Bobby Wynn Watson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Bobby Wynn Watson (“Watson”) appeals, following a jury trial, his conviction for Level 6 felony possession of cocaine.¹ Watson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence.

Facts

[3] In July 2022, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officers Cassandra Crawley (“Officer Crawley”) and David Woloszyn (“Officer Woloszyn”) (collectively “the officers”), arrived on the scene to respond to a dispatch for an overdose in Indianapolis. Emergency medical personnel arrived at the same time as the officers. When Officer Crawley arrived on the scene, she saw that Watson “wasn't standing very well[,]” and Watson had been “assisted into a seat.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 88). Officer Crawley attempted to speak with Watson, but Watson was “[u]nable to really communicate ․ or have any sort of back-andforth conversation.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 88). Officer Woloszyn observed that Watson “was lethargic” and “was sweating profusely.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 112). Officer Woloszyn also observed that Watson's “pupils were dilated” and that Watson looked like he “needed medical attention.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 112). Officer Woloszyn “[b]riefly” spoke with Watson, but Watson was “[n]ot really” able to respond to the officer's questions. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 112).

[4] Emergency medical personnel tested Watson's vitals such as heart rate and blood pressure. Officer Crawley saw the machines used by the emergency medical personnel and saw that Watson's vitals were high. Either Officer Woloszyn or one of the emergency medical personnel on the scene stated that Watson's blood pressure was “200 something over something.” (State's Ex. 1). Officer Crawley continued to question Watson, but Watson had a “thousand-yard stare” and was unable to answer all of Officer Crawley's questions. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 89). Officer Crawley asked Watson multiple times if he had taken drugs or what drugs he had taken, and Watson denied using drugs. Officer Crawley believed that Watson was intoxicated and concluded that Watson “needed to go to the hospital.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 91). Officer Crawley told Watson that he “needed to get checked out” at the hospital because his “vitals [were] elevated.” (State's Ex. 1). Officer Crawley also told Watson that he had to go to the hospital and that it was not a choice.

[5] Watson entered the ambulance, and Officer Woloszyn conducted a patdown of Watson's clothing. During the patdown, Officer Woloszyn found a “baggy of white powder” in his “right front pocket[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 114). Officer Woloszyn believed the white powder was “[c]ocaine or Fentanyl” and handed the baggy to Officer Crawley. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 114). The officers then handcuffed Watson, and Watson was taken to the hospital in the ambulance.

[6] The State charged Watson with Level 6 felony possession of cocaine. In October 2022, Watson filed a motion to suppress. In his motion, Watson argued that the officer's search of Watson's person in the ambulance was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. In November 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Watson's motion to suppress. In January 2023, the trial court issued an order denying Watson's motion to suppress. The trial court found that Officer Woloszyn's patdown of Watson in the ambulance did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to patdown Watson.

[7] In January 2024, the trial court held a jury trial. Officer Crawley testified about her interaction with Watson. Watson objected to Officer Crawley's testimony, arguing that the officers had forced Watson to board the ambulance and receive medical care that he had attempted to refuse. Watson argued that requiring him to go into the ambulance was a seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court overruled Watson's objection, and Watson lodged a continuing objection. Officer Crawley testified that she believed that Watson “was intoxicated.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 90). When the State asked Officer Crawley if she believed that she had probable cause to arrest Watson, Officer Crawley responded, “[y]es.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 91).

[8] During Officer Crawley's testimony, the State moved to admit State's Exhibit 1, which was a video of Officer Crawley's bodycam footage of her interaction with Watson. Watson lodged his continuing objection, and the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 1 over his objection. The State also moved to admit State's Exhibit 3, which was the cocaine that Officer Woloszyn had collected from Watson's front right pocket during his patdown search of Watson. Watson also objected to the admission of this evidence based on his continuing objection as well as his arguments during the suppression hearing. The trial court also admitted State's Exhibit 3 over Watson's objection.

