Michael Auriemma, Appellant-Defendant v. Catherine Capers, et al., Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a small claims bench trial, the small claims court issued a lengthy Order concluding Michael Auriemma had engaged in “the worst treatment by a landlord of former tenants” the small claims court had ever witnessed. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 36. The small claims court found Auriemma liable for conversion and awarded Catherine Capers and Antoinette Capers (collectively, “Capers”) damages in the amount of $10,000 for their unrecovered or damaged personal property, which included an award of treble damages. On appeal, Auriemma raises three issues, which we restate as:

(1) whether the small claims court's determination that the Capers had not abandoned their personal property was contrary to law;

(2) whether treble damages could be awarded under the Indiana Crime Victims Relief Act (“CVRA”); and

(3) whether the trial court applied an incorrect measure of damages, resulting in an impermissible windfall to the Capers.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Antoinette Capers and Chadwick Loyd (“Tenants”) rented a South Bend, Indiana house from Auriemma. Auriemma brought an action to eject Tenants for failing to pay rent and received a final order of possession on June 9, 2023.¹ In the same cause, the small claims court awarded Auriemma post-ejectment damages in the amount of $3,067.48, plus costs.² Tenants vacated the house on June 20, 2023, and Auriemma reclaimed his property and changed the locks on June 21, 2023, with the assistance of the sheriff's department. Catherine Capers, the mother of Antoinette, also had various personal property items in the house but was not a tenant or party to the ejectment action.³

[3] On July 13, 2023, Auriemma rented a storage unit to warehouse personal property remaining in the house. Auriemma and Loyd had a couple of discussions about Loyd retrieving his personal property from the house, including “in person during the eviction hearing.” Transcript at 148. On July 18, 2023, Loyd made an appointment to retrieve his personal property from the house; however, he canceled the meeting. He then “made another appointment” to pick up his property and canceled that one as well. Id. at 149. On Tuesday July 18, 2023, Auriemma texted Antoinette, “[a]re you ever going to pick up your stuff?” Ex. Vol. 2 at 5. That same date, Antoinette responded, “[y]es Monday for sure truck already pre ordered.” Id.

[4] On July 22, 2023, at Auriemma's direction, Rodney Hagedorn (“Hagedorn”), who works for Auriemma, removed most of the Capers’ personal property from the house and transported the property to the storage unit. At the time, “[e]verything was in good condition.” Tr. at 168. Auriemma instructed Hagedorn not to give the Capers their property back until they paid approximately $900.00—the amount Hagedorn had quoted Auriemma for moving the property.

[5] On Monday, July 24, 2023, the day of Antoinette's scheduled move, between 12:45 and 12:51 p.m., Antoinette and Auriemma exchanged the following text messages:

Antoinette: “Can you have somebody meet me at the house I'm ready to move my stuff got truck an [sic] movers”

Auriemma: “You can start off with the garage. Let me know when that's cleaned out”

Antoinette: “I'm putting that stuff in last I'm dropping that off to my mom's first then taken [sic] everything else to storage․. everything will be cleaned out.”

Auriemma: “That stuff needs to be first ․ Let me know when it is moved”

Antoinette: “I'm taken [sic] everything I don't understand why that has to be first”

Auriemma: “Because that's what I want ․ I do understand why you want to leave it there. That's why it needs to be first”

Ex. Vol. 2 at 5-8. Twenty minutes later, at 1:10 p.m., Antoinette texted Auriemma, “U moved my stuff already??? I have mail saying u did an I gotta pay for it? [sic throughout]” Id. at 8. Three minutes later, and without answering her question, Auriemma responded, “Let me know when the garage is moved out[.]” Id. Approximately three and a half hours later, Antoinette replied, “The garage is cleaned out so what's next[?]” Id. at 9. At that point, Auriemma told her to “[g]ive [Hagedorn] a call and let him know[.]” Id. The Capers called Hagedorn but were not permitted to retrieve their personal property inside the house—most of which had already been taken to the storage unit, and some of which remained in the house ⁴ —until several months later.

