CAWEIN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jennifer Cawein appeals her conviction for Class B misdemeanor battery by bodily waste, arguing the evidence is insufficient to support it. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The evidence most favorable to the judgment is as follows. In September 2023, Cawein was staying at the Comfort Inn South in Indianapolis. On the last day of her stay, Cawein remained in her room past check-out time. Denisse Whiteside, the front-desk agent, called Cawein and told her to leave because she hadn't paid for another night. Cawein went to the front desk, and when Whiteside asked her to leave the hotel, she “was irate” and “started cussing” at Whiteside. Tr. p. 49. Whiteside notified the hotel manager, Michael King, that Cawein was refusing to leave. King came to the front desk and told Cawein she was no longer allowed on the property. Cawein “got very loud and very aggressive” and started moving toward King and yelling profanities at him. Id. at 32. She had her belongings on a luggage cart, and when King told her she couldn't take the cart with her and would have to remove her belongings from it, Cawein “leaned forward” until her face was “around a foot” away from King's and “sp[a]t directly at” him, hitting him in the face, on the side of his head, and on his glasses. Id. at 34, 35. King ushered Cawein out the front door of the hotel and blocked the doorway. Once outside, Cawein spat on King again, this time “fully on the side of [his] head.” Id. at 35. Cawein eventually turned and walked away, and King followed her through the parking lot to ensure she left the property. When police arrived, King told them Cawein spat on him twice and “hit him” on the shoulder. Ex. A.

[3] The State charged Cawein with Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury and Class B misdemeanor battery by bodily waste. A bench trial was held in July 2024. King testified as detailed above. When the State asked if either of the spitting incidents could have been “any type of accident of some amount of spittle coming out,” King answered, “No, sir. It was entirely intentional. She even kind of revved up before she released.” Tr. p. 36. King explained that when he was following Cawein through the parking lot to ensure she left the property, she “turned and shoved [him] in the arm and shoulder.” Id. at 35. Whiteside testified that she witnessed both spitting incidents and described the bodily fluid that landed on King the first time as a “loogie.” Id. at 52.

[4] Cawein testified in her own defense. She admitted that she “sa[id] some vulgar words” to King but denied spitting on him. Id. at 65. She claimed that when she was leaving the hotel, King was “chasing [her] across the parking lot” and “charging after [her]” and that “it felt like [she] was a victim.” Id. at 65, 66.

[5] The trial court found Cawein guilty of Class B misdemeanor battery by bodily waste but not guilty of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, finding that it was “unclear as far as what kind the physical contact was. Was it a rude, insolent or angry touching or was it something else that was simply reactive given the heightened tensions between both parties?” Id. at 80. The court sentenced Cawein to time served.

[6] Cawein now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Cawein contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for battery by bodily waste. When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. Id. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] To convict Cawein of Class B misdemeanor battery as charged here, the State had to prove that she knowingly or intentionally, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, placed bodily fluid on King. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(2); Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. Cawein contends the State failed to prove that she knowingly or intentionally spat on King. Pointing to her testimony at trial that she did not spit on him, she claims “any release of spit or bodily fluids” during her argument with King “was unintentional.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. But the only evidence supporting this claim is Cawein's own self-serving testimony, which the trial court was free to disbelieve. See Fitzgerald v. State, 26 N.E.3d 105, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Contrary to Cawein's version of events, King testified that Cawein leaned forward until her face was about a foot away from his, “revved up,” and spat directly at him, hitting him in the face, on the side of his head, and on his glasses. And Whiteside, whom the trial court found to be “very credible in her testimony,” Tr. p. 79, testified that Cawein spat a “loogie” in King's face. This evidence is sufficient to show that Cawein intentionally spat on King.

[9] In the alternative, Cawein argues that even if she did knowingly or intentionally spit on King, she did so in self-defense. The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002).

[10] Indiana's self-defense statute provides that a person is justified in using reasonable force against another to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must show: (1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he acted without fault; and (3) he was protecting himself from what he reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful force. Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Once a defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt for the defendant's claim to fail. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Id.

[11] There is sufficient evidence to disprove Cawein's self-defense claim. Cawein claims she “reasonably felt a threat to herself from [King].” Appellant's Br. p. 9. She doesn't pinpoint what “threat” she allegedly perceived from King, but the only evidence she references is that the two of them were in a “heated confrontation ․ in close proximity” and her own testimony that King was “charging after [her].” Appellant's Br. p. 9. But, again, the trial court was not required to believe Cawein's self-serving testimony. See Fitzgerald, 26 N.E.3d at 110. Further, Cawein does not argue that she believed King was imminently going to use unlawful force. Nor could she—King merely told her to leave the hotel and followed her through the parking lot to ensure she left the property.

[12] In any event, any belief Cawein had that she needed to use force was not reasonable. “[A] claim of self defense has both subjective and objective components, as follows: (1) a defendant must have actually believed that the use of force was necessary to protect himself or herself; and (2) the belief must have been one that a reasonable person would have held under the circumstances.” Schermerhorn v. State, 61 N.E.3d 375, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. A reasonable person under the circumstances here would not have believed that force was necessary—and a reasonable person certainly would not have believed it was necessary to spit on King. As the trial court put it, “There would be nothing that would justify in that scenario being spit upon.” Tr. p. 79. The State sufficiently rebutted Cawein's self-defense claim.

[13] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Crone, Sr. J., concur.