Ty Evans, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2005, Ty Evans was convicted of, inter alia, Class A felony attempted murder and was found to be a habitual offender. Evans was sentenced to forty-one years for his criminal convictions, enhanced by thirty years by virtue of his status as a habitual offender, for an aggregate seventy-one-year sentence. We subsequently overturned the habitual-offender finding but, in an order issued as clarification to our opinion, noted that pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Jaramillo v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 2005), the State could retry, and the trial court could re-sentence, Evans on the habitual-offender allegation. We reiterated that conclusion in Evans's subsequent appeal from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The matter eventually proceeded to trial on the habitual-offender allegation, after which the jury found Evans to be a habitual offender, and the trial court imposed a thirty-year enhancement to Evans's underlying sentence. Evans contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to amend the habitual-offender information before retrial. He also contends that the law of the case barred retrial on the habitual-offender allegation, that the State waived any argument for retrial of the habitual-offender allegation, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts and procedural history, as determined in Evans's most recent prior appeal, are as follows:

In 2005, the State charged Evans with Class A felony attempted murder, Class B felony aggravated battery, Class B felony criminal confinement, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The State also filed an habitual offender sentencing enhancement. The jury determined Evans was guilty of the offenses, and Evans admitted he was an habitual offender. The trial court imposed a total sentence of seventy-one years, including a sentencing enhancement of thirty years. Evans appealed his convictions, but the Court affirmed. Evans v. State, 855 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

Evans petitioned for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. Evans appealed, but the Court issued a memorandum decision affirming the post-conviction court's judgment. Evans v. State, No. 49A04-1112-PC-697, at *8 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2012) (mem.), trans. denied.

Next, Evans requested and received the Court's permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Evans v. State, No. 20A-SP-1719 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2020) (mem.). In subsequent litigation, Evans sought to withdraw his guilty plea to the habitual offender sentencing enhancement, claiming: (1) the State had failed to prove the predicate offenses occurred in the order set forth in the charging documents; and (2) he would not have entered a guilty plea if he had been aware of the error. The post-conviction court denied Evans’ petition, and he appealed. The Court reversed and remanded “with instructions to issue an amended abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion.” Evans v. State, 209 N.E.3d 472, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“Evans IV”).

On remand, the trial court scheduled a hearing. Evans filed an emergency motion asking the court to vacate the hearing and issue an amended abstract of judgment. He argued: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to take any action other than amending the abstract; and (2) he had fully served his sentence. In response, the State claimed it could retry Evans on the habitual offender sentencing enhancement because he had other predicate felony convictions. Later, the State filed an amended charging information for the sentencing enhancement.

After a hearing, the trial court issued an order amending the abstract of judgment to remove the habitual offender sentencing enhancement. The court also noted the State intended to retry Evans on the enhancement.

Evans moved for immediate release from custody, which the trial court denied. He then returned to the Evans IV Court and filed a Corrected Verified Petition for Writ in Aid of Appellate Jurisdiction, asking the Court to order his immediate release from incarceration. On October 23, 2023, the Evans IV Court denied his Verified Petition, determining that the State was not barred from re-prosecuting Evans on the sentencing enhancement.

Meanwhile, Evans had filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion after a hearing. Evans asked the court to certify its ruling for discretionary interlocutory review, and the court granted his request. Next, Evans asked the Court to accept jurisdiction over this appeal. The Court denied Evans’ motion in an order. Evans v. State, No. 23A-CR-2557 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2023) (mem.).

Evans then filed with the trial court a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing he was entitled to immediate release. The court denied Evans’ verified petition[.]

Evans v. State, 2024 WL 2048707 * 1–2 (Ind. Ct. App. May 8, 2024) (“Evans V”), trans. denied. In affirming the denial of Evans's habeas-corpus petition, we noted that “[t]he Evans IV Court determined that retrial of Evans is permitted under the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in [Jaramillo].” Id. at *2. We concluded that

[i]n the current case, as in Jaramillo, the State seeks to retry Evans on a sentencing enhancement. And the Evans IV Court vacated the sentencing enhancement due to the State failing to prove the proper chronological order of the predicate felonies, which is similar to the State's failure in Jaramillo to prove a judgment of conviction existed for the predicate felony. Following our Supreme Court's precedent, we conclude the State may retry Evans on the habitual offender sentencing enhancement. Evans is not entitled to immediate release, and the trial court did not err in denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Id. at *3.

[3] Meanwhile, on or about August 21, 2023, the State filed an amended habitual-offender information, in which it set forth four unrelated felony convictions. On January 9, 2024, Evans filed a motion for an early trial on the amended habitual allegation. The trial court granted Evans's motion and set a trial date for March 13, 2024. The State again moved to amend the habitual-offender information on March 11, 2024, after which Evans filed a motion to continue. Evans's trial was continued to April 17, 2024. Following trial, the jury found Evans to be a habitual offender, after which the trial court re-sentenced him to thirty years for the habitual-offender enhancement.