[6] The Capers filed a notice of claim on August 11, 2023, seeking $10,000.00 or the return of their personal property. On October 25, 2023, the parties appeared for a bench trial, but the hearing resulted in a court-memorialized agreement ordering Auriemma to return the Capers’ property without unnecessary delay, requiring the Capers to remove the remaining personal property from the house and storage unit by November 6, 2023, and for the Capers to make arrangements to pay rent on the storage unit if they intended to continue storing their property there. The Capers timely recovered what personal property remained; however, some of their personal property items were never recovered or were returned wet, moldy, or otherwise damaged.

[7] On March 27, 2024, the small claims court conducted a trial on the missing or damaged personal property. Auriemma testified he believed Loyd was not “too interested in removing” his personal property after Loyd “never followed through” with their appointments, and people “not wanting their items” was “very confusing.” Tr. at 149, 154-55. Auriemma was shown pictures of the personal property in the storage unit, which he identified as “stuff in the garage” he “believe[d]” would have been removed by Tenants on July 24, 2023. Id. at 150-51. However, Auriemma later revised his testimony, confirming the personal property shown in the photos was at the storage unit, not the house's garage, and admitted he “would have asked for the storage fee” before allowing the Capers to retrieve their personal property from the storage unit. Id. at 157. The Capers testified that “[e]verything was brand new” or lightly used and gave approximate purchase prices for various lost or destroyed personal property items, including $1,200 for a television, $2,000 for a PlayStation,⁵ $1,400 for both a Gucci camera and shoulder bag, $300 for a Gucci belt, $600 for a washer, $150 for a cookware set, “two something” for retro Jordan sneakers, and $120 for Nike sneakers. Id. at 125, 129. Antoinette testified she had kept a “drawer full of receipts” but the receipts were never recovered due to the actions of Auriemma. Id. at 122.

[8] The small claims court subsequently entered a lengthy written Order concluding Auriemma was liable to the Capers for conversion. Specifically, the small claims court found that as of Antoinette's July 18, 2023 text message, “any reasonable person should have known without a doubt that the former tenant(s) intended to retrieve their personal property” and had not abandoned the items. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27. The small claims court determined that “[o]n Saturday July 22, 2023, [Auriemma] began intentionally exerting unauthorized control over all the personal property removed from the home—removed knowing full well the [Capers] hoped to regain possession of all of it on Monday, July 24, 2023.” Id. at 28. The small claims court took judicial notice of the parties’ related eviction case and observed the following about Auriemma's conduct:

In effect, [Auriemma] commandeered the tenants’ labor to empty a garage of items so he didn't have to pay someone like Rodney Hagedorn to do it. Even worse, [Auriemma] had already charged someone to remove that property, specifically the Plaintiff Antoinette herself via the default judgment awarded on July 19, 2023 in [the related eviction action]. Five days later, [Auriemma] then lied to [the Capers] to induce them to do work he didn't want to do—knowing they had no chance that day of getting the property they most cared about from inside the home, as he had ordered it removed two days prior. No chance, of course, unless the [Capers] would agree to pay him $900 in cash to access the unlawfully warehoused property. Nothing about the payment demand appears to be contemplated as going to offset the default judgment, either—it appears simply to be a demand for cash in order to obtain access to property he unlawfully deprived them access to with the specific intention to make them pay to obtain that to which they were always entitled to reclaim: their personal property. [Auriemma] knew the most significant personal property the tenants’ [sic] hoped to reclaim was that stored inside their home—and he knew taking that property from them and holding it hostage until his demands were met might supply him with leverage to extract some cash payments from them. And when his demands for cash payments failed, he used their hope to reclaim those items to induce them to provide labor he already charged them for when it came to emptying the garage.

Id. at 29-30.

