IN RE: A.M.C. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.C. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of A.M.C. (“Child”), who was born on November 27, 2023. At the time of Child's birth, Mother and K.C. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) had two other children (“Siblings”)¹ who had been removed from their care and had been found to be children in need of services (“CHINS”). On December 1, 2023, due to a positive test for marijuana while Mother was pregnant with Child, concerns about the conditions of Parents’ home, and a history of domestic violence between Parents, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS. Mother contends on appeal that the evidence presented during the fact-finding hearing was insufficient to support the juvenile court's CHINS determination and, alternatively, that the juvenile court violated her due-process rights by not allowing her to cross-examine a witness during the emergency detention hearing.² Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] DCS initially became involved with the family in July of 2023, after which Siblings “were removed and placed out of the home due to home conditions and concerns with the parenting of those children.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23. Parents stipulated that Siblings were CHINS. DCS discovered that Mother was pregnant with Child while Siblings’ cases were pending.

[3] While pregnant with Child, Mother tested positive for marijuana. Father also tested positive for marijuana, and Parents made “very little progress” towards reunification with Siblings. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Throughout Siblings’ CHINS case and Mother's pregnancy, Parents continued to reside in a trailer that had been found to be inappropriate housing for children, but the trailer burned down around the time of Child's birth. After their trailer burned down, Parents’ housing was unstable.

[4] A few days after Child's birth, on December 1, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. In its petition, DCS alleged that Parents (1) were subject to ongoing CHINS proceedings involving Siblings, (2) had both tested positive for marijuana during Mother's pregnancy, (3) lacked stable housing, and (4) had a history of domestic violence. Based on these allegations, DCS asserted that court intervention was necessary to ensure that Child's needs were met. During a multi-day fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court heard evidence of Parents’ drug use, domestic-violence concerns, Parents’ continued housing instability, Parents’ lack of employment, and Mother's untreated mental-health issues. The juvenile court also heard evidence indicating that Mother lacked the necessary parenting skills to care for a newborn. On March 4, 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. The juvenile court subsequently issued a dispositional order in which it ordered Mother to complete certain services.

Discussion and Decision

[5] The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that when deciding whether a child is a CHINS,

[j]uvenile court judges are often faced with the challenge of balancing multiple factors and multiple voices․. Judges must uphold the due process rights of parents, apply the proper law, and take into account recommendations and input from the court appointed special advocate (CASA), DCS, parents, step-parents, guardians, grandparents, the child, and often several attorneys. By their very nature, these cases do not fit neatly defined guidelines.

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2012).

[6] The juvenile court found that Child is a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides that

[a] child is a [CHINS] if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. “That final element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)) (emphases omitted).

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[7] In challenging the juvenile court's CHINS adjudication, Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's determination that coercive court intervention was necessary.

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

[8] Mother acknowledges that “[m]any of the [juvenile] court's factual findings were summaries of the testimony from witnesses and recitations of the exhibits that were admitted into evidence.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. Mother argues, however, that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's CHINS determination because it was insufficient to prove endangerment to Child or that court intervention was necessary. In making this argument, Mother challenges the juvenile court's conclusions regarding housing, her ability to provide adequate care for Child, her unresolved mental-health and substance-abuse issues, and Siblings’ CHINS cases.

A. Housing Instability

[9] With regard to housing, the juvenile court concluded as follows:

35. The Court finds that housing issues are still a concern with the parents. While some level of relocation is understandable given the loss of their home due to the fire, the number of relocations gives the Court concern that there is ongoing housing instability.

36. Additionally, the conditions of both the homes that parents were residing in the longest during the last 6 months were not appropriate for the Child to live in by the Parents’ own admission to DCS, and parents refused to allow DCS to see the homes to verify.

37. Mother consistently argued that she had no plans to ever bring the Child into either home, but that she always intended to live with her grandfather with the Child. This then raises the question of why Mother was residing in housing that was not appropriate to have the Child in in the first place, especially in light of the fact that her two other children are also removed.

