Lori Goodner, a.k.a. Lori Ryan, Appellant-Defendant v. GVC (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Lori Goodner financed her purchase of an Indianapolis home (the Property) with a $94,162 mortgage loan. Later, to ward off two foreclosure actions, Goodner twice agreed to loan modifications that reaffirmed the validity of the original loan. But when a third foreclosure action ended in a judgment against her, Goodner sought to set aside the judgment by alleging, among other things, fraud and duress. Despite signing three sets of mortgage loan documents showing that she owed amounts exceeding $90,000 for the home and despite making mortgage payments for over a decade, Goodner claimed she bought the Property outright for $10 cash and never owed anything to any lender. The trial court rejected her arguments, and we affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2011, Goodner purchased the Property by obtaining a $94,162 loan from GVC Mortgage, Inc. d/b/a Preferred Capital (GVC). The closing settlement statement provided to Goodner before the closing identified Goodner as the “Borrower,” named the U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development as the “Seller,” and specified the “Principal amount of new loan” as “$94,162.00.” Appellant's App. Vol. VIII, p. 6. At the closing, Goodner signed a promissory note (the Note) in favor of GVC for $94,162.00.

[3] Goodner also signed a mortgage on the Property that, by its terms, granted GVC a security interest in the Property. The mortgage secured repayment of the Note “and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note.” Appellant's App. Vol. VI, p. 5.

[4] GVC later stamped “VOID” over an unexecuted endorsement block at the bottom of the Note. Immediately to the right of that block, GVC endorsed the Note to the Order of Wells Fargo. Id. at 66. This endorsement was executed by Cindy Gressett, Vice President of Texas Capital Bank, N.A. (TCB), as attorney in fact for GVC. GVC had granted TCB a limited power of attorney in 2011 authorizing TCB to make such endorsements on GVC's behalf.

[5] Less than 18 months after the closing, Wells Fargo filed the first foreclosure action against Goodner. The foreclosure was resolved through a loan modification agreement (2014 Loan Modification). The 2014 Loan Modification, signed by Goodner, specified the loan balance on the Property was $99,147.68. Under the terms of the agreement, Goodner expressly promised to pay “Lender,” which was defined as Wells Fargo, the modified monthly mortgage payments beginning October 1, 2014. Id. at 16.

[6] When Goodner defaulted again, Wells Fargo filed a new foreclosure action in November 2015. This led to a second loan modification agreement (2017 Loan Modification) that Goodner signed two years later. In addition to again identifying Wells Fargo as the “Lender,” the 2017 Loan Modification specified that the new principal balance would be $104,254.85, the modified interest rate would be 4.250%, and Goodner's modified mortgage payments of $869.18 would begin January 1, 2018. Id. at 24. Under the terms of the 2017 Loan Modification, Goodner affirmed “[t]hat the Loan Documents are composed of duly valid, binding agreements, enforceable in accordance with their terms and are hereby reaffirmed.” Id. at 27.

[7] Goodner again defaulted, making her last mortgage payment in 2018. In 2019, Wells Fargo assigned its interest in the mortgage to M&T Bank, which filed the third and final foreclosure action in July 2019. In her answer and counterclaim, Goodner raised various defenses, including the alleged invalidity of the Note (and any successive versions of it) due to the “VOID” stamp.

[8] M&T Bank moved for summary judgment on its foreclosure complaint and Goodner's counterclaim.¹ After expiration of the 30-day deadline for responding to the motion for summary judgment, Goodner moved for an extension of time to respond. The trial court denied the extension, granted summary judgment to M&T Bank, and entered a decree of foreclosure.

[9] On the same date that the trial court signed the foreclosure decree, Goodner filed “Defendant Goodner's Verified Motion for Declaratory Judgment Regarding GVC Power of Attorney.” In this motion, Goodner contended that TCB President Gressett had no authority to endorse the Note to Wells Fargo on behalf of GVC because the limited power of attorney that GVC executed was invalid. Goodner based this claim on M&T Bank's submission of two versions of the power of attorney document. One version, provided to Goodner in discovery, reflects both that Gressett signed the document on January 4, 2011, and that a notary witnessed Gressett's signature a year earlier on January 4, 2010. The other version of the power of attorney document—attached to M&T Bank's summary judgment motion—showed that the notary witnessed Gressett's signature on January 4, 2011. Goodner claimed that the power of attorney was defective and therefore Gressett lacked authority to endorse the Note to Wells Fargo on GVC's behalf. Goodner sought judgment against Wells Fargo and M&T Bank on the grounds that they had no valid interest in the Property.

