GRIFFIN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jeremy Vondale Griffin appeals his conviction for intimidation as a level 6 felony and claims the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 22, 2023, South Bend Police Officer Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., transported Griffin to the St. Joseph County Jail. Griffin was “[v]ery aggressive” and “was hitting his head against [the] Plexiglass cage in the back.” Transcript Volume II at 7. Griffin “called [Officer Rodriguez] vulgar names throughout the entire transport and at the jail.” Id. Griffin told Officer Rodriguez that “he'd f--- [his] ass up, he'd whoop [his] ass, he'd f--- [his] daughter.” Id. At the jail, Griffin “kept standing up,” and Officer Rodriguez believed Griffin was trying to intimidate him. Id. at 8. Griffin had a “very aggressive demeanor.” Id. Officer Rodriguez believed that Griffin was going to assault him and feared for his daughter. Griffin “was saying the N-word.” Id. at 16. He said Officer Rodriguez “was a b---- and said he would f--- [him] up.” Id. at 18. Officer Rodriguez was concerned that, after Griffin was released, he would carry out the threats against his family members.

[3] The State charged Griffin with strangulation as a level 6 felony, intimidation as a level 6 felony, and domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. The trial court, at the State's request, dismissed the strangulation and domestic battery charges. The court held a bench trial. Officer Rodriguez testified to the foregoing. He testified that, “[w]hen I had first come into contact with [Griffin] he was extremely calm and collected,” “[h]e got super angry once the victim of the original charge identified him,” and “from then on he was extremely aggressive.” Id. at 7. He testified, “[Griffin] stated multiple times on my dead wife and on my dead daughter, that I'm yelling.” Id. He testified: “I believed he was going to assault me. At the time I feared for my daughter's life also.” Id. at 9. Griffin testified “I was just frustrated, just talking. He [was] arresting me. I was just taking my anger out.” Id. at 32. He testified that he was not intending to place Officer Rodriguez in fear or to threaten him.

[4] The trial court stated:

I do infer, that the intent was to place Officer Rodriguez in fear that [Griffin] would, in fact, carry out those threats․ I just don't find a situation in which you can say the things that you said to that officer and expect that that officer is not going to -- that you're not intending to place that officer in fear that you would do those things at some point. I recognize what you are saying that they were statements made in anger that you didn't mean it that way. But they were very specific, very direct, directed at his children, his daughter specifically, a very specific statement about what you were going to do to her. And very specific statements about dead family members. From my perspective, there's only one way that those statements can be construed and that is that you intended to place [the] officer in fear that you would do those things. So I am going to find that the State met its burden of proof.

Id. at 52. The court found Griffin guilty.

Discussion

[5] Griffin asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for intimidation. He argues that, while his statements were vulgar and rude, he testified that it was intent to express his frustration and dissatisfaction and not to place Officer Rodriguez in fear.

[6] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[7] A person commits intimidation as a level 6 felony when he communicates a threat with the intent that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out and the threat is to commit a forcible felony. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4); (b)(1)(A). A forcible felony means a felony “that involves the use or threat of force against a human being, or in which there is imminent danger of bodily injury to a human being.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-138. A threat means “an expression, by words or action, of an intention to,” among other things, “(1) unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property; (2) unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or restraint; [or] (3) commit a crime.” Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(c).

[8] Whether a communication is a threat is an objective question for the trier of fact. Newell v. State, 7 N.E.3d 367, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “The intent that matters is not whether the speaker really means to carry out the threat, but only whether he intends it to place the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 963 (Ind. 2014) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077 (2015). Intent is a mental function which must be determined from a consideration of the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual consequences of such conduct, and the trier of fact must usually resort to reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Hendrix v. State, 615 N.E.2d 483, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

[9] The record reveals that Griffin was very aggressive and threatened to assault Officer Rodriguez and his family. The court heard testimony from Officer Rodriguez regarding Griffin's statements, demeanor, and body language. Officer Rodriguez and Griffin were thoroughly questioned and cross-examined. Based upon the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value exists from which the court could determine that Griffin intended that Officer Rodriguez be placed in fear that his threats would be carried out and thus that Griffin committed intimidation as a level 6 felony.

[10] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Griffin's conviction.

[11] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.