IN RE: the Commitment of K.K. (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] K.K. appeals, pro se, the trial court's temporary civil commitment order, claiming the trial court erred by holding the commitment hearing beyond the statutory deadline despite (1) representations by counsel indicating that K.K. consented to delay and (2) K.K.’s personal request for a continuance, when the trial court advised him that the continuance would result in additional delay. Because the commitment order expired—rendering this appeal moot—and we cannot say an exception applies to warrant addressing the merits, we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 22, 2024, K.K. was involuntarily admitted to Eskenazi Mental Health Center (“Eskenazi”). Eskenazi applied for an emergency detention order, which the trial court issued, and K.K. was transferred to the Richard L. Roudebush Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“the VA”). On April 24, 2024, the VA filed a Petition for Involuntary Commitment. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 8–11. By statute, K.K.’s commitment hearing was required to be held within fourteen days of his admission, excluding weekends and holidays.

[3] A commitment hearing was scheduled for April 29, 2024. On April 26, K.K.’s appointed counsel moved for a continuance “to obtain and review records and interview various witnesses,” asserting “[t]hat [K.K.] understands that if the April 29 hearing is continued, he would be detained at the VA ․ past April 29 and he does not object to continuing his detention so that ․ counsel can properly prepare for the hearing.” Id. at 43. The trial court granted the motion. On April 29, 2024, K.K.’s counsel moved for a change of judge, asserting that K.K. “has acknowledged and understands that he will be detained for an additional period of time in order for the change of judge to occur[.]” Id. at 51. The original judge granted the change of judge motion on April 30, 2024, appointing a new judge. On May 6, 2024, K.K.’s counsel filed an objection to the appointment of the new judge and sought the appointment of an eligible special judge. In doing so, K.K.’s counsel represented that, “after consultation with [counsel], [K.K.] knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive[d] the requirement that the hearing be held on or before May 13, 2024.” Id. at 85. Thereafter, there were delays related to the selection of an eligible special judge.

[4] At a status conference held on May 17, 2024—by which point the statutory deadline had passed—K.K. personally appeared and requested a continuance so he could hire private counsel. The trial court advised K.K. that granting his request would cause additional delay: “Now you understand that this would, your current situation would continue, and we wouldn't be holding a hearing ․ until we can get your counsel on board[.] ․ That's necessarily part of the process you understand?” Tr. Vol. II p. 10. K.K. said he understood and confirmed that he still wanted a continuance. Id. The trial court ordered a one-week continuance and set a status conference for May 23, 2024. The court then held the commitment hearing on May 30 and 31, 2024, ultimately granting the VA's petition and ordering K.K. committed “until August 28, 2024, unless discharged prior.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 157. K.K. now appeals, pro se.

Discussion and Decision

[5] K.K.’s temporary civil commitment order has expired. Generally, when this type of order expires, the case is deemed moot because we can no longer grant the appellant effective relief. See E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466–67 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam) (discussing mootness in the context of civil commitment); cf. J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 222 N.E.3d 1020, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting that, although typically moot, this type of case is not moot if “the appellant demonstrates a particularized collateral consequence flowing from the temporary commitment order”).

[6] Neither K.K. nor the VA address the expiration of the commitment order. However, we readily conclude the appeal is moot. When faced with a moot appeal, we have no obligation to discuss the merits, and it is procedurally proper to dismiss. Cf. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466. Nevertheless, even when the appeal is moot, we have discretion to discuss the merits under the “public interest” exception. See id. at 466–68. This exception applies if the case presents a “question of great public importance which is likely to recur.” Id. at 466.

[7] As our Supreme Court has explained: “Temporary civil commitments ․ often fit within this public interest exception ․ because they are transitory in nature and require the delicate balancing of a person's fundamental liberty interest with the safety of individuals and the public.” Id. at 465. We apply this exception “on a case-by-case basis,” id., tasked with “thoughtfully and thoroughly consider[ing] whether the case is moot and whether the public-interest exception ․ should apply,” id. at 467. All in all, although we “are not required to issue an opinion in every moot temporary commitment appeal,” we “may readily do so to address novel issues or close calls, or to build the instructive body of law to help trial courts make these urgent and difficult decisions.” Id. at 466. If we exercise our discretion to discuss the merits, our opinions “are, for all practical purposes, advisory opinions.” Id. at 467 (quoting I.J. v. State, 178 N.E.3d 798, 799 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam)). Further, if we elect to discuss the merits, we need not address all issues presented on appeal. Id.

[8] Here, K.K. does not discuss mootness, nor does he ask us to apply the public interest exception. K.K. instead focuses on whether the record reflects that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the statutory deadline for holding a commitment hearing. K.K. argues that he protested to language in counsel's motions regarding waiver of the deadline, and that counsel included that language anyway. K.K. also disputes that his decision to personally seek a continuance, despite the trial court's advisement that doing so would result in further delay, should result in K.K.’s implicit waiver of the statutory deadline.

[9] Having thoughtfully and thoroughly considered the issues presented on appeal, we conclude that this case fails to present a “question of great public importance which is likely to recur.” E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466. We therefore decline to address the merits and instead dismiss this appeal as moot.

[10] Dismissed.

Foley, Judge.

Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.