[10] Before the trial court could rule on this motion, Goodner filed other motions aimed at setting aside or delaying enforcement of the foreclosure judgment. In her “Motion for Declaratory Relief as to Amended Note,” Goodner sought a determination of the effect of the word “VOID” on the signature page of the Note. Soon thereafter, she filed “Defendant Goodner's Verified TR-60(B) Motion for Order to Set Aside Summary and Default Judgement (sic) Entry and Decree of Foreclosure and Verified TR-62(B) Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Verified TR-59 Motion to Correct Error and Verified TR-41 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff M&T's Claims.” She later filed another motion for declaratory judgment seeking a determination of the validity of the original mortgage and the Note.

[11] In these additional motions, Goodner raised a myriad of claims including:

• M&T Bank committed fraud upon the trial court by:

o failing to mention that the word “VOID” appears on the signature block of the Note and Amended Note.

o seeking to foreclose based on a void Note for which M&T Bank lacks an original copy.

o altering the power of attorney that GVC executed in favor of TCB.

o suggesting a loan was taken out to purchase the Property when Goodner paid for the Property in full at closing in 2011.

o committing perjury in discovery by denying the presence of the word “VOID” on the Note.

• TCB had no authority to sign on behalf of GVC so no valid transfer of the Note to Wells Fargo and, later, to M&T Bank ever occurred.

• The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to M&T Bank because M&T Bank had not met its burden of showing it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[12] In its lengthy written response, M&T Bank refuted all Goodner's claims. It noted that some of the claims were made in the previous foreclosure actions and that she had paid nothing toward the mortgage for about five years. M&T Bank also explained that the original Note was in the possession of M&T Bank's counsel and that Goodner had viewed it in counsel's office.

[13] At the hearing on Goodner's motions, she claimed that she paid for the Property in cash and that no valid loan ever existed, despite her signature on the original mortgage and two loan modifications, including the 2017 Loan Modification that specifically acknowledged the validity of the original mortgage. When the trial court inquired into Goodner's assertion, the following exchange occurred:

MS. GOODNER: The house was paid for, yes.

THE COURT: But did you pay for it?

MS. GOODNER: I paid for it, yes, with all due consideration.

THE COURT: How much did you pay for it?

MS. GOODNER: According to the title, I paid $10.

THE COURT: So, you think $10 was the value of the house?

MS. GOODNER: It meant something to me ․

THE COURT: Are you disputing the fact that the house, the day you bought it ․ cost $94,000?

MS. GOODNER: Yes, I am, because that was based on the amount of a non-existent mortgage.

THE COURT: I didn't ask you about the mortgage. I asked you about the price of the house.

MS. GOODNER: Yes, because the price of the house was $93,000.

THE COURT: So, you're agreeing that the price of the house is $93,000?

MS. GOODNER: The price of the house on the sales contract was [$93,000].

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 19, 32.

[14] After the hearing, the trial court denied all Goodner's motions. Noting that most of the motions were filed 11 days after her summary judgment response was due, the court ruled it could not consider the motions because they were improper attempts to respond belatedly to M&T Bank's summary judgment motion. The court also declined to review the claims in Goodner's motion to correct error because the motion had already been denied.

[15] The court also concluded that even if Goodner's series of motions could be considered, M&T Bank had met its burden on summary judgment and was entitled to enforce the Note. In particular, the court found no evidence of fraud and no support for Goodner's claim that the word “VOID” on the Note rendered it unenforceable. The court entered a decree of foreclosure but stayed the judgment pending the outcome of this pro se appeal by Goodner.

Discussion and Decision

[16] Goodner claims that the trial court erroneously denied all her motions. Where, as here, a trial court has conducted an evidentiary hearing before entering judgment, we review a Trial Rule 60(B) ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. Holland v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 171 N.E.3d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Without reweighing the evidence, we will reverse a Trial Rule 60(B) ruling when the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. KWD Industrias SA DE CV v. IPM LLC, 129 N.E.3d 276, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We also review the court's ruling on a motion for declaratory judgment and a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Estate of Morris ex rel. Morris, 966 N.E.2d 681, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (declaratory judgment); Knowledge A-Z, Inc. v. Sentry Ins., 891 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (motion to correct error). We conclude that Goodner is not entitled to relief.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Consider Goodner's Trial Rule 60(B) Motions and Motions for Declaratory Judgment

[17] The trial court relied on Indiana Trial Rule 56 and our Supreme Court's ruling in Homeq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 2008), when determining that it could not consider Goodner's Trial Rule 60(B) motions and motions for declaratory judgment. Rule 56(C) specifies that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment has 30 days to serve a response or any opposing affidavits.

[18] In Homeq Servicing, our Supreme Court reiterated that when a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), “the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-day period.” Id. at 98-99 (quoting Borsuk v. Town of St. John, 820 N.E.2d 118, 124 n.5 (Ind. 2005)). This “bright-line rule” has been applied to bar consideration of a summary judgment response tendered only one day late. Starks Mech., Inc. v. New Albany-Floyd Cnty. Consol. Sch. Corp., 854 N.E.2d 936, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that the trial court had no discretion to allow the non-movant to file its tardy response and designated evidence).