[9] Officer Woloszyn also testified at the jury trial. Officer Woloszyn testified that he believed that Watson had been intoxicated. When the State asked Officer Woloszyn if he believed that he had probable cause to arrest Watson, Officer Woloszyn responded, “[y]es.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 113). Officer Woloszyn also testified that he had patted down Watson in the ambulance because the ambulance driver and the emergency medical personnel had been unarmed. Officer Woloszyn testified that they “were in a high crime area” where people “usually ․ carr[ied] weapons[,]” and he wanted to make sure that Watson “didn't have anything that would hurt the ambulance drivers.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 114). Officer Woloszyn also testified that, based on his training and experience, he believed that the white powder found on Watson's person was either cocaine or Fentanyl. The State asked Officer Woloszyn if Watson had been placed under arrest after Officer Woloszyn had discovered the baggy containing a white substance, and Officer Woloszyn replied, “[y]es.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 116). During Officer Woloszyn's testimony, the State moved to admit State's Exhibit 2, Officer Woloszyn's bodycam footage of his interaction with Watson. Watson lodged his continuing objection, and the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 2 over Watson's objection.

[10] During Crime Lab Forensic Scientist Kaitlin Schilde's (“Scientist Schilde”) testimony, the State moved to admit Scientist Schilde's report as State's Exhibit 5. Watson lodged a continuing objection, and the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 5 over Watson's objection. Scientist Schilde testified that she had analyzed the baggy of white powder that Officer Woloszyn had collected from Watson's pocket. Scientist Schilde further testified that the baggy had a white powder and three smaller baggies inside of it and that the white powder inside of the baggy tested positive for cocaine. Scientist Schilde testified that the cocaine that she had tested weighed approximately 1.0896 grams.

[11] Watson also testified at his jury trial. Watson testified that he had “fainted a little bit” due to being dehydrated from the heat. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 138). Watson also testified that he had not taken any drugs, had not had cocaine in his front right pocket, and that Officer Woloszyn had tried to “put cocaine on [him].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 145).

[12] At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found Watson guilty of Level 6 felony possession of cocaine. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Watson to three hundred and sixty-five (365) days of probation.

[13] Watson now appeals.

Decision

[14] Watson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the cocaine seized from the patdown search of his pockets. He contends that the patdown search violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

[15] We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). “However, when a party argues the admission of evidence constituted a constitutional violation, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Miller v. State, 201 N.E.3d 683, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[16] Watson first challenges the admission of the evidence seized during the search of his pockets under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

[17] “The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.” Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). This protection has been “extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). “As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception.” Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260. “When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search.” Bradley, 54 N.E.3d at 999 (cleaned up).

[18] One such exception relevant to the circumstances in this case is the emergency aid exception, in which a law enforcement officer had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger[.]” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.”) (footnotes omitted). Indiana courts have also recognized the emergency aid exception. See M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 334 (Ind. 2016) (explaining that “the test [for the emergency aid exception] is objective, and the government must establish that the circumstances as they appeared at the moment of the stop would lead a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone ․ required immediate assistance”) (cleaned up).

[19] We find the facts of the case before us to be similar to those in Fritz v. State, 223 N.E.3d 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), where our Court applied the emergency aid exception to the search of a person. In Fritz, an officer responded to a medical emergency call in a grocery store parking lot in January. Id. at 273. The officer found Fritz lying on his back in the middle of the parking lot. Id. When the officer approached Fritz, Fritz told the officer that he must have fallen. Id. When the officer asked Fritz if he had ingested any drugs, Fritz's response was slow and drawn out. Id. at 274. Prior to Fritz being placed in an ambulance, the officer performed a patdown search of Fritz for his own safety and the safety of the paramedics who had arrived to administer aid. Id. Our Court held that this patdown search of Fritz “was limited to a search for weapons and/or items that might harm [the officer] or the paramedics as they administered treatment to Fritz.” Id. We held that the patdown search of Fritz by a concerned police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officer “had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Fritz might need medical assistance, and it was not unreasonable for the [officer] to be concerned about his safety and the safety of the attending paramedics when they rendered assistance to Fritz.” Id.

