IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.G. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this consolidated appeal, L.C. (“Mother”) and J.G. (“Father”) challenge the termination of their parental rights to six of their children. They argue DCS did not present clear and convincing evidence to support termination. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) have had seven children together. Their parental rights to their firstborn were terminated before these proceedings. Their six other children are: A., born in 2011; S., born in 2012; L., born in 2014; J., born in 2016; Nta., born in 2017; and Nra., born in 2019 (collectively, “Children”). By the time of the termination hearing, all but S. had been diagnosed with autism.

[3] Both Parents have low IQs and attended special education classes in school. Neither finished high school. During these proceedings, Mother was diagnosed with autism, ADHD, and poor intellectual functioning. Father receives Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) for cognitive impairment. While Parents resided together, Father's SSI checks supported the family. Mother has unsuccessfully applied for SSI five times. In 2020, a protection order was issued preventing Father from having contact with Mother and Children due to felony charges alleging Father committed battery on Mother and one of the children.

[4] In August 2021, Mother and Children were living with another man, S.M., and Mother was pregnant with S.M.’s child. On August 21, DCS received a report that the three oldest children were not properly supervised, as they had been outside for hours with no adult present. This was the latest in a series of reports to DCS and law enforcement that Children lacked supervision and suffered from poor hygiene. Children were not removed from Mother's care, but on October 7, DCS filed a petition alleging A., S., and L. were children in need of services (“CHINS”).¹ Father failed to appear for the factfinding hearing in November; Mother appeared by telephone and admitted the children were CHINS. The trial court adjudicated A., S., and L. as CHINS and entered a dispositional order in December, ordering Parents to obtain and maintain suitable housing, complete a family preservation assessment, and abide by the terms of the protection order, among other things. A., S., and L. remained in Mother's care, and the family received services.

[5] In March 2022, Mother and Children were still living with S.M., and Mother and S.M.’s child had been born. On March 17, A., S., and L. were removed from Mother's care due to continued lack of supervision. Services continued, with Father receiving Fatherhood Engagement services, Mother receiving home-based casework services, and Mother and the children receiving therapy. Mother participated in supervised visits with A., S., and L., but the no contact order prevented Father from exercising visitation. “For the most part,” Parents participated and engaged in services, but Father had several different service providers because “he would become frustrated with things they would do or say” and request a change. Tr. Vol. 2 at 66–67.

[6] In summer 2022, the protection order against Father was dismissed, and Mother and the younger children moved into an apartment with Father. With Parents living together and DCS having no safety concerns for the younger children in their care at that time, DCS began placing the older children one at a time with Parents on a trial home visit. Because Parents “seemed very overwhelmed” in caring for all the children and handling their behaviors, DCS “wanted to give them ․ a chance to be able to start those trial home visits ․ and be successful with it.” Id. at 69–70. L. was placed with Parents on a trial home visit in August, S. in October, and A. in December. After all the children were returned to Parents’ care, DCS wardship over L. was terminated because the trial visit had already been extended and things were going well. DCS felt terminating L.’s wardship was okay “because we still had an open case and still had services [in place] that were working for everyone in the home.” Id. at 72.

[7] Issues soon developed. DCS had concerns about domestic violence between Parents. Mother would sometimes stay with S.M. and their child, and Father could not handle caring for Children by himself. Parents did not have independent transportation, so getting to school and appointments was difficult. Parents had trouble dealing with Children's various behavioral issues, including L.’s mild cognitive disability, S.’s anger issues, and J.’s Level 3 non-verbal autism diagnosis. And DCS was concerned about the conditions of the home and Children's hygiene. On top of continuing the existing services, DCS added family preservation services to help Parents maintain a clean and safe home and access resources for things like transportation and budgeting.

[8] Nonetheless, Parents were in frequent contact with their family case managers (“FCM”). Danielle Westfall, the FCM beginning in July 2022, spoke to Father “daily, if not several times a day.” Id. at 73. He would call because he was frustrated with Mother, or because he could not deal with a child's behaviors, or for advice on meeting Children's needs. She also spoke with Mother frequently and visited the home an unusual number of times in response to new allegations and additional concerns. Scott Masson, the FCM beginning in April 2023, eventually transferred the case in part because he felt a “fresh pair of eyes” might help given Parents’ lack of progress, and in part because the case was “very overwhelming.” Id. at 114.

