BLANTON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Zachariah C.J. Blanton appeals the denial of his pro-se “Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Concerning Credit Time”¹ (petition for post-conviction relief), arguing that the post-conviction court failed to address his claim for the restoration of good time credit that the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) improperly revoked. Thus, Blanton requests that we remand this case to the post-conviction court with instructions that it enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Blanton is currently serving a forty-two-year sentence at the DOC Branchville Correctional Facility, following his convictions for voluntary manslaughter, a Class A felony, and criminal recklessness, a Class D felony. Blanton was sentenced on December 27, 2007, and the DOC lists his earliest possible release date (release date) as August 5, 2027.

[4] On November 18, 2021, Blanton opted into an individualized case management plan (management plan) through the DOC for the purpose of earning educational credit time.² Blanton's management plan was designated as case plan credit time (CPCT).³ As Blanton was committed to the DOC before the CPCT framework became effective, the DOC determined that he was eligible for a total of 681 days of educational credit time. Also, because Blanton had less than six years remaining prior to his release date, he was to undergo three CPCT reviews that were to occur between January 1, 2022, and his release date.

[5] The DOC conducted Blanton's first CPCT review hearing on June 2, 2023, and awarded him 227 days of educational credit time. The DOC, however, subsequently revoked those days due to disciplinary conduct reports. Although Blanton requested that those days be restored, the DOC refused to do so based upon its offender disciplinary code.

[6] On July 10, 2023, Blanton filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief, raising the following claims: (1) the DOC's implementation of the CPCT program improperly limited the amount of educational credit time that could be earned; (2) the DOC improperly rescinded the credit time he was awarded in his first CPCT review; and (3) the DOC “unreasonably seized” his credit time because he “has a State created ‘liberty interest’ in the restoration of his earned educational credit time.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 22.

[7] The State opposed Blanton's petition asserting, among other things, that dismissal of the petition was proper because Blanton has no constitutional right to credit time. The State directed the post-conviction court to Brown v. State, where a panel of this court determined that “credit time is a bonus created by statute and the deprivation of credit time does nothing more than take that bonus away.” 172 N.E.3d 1273, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App 2021) (quoting State v. Mullins, 647 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)) (emphasis added). The Brown Court observed that because the deprivation of credit time does not lengthen the fixed term of a sentence, there is no impingement “on a fundamental liberty interest.” Id.

[8] The State also filed a motion for summary disposition on October 24, 2023, that the post-conviction court subsequently granted. The post-conviction court entered an order on January 30, 2024, dismissing Blanton's petition and denying his request for relief on all claims. The post-conviction court's order regarding the DOC's refusal to reinstate Blanton's educational credit time—which is the sole issue that Blanton raises on appeal—provided that

The Petition should be dismissed, as Petitioner has no constitutional claim for any allegations arising from Respondent's implementation of the CPCT framework or from Respondent's alleged seizure of Petitioner's earned credit time. Indiana courts have established that Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to credit time. See Brown v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1273, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (stating that credit time “is a bonus created by statute and the deprivation of credit time does nothing more than take that bonus a way,” and that “deprivation of credit time therefore [does] not ․ rise to the level of impinging on a fundamental liberty interest.”).

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 15.

[9] Blanton now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] As Blanton is appealing from a negative judgment denying his request for post-conviction relief, he must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision. Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019). When reviewing the post-conviction court's order denying relief, we will “not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions,” and the “findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). When a petitioner fails to meet this rigorous standard of review, we will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681.

[11] In accordance with Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g), the post-conviction court may grant a motion for summary disposition of the petition “when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations of fact, and any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary disposition, like summary judgment, is a matter for appellate de novo determination when the determinative issue is a matter of law, not fact. Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. 2008). Summary disposition should be granted only if “there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” P-C.R. 1(4)(g). Finally, we note that even if a hearing is not held, the post-conviction court must make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented. P-C.R. 1(6)(g).

[12] Here, Blanton contends that the post-conviction court erred because it did not enter detailed findings as to why he was denied the “restoration of [educational] credit [time] from his seven write ups” at the DOC. Appellant's Brief at 7. Thus, Blanton maintains that we must remand this case to the post-conviction court for the entry of findings and conclusions on that issue.

[13] We note that while the post-conviction court did not enter specific findings regarding the propriety of the DOC's refusal to restore Blanton's educational credit time, it addressed his underlying constitutional claim. The post-conviction court followed this court's holding in Brown, determined that the deprivation of credit time does not violate a fundamental liberty interest, and entered findings and conclusions thereon. To be sure, Blanton's educational credit time claim relied entirely on his incorrect proposition that he had a “liberty interest” in the restoration of that time. Moreover, Blanton does not make any additional argument on appeal as to why the DOC improperly refused to restore the revoked educational good time credit. Because the post-conviction court decided Blanton's constitutional argument adversely to him and Blanton made no further argument on the merits of his claim, he failed to carry his burden of proof in his request for relief. Therefore, the post-conviction court was not required to address additional aspects of Blanton's claim or enter findings and conclusions thereon. See, e.g., King v. State, 499 N.E.2d 213, 214 (Ind. 1986) (even though the court's findings were brief, it was clear that the decision was based on the conclusion that the petitioner had not carried his burden of proof). The post-conviction court properly dismissed Blanton's petition and denied his request for relief.

[14] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because Blanton seeks additional credit time, this action is properly considered as a request for post-conviction relief. See Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 (Ind. 2008).

2.   Beginning January 1, 2022, the legislature amended the credit time statutes to allow for a management plan approved by the DOC.

3.   Because Blanton opted into CPCT, he agreed that he would not earn educational credit time “upon completion of [his] current program, but at the first CPCT review.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 162.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Crone, Sr.J., concur.