[9] The small claims court also found the condition in which the Capers discovered their property “demonstrates malice on the part of [Auriemma],” finding the Capers’ testimony credible about the damaged state in which they found their personal property, and disregarding Hagedorn's testimony that the personal property had been packed “carefully” in the storage unit. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 31; Tr. at 168. The “inescapable conclusion,” the small claims court reached, was that Auriemma's “control over the property resulted in all the damages reported at trial. These damages were not accidental. The treatment of the [Capers’] personal effects went beyond mere negligence, recklessness, or even knowing conduct—it show[ed] an intention to destroy and damage those items of property.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32-33.

[10] The small claims court calculated the replacement value of the items and imposed treble damages under the CVRA. Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1. Together, these damages amounted to $14,209.77, which exceeds the small claims jurisdictional damages cap of $10,000.00, prompting the small claims court to reduce the judgment to $10,000.00. The small claims court noted other losses sustained by the Capers were “moot because the damages illustrated surpass the monetary limitations” of the small claims court and found that Auriemma's conduct justified the imposition of punitive damages.⁶ Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 35.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Auriemma appeals the small claims court's judgment in favor of the Capers. The small claims court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte. Facts determined in a bench trial are reviewed “under the clearly erroneous standard with due deference paid to the trial court's opportunity to assess witness credibility.” Branham v. Varble, 952 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. 2011); Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). “This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, ‘with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice’ between parties according to the rules of substantive law.” Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008) (quoting City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep't v. Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995)); Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A). The clearly erroneous standard “does not apply to the substantive rules of law, which are reviewed de novo just as they are in appeals from a court of general jurisdiction.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006).

[12] As an initial matter, we note that the Capers did not file an appellee's brief. In such instances, we do not develop the appellee's argument for them, and “may reverse the trial court's decision if the appellant makes a prima facie showing of reversible error.” Walking with Jesus Ministries v. Alexander, 240 N.E.3d 183, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “[P]rima facie error is defined as ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).

1. Abandonment of Property.

[13] Auriemma argues the small claims court erred when it determined the Capers had not abandoned their personal property. Abandonment is an affirmative defense ⁷ to a conversion claim and it was Auriemma's burden to prove the Capers abandoned their personal property. In small claims trials, affirmative defenses are deemed “at issue without responsive pleadings,” but the defendant still bears the burden of proving these defenses. Ind. Small Claims Rule 4(a). A judgment against a party bearing the burden to prove an affirmative defense is a negative judgment. Ayers v. Stowers, 200 N.E.3d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We reverse a negative judgment “only if the judgment is contrary to law.” RCM Phoenix Partners, LLC v. 2007 East Meadows, LP, 118 N.E.3d 756, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “A judgment is contrary to law if the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion.” Id. In making this determination, “we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party” and we will not “reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id.

[14] Indiana Code Section 32-31-4-2 defines abandonment and outlines a process for dealing with abandoned personal property in the context of the landlord-tenant relationship:

(a) A landlord has no liability for loss or damage to a tenant's personal property if the tenant's personal property has been abandoned by the tenant.

(b) For purposes of this section, a tenant's personal property is considered abandoned if a reasonable person would conclude that the tenant has vacated the premises and has surrendered possession of the personal property.

(c) An oral or a written rental agreement may not define abandonment differently than is provided in subsection (b).

(d) If a landlord is awarded possession of a dwelling unit by a court under IC 32-30-2, the landlord may seek an order from the court allowing removal of a tenant's personal property.

(e) If the tenant fails to remove the tenant's personal property before the date specified in the court's order issued under subsection (d), the landlord may remove the tenant's personal property in accordance with the order and deliver the personal property to a warehouseman under section 3 of this chapter or to a storage facility approved by the court.

In past cases, this Court has defined abandonment as “the relinquishment of property to which a person is entitled, with no purpose of again claiming it, and without concern as to who may subsequently take possession.” Schaffner v. Benson, 166 N.E. 881, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 1929). In the personal property context, “for there to be ‘an abandonment of property, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and an actual relinquishment.’ ” McLendon v. Safe Realty Corp., 401 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Hoeppner v. Slagle, 231 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967), trans. denied).

