IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.P. (Minor Child) and K.P. (Mother) (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.P. (“Mother”) appeals an order involuntarily terminating her parental rights over T.P. (“Child”) upon the petition of the Lake County Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Mother presents the sole issue of whether the order is clearly erroneous. Specifically, Mother argues that the court's findings do not support its conclusions that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions for removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied; (2) continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child; and (3) termination is in Child's best interests. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In December of 2022, Child was born addicted to fentanyl. Child suffered withdrawal symptoms requiring his hospitalization for fifteen days. Mother was placed in an intensive care unit due to her withdrawal from fentanyl and was discharged to an inpatient substance abuse treatment facility. Child was initially placed with a family member, but that placement failed and, when he was six weeks old, Child was sent to a foster home.¹

[3] On January 17, 2023, DCS alleged that Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to parental neglect. DCS subsequently amended the petition to allege that Child had been born drug-exposed. Mother admitted to the allegations, and, on May 24, Child was adjudicated a CHINS. In a dispositional order, Mother was required to participate in home-based caseworker services, individual therapy, drug assessment and treatment, drug screens, and supervised visitation with Child.

[4] On January 10, 2024, after Mother had failed to provide a single clean drug screen, the CHINS court changed the plan of reunification to one of adoption. On January 24, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on June 5, and, on June 21, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order terminating Mother's parental rights. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We begin our review by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[6] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.․

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).² DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[7] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[8] Here, in terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[9] The trial court's findings of fact include the following: Mother has been unable to obtain sobriety; she has not obtained employment or stable housing; and she has unaddressed mental health issues. On appeal, Mother does not challenge any of the factual findings made by the trial court. When findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Mother challenges the court's conclusions that the reasons for Child's removal or the continued placement outside of his home probably will not be remedied, that continuation of the parental relationship poses a threat to Child, and that termination is in Child's best interests. We address the arguments in turn.

Probability of Remediation of Conditions

[10] As previously observed, Mother does not specifically claim that any finding is unsupported by the evidence. Rather, she contends that the trial court failed to give enough emphasis to her partial compliance with services – that is, Mother completed two in-patient drug treatment programs. She additionally asserts that she is “signing up to participate in an aftercare program” and “has indicated that she has employment and housing.” Appellant's Brief at 9. On that basis, she challenges the trial court's conclusions that the conditions prompting Child's removal will likely not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child. Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we need only address whether the trial court erred in concluding that there exists a reasonable probability that Mother will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal.

[11] As to the likelihood of remediation of conditions, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[12] However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted); see also In re M.S., 898 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the “trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development are permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship”).

[13] In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013). And DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Moore, 894 N.E.2d at 226.

[14] Child was removed from Mother's care because he was born addicted to fentanyl and needed care that Mother could not provide, in part because she was enduring her own withdrawal from fentanyl. Mother completed two inpatient drug treatment programs but relapsed after each program. She made minimal efforts outside the treatment programs. For example, Mother was referred to outpatient treatment but waited “a couple of months” to begin those services. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 19.) Her attendance at aftercare sessions was “zero.” (Id. at 61.) Mother was scheduled to provide sixty-six drug screen samples; she provided three samples, all of which were positive for fentanyl.

[15] Mother's home-based caseworker, Chloe Bowman, testified that the goals for Mother were to achieve sobriety and obtain stable housing and employment. But Mother participated in less than half of the scheduled sessions. At times, Bowman received no response from Mother either at the residence or by telephone. Mother claimed to have obtained employment that interfered with her service appointments. However, DCS family case manager Britney Rice (“FCM Rice”) placed a call to confirm Mother's reported employment and found that she had been fired three months earlier. DCS had no verification of subsequent employment. Mother had housing with her father but reported that he would “kick her out” if she used illicit drugs. (Id. at 58.) Given these circumstances, both Bowman and FCM Rice testified that Mother had not achieved any of the goals: sobriety, stable housing, or stable employment.

[16] As for visitation with Child, there was testimony that Mother was initially compliant with that service, but as time went on, Mother became inconsistent. She was “consistently late,” and prone to “cancel at the last minute.” (Id. at 47-48.) At times, Mother dozed off during visits; she claimed to be overtired from working but this was after FCM Rice had been informed that Mother had been fired. At other times, Mother ended visits early. Visitation services were eventually paused. FCM Twyla Johnson estimated that Mother's attendance at individual therapy sessions had been at 50%. In sum, Mother did not successfully complete any program offered to her, apart from two in-patient substance abuse programs. Mother testified and essentially denied that she was abusing drugs; she claimed that her primary struggles were with depression and anxiety, and that she had been prescribed fentanyl patches on account of a kidney tumor not previously disclosed to her family or caseworkers.

[17] The trial court's unchallenged findings that Mother has not achieved sobriety, obtained stable housing and employment, or adequately treated mental health issues – which are amply supported by the evidence – clearly and convincingly support its conclusion that there exists a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[18] In determining what is in a child's best interests, the court must look to the totality of the evidence. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In this case, DCS involvement began when Child was born drug-addicted and Mother reported that she had used fentanyl during her pregnancy. Child has never been in Mother's custody and the parent-child contact has never progressed from supervised visitation. Indeed, Mother was historically non-compliant with drug screening and failed to produce a single clean drug screen such that she might demonstrate fitness as a caregiver. Mother's struggle to achieve and maintain sobriety spans twelve years yet she indicated at the fact-finding hearing that she was legally using fentanyl and had chosen to withhold that information previously. As of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had no verified employment and had housing with her father, contingent upon her not abusing drugs.

[19] Meanwhile, Child was thriving in the foster care home where he had been placed at six weeks. Home-based caseworker Robin Rivera testified that Child was “super[-]excited” when returned to the care of his foster family. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 52.) He appeared to be bonded to both his foster parents and his foster siblings. Child's foster parents had expressed a desire to adopt him. Mother's service providers uniformly opined that Mother was not making progress toward permanency and that termination of parental rights was in Child's best interests. The totality of the evidence is such that the trial court did not clearly err in finding termination of Mother's parental rights to be in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[20] The judgment terminating Mother's parental rights over T.P. is not clearly erroneous.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's alleged father was incarcerated in North Carolina. He does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The Indiana General Assembly amended this statute effective March 11, 2024. We cite to the version of the statute in effect at the time of the filing of the termination petition.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Foley concur. Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.