Jason Beasley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jason Beasley challenges his conviction for resisting law enforcement, as a Level 6 felony.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Beasley raises the following two issues on appeal:

I. Whether the resisting law enforcement statute, as applied to him, is unconstitutionally vague.

II. Whether the State provided sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Facts and Procedural Summary

[3] On December 27, 2023, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Evansville Police Officers Zackary Turpin and Stephen King were on patrol in a marked police vehicle. The officers noticed a group of bicycles without front lights that “were circling the middle of the street.” Tr. at 49.

[4] One of the bicyclists, who was later identified as Beasley, noticed the officers and “immediately started turning down alleys.” Id. at 50. Because Beasley's bicycle lacked a headlight and he was behaving in a suspicious manner, the officers decided to follow him. Officer Turpin activated his emergency lights and briefly activated his siren to get Beasley's attention. Beasley looked back, but then continued to evade the officers. At some point, Officer Turpin exited his vehicle and unsuccessfully attempted to cut off Beasley. Officer Turpin then yelled, “stop,” ordered Beasley off the bicycle, and yelled, “taser” as he attempted to deploy his taser. Id. at 54. The taser did not make contact with Beasley, and Beasley did not stop but began to pedal his bicycle faster. Eventually, other officers arrived in the area and apprehended Beasley.

[5] On December 28, 2023, the State charged Beasley with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, as well as several other offenses, which the State later dismissed. Beasley moved to dismiss the resisting law enforcement charge, arguing that the term “vehicle” was unconstitutionally vague. Beasley's counsel noted that he “did not make a motion to dismiss for any other purpose.” Id. at 37. The trial court denied Beasley's request, and the jury subsequently found him guilty as charged. The court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Beasley accordingly. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Constitutionality of Statute

[6] Beasley first asserts that Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-3-1(c)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague, “as applied” to him.² Appellant's Br. at 5. We review statutory and constitutional questions de novo. E.g., Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1033 (Ind. 2024). “[E]very statute stands before [an appellate court] clothed with the presumption of constitutionality unless clearly overcome by a contrary showing” by the party challenging it. Mellowitz v. Ball State Univ., 221 N.E.3d 1214, 1229 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Penal statutes must be “construed strictly[;]” however, they “should not be read so narrowly as to exclude cases they fairly cover.” George v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 945 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 2011). Our primary goal in construing statutes is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent, which is “best gleaned from the statutory text itself.” Id. Moreover, “[w]hen a statutory term has been defined by the General Assembly, we are bound by its definition.” Loomis v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 244 N.E.3d 908, 914 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[7] To satisfy the due process requirements of the United States and Indiana Constitutions, a penal statute must “clearly define the prohibited conduct so that it provides adequate and fair notice as to what precisely is proscribed.” George, 945 N.E.2d at 154. For a criminal statute to survive a challenge asserting unconstitutional vagueness under due process principles,

the statute need only inform the individual of the generally proscribed conduct[ ] and need not list with itemized exactitude each item of conduct prohibited. A statute will not be found unconstitutionally vague if individuals of ordinary intelligence can comprehend it adequately to inform them of the proscribed conduct.

Bradbury v. State, 180 N.E.3d 249, 255 (Ind. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A statute is only void for vagueness if it is vague as applied to the precise circumstances of the case giving rise to the challenge, and the defendant does not meet his burden of showing unconstitutional vagueness by devising hypothetical situations which might demonstrate vagueness.” Gates v. State, 192 N.E.3d 222, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[8] Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) defines resisting law enforcement as knowingly or intentionally fleeing “from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop.” Subsection (c)(1)(A) further provides that the crime is a Level 6 felony if it is done with the use of a “vehicle.” Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-1-1 provides that the definitions in Article 31.5 “apply throughout [Title 35, Criminal Law and Procedure] and to all other statutes relating to penal offenses.”³ Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-346 defines “vehicle” as “a device for transportation by land, water, or air. The term includes mobile equipment with provision for transport of an operator.”

[9] Beasley claims that Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-3-1(c)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because he could not have known that the word “vehicle” as used in that statute applies to a bicycle, which is what he was using at the relevant time. However, the General Assembly has clearly defined the term “vehicle” as used in penal statutes as “a device for transportation by land, water, or air,” Ind. Code 35-31.5-2-346, and any “individual of ordinary intelligence can comprehend” that a bicycle is a device for transportation by land, Bradbury, 180 N.E.3d at 255.

[10] Beasley does not claim otherwise, but nevertheless asserts that the term “vehicle” is vague because it would include roller skates or skateboards. However, we look only at the “precise circumstances” of his case, not “hypothetical situations which might demonstrate vagueness.” Gates, 192 N.E.3d at 225.⁴ The resisting law enforcement statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Beasley.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Beasley also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his resisting law enforcement conviction. Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is clear:

[W]e examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[12] Under Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), the State must prove that (1) Beasley (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) fled from (4) a law enforcement officer, (5) after the officer by visible or audible means (6) identified himself or herself and (7) ordered Beasley to stop. The offense is a Level 6 felony if it is done with the use of a vehicle. I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(c)(1)(A).

[13] Beasley does not dispute that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally fled from a law enforcement officer after the officer visibly or audibly identified himself and ordered Beasley to stop. Rather, Beasley's only contention in his sufficiency claim is merely a rehashing of his vagueness claim; that is, he asserts that the State failed to prove he committed the crime with the use of a “vehicle” because that term does not include a bicycle. However, for the reasons stated above, that claim fails.

[14] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Beasley's conviction.

Conclusion

[15] The resisting law enforcement with use of a vehicle statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Beasley, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support Beasley's Level 6 felony conviction of the same.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a), (c)(1)(A).

2.   This case does not involve a First Amendment claim, and “it is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.” State v. Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653, 656 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3.   Thus, Beasley's references to definitions of “vehicle” in other articles of the code are unavailing.

4.   Beasley also states in his briefs that the statute is “overly broad” within the context of his vagueness argument but does not raise a separate overbreadth claim. Reply Br. at 4. Indeed, he could not raise such a claim on appeal, as he did not raise an overbreadth claim in the trial court. See Tr. at 37 (Beasley's counsel stating that he “did not make a motion to dismiss for any [ ] purpose” other than vagueness); State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting issues not raised in trial court are waived on appeal), trans. denied.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Foley concur. Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.