[9] DCS continued to receive reports of lack of supervision, unsafe housing conditions, and poor hygiene. In March 2023, DCS received a report that drywall was missing throughout the family's apartment, electrical switches were uncovered, and wiring was exposed. On further investigation, DCS discovered additional safety concerns, including bedbug bites on Children, diaper rash on Nta. and Nra., and broken teeth and sores in L.’s and Nta.’s mouths. Parents were struggling to get the school-age children to school regularly and on time. And they had called law enforcement repeatedly regarding L., whose behavior they could not control. In April, Parents were arrested for neglect of a dependent, and DCS removed Children from their care. The 2021 CHINS cases for A. and S. were still open, and DCS filed new petitions alleging L., J., Nta., and Nra. were CHINS.²

[10] Parents admitted L., J., Nta., and Nra. were CHINS, and the trial court adjudicated them as such in August 2023. The dispositional order required Parents to maintain safe and suitable housing; complete a parenting assessment and complete all recommended services; meet their own and Children's medical and mental health needs; not commit any acts of domestic violence, attend all scheduled visitations; and “[p]rovide [C]hildren with a safe, secure and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect and be an effective caregiver who possesses the necessary skills, knowledge and abilities to provide the [C]hildren with this type of environment on a long-term basis to provide the [C]hildren with permanency.” Ex. Vol. 7 at 199.

[11] DCS referred Parents for home-based casework, skills coaching, individual and family counseling, and parenting assessments. At some point after Children were removed, Parents were evicted from their apartment. Father moved into a motel; Mother sometimes stayed with Father at the motel and sometimes stayed with S.M. Father did not immediately start services, and once he did, his participation was inconsistent and he did not show progress. Mother's participation was more regular, but she also failed to show progress. Visits with Children—individually and in combination—were never less than fully supervised. Although Father was generally focused on Children during visits, he could not control them effectively and required frequent direction from visit supervisors. Mother had to be reminded to interact with all Children and not just her youngest. Her visits were “very hectic” because she did not impose consistent rules and boundaries to keep Children safe. Tr. Vol. 3 at 57. Neither Parent showed improvement in their parenting skills over time.

[12] Despite participating in services for nearly two and one-half years, Parents were unsuccessful in implementing lessons from those services, and DCS filed petitions to terminate their parental rights to Children in February 2024. During the two-day factfinding hearing, DCS elicited testimony that Parents had not benefitted from services as they were unable to retain and implement parenting techniques on their own, there were no more services that would help, and they would be unable to parent Children effectively without supervision. Dr. Alan Wax, a psychologist who conducted a psycho-parenting evaluation with Father, testified Father had not benefitted from services, as the “same problems [occur] over and over again.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. Dr. Wax did not think there were any services not already provided that would be beneficial to Father or produce a different result. Id. Dr. Rachel Garcia, a clinical psychologist who conducted a psychological evaluation of Mother, also testified, noting Mother had never been employed or lived on her own and had not yet shown the ability to take care of herself, let alone take care of Children. Dr. Garcia said it would “be difficult for [Mother] to be able to change anything” because she was unwilling or unable to understand why DCS was involved with the family and take responsibility for fixing the situation. Id. at 50.

[13] Every FCM, service provider, and court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) said the same thing: Parents had not enhanced their parenting ability despite years of services, they could not parent Children without supervision, and termination was in Children's best interests. The Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) stated succinctly:

I don't take the position lightly to agree with the DCS and advocate for termination; but in this case, they've brought witnesses up, one after the other, and basically ․ showed the Court that they aren't able to parent at a ․ base level. [T]he doctors have basically made predictions they're not going to be able to improve much. The other providers and case managers, basically provided the track record of what they've done over the last couple of years.

The other part of this is that the children have exceptional needs, needs that aren't being met, needs that won't be met by the parents. And so, in this particular case, I think termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 113. The trial court issued orders terminating the parent-child relationships on May 30, 2024.³

Standard of Review

[14] In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the trial court must enter findings of fact that support its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c) (2012). On review, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but will only consider the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We give “due regard” to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and only set aside the trial court's findings or judgment if clearly erroneous. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). “In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, ‘we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.’ ” Id. at 1229–30 (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). In addition, trial court findings not challenged on appeal must be accepted as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

The trial court's termination decision is not clearly erroneous.

[15] As Indiana Courts have repeatedly recognized, “parental rights are precious and protected by our Federal and State constitutions.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 641–42. A parent's interest in the upbringing of their child is perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by courts, but parental rights are not absolute. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230. Parental rights may be terminated if parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities by “failing to provide for the child's immediate and long-term needs.” Id.

[16] To terminate parental rights in this case, DCS must have alleged and proved by clear and convincing evidence:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interest of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019);⁴ I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

[17] Parents contend DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for their placement outside Parents’ home will not be remedied, and (2) there is a reasonable probability continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being. In addition, Father contends the State failed to prove termination was in Children's best interests. Parents do not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact. We therefore accept the trial court's findings as true, In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), and determine only whether these unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment, T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming termination order where unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support termination), trans. denied.