[15] It is undisputed that, after he received the final order of possession in the eviction action, Auriemma elected not to seek a court order approving his removal of the Capers’ personal property pursuant to the statutory roadmap provided in subsection (d). Accordingly, to avoid liability, Auriemma was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable person would conclude the Capers had surrendered their personal property with intentional relinquishment and no intention of reclaiming it. See I.C. § 32-31-4-2(a); McLendon, 401 N.E.2d at 83.

[16] The small claims court specifically found that as of July 18, 2023, when Auriemma asked Antoinette if she was “ever going to pick up [her] stuff,” and Antoinette promptly responded that she intended to do so on a date certain and had pre-ordered a moving truck, “any reasonable person should have known without any doubt that the former tenant(s) intended to retrieve their personal property” and there was “no reasonable way to believe the tenants had relinquished their personal property.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27. Auriemma argues the small claims court took a “myopic view” of the situation and should have determined whether abandonment occurred before Auriemma prompted Antoinette about her personal property remaining in the dwelling. Appellant's Br. at 13. Auriemma supports his claim by emphasizing that Tenants stayed in the house for almost two weeks after Auriemma received the final possession order on June 9, 2023, Loyd had canceled a couple of arranged meetings to pick up his personal items, and the property remained uncollected through the parties’ text messages on July 18, 2023. Auriemma claims the Capers made no efforts to recover their personal property within those five weeks and therefore reasonable people would consider the items abandoned. However, if Auriemma wanted to flesh out the status of the personal property in the five weeks between the final order of possession and the July 18, 2023 text to Antoinette, he could have availed himself of the court's assistance pursuant to Indiana Code Section 32-31-4-2(d). But clearly Auriemma was not convinced the property had been abandoned or he would not have needed to ask Antoinette on July 18, 2023, whether she was going to retrieve her property.

[17] When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Capers, the trial court's finding that the Capers had not abandoned their personal property was not contrary to law. Given Auriemma's conversations with Loyd prior to July 18, 2023, and Loyd's expressed intent at that time to retrieve his personal property (despite his cancellations of those meetings), the trial court was within its right to then consider the text message exchanges between Auriemma and Antoinette on July 18, 2023, as evidence the Capers were not abandoning their personal property. By the time Auriemma texted Antoinette on July 18, 2023, he had already rented the storage unit but had not yet enlisted Hagedorn to remove the property because he “didn't want to have to pay” the moving fee if the Capers and Loyd were “coming to pick up the stuff.” Tr. at 162. Auriemma had been willing to facilitate the personal property retrieval and had apparently “paid [Hagedorn] there twice” before Loyd's cancellations. Id. at 155. On July 18, 2023, Auriemma asked Antoinette, “[a]re you ever going to pick up your stuff?” Ex. Vol 2 at 5. This question to Antoinette indicates that Auriemma, at a minimum, had doubts that the Capers had already relinquished their personal property with no intent of reclaiming it. Antoinette's response that they were planning to remove their personal property from the home the following Monday and had even rented a moving truck is further evidence that the Capers had not abandoned their property. While measuring abandonment at the time a landlord prompts an ex-tenant about the removal of their leftover personal property may not always be appropriate, these circumstances permitted it. After considering the July 18, 2023 text message exchanges, the trial court's determination that the Capers did not abandon their personal property was not contrary to law.

2. Treble damages.

[18] Auriemma argues the small claims court confused the tort of conversion with the civil action for criminal conversion and erred when it awarded the Capers treble damages under the CVRA. See I.C. § 34-24-3-1(1)(A).