[20] Here, the officers responded to a dispatch regarding an overdose. When the officers arrived, they saw that Watson had trouble standing and had been assisted into a seat. Officer Woloszyn observed that Watson “was lethargic” and “was sweating profusely.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 112). Officer Woloszyn also observed that Watson's “pupils were dilated” and believed that Watson looked like he “needed medical attention.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 112). Officer Crawley watched the emergency medical personnel check Watson's vitals and saw that Watson's vitals were very high. Both of the officers believed that Watson was intoxicated and testified that Watson had trouble communicating. When Watson entered the ambulance, Officer Woloszyn conducted a patdown of Watson's clothing because the ambulance driver and the emergency medical personnel were unarmed, they “were in a high crime area[,]” and Officer Woloszyn wanted to make sure that Watson “didn't have anything that would hurt the ambulance drivers.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 114).²

[21] Here, similarly to our determination in Fritz, we hold that Officer Woloszyn's patdown search of Watson in the ambulance did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Officer Woloszyn had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Watson might need medical assistance, and it was not unreasonable for Officer Woloszyn to be concerned about his safety and the safety of the attending emergency medical personnel when they rendered assistance to Watson. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the cocaine found during Officer Woloszyn's patdown search of Watson in the ambulance.³

[22] Watson also challenges the admission of the evidence seized during the search of his pockets under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 11. “The purpose of this section is to protect those areas of life that Hoosiers consider private from unreasonable police activity.” State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2008), reh'g denied. Although Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, we interpret Article 1, Section 11 independently. See Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2010). “[W]e focus on the actions of the police officer[ ] and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer's actions.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1034 (cleaned up). The reasonableness of a law enforcement officer's search or seizure requires balancing three factors: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).

[23] Here, the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred was high. In the context of an emergency aid exception case, this factor can be read as “the degree of concern that emergency medical assistance was needed[.]” See Randall v. State, 101 N.E.3d 831, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that, in the context of the emergency aid exception, the first Litchfield factor can be read as “the degree of concern that emergency medical assistance was needed”), trans. denied. The officers responded to a dispatch regarding a person who had overdosed. When the officers arrived, they found a profusely-sweating Watson. Watson was lethargic and was having trouble standing and communicating. Watson also had dilated pupils and elevated vitals. The degree of concern that emergency medical assistance was needed was high.

[24] The degree of intrusion was moderate. Officer Woloszyn conducted a patdown of Watson's clothing , which is a “fairly limited intrusion[.]” Berry v. State, 121 N.E.3d 633, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. But, the officers ordered a reluctant Watson into the ambulance to receive medical care due to his signs of intoxication and elevated vitals.

[25] Finally, we turn to the extent of law enforcement needs. Law enforcement needs exist “not only when officers conduct investigations of wrongdoing but also when they provide emergency assistance or act to prevent some imminent harm.” Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 946 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied. The extent of law enforcement needs here was significant because the officers patted down Watson in the context of providing for the safety of the officers and the emergency medical personnel as they provided medical assistance to Watson. The patdown search of Watson was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the cocaine that Officer Woloszyn found in Watson's pocket.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   IND. CODE § 35-48-4-6.

2.   We note that an individual's presence in a high crime area alone does not justify an officer's patdown search. See Swanson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Here, however, Officer Woloszyn did not patdown Watson only because he was in a high crime area. Instead, Officer Woloszyn conducted the patdown search in the context of providing emergency aid and for the protection of himself and the unarmed emergency medical personnel.

3.   Watson also argues that the officers did not have “reasonable suspicion that Watson was publicly intoxicated[.]” (Watson's Br. 9). However, since we have already determined that the patdown search did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the emergency aid exception, we decline to address Watson's reasonable suspicion argument.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Pyle

Judges May and Brown concur. May, J., and Brown, J., concur.