IN RE: L.R.K. and W.C.-K. (Minor Children) (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] D.K. (“Mother”) is the mother of L.K. and W.C-K. (the “Children”). Due to Mother's substance abuse and mental health concerns, the Children were removed from her care and child in need of services (“CHINS”) petitions were filed. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted that petition and adjudicated the Children as CHINS. Mother now appeals ¹ and raises three issues for our review that we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating the Children as CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] L.K. was born on May 16, 2017, and W.C.-K. was born on August 26, 2021. In February 2024, Mother and the Children were living with the Children's maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) in Indiana. On February 13, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report of child neglect, alleging that Mother was drinking with the Children in the vehicle, using illegal substances, living with others who were using illegal substances, and was mentally unstable. That same day, a DCS family case manager (“FCM”) spoke with Mother—who was drinking alcohol during their conversation—and Mother admitted she had recently used methamphetamine. Mother also told the FCM that she was “engaged in services to address her abuse” and Grandmother was a “sober caregiver” for the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 26, 28. On February 15, Mother entered a “detox” program, Tr. Vol. II at 19; she was released from that program after five days and she soon began drinking alcohol and using methamphetamine again.

[4] On February 26, an FCM met with Grandmother; she told the FCM that Mother used illegal substances but claimed Mother never did so in the Children's presence while in her care and she had not left the Children alone with Mother for several months. On February 29, the same FCM met with Mother and Grandmother, and Mother admitted to using methamphetamine two days before. A subsequent drug screen confirmed Mother's statement. During the February 29 meeting, the FCM, Mother, and Grandmother created a safety plan that “ensure[d] the children would always be in the care of a sober caregiver, which was [Grandmother].” Tr. Vol. II at 64.

[5] From March 8 to March 12, Grandmother was in the hospital and Mother was the Children's sole caregiver. When the FCM met with Mother on March 12, Mother stated she last used methamphetamine on March 7; Mother subsequently tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mother's boyfriend stayed with her and the Children while Grandmother was in the hospital, and he also tested positive for methamphetamine.

[6] On March 21, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children were CHINS. On March 26, Mother tested positive for alcohol, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. After holding the initial and detention hearings on March 28, the juvenile court authorized DCS to remove the Children from Mother's care and place them in Grandmother's care. This removal resulted in Mother moving out of Grandmother's residence and staying in a tent at a campground.

[7] In April, Mother entered an inpatient substance abuse program, but she did not successfully complete it. When contacted by an FCM about this, Mother asked for a referral to a different substance abuse program; Mother did not use that referral because “she forgot about it.” Tr. Vol. II at 77.

[8] At the factfinding hearing on May 8, Mother testified that she started using methamphetamine when she was 16 years old, she regularly uses methamphetamine, and she last used methamphetamine approximately 17 days before the factfinding hearing. Mother claimed she had not used illegal substances in the Children's presence. Mother further testified that when she is using methamphetamine, she does so daily, and her longest period of sobriety was approximately two-and-a-half years. At the time of the factfinding hearing, Mother was participating in a virtual substance abuse treatment program and attending virtual Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Additionally, Mother testified that she was unemployed but “actively looking” for a job, Tr. Vol. II at 51, and she had a driver's license but no vehicle.

[9] One of the FCMs in this case testified that the Children had not been seeing a pediatrician regularly while in Mother's care. Consequently, L.K. had not yet seen a specialist to address her hearing problems.

[10] The juvenile court adjudicated the Children as CHINS and entered the following relevant findings and conclusions:

7) Mother has a long history of substance use.

8) Mother has used methamphetamine on at least one occasion where she was acting in a caregiving role.

9) Mother is currently homeless.

10) Mother's attempts to address her substance use until now have been unsuccessful.

11) Mother's continued substance use poses a threat to the health and wellbeing of the child.

12) The coercive intervention of the court is necessary to protect the child.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 45; see also id. at 46. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Juvenile Court Did Not Clearly Err by Adjudicating the Children as CHINS

[11] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that the Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. In order to adjudicate a child a CHINS under that section, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. Although there is “a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010).

[12] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if the juvenile court's decision was clearly erroneous. In re R.L., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017)). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if [the juvenile court] applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (quoting D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578). “[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. (citing D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78). When, as here, a trial court enters findings and conclusions sua sponte, we review any issue not covered by the findings “under the general judgment standard,” which means we will affirm “on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[13] On appeal, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in determining that her substance use seriously endangered the Children and that coercive intervention was necessary. In making her arguments, Mother does not specifically challenge any of the juvenile court's findings; consequently, we take all the juvenile court's findings as true, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Mother's arguments can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see R.L., 144 N.E.3d at 689 (citing D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578).

[14] For instance, Mother argues that the trial court's finding that she has a history of methamphetamine use does not support the conclusions that she seriously endangered the Children or that coercive intervention was necessary. In support, Mother cites her own testimony about her participation in a substance abuse treatment program, her belief that she can stay sober while in her current treatment programs, her assertion that she never used illegal substances around the Children or in Grandmother's residence, and her claim that she ensures Grandmother cares for the Children when she uses illegal substances outside of Grandmother's residence. The record reveals, among other things, that Mother has been using methamphetamine almost daily since she was 16 years old, she repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine throughout the proceedings, she cared for the Children while under the influence of methamphetamine on at least one occasion, and she had failed to obtain necessary medical services for the Children. This evidence clearly supports the trial court's conclusion that Mother's continued substance use is a threat to the Children's health and wellbeing; it also supports the trial court's conclusion that coercive intervention is necessary to ensure the Children receive sufficient care and treatment.

[15] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the juvenile court's decision, we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that Mother's substance abuse seriously endangered the Children and coercive intervention was necessary to get the Children the care and services they need. We therefore affirm the juvenile court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Children's fathers do not participate in this appeal.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur. Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.