[19] “A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person commits criminal conversion.” I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a). “A person who has suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of a criminal conversion may bring a civil action to recover the loss” and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the criminal offense was committed. JET Credit Union v. Loudermilk, 879 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied; Schrenker v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. On the other hand, “[c]onversion, as a tort, is the appropriation of the personal property of another to the party's own use and benefit, or in its destruction, or in exercising dominion over it, in exclusion and defiance of the rights of the owner or lawful possessor, or in withholding it from his possession, under a claim and title inconsistent with the owner's.” Schrenker, 919 N.E.2d at 1194. The difference between the two causes of action is that “[c]riminal conversion requires the unauthorized control to be either knowing or intentional,” whereas “mens rea is not an element of tortious conversion.” Id. The CVRA permits a trial court to impose treble damages when a defendant has committed criminal conversion. I.C. § 34-24-3-1(1)(A); see also Mahvash K, LLC v. Hardwood Timber & Veneer, Inc., 236 N.E.3d 689, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“A claimant who proves the elements of criminal conversion by a preponderance of the evidence can recover the costs of the action, reasonable attorney fees, and up to three times the actual damages.”), reh'g. denied. Specifically, the statute provides in relevant part: “[i]f a person has an unpaid claim on a liability ․ or suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of IC 35-43 ․, the person may bring a civil action against the person who caused the loss” and recover “[a]n amount not to exceed three (3) times” the “actual damages of the person suffering the loss.” I.C. § 34-24-3-1(1)(A).

[20] In small claims proceedings, a plaintiff's notice of claim need not state a specific theory of recovery but must provide a “brief statement of the nature and amount of the claim.” Small Claims Rule 2(B)(4). Here, the Capers’ notice of claim requested $10,000.00 or the return of their personal property. After the Capers’ personal property was returned damaged and some remained unrecovered, a small claims trial was held to “speedily dispense justice by applying substantive law between the parties in an informal setting.” Dorsett v. Lubitz, 213 N.E.3d 1058, 1062 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023); see also Small Claims Rule 8(A). At the close of trial, the small claims court remarked that the Capers’ “claim is one of conversion, knowingly exert[ing] unauthorized control over the property of another person ․ And there's a treble damages provision in the conversion section.” Tr. at 188. At the outset of its Order, the small claims court characterized the Capers’ claim as “involv[ing] the tort of conversion,” and used the term “tort of conversion” four total times throughout its Order. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 21. Based on the small claims court's mingling of this term and “criminal conversion,” Auriemma argues he was found to have committed only the tort of conversion and treble damages were not an available remedy. Contrary to the explicit purpose of small claims proceedings, Auriemma's argument puts form over substance and completely ignores that the small claims court cited the criminal conversion statute in its Order, defined and analyzed each of the statute's elements, and made several remarks about the severity of Auriemma's conduct, including that punitive damages would have been appropriate because Auriemma “crossed any line of decency and fair play,” and his “conduct proven at trial went beyond ‘mere’ conversion—it represents the worst treatment by a landlord of former tenants this Court has seen.” Id. at 36-37. Based on the small claims court's detailed Order, we conclude the small claims court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Auriemma committed criminal conversion, and its imposition of treble damages under the CVRA was therefore appropriate.⁸

3. Actual damages.

[21] Auriemma challenges the method used to value the Capers’ lost and damaged property. “It is a well-established principle that damages are awarded to fairly and adequately compensate an injured party for her loss, and the proper measure of damages must be flexible enough to fit the circumstances.” Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (Ind. 2000). A damage award must be supported by probative evidence and may not be determined based on conjecture and speculation. Mahvash K, 236 N.E.3d at 698. A plaintiff should not receive a damage award that constitutes a windfall. Bokori v. Martinoski, 70 N.E.3d 441, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “The measure of damages allowable in conversion is generally the fair market value of the converted property at the time of conversion.” Willis v. Dilden Brothers, Inc., 184 N.E.3d 1167, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. A plaintiff bears the burden of proving the fair market value of personal property, which is “defined as the value a willing seller will accept from a willing buyer for a good.” Bokori, 70 N.E.3d at 444. “Evidence of fair market value may include the plaintiff's testimony, the price paid upon purchase, testimony from skilled witnesses, and other competent forms of evidence.” Id.

