Jake Raibley, Appellant-Defendant v. Jack Wright, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jake Raibley appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment. Raibley identifies four issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following dispositive issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Raibley's motion to set aside the default judgment.

[2] We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Raibley owns a boat repair, sales, and hauling business. In October 2021, Jack Wright brought his pontoon boat to Raibley's place of business for repair—specifically, to replace the boat's defective motor with another one furnished by Wright. Raibley determined that the replacement motor furnished by Wright was also defective, and Wright agreed that Raibley should find and install a working motor. Raibley found such a motor and partially installed it on Wright's boat.

[4] Wright's boat remained outside on a lot while it was at Raibley's place of business. Wright did not provide Raibley with a cover for the boat, and Raibley did not provide one either. During some winter months, Raibley covered Wright's boat with a tarp.

[5] In March 2023, Wright went to Raibley's place of business and removed his boat from Raibley's lot. The replacement motor Raibley had obtained was still partially installed on Wright's boat at that time. Raibley reported the motor as stolen to the police, and the police required Wright to bring the boat back to Raibley so that the latter could retrieve his motor.

[6] On March 30, 2023, Wright filed a lawsuit against Raibley for negligence, conversion, and breach of contract. Wright sought damages, including costs and attorney fees. On March 31, 2023, Bob Miller filed an Affidavit of Service in which he affirmed that he “personally served Jake Raibley a true and accurate copy of the attached document(s) on 3/31/23 at 1:10 p.m. at 5950 E[.] Morgan Avenue[,] Evansville[,] IN 47715[,]” which is the location of Raibley's business. App. at 13. The documents attached to the filed Affidavit of Service were Wright's lawyer's appearance form, a summons, and Wright's complaint.

[7] On May 8, 2023, Wright filed a motion for a default judgment against Raibley on the ground that the latter had failed to timely file an answer to the complaint. Wright's motion also sought a hearing on damages. On May 10, the court entered a default judgment against Raibley and scheduled a damages hearing. The order indicated that it was distributed to Wright's lawyer and to Raibley at his place of business. On July 20, the court held a damages hearing at which Wright appeared with counsel and Raibley did not appear. After hearing evidence, the court entered a judgment against Raibley for $32,524.92.¹

[8] Wright filed a motion for proceedings supplemental, and a hearing on the same was scheduled for January 26, 2024. Raibley appeared pro se at the hearing, which was then rescheduled. On February 13, 2024, counsel for Raibley entered his appearance, and Raibley subsequently filed a motion to set aside default judgment and motion to stay proceedings supplemental.

[9] On April 19, the court conducted a hearing on Raibley's motion to set aside default judgment. Raibley testified as follows. He was served “a packet” in an envelope that contained only Wright's attorney's appearance. Tr. at 18. At an unspecified time thereafter, Raibley went to the courthouse to inquire about the lawsuit. Raibley, who uses an electric scooter, went to the prosecutor's office, the small claims court office, and “some other office” that instructed him to go to the office of Wright's lawyer. Id. Raibley left his name and number at Wright's lawyer's office and called the office “a couple of times,” but he never got a return call. Id. at 19.

[10] In an order dated April 24, 2024, the trial court denied Raibley's motion to set aside default judgment. However, the court “set aside and vacated” the previous order on damages and stated its intent to set a new hearing on damages “on a mutually agreeable date for Plaintiff and Defendant.” Appealed Order. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Raibley challenges the denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment.² Our standard of review in such cases is well-settled.

We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for relief from judgment using an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's action is clearly erroneous, that is, against the logic and effect of the facts before it and inferences drawn therefrom.

Young v. Davis, 139 N.E.3d 1099, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), (quotation and citation omitted), trans. denied. When reviewing a trial court's determination on a motion to set aside default judgment, “we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Baker v. Paschen, 188 N.E.3d 486, 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Car-X Assoc. Corp., 39 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. 2015)), trans. denied. The burden of proof is on the movant to show sufficient grounds for relief. See, e.g., Huntington Nat'l Bank, 39 N.E.3d at 655.

[12] Raibley claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for relief from default judgment due to “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” because he did not receive sufficient service as required by Trial Rule 4. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(1). The trial court had before it conflicting evidence on the issue of service: specifically, Miller's sworn affidavit that he personally served the appearance, summons, and complaint upon Raibley, and Raibley's testimony that he was served with only the appearance form. It was within the trial court's discretion to credit Miller's affidavit over Raibley's contrary testimony. Raibley's contentions to the contrary are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See, e.g., Baker, 188 N.E.3d at 491.³

[13] Raibley also asserts that he was entitled to have the default judgment set aside under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(3) because Wright made “material misrepresentations” in his complaint that constituted “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party” justifying relief from judgment. Appellant's Br. at 19-20. However, the default judgment did not rely upon the allegations in Wright's complaint; rather, it was based upon Raibley's failure to file a timely answer to the complaint. Therefore, relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) is not warranted. See Baker, 188 N.E.3d at 492 (holding “the alleged misrepresentations that Defendants reference were not made with respect to a material fact which would change the trial court's judgment because the judgment was based on the fact that Defendants failed to answer the complaint or attempt to defend the complaint in any manner”).

Conclusion

[14] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Raibley's motion to set aside default judgment.⁴

[15] Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The damages order included an award of treble damages for conversion.

2.   By separate order, we deny Wright's motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the default judgment is not a final order. “A ruling denying or granting relief on a motion to set aside a default is deemed a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken.” Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Constr. Co., 798 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. 2003) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 60(C), which states, in relevant part, “a ruling or order of the court denying or granting relief, in whole or in part, by motion under subdivision (B) of this rule shall be deemed a final judgment, and an appeal may be taken therefrom as in the case of a judgment.”). This is so even if the issue of damages has not yet been determined.

3.   Raibley also maintains that the default judgment should have been set aside because he did not get notice of the damages hearing. However, that issue is moot, as the trial court vacated the damages judgment and indicated its intent to set a new hearing on damages.

4.   We decline to address Raibley's assertion that his Rule 60(B) motion should have been granted because Wright failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because (1) Raibley did not raise that issue below and has therefore waived it for appeal, see, e.g., State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, and (2) it is not a proper basis upon which to grant relief from judgment due to mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, see KWD Industrias SA DE CV v. IPM LLC, 129 N.E.3d 276, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (case citation omitted) (“A motion under Rule 60(B)(1) does not attack the substantive, legal merits of a judgment, but rather addresses the procedural, equitable grounds justifying the relief from the finality of a judgment.”).

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Foley concur. Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.