Discussion and Decision

I. Amendment to Habitual-Offender Information Prior to Retrial

[4] Evans contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to amend the habitual-offender information before retrial. “We review a trial court's decision on whether to permit an amendment to a charging information for an abuse of discretion.” State v. McFarland, 134 N.E.3d 1027, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “We will reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and errors affect a party's substantial rights.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). “The State bears the burden of proof to show that an amendment will not prejudice a defendant's substantial rights.” McFarland, 134 N.E.3d at 1030.

[5] Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(b) provides that an information “may be amended in matters of substance” at any time prior to the commencement of trial “upon giving written notice to the defendant[.]” In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to amend the habitual-offender information, Evans argues that his trial for the underlying criminal acts commenced on December 12, 2005, meaning that both the August of 2023 and the March of 2024 amendments occurred after his trial commenced.¹

[6] The Indiana Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the bifurcated nature of [a habitual-offender determination] clearly demonstrates the severability of the issues so that having a retrial on the habitual offender question alone can easily be accomplished.” State v. McMillan, 274 Ind. 167, 174, 409 N.E.2d 612, 617 (1980). The Supreme Court went on to conclude that constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy present no obstacle to a new or subsequent trial on “the severable question of habitual[-]criminal status[.]” Id. at 176, 409 N.E.2d at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has also allowed for retrial on an amended habitual-offender information after a habitual-offender finding had been reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence. See Jaramillo, 823 N.E.2d at 1191 (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the State from re-prosecuting a habitual offender enhancement after a conviction therefore has been reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence.”)

[7] The facts of this case are similar to those in Jaramillo. The date of trial at issue here is not the date on which Evans's underlying criminal trial commenced, but rather the date on which trial commenced on the habitual-offender allegation. That trial started on April 17, 2024, i.e., after the amendments to the habitual-offender information were made.

[8] While the State agrees that this amendment in question was substantive, it asserts that Evans was given proper notice of the amendments and an opportunity to prepare a defense. As the Indiana Supreme Court has noted, the ultimate question “is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges.” Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400, 405–06 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). The initial amendments, as set forth in the amended habitual-offender information, were filed on August 21, 2023, more than seven months prior to the habitual-offender trial. In considering how much time should be allowed following an amendment to a charging information to prepare for a defense, we have held that the “common scenario is two or more months.” Hobbs v. State, 160 N.E.3d 543, 551 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal emphasis, brackets, and quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[9] Furthermore, although additional amendments were made on March 11, 2024, Evans was granted a continuance after these additional amendments were made, such to allow him to prepare a defense to the amended information. The additional amendments merely added a hyphen to one of the cause numbers listed and removed a fourth prior alleged conviction, a 1980 felony from Illinois. Otherwise, the second amended information was substantially the same as the original amended information, as it relied on the remaining prior felonies set forth in the information that had been filed on August 21, 2023. We have previously concluded that an amendment to a charging information does not prejudice a defendant's substantial rights when the defendant is granted a continuance to prepare for trial after the amendment is made. See Barnett v. State, 83 N.E.3d 93, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Evans was granted a continuance to allow him additional time to prepare for trial on the habitual-offender enhancement. As such, we cannot say that his substantial rights were violated or that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to amend the habitual-offender information.

II. Evans's Additional Contentions

[10] Evans also contends that our opinion in Evans IV barred retrial on the habitual-offender allegation, that the State waived any argument for retrial of the habitual-offender allegation when it failed to cite Jaramillo, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him. While Evans asserts that these issues are being raised for the first time in this appeal, the State contends that we decided each of these issues in Evans V, which is now binding as the law of the case. We agree with the State.

[11] “The law of the case doctrine mandates that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds the trial court and ordinarily restricts the court on appeal in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and relevantly similar facts.” Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ind. 2003) (internal citation omitted). As for Evans's contention that Evans IV barred retrial on the habitual-offender allegation, we specifically found otherwise in Evans V. See Evans V, 2024 WL 2048707 at *2–3 & n 1 (citing an order issued by the Evans IV court explicitly stating that, pursuant to Jaramillo, the trial court could re-prosecute the habitual-offender allegation).

[12] The same is true for Evans's contentions that the State waived any argument for retrial of the habitual-offender allegation when it failed to cite Jaramillo, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him. See id. at *2–3. In Evans V, we applied Jaramillo and specifically concluded that, pursuant to Indiana Supreme Court precedent, the trial court could both retry and resentence Evans on the habitual-offender allegation. Id. at * 2–3. Our decision in Evans V is the law of the case and controls.

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Evans relies on Nunley v. State, 995 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, to support his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the amendment to the habitual-offender information. In Nunley, the State amended a habitual-offender information after the defendant's trial had commenced, and we found such amendment violated the defendant's substantial rights. 995 N.E.2d at 724–25. Given our conclusion that the amendments in this case were made prior to the start of the relevant trial, Evans's reliance on Nunley is unavailing.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Foley concur. Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.