[22] The amount of recovery for household goods, however, “is not limited to the price which could be realized by a sale in the market, but that the owner may recover the value of the goods to him, based on his actual money loss resulting from his being deprived of the property, or the difference in actual value caused by the injury, excluding any fanciful or sentimental values which he might place upon them.” Willis, 184 N.E.3d at 1182. Household goods are “[a]rticles in actual use in furnishing and equipping a home” and “the law recognizes that [these goods] have a value when so used in the home that is not fairly estimated by their value as second-hand goods on the market.” Cannon v. Northside Transfer Co., Inc., 427 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

[23] Here, the converted items that the trial court attributed values to were either personal effects or household goods and should have been valued based on their fair market value or household good value, rather than their replacement value. However, the small claims court was abundantly clear that it drew the “inescapable conclusion” that Auriemma's unauthorized control over the Capers’ property “resulted in all the damages reported at trial.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32 (emphasis added). The small claims court also credited Antoinette's testimony that she “had a drawer full of receipts” that were lost or destroyed due to Auriemma's actions. Tr. at 122. The Capers provided ample testimony of purchase prices and the condition of their personal property items at the time of conversion to sustain—when trebled—a $10,000.00 damage award under the applicable measure of damages.⁹ Accordingly, we affirm the small claims court's damage award.

Conclusion

[24] We affirm the small claims court's determinations that the Capers did not abandon their personal property, that Auriemma committed criminal conversion and therefore treble damages were appropriate, and its $10,000.00 damage award.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The final order of possession issued in Cause 71D08-2304-EV-000705 was filed June 8, 2023, but states in bold, capitalized, and highlighted wording that the order is effective as of June 9, 2023. We will therefore use June 9, 2023, as the relevant date for the final order of possession.

2.   This appeal stems from the Capers’ conversion action filed under Cause 71D08-2308-SC-4634 related to the underlying eviction action.

3.   Although Loyd was a co-tenant with Antoinette Capers and had personal property at the home, he was not a party to or involved in the conversion action brought by the Capers women. We include some facts about Loyd to provide proper context for the events leading up to the lawsuit. From this point forward, we will reference the personal property removed from the home as the Capers’ property.

4.   A dresser, washer and dryer, and some kitchenware remained in the house until retrieved in November 2023.

5.   The PlayStation was purchased through Rent-A-Center on a rent-to-own payment plan.

6.   Despite the small claims court's position that punitive damages were warranted, the small claims court did not impose them.

7.   “Whether a defense is affirmative ‘depends upon whether it controverts an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case or raises matters outside the scope of the prima facie case.’ ” Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179, 1185 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Paint Shuttle, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 733 N.E.2d 513, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied). “An affirmative defense is a defense upon which the proponent bears the burden of proof and which, in effect, admits the essential allegations of the complaint but asserts additional matter barring relief.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Here, at the informal small claims trial, Auriemma argued that the Capers abandoned their personal property. This claim functions to undermine the Capers’ alleged ownership of the personal property items and would thwart their conversion claim even if its enumerated elements respecting Auriemma's conduct were proven.

8.   To the extent Auriemma indirectly asks this Court to analyze whether sufficient evidence was elicited at trial to find him liable of criminal conversion, given our appellate standard of review of small claims trials and our review of the record, we conclude the criminal conversion finding was supported by sufficient evidence. Auriemma argues that he lacked the intent necessary to commit criminal conversion by essentially rehashing the abandonment issue; however, we have upheld the small claims court's finding that the Capers did not abandon their personal property, and the evidentiary inferences most favorable to the judgment support the small claims court's many findings pertaining to Auriemma's knowing or intentional conduct.

9.   We also note that the small claims court actively and frequently commented on the grievous nature of Auriemma's conduct and abstained from awarding punitive damages solely because the jurisdictional damage cap had been reached with the imposition of other damages.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judge May concurs. Judge Tavitas concurs in result. May, J., concurs. Tavitas, J., concurs in result.