Jonathan M. Buwa, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jonathan Buwa violated his probation by failing to comply with probation terms related to his sex offender status. As a result, the trial court revoked Buwa's probation and executed his suspended sentence. Buwa now appeals and raises a single issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by executing his suspended sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2017, Buwa was convicted of rape as a Level 3 felony and child solicitation as a Level 4 felony. The trial court sentenced Buwa to ten years with eight years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (the “DOC”) and two years suspended to probation. The trial court issued probation conditions related to Buwa's status as an adult sex offender, including therapy, reporting requirements, and restrictions on Buwa's proximity to and interactions with children. On April 10, 2023, Buwa was released from the DOC, and he began his probation the following day.

[4] On February 5, 2024, the State filed a probation violation report alleging Buwa had violated eight conditions his probation which required him to, among other things, participate in and consistently attend sex-offender treatment programs, avoid contact or communication with children under the age of 16, and remain in St. Joseph County. Buwa admitted to all the allegations. The trial court executed the remainder of Buwa's suspended sentence. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Executing Buwa's Suspended Sentence

[5] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). We review a trial court's sentencing decision on a probation violation for an abuse of discretion. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188 (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App 2005)). “An abuse of discretion occurs ‘where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.’ ” Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1112 (quoting Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188). “We will consider all the evidence most favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citing Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999)).

[6] Buwa argues that the trial court abused its discretion because its sentence was improperly based on speculation about the risk Buwa posed to the public. Buwa points us to the following language from the trial court's sentencing decision:

My overwhelming purpose for being on the bench is to make sure that the community is safe.

That is the number one thing I think of in any of these cases.

I have to weigh that with your rights, as well as the State's rights, but honestly, in this case I find that the interest of the community, the ability for the community to feel safe is an overwhelming precedence in this case ․

Tr. Vol. II at 16–17. Buwa claims that this language demonstrates that the trial court imposed its sentence based on its “problem with any sexual crimes against children in general, not necessarily Mr. Buwa's particular case.” Appellant's Br. at 10.

[7] Buwa compares the present case to the sentencing decision in Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). There, we reversed a trial court's decision to execute Puckett's remaining suspended sentence because it relied on “multiple improper factors” in reaching its decision. Puckett, 956 N.E.2d at 1189. We described the trial court's conduct that led to our conclusion that the sentence was an abuse of discretion:

[T]he trial court plainly and repeatedly expressed its displeasure with Puckett's original plea agreement. The trial court indicated at least four times that Puckett had sexual intercourse with R.S., but Puckett had pled guilty to Class C felony child molesting by fondling. ․

The trial court indicated that Puckett's original plea agreement was the result of incredible generosity on the State's part and that he in fact should have been convicted of one Class B felony, at least.

Id. at 1187.

[8] We find Puckett inapposite to the present case. The trial court here did not rely on any improper factors in reaching its decision, and the sentencing hearing does not show any indication of the bias that was present in Puckett. Contrary to Buwa's interpretation, we cannot discern any inappropriate motivation or speculation from the trial court's comments during sentencing, and Buwa admitted to multiple probation violations, with some of the violations occurring more than once, concerning his status as a sex offender. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in executing Buwa's suspended sentence.

[9] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur. Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.