38. Mother's credibility of her testimony as to where she might live with this child is questionable[.] While the Court does not believe Mother's testimony to be deliberately untrue, her actions do not match up with her statements. Until recently, she lived with Father in housing that she felt was inappropriate for a Child, and never attempted, until after the fact finding began, to live in the home she felt was appropriate. She now claims she will live with her grandfather, but there has been some testimony that [M]other herself has battered grandfather in the past. The Court does not find her testimony credible as to her future plans to live with grandfather.

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41. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the family is unlikely to remedy their housing issues without coercive intervention of the Court.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. In challenging the juvenile court's conclusion that court intervention was necessary to help the family resolve their housing issues, Mother does not challenge the conclusions specifically, or the factual findings supporting these conclusions. The juvenile court's findings, therefore, must be accepted as true. See M.M. v. A.C., 160 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (providing that unchallenged factual findings must be accepted as true). Mother merely points to her own self-serving testimony that she planned to live with Child with her grandfather and grandfather's testimony that he would allow Mother and Child to reside with him. As the juvenile court stated, it did not find Mother's testimony in this regard to be credible. It was for the juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, to make such credibility determinations. See generally Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 320 (Ind. 1993) (providing that it is for the trier-of-fact to determine which witnesses to believe or disbelieve).

[10] Mother's reliance on In re K.S., 78 N.E.3d 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), is unavailing. In K.S., we concluded that the evidence did not support the juvenile court's determination that the mother had failed to remedy her housing stability issues, noting that the evidence indicated that the mother had resided in stable housing with a family member for several months prior to the fact-finding hearing and any concern that the mother may leave that housing was mere speculation. 78 N.E.3d at 745. In this case, however, Mother had never actually obtained stable housing. She had previously promised DCS that she would reside at grandfather's house but had broken that promise by continuing to live in unsuitable housing with Father, even after Siblings had been removed from her care. Again, the juvenile court was in the best position to determine whether Mother's testimony that she would reside with grandfather was credible, with the juvenile court finding otherwise. Mother's challenge to the juvenile court's conclusions regarding the family's housing instability effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

B. Ability to Provide Care

[11] Mother also challenges the juvenile court's conclusion that, without court intervention, she lacked the ability to provide adequate care for Child. In this regard, the juvenile court concluded as follows:

42. Additionally, the testimony of all of those that have observed the visits have illustrated that the parents continue to need interventions to provide for the basic needs of the Child.

43. This gives the Court concern with returning the Child to [P]arents’ care at this time.

44. For the Child to continue to be removed from the home, the intervention of the Court is necessary.

45. Mother and [F]ather both need help with the basics of parenting a newborn child. The Court does not believe either parent is capable of properly feeding, cleaning or supervising this newborn child. The coercive intervention of this Court is necessary to assist these parents in getting services to correct these concerns.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. In making these conclusions, the juvenile court found as follows:

27. The [DCS family case manager (“FCM”)], CASA, and visit supervisor all noted concerns with Mother's ability to parent the Child. Specifically, it was noted that Mother needed to be prompted to initiate basic care for the Child, that she needed direction in ensuring the Child was cleaned after changing his diaper, and to ensure the Child was eating properly.

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34. Multiple witnesses testified that [Mother] lacked parenting skills for this newborn. During current visits, [Mother] has trouble feeding [Child] and does an inadequate job of getting [Child] clean after changing a dirty diaper. She has a history of feeding the other two children “baby bird style” by chewing up chips herself and then placing them into the mouths of the children. All three children are still on formula.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. Mother does not specifically challenge the juvenile court's findings on this point, which must be accepted as true. See A.C., 160 N.E.3d at 1135. She merely argues that “[i]t is not uncommon for young parents—especially those under scrutiny in supervised settings—to need occasional coaching by more experienced caregivers.․ [Mother's] need for support in specific parenting tasks does not justify the conclusion that she cannot independently care for her child.” Appellant's Br. pp. 15–16.

