B.B., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] B.B. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for committing battery as a Class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult. B.B. raises two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's adjudication. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2023, then-sixteen-year-old B.B. began dating C.C., who was fourteen years old. After about one week of dating, B.B. drove C.C. to a boat dock at Arch Street Park in Dearborn County. He parked the car there, and the two got into the back seat. There, the two began kissing. B.B. then asked C.C. to take her shirt off. She said, “No.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 41. They resumed kissing, and he again asked her to take her shirt off. She again said, “No.” Id. B.B. then lifted up C.C.’s shirt and twice asked her to take her bra off. C.C. responded “[n]o” both times. Id. B.B. then “put his hands under” C.C.’s bra and fondled her breasts. Id. at 41, 43-44.

[3] C.C. felt “panicked” and “scared,” and she later recalled feeling “frozen” in that moment. Id. at 44. However, she collected herself enough to “check the time on [her] phone” as “an excuse ․ to leave.” Id. B.B. complied and drove her home.

[4] The next day, C.C. texted B.B. But C.C. did not want to admit that she had had “a horrible time” in the car, and she was “scared to even say anything about” what had happened. Id. at 66. So, instead, she texted him that she had had “a great time yesterday. Like a really good time.” Id. at 65-66. C.C. hoped that her text messages would “smooth[ ] things over” and that they could move on from it. Id.

[5] However, as the days passed, C.C. became more and more uncomfortable with the incident in the car. Nine days after the incident, she met with her school counselor and school resource officer and told them what had happened. The school officials, in turn, informed law enforcement.

[6] Thereafter, the State filed a petition alleging that B.B. had committed sexual battery as a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. The juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing at which C.C. testified about the incident and her text messages to B.B. after the incident. Following the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court concluded that the State had not demonstrated Level 6 felony sexual battery but had demonstrated Class B misdemeanor battery. The court adjudicated B.B. as a delinquent child accordingly, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, B.B. asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his adjudication as a delinquent child for Class B misdemeanor battery if committed by an adult. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile adjudication, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006) (citation omitted). We consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it. Id. We will affirm a juvenile-delinquency adjudication if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the [juvenile committed the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt. Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993) (citations omitted).

B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018).

[8] To demonstrate that B.B. committed Class B misdemeanor battery, the State was required to show that B.B. touched C.C. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) (2023). Here, B.B. asserts only that the State's evidence failed to show that his touching of C.C. was “rude” or “insolent.” As our Supreme Court has stated:

Although the battery statute does not separately define “rude, insolent, or angry manner,” these disjunctive terms of art have plain and ordinary meanings readily susceptible of application by a factfinder. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rude [https://perma.cc/SE9X-FNRJ] (defining “rude” in part as “lacking refinement or delicacy,” “inelegant, uncouth,” or “offensive in manner or action: discourteous”); https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insolent [https://perma.cc/6H9J-LAXW] (defining “insolent” as “insultingly contemptuous in speech or conduct: overbearing” or “exhibiting boldness or effrontery: impudent”).

In re Hill, 144 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2020) (per curiam).

[9] As the evidence underlying the manner in which B.B. touched C.C. is founded on C.C.’s testimony, B.B. attempts to attack her testimony on appeal as incredibly dubious. Indiana's appellate courts may impinge upon a fact-finder's function to judge the credibility of a witness under the “incredible dubiosity” rule. Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015). Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely hesitant to invade the province” of the fact-finder. Id. Thus, to warrant application of the incredible dubiosity rule, there must be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015)).

[10] B.B.’s assertions on appeal notwithstanding, nothing about C.C.’s testimony was inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion, and, thus, her testimony was not incredibly dubious. She cogently explained why she acted as she did both during the incident in the car and during the several immediate days thereafter. She explained that she felt frozen, panicked, and scared, and that she initially just wanted to move past the situation. She further explained that, as the days progressed, B.B.’s insistence on touching her breasts inside the car on the day in question progressively felt more wrong to her. There is nothing in that testimony that is contrary to human experience, let alone so contrary that we must invade the province of the fact-finder on this issue. We reject B.B.’s argument that C.C.’s testimony was unworthy of credit.

[11] As for the sufficiency of the evidence underlying B.B.’s adjudication, “[i]t is well established that the testimony of a single eye witness is sufficient” to affirm the trial court's judgment. Brasher v. State, 746 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Ind. 2001). C.C. testified that B.B. touched her breasts under her bra after she repeatedly told him not to. At a minimum, that was rude and insolent. We therefore affirm B.B.’s adjudication as a delinquent child for Class B misdemeanor battery if committed by an adult.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges Brown and Kenworthy concur. Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.