DEYOUNG v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Roy DeYoung Jr. committed Level 6 felony Escape after being arrested for, but before being discharged from, a term of imprisonment for committing an unrelated crime. In both causes of action, the sentences for each crime had been enhanced under our habitual offender laws. DeYoung contends that the trial court misapplied concurrent sentencing in its latest sentencing order when it failed to give him credit against his new Habitual Offender enhancement for time he served on a Habitual Vehicle Substance Offender enhancement prior to committing Escape. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 25, 2021, under cause number 79D06-2107-F6-646 (“F6-646”), DeYoung pled guilty to Level 6 felony Operating a Vehicle with an ACE of .15 or More with a prior conviction ¹ and admitted he was a habitual vehicular substance offender (“HVSO”).² On September 10, 2021, the trial court entered an agreed sentence of two years, enhanced by three years for the HVSO sentencing enhancement.

[3] On November 18, 2023, DeYoung was serving his sentence in F6-646 on home detention when he removed his electronic monitoring or GPS tracking device. On November 30, 2023, under cause number 79D06-2311-F6-1167 (“F6-1167”), the State charged DeYoung with Level 6 felony Escape ³ , and filed an information alleging DeYoung was a habitual offender (“HO”).⁴ On May 1, 2024, DeYoung agreed to plead guilty. The agreement provided he would receive a six-year sentence for Escape, based on a two-year sentence for the Level 6 felony being enhanced by four years for the HO adjudication.

[4] On May 22, 2024, the trial court conducted a sentencing at which the parties argued the concurrent and consecutive nature of the sentence in relation to F6-646. DeYoung's counsel contended that the habitual enhancements must run concurrently, with the new habitual enhancement in F6-1167 backtracked to the date the old habitual enhancement began, “[o]therwise per case law it is unauthorized double enhancement.”⁵ Tr. Vol. 2 at 30. Following the hearing, the trial court issued a sentencing order,⁶ ordering the underlying felonies to run consecutively ⁷ and the HO in F6-1167 to run concurrently to the HVSO in F6-646, with concurrence starting on May 22, 2024.

Discussion and Decision

[5] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when a sentencing decision is “ ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006) (quoting In re L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). A trial court may abuse its discretion when the reasons given for a sentence are improper as a matter of law. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. We review questions of law de novo. Temme v. State, 169 N.E.3d 857, 859 (Ind. 2021).

[6] Our Indiana Supreme Court has observed that “sentencing is a creature of the legislature and we are limited to sentences that have been expressly permitted by the legislature.” Wilson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). “Courts are limited to imposing sentences that are authorized by statute, rather than only being limited to sentences that are not prohibited by statute.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).

[7] DeYoung argues that the trial court abused its discretion because concurrency requires his F6-1167 HO enhancement to be backdated, or credited, as if the HO enhancement started on the day he began the HVSO enhancement in F6-646. In other words, DeYoung's contention focuses on the meaning of “concurrent.”⁸

[8] Indiana does not recognize the concept of pre-offense credit. According to DeYoung, running the enhancements concurrently would require backdating his F6-1167 enhancement to the effective date of the HVSO in F6-646, entitling him to receive almost one year's worth of credit time for the F6-1167 enhancement despite the fact that DeYoung had not even committed the Escape at issue in F6-1167 at that time. Nothing about the word “concurrent” or the nature of concurrent sentencing schemes suggests this would be an appropriate or necessary result, nor has our legislature expressed support for such a result. In fact, DeYoung's position regarding the application of concurrence would utterly fail to support the purpose of habitual offender enhancements, which “ ‘is to more severely penalize those persons whom prior sanctions have failed to deter from committing felonies’ ” and other tailored repetitive offenses with respect to specialized habitual offender statutes. Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 93-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Baker v. State, 425 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. 1981)). DeYoung's contention that concurrent habitual offender enhancements must wholly overlap to be concurrent, which would require backdating offenses and affording habitual offenders with pre-offense credit, defies language, law, and logic.

Conclusion

[9] The trial court did not err when it refused to give DeYoung credit against his HO enhancement in F6-1167 for time he served on the HVSO enhancement in F6-646 prior to committing the Escape at issue in F6-1167. As his argument fails, we affirm the trial court.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 9-30-5-1(b), -3(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2.

3.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-4(c)(2).

4.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

5.   DeYoung also framed his position as necessitating “credit time” or “recycling” part of a latter, overlapping habitual enhancement to effectuate concurrent habitual enhancements. Tr. Vol. 2 at 30.

6.   The trial court issued its sentencing order on May 22, 2024, and amended this order on May 24, 2024, to reflect the concurrent and consecutive nature of the sentence.

7.   DeYoung does not challenge the trial court's consecutive sentencing of his underlying felonies.

8.   DeYoung and the State agree that Indiana law mandates the imposition of concurrent habitual enhancements in this case. See Starks v. State, 523 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ind. 1988) (holding that the purpose and process of the general felony habitual offender statute, I.C. § 35-50-2-8, has “special and distinct dimensions,” and that absent express statutory authority to consecutively tack such habitual offender sentences, which the statutes at issue did not contain, there is no such authority). Breaston v. State, 907 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 2009) (holding that habitual offender enhancements must run concurrently even when attached to a crime for which a consecutive sentence is mandatory under I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d), which is now I.C. § 35-50-1-2(e)). Young v. State, 57 N.E.3d 857, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (applying the rationale of Starks and Breaston to the repeat sexual offender enhancement and holding: “Just as there is no express statutory authorization for stacking general habitual offender enhancements, there is likewise no authorization for stacking general and specialized habitual offender enhancements.”).

DeBoer, Judge.

May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.