[12] We disagree with Mother's assertion that the juvenile court's concerns about her ability to provide adequate care for Child are speculative. The juvenile court outlined concerns regarding feeding and general hygiene. These concerns were supported by evidence indicating that Child had developed a serious diaper rash after Mother had failed to adequately clean him during a diaper change and that Child had developed a urinary tract infection or possible staph infection after a visit with Mother. Mother's argument on appeal again amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

C. Mental-Health and Substance-Abuse Issues

[13] Mother also argues that the juvenile court's conclusions regarding her mental-health and substance-abuse issues are not sufficient to prove that court intervention was necessary. With regard to these factors, the juvenile court concluded as follows:

46. The Court also believes Mother would benefit from therapy not only to address her own needs but to better herself as a parent. From the testimony given, the Court has concern[s] that Mother would not fully follow through with therapy without the intervention of the Court.

47. Mother is also in need of mental health treatment and assistance with her anger issues. As stated earlier, by her own admission she is bipolar, schizophrenic and has anger issues. At the present time, she is not being treated for any of these concerns. Mother needs the coercive intervention of this Court to help her get treatment, medication and other services for these mental health and anger issues.

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49. Finally, while substance abuse alone does not make a Child a CHINS, the Court finds that the ongoing substance use in this case is at least, in part, a contributing factor to the conditions and needs to be addressed. Specifically, the Court is concerned with Mother testing positive for THC after she knew she was pregnant with the Child, and for Father testing positive for methamphetamine, as well as testing positive for THC on the same day as a Fact[-]Finding Hearing regarding his child, which calls into question whether he was under the influence of THC while in Court.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 26–27. With regard to these conclusions, the juvenile court found as follows:

29. Both Mother and Father tested positive for illegal substances prior to the birth of the Child, and after the birth of the Child. Mother tested positive once in September after she knew she was pregnant, and for THC after the Child's birth.․

30. Mother admitted taking marijuana after [Child] was born but said she took it “on accident”.

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32. During testimony, the Court heard that Mother has multiple mental health and behavioral problems. [Mother] admitted she was Bipolar, Schizophrenic and has anger issues. She has been on medication for these in the past and has gone to anger management classes. Morn is currently not on any mental health medications or taking any type of anger management.

33. The Cour[t] did hear testimony from DCS case worker Joni Garrett that Mother would “hit and kick” her 80[-]year[-]old grandfather when he refused to give her money. This is the same grandfather's home where she claims she is planning on living with the Child if it is returned to her.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25.

[14] Mother asserts that she demonstrated clear insight into her mental-health needs during the evidentiary hearing and that the juvenile court's conclusion that she would benefit from therapy was “vague.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. Mother asserts that she had expressed a willingness to engage in therapy and to seek treatment for her mental-health issues without court intervention.³ While Mother may have expressed such a willingness, she does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that, as of the date of the fact-finding hearing, her mental-health remained were untreated. Again, this unchallenged fact must be accepted as true. See A.C., 160 N.E.3d at 1135. Mother claims that her mental-health issues and the fact that she tested positive for drugs on two occasions do not, without more, support the juvenile court's CHINS determination. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that neither of these factors alone would support a CHINS determination, these are not the only two factors relied on by the juvenile court in finding Child to be a CHINS. Mother's arguments in this regard effectively amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

D. Other Ongoing CHINS Case

[15] Mother last argues that “[t]he circumstances surrounding [Siblings’] case are not directly applicable to [Child's] situation[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 18. In finding Child to be a CHINS, the juvenile court noted that Parents “had yet to remedy the parenting concerns raised regarding the other children.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. The record indicates that Siblings had been removed from Parents care due to poor home conditions and concerns with Mother's ability to parent them. These same issues were raised as concerns regarding Child. Mother has cited no authority that it was inappropriate for the juvenile court to take note of Mother's other ongoing CHINS action when the facts of this case indicate that, despite services having been offered in that other case, many of the same issues remain. We cannot say that the juvenile court erred in noting Mother's other pending CHINS action. See generally, Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005) (noting in the context of the termination of parental rights, that while a termination determination should be based on the parent's ability to provide adequate care at the time of the hearing, a juvenile court must consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a future probability of future neglect or deprivation).

