defining the term of coverage:

For any delivery operator the term of coverage begins at the time the delivery operator accepts a delivery request made through a delivery application and begins operating a covered auto for delivery. The term of coverage ends when the delivery operator has completed the delivery request(s) made through the delivery application.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 215 (emphases removed).

[28] If a contract demonstrates an employer's intent to assume a specific duty of care, the employer may be exposed to liability for a negligence claim where no such liability would have otherwise existed. See Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 914 (Ind. 2017). Because determining the extent of a duty owed, if any, is a matter of contract interpretation, we look to the contract as a whole to determine whether a party is charged with a specific duty of care under the contract. Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 135. “For this exception to apply, a contract must provide for a specific duty of care, evidence that the duty was breached, and evidence that the breach proximately caused the injury.” Beatty v. LaFountaine, 896 N.E.2d 16, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Whether a duty exists is a pure question of law left for the court to decide. Ryan, 72 N.E.3d at 913.

[29] The provision of the insurance contracts pointed to by Black lacks any language—let alone an express statement—tied to DoorDash's intent to assume a specific duty of care as to Black, travelers on the public roadway, or even a general duty of care regarding delivery services. Moreover, a portion of the Agreement Shaffer signed with DoorDash before she was eligible to receive delivery opportunities shows DoorDash's intent to the contrary:

Contractor agrees, as a condition of doing business with DoorDash, that during the term of this Agreement, Contractor will maintain current insurance, in amounts and of types required by law to provide the Contracted Services, at his/her own expense.

* * *

Contractor agrees to indemnify, protect and hold harmless DoorDash ․ from any and all claims, demands, damages, suits, losses, liabilities and causes of action arising directly or indirectly from, as a result of or in connection with, the actions of Contractor ․ arising from the performance of delivery services under this Agreement, including personal injury or death to any person ․ as well as any liability arising from Contractor's failure to comply with the terms of this Agreement.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 88 (capitalization normalized).

[30] In essence, Black would have us hold the assumption of duty exception applies here solely because DoorDash procured liability insurance to protect itself from potential liability stemming from injuries caused by DoorDash drivers while making a delivery. We decline to do so and conclude this exception does not apply. See Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 136 (concluding this exception did not apply when a contract between a logging company and a producer of veneer wood displayed no intention on the part of the logging company to assume a specific duty as to the traffic accident victim, travelers on the public roadway, or regarding log hauling generally).

B. Due precaution

[31] Black next argues DoorDash is liable for Shaffer's alleged negligence under the “due precaution” or “peculiar risk” exception to the general rule of principal nonliability. Black claims delivering for DoorDash poses a peculiar risk of injury because “the only practical way for DoorDash [delivery drivers] to earn money on the application is to manipulate it while driving a motor vehicle.” Appellant's Reply Br. at 20.

[32] This exception focuses on “the foreseeability of the peculiar risk involved in the work and ․ the need for special precautions.” Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 588. It applies when a principal “should have foreseen that the performance of the work or the conditions under which it was to be performed would, absent precautionary measures, probably cause injury.” Id.; see also Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853, 857 (Ind. 1999) (noting that imposing an “absolute duty on the employer's part to guard against all accidents probable as well as improbable” would result in “virtual abrogation” of the general rule of nonliability) (quotation omitted). So, the mere possibility of harm is not sufficient. Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 136. Additionally, the risk involved must be “something more than the routine and predictable hazards generally associated with a given occupation: it must be a risk unique to the circumstances of a given job.” McDaniel v. Bus. Inv. Grp., 709 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[33] DoorDash could have reasonably foreseen the possibility of Shaffer causing a traffic accident and injuring a third party while delivering for DoorDash. After all, every traveler on the public roadway risks the possibility of being involved in a traffic accident each time they drive or ride in a motor vehicle. But more than the possibility of harm is required; Black had to show a probability of such harm. See Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Purvis, 691 N.E.2d 1341, 1346 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. Black made no such showing. The act of delivering for DoorDash does not in and of itself establish an injury will probably occur. See Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 137 (“While it may be possible the act of hauling logs may cause injury unless certain precautions are taken, we cannot say that the act in and of itself establishes that injury will probably occur.”). The due precaution exception therefore does not apply.

C. Illegal acts

[34] Lastly, Black argues the exception for illegal acts should apply because “[i]t would be impractical for a [DoorDash delivery driver] to earn money through DoorDash without manipulating their cellphone while operating a motor vehicle, which is both dangerous and against Indiana law.” Appellant's Reply Br. at 21 (asserting the DoorDash application “requires” such conduct); see also I.C. § 9-21-8-59 (2020) (making it unlawful to hold or use a telecommunications device while operating or moving a motor vehicle). But the act of delivering for DoorDash is not itself illegal. And Shaffer signed the Agreement, which included a provision that she would complete the contracted work in a “timely, efficient, safe, and lawful manner.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 85. Although some DoorDash delivery drivers may seek to maximize earnings by manipulating the app while driving, such conduct is neither required nor sanctioned by DoorDash. See Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 137 (explaining the illegal act exception “requires the knowledge and sanctioning of the illegal act at the time of contracting by the owner”) (citation omitted). This exception therefore does not apply.

Conclusion

[35] Because Shaffer was an independent contractor as a matter of law and no exception to the general rule that a principal is not vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor applies, DoorDash was entitled to summary judgment.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We agree with Black that the trial court erred in classifying portions of Officer Riemerts’ and Lescynski's testimonies as inadmissible hearsay. Shaffer's statements to Officer Riemerts and Lescynski were not hearsay and should have been considered by the trial court when determining whether to grant DoorDash summary judgment. See Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(A) (“[A] statement is not hearsay if ․ [t]he statement is offered against an opposing party and ․ was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity[.]”). We also agree with Black that if these statements were properly considered, they create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Shaffer was making a delivery for DoorDash at the time of the accident, thereby precluding summary judgment on this basis. That said, the wrongfully excluded evidence has no bearing on our determination of whether the undisputed evidence shows Shaffer was an independent contractor or a DoorDash employee.

2.   Three years after the accident underlying this case, our General Assembly passed legislation classifying delivery network company drivers connected to a delivery network company's digital network as independent contractors of the delivery network company, not employees or agents of the company. See Ind. Code § 8-2.1-19.3-2(1) (2023).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Felix concur. Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.