1. Continuation of the Parent-Child Relationship

[18] We begin by noting—as we often have—subsection (b)(2)(B) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive. Here, the trial court found both a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in removal would not be remedied and continuation of the relationship was a threat to Children's well-being. But the State was only required to prove either conditions resulting in removal will not likely be remedied or continuation of the relationship likely poses a threat to Children's well-being. See In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. If we conclude one of these elements was proven, we need not address the other.

[19] The trial court's unchallenged findings are sufficient to support its conclusion there is a reasonable probability continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being. To evaluate whether continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child, a trial court “should consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation” while also judging a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination proceedings, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The trial court need not wait to terminate the parent-child relationship until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his “physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired.” In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[20] Here, the trial court's unchallenged findings include: Parents have not obtained stable and appropriate housing for Children, as they share a motel room with one bed. Parents are only able to parent Children one at a time or with full-time professional supervision. None of the visit supervisors would recommend decreased supervision because Parents cannot implement what they have learned from the many services offered to them and the same issues need to be corrected at each visit. Father “minimizes, denies, and blames others for any issues that come up” and refuses to recognize and learn how to overcome his limited intellectual functioning. Appellant-Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 120. Father has not benefitted from any services provided to him and there are no other services that can be offered to affect a change. Mother has a limited understanding of parenting techniques and cannot apply them when visiting with Children. Mother lacks engagement with Children. Given Mother has not enhanced her parenting skills with the support already provided to her, she will probably not gain the skills needed to provide care and safety for Children. In short, “Parents do not have the capacity to parent these children, [and no] amount of services will remedy their inability to appropriately and effectively care for the children.” Id.

[21] Father argues there was a “wealth of evidence” showing continuation of his relationship with Children does not threaten their well-being, pointing to testimony that he was Children's primary caregiver when they were in the home, he interacted and played well with Children during supervised visits, and he consistently provided food for them. Appellant-Father's Br. at 9. And Mother argues continuation of her relationship with Children does not threaten their well-being because she “has a loving bond with her children, and she is capable of appropriately caring for them with some assistance from others.” Appellant-Mother's Br. at 10. We do not doubt Parents’ love for Children, but as one of the visit supervisors stated, “[U]nfortunately, love isn't all it takes.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 156.

[22] Not only do Parents have emotional and intellectual challenges, but so do each of the Children. Parents’ limited cognitive abilities alone do not mean they are unable to parent, but they failed to gain through services the necessary skills, knowledge, and abilities to effectively parent despite those limitations. Father treated Children as “little adults” who should be able to care for themselves, and Mother was often disengaged. Tr. Vol. 3 at 59–60. Interaction between Parents and Children remained fully supervised at a neutral site for a year before the termination hearing. Parents—Father especially—constantly sought assistance and advice from service providers rather than implementing skills they were taught. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 226 (FCM stating Father would often call her for help and she would “tell him to utilize his resources first” or “work on certain things on his own” but he did not do so). The goal of the offered services was to educate Parents about parenting skills and techniques and help them create a home environment that would allow the family to be reunified and DCS to end its involvement. But Parents did not improve their ability to parent Children on their own and did not create a safe and suitable home for them. And many witnesses testified there were no additional resources that would help them do so.

[23] The findings show Children need care and supervision Parents cannot provide—now or in the future. The trial court's conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationships threatens Children's well-being is not clearly erroneous.

2. Best Interests of the Children

[24] Father also asserts the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Children's best interests is clearly erroneous. When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, courts look to the totality of the evidence and “must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Children's need for permanency is a central consideration, and they “cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Recommendations of the case manager, CASA, or GAL, in addition to evidence continuation of the relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[25] Here, the family's two most recent FCMs each testified termination was in Children's best interests. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 112, 239. Children's CASAs ⁵ all testified termination was in their best interests. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 12, 20, 26, 38. And visit supervisors offered their opinions that Parents would not be able to effectively parent Children without supervision. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 180; Tr. Vol. 3 at 49, 52. The testimony of these service providers, as well as the other evidence discussed, supports the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[26] The trial court's decision to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to Children was not clearly erroneous.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A., S., and L.’s CHINS cases originated in St. Joseph County. In June 2022, the cases were transferred to Marshall County where Parents were living, and all further proceedings occurred in Marshall County.

2.   DCS also removed Mother's child with S.M. Proceedings concerning that child are not part of this appeal.

3.   The trial court issued three separate orders: one for A., one for S., and one for the other four children. The orders are substantially similar.

4.   This statute was amended March 11, 2024. Mother cites the provisions of the new statute in her brief. See Appellant-Mother's Br. at 11–12. But DCS filed these petitions before the amended version of the statute became effective, and we use the version of the statute in effect at the time the petitions for termination were filed.

5.   There were four CASAs involved in this case: one for A., one for J., one for Nta. and Nra., and one for S. and L.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Brown concur. Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.