II. Due-Process

[16] Mother alternatively contends that the juvenile court violated her due-process rights by denying her the ability to cross-examine FCM Joni Garrett during the emergency detention hearing. In making this alternate contention, Mother acknowledges that “[i]t is unlikely that the failure to allow [Mother] to cross-examine the FCM during the [emergency] detention portion of the ․ hearing will result in a reversal.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. She argues, nonetheless, that “this case offers an opportunity to clarify what rights are afforded to a parent at this critical stage of the proceedings.” Appellant's Br. pp. 22–23.

[17] Due process requires “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)]. We have previously written that the process due in a termination of parental rights action turns on balancing three Mathews factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (2011). We hold these same factors apply to a due process analysis of a CHINS adjudication.

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1257.

[18] With regard to emergency detention hearings, Indiana Code section 31-34-5-1 provides as follows:

(a) If a child taken into custody ․ is not released, a detention hearing shall be held not later than forty-eight (48) hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and any day on which a legal holiday is observed for state employees․, after the child is taken into custody. If the detention hearing is not held, the child shall be released. Notice of the time, place, and purpose of the detention hearing shall be given to the following:

(1) The child.

(2) The child's parent, guardian, or custodian if the person can be located.

(3) Each foster parent or other caretaker with whom the child has been placed for temporary care[.]

(b) The court shall:

(1) provide a person who is required to be notified under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3) an opportunity to be heard; and

(2) allow a person described in subdivision (1) to make recommendations to the court;

at the detention hearing.

(c) A petition alleging that a child described in subsection (a) is a [CHINS] shall be filed before a detention hearing is held for the child.

Mother does not argue that she was denied the opportunity to be heard or to present arguments to the juvenile court during the emergency detention hearing. She merely argues that she was denied the opportunity to cross-examine FCM Garrett, who had outlined DCS's arguments in favor of detention.

[19] When Mother expressed a desire to cross-examine FCM Garrett during the emergency detention hearing, the juvenile court stated

Okay. Unfortunately, the nature of the emergency detentions [sic] hearings, they're -- this is not a fact finding. It's kind of a[n] ex parte. I will let you cross in a moment with regard to placement. We're going to let you talk with one -- both attorneys -- talk to the -- [FCM] Garrett.

But for now, I'm going to find there is probable cause to believe that this child is a child in need of services, based on – I'm going to take judicial notice of the other active CHINS cases where both sisters have been removed, and they're both currently in foster care.

I am going to find that this hearing was timely held and that the detention was appropriate.

So I am going to say ․ if you have cross for [FCM] Garrett with regard to placement, certainly you can ask her some questions at this time.

Tr. Vol. II p. 13.

[20] We have previously concluded in a similar situation that a parent is not entitled to a full adversarial hearing in preliminary proceedings, stating that

While [mother] argues that she should have been afforded such an opportunity at her hearing, we find that neither due process nor the statutory scheme under which the proceeding was held requires that she be permitted to call character witnesses at this stage. It is sufficient that she was given the opportunity to be present with counsel and state her version or explanation of the events in question. The hearing was not intended to be adjudicatory in nature. It was a preliminary proceeding for the purpose of determining whether probable cause existed for the detention of the child and for the filing of a petition. While a parent's right to the custody of his child cannot be terminated by less than a full adjudicatory hearing, the Welfare Department or the court can intervene in the parent-child relationship on the basis of a probable cause determination that the subject child is in need of services.

Wardship of Nahrwold v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Allen Cnty., 427 N.E.2d 474, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

[21] We find Nahrwold to be dispositive of Mother's due-process claim. Mother was given the opportunity to be present and to be heard. She was given the opportunity to make arguments to the juvenile court regarding her belief that it was not necessary for DCS to detain Child and to cross-examine FCM Garrett with regard to placement. Mother was also given the opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine all witnesses during the fact-finding hearing on the question of whether Child was a CHINS. Considering the facts of this case together with our decision in Nahrwold, we cannot say that Mother's due-process rights were violated during the emergency detention hearing.

[22] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Siblings are twins who were one-year-old as of the date of the issuance of the juvenile court's CHINS order pertaining to Child.

2.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Contrary to Mother's claim, her therapist testified that, based on her involvement with Mother, she did not believe that Mother would continue therapy without court intervention.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Foley concur. Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.