HENRY v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] John Henry (“Henry”) was convicted of murder,¹ a felony, after a jury trial and was sentenced to fifty-five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Henry challenges his sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Tara Smith (“Smith”) and Henry were in a romantic relationship that began around 2017. Smith and Henry had two children, L.H.M. and E.H.M, who resided with Smith and Henry at his parents’ townhome. In October 2020, Smith, who had a history of substance abuse and suicidal thoughts, was briefly hospitalized because she expressed suicidal thoughts and ideations.

[3] Days later, Henry corresponded via text message with Smith's mother, Tina Morgan (“Morgan”). When Morgan asked how Smith was doing, Henry said, “Ugh. I'm reaching my limit.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 153. Morgan asked if Smith “can go to the methadone clinic or if she's doing okay ․?” Id. at 154. Henry responded to Morgan, “I'm so ․ tired, broken, and over it. I don't even know. LOL Ha, ha, ha. Can't take this much more with her.” Id. Henry further stated, “All she cares about is herself. Ugh. ․ I will not let my children be subjected to Tara's ridiculous bull crap. And wow, she cheated on me as well with [someone]. Over the drama. Don't know how to handle this. I'm over it.” Id. Henry also said, “I'm growing tired and weak from this bullsh[*]t, that I don't know what to do but to cut her out of our lives. Ugh.” Id.

[4] On October 27, 2020, officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) responded to a 911 call at the Henry family townhome. Upon arrival, the responding officer approached the front door, and a gentleman “opened the door and said that upstairs his daughter-in-law or son's girlfriend had shot herself.” Id. at 107. The officer noticed that there was a man, later identified as Henry, positioned near “a female” and “was crying.” Id. The responding officer determined that Smith suffered a gunshot wound to the chest. Id. at 111. Thereafter, Detective Steven Gray (“Detective Gray”) responded to the scene. Detective Gray briefly spoke to E.H.M. and L.H.M, Henry's parents, and Henry, who was transported to the homicide office for a more formal interview. Henry ultimately participated in several interviews with law enforcement. Henry gave his first recorded interview on the morning of October 28, 2020.

[5] During the course of the investigation, law enforcement determined that the physical evidence recovered from the scene did not match the narrative Henry relayed to detectives during his first recorded interview. Detective Gray conducted a second interview with Henry, after which Henry was arrested for the murder of Smith.

[6] On November 22, 2021, the State charged Henry with murder, a felony. A jury trial was held from January 9–10, 2024, with the jury returning a guilty verdict. On February 23, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Henry offered several mitigating factors, including that the circumstances that led to the shooting were unlikely to recur and that Henry had led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time prior to the shooting. Henry argued that the offense largely stemmed from Henry and Smith's turbulent relationship, each of them having struggled with addiction and mental health issues. In pronouncing Henry's sentence, the trial court referenced the substance abuse and mental health issues suffered by both Henry and Smith and stated “Mr. Henry had his own demons. And unfortunately, when two people have demons get together, it brings out the worst in each other.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 92. Furthermore, the trial court found that Henry's criminal history was an aggravator, referencing his “nine arrests, three misdemeanor convictions, two felony convictions, significant arrest history.” Id. at 92–93. The trial court also considered as a “substantial aggravator” that the crime occurred in front of Henry's children. Id. at 93. The trial court identified one mitigator, Henry's poor physical health, noting that “we have a 52[-]year-old man who's on oxygen.” Id. The court also took note of Henry's history of alcoholism, which it determined “ha[d] appeared to trigger this event.” Id. The court added, “I don't consider that a mitigator, perhaps merely an explanation.” Id. The trial court ultimately sentenced Henry to fifty-five years executed in the DOC. Henry now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Henry argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because he alleges that the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating factors. Indiana courts have long held that “sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion “where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Guillen v. State, 829 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). When it comes to selecting a sentence, the trial court “must consider all evidence of mitigating factors offered by a defendant[.]” Guzman v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1125, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. 2002)). At the same time, “the finding of mitigating factors rests within the court's discretion.” Id. A court abuses its discretion with respect to mitigators if the court “omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration.” Higginson v. State, 209 N.E.3d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). To establish reversible error premised on the omission of a mitigating factor, the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Guzman, 985 N.E.2d at 1133 (citing Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999)). Notably, however, “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (citing Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).

[8] Henry first asserts that the trial court should have identified as a mitigating factor that the circumstances that led to Smith's murder were unlikely to recur. Henry characterized Smith as being plagued by serious mental health and substance abuse issues which caused Henry to be “tired, broken and confused over everything,” and influenced his actions. Appellant's Br. p. 14. However, the trial court did consider that both Henry and Smtih were struggling with mental health issues, stating the following at the sentencing hearing.

In preparing for this sentencing, I do agree wholeheartedly with what Miss Wall said. I just -- the term “they both had issues” comes to mind. [Smith] was struggling -- I believe we can all agree with that -- with some demons. Mr. Henry had his own demons. And unfortunately when two people have demons get together, it brings out the worst in each other.

Tr. Vol. 3 p. 92.

The trial court's statement reveals that it thoughtfully considered Henry's offered mitigating circumstances but failed to specifically characterize them as a mitigating factor. We are unpersuaded that doing so was an abuse of discretion. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (“If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.”). The trial court's failure to specifically identify Henry's offered mitigator was not an abuse of discretion.

[9] Henry next argues that the trial court should have identified as a mitigating factor that “[he] led a law-abiding life for ․ a substantial period before the crime” and that there's “no violence in his criminal history.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. The record reflects that Henry had an extensive criminal history beginning at the age of seventeen. Henry focuses on evidence that he has no history of violence and highlights his “five convictions for operating while intoxicated, two of which included possession of marijuana.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Further, Henry argues that his last arrest was on April 15, 2012, eight and a half years prior to committing this crime on October 27, 2020. Henry has also argued that he had previously performed well while incarcerated and on probation.²

[10] This is not a situation where the trial court failed to consider Henry's criminal history. To the contrary, the trial court expressly identified Henry's criminal history as a significant aggravator. The trial court reflected that Henry's criminal history includes “․ nine arrests, three misdemeanor convictions, two felony convictions, significant arrest history, ․” Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 92–93. In short, Henry claims on appeal that the trial court should have focused on more favorable aspects of his criminal history. However, this argument distills to a contention that the trial court erred in weighing Henry's criminal history when deciding upon a sentence, and the relative weight or value assignable to proffered mitigators or aggravators is not subject to review for an abuse of discretion. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. To the extent Henry argues that his last arrest was eight and a half years prior to committing this crime, this argument is unpersuasive. The record reveals that this span of time was actually shorter as Henry violated his community corrections placement for the prior offenses and was ordered to serve his suspended sentence in the DOC, with a release date in June 2014. Therefore, the period of time since being released from the DOC was actually a little more than six years, rather than the eight and half years as argued. Further, Henry admitted to using marijuana daily at the time of his arrest for the present offense. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to find that Henry led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time as a mitigating factor.

[11] Henry has failed to establish that the mitigating evidence at issue was significant and clearly supported by the record. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Henry.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(a).

2.   However, to the extent that Henry argues that, based on his past performance while incarcerated and on probation, his offense is unlikely to recur, he has waived that argument because he did not raise that argument to the trial court. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion with respect to this proffered mitigator. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 492 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Foley, Judge.

Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.