LOCKETT v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Cortell Lockett appeals his conviction and two-year prison sentence for Level 6 felony auto theft. He argues that the trial court erred by not ordering a mistrial after a witness volunteered that Lockett was a convicted sex offender. The record, however, reveals that Lockett invited any such error by withdrawing his motion for a mistrial moments after the trial court granted it. Lockett also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the appropriateness of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2023, Lockett's friend Helen Enyeart gave Lockett ongoing permission to borrow Enyeart's 2006 Dodge Durango truck. Lockett borrowed the truck regularly but became unreliable in returning it when Enyeart asked. Enyeart therefore told Lockett he could no longer borrow the truck.

[3] A few weeks later, during an argument at Enyeart's home, Lockett took possession of the truck's keys and refused to give them back to Enyeart. Lockett eventually left without the truck, telling Enyeart he had discarded the keys in her yard. Enyeart searched her yard but never found the keys.

[4] The following week, Enyeart's truck was taken from her driveway. Enyeart reported the truck as stolen and identified Lockett as a suspect. She also sent Lockett text messages, accusing him of stealing the truck and demanding its return. Police eventually found Enyeart's truck abandoned on a local street, after which the State charged Lockett with Level 6 felony auto theft.

[5] At Lockett's jury trial, Enyeart testified about the events leading up to her truck being taken. During this testimony, Enyeart unexpectedly revealed that Lockett was a convicted sex offender. Lockett promptly moved for a mistrial, and the trial court initially granted his request. But moments later, after the court denied Lockett's related motion to be released from prison pending a new trial, Lockett advised the court that he wished to proceed with the instant trial instead. He then formally withdrew his motion for a mistrial and declined a curative jury instruction as to Enyeart's sex offender statement.

[6] Trial resumed, and Lockett eventually took the stand. During his testimony, Lockett admitted that he took Enyeart's truck the day she reported it as stolen; however, Lockett claimed he was still permitted to borrow the truck at that time. According to Lockett, Enyeart did not tell him he could no longer borrow the truck until after he took it—when she texted him and accused him of theft. Lockett also testified that he immediately parked the truck on a local street upon receiving Enyeart's text messages.

[7] At the close of evidence, Lockett moved for a directed verdict of not guilty on the auto theft charge. The trial court denied this motion. The case was then presented to the jury, which found Lockett guilty of auto theft. The trial court entered judgment of conviction and later sentenced Lockett to two years in prison. Lockett now appeals his conviction and sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Lockett raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred by not ordering a mistrial after Enyeart volunteered that Lockett was a convicted sex offender. Second, Lockett challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his auto theft conviction. Third, Lockett argues that his two-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Ordering a Mistrial

[9] “Whether to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 480 (Ind. 2015). Despite this discretion, Lockett contends the trial court was required to order a mistrial after it initially granted his motion for one. Lockett, however, cites to no applicable authority to support this contention.¹ He also largely ignores that the court's inaction came at Lockett's request.

[10] “A party may not invite error, then later argue that the error supports reversal, because error invited by the complaining party is not reversible error.” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 822 (Ind. 2002). Here, the trial court initially granted Lockett's motion for a mistrial. But moments later, when Lockett learned he would not be released from prison pending a new trial, he withdrew his motion and advised the court he wished to proceed with the instant trial instead. Having effectively asked the trial court not to order a mistrial, Lockett may not assert the court's purported failure to order one as error on appeal. See id.; cf. Isom, 31 N.E.3d at 482 (observing that failure to request an admonishment or move for a mistrial results in waiver of the issue).

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Lockett's Conviction

[11] “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. “We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[12] “A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). However, the offense becomes auto theft, a Level 6 felony, if the subject property is a motor vehicle. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(i).

[13] Though Lockett admitted that he took Enyeart's 2006 Dodge Durango truck on the day Enyeart reported it as stolen, he claims the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his control over the truck was unauthorized. Lockett points to evidence that he still had Enyeart's ongoing permission to borrow the truck when he took it. But this is simply an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Bailey, 907 N.E.2d at 1005.

[14] The evidence most favorable to the judgment shows Enyeart expressly told Lockett he could no longer borrow her truck weeks before Lockett took it from her driveway. Enyeart's testimony in this regard sufficiently proved that Lockett exerted unauthorized control over her truck. See Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (“A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim.”).²

III. Lockett's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate

[15] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, our principal role is to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived “correct” sentence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, we give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision. Id. The trial court's judgment should prevail unless it is “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[16] The appropriateness of a sentence begins with the statutory range established for the subject class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. Lockett was convicted of a Level 6 felony, which has a sentencing range of six months to two-and-a-half years and an advisory sentence of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Thus, Lockett's two-year sentence is one year more than the advisory sentence and six months less than the maximum.

[17] In requesting a revised sentence, Lockett simply highlights the non-violent nature of his offense. He makes no argument concerning his character and did not include in the appellate record the pre-sentence investigation report presented at his sentencing hearing. The trial court, however, observed that Lockett “has an extensive twenty[-]year history of criminal and delinquent behavior as set forth in the records check ․ including numerous crimes of violence and as well as probation violations.” Tr. Vol. III, pp. 61-62. The court also noted that he was on probation at the time of his auto theft.

[18] On appeal, Lockett does not contest the trial court's sentencing observations. We therefore accept them as true and cannot say that Lockett's two-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As the State observes, Lockett's appellate brief is plagued by misrepresented authorities, inapplicable case law, and general citation errors. See Appellee's Br., pp. 13-19. At least five citations refer to cases that do not exist. And we count at least nine cases which have been materially misrepresented by appellant's counsel. Most notably, Lockett cites to our Supreme Court's decision in Vaughan v. State, 269 Ind. 142, 378 N.E.2d 859 (Ind. 1978), as having “established” that “once a mistrial is declared due to prejudicial testimony or irreparable events, it cannot be undone.” Appellant's Br., p. 14. Contrary to Lockett's assertion, Vaughan concerned neither a motion for nor the granting of a mistrial, and it did not establish a limitation on any discretionary trial court function. What's more, when the State in its appellate brief called out Lockett's misrepresentations about Vaughan, appellant's counsel made no attempt to correct them in his reply.We find this careless briefing extremely troublesome, and we take this opportunity to remind all appellate counsel of their obligations under the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct and the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. See, e.g., Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting lawyers from knowingly making or failing to correct false statements of fact or law to a tribunal); Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), (B) (requiring appellate brief arguments to be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to the authorities relied on). Notwithstanding the briefing errors, we decline the State's invitation to find waiver and, instead, opt to review Lockett's appeal on the merits.

2.   Lockett also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. But “[i]f the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal, the denial of a motion for directed verdict cannot be error.” Russell v. State, 217 N.E.3d 544, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Beverly v. State, 543 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. 1989)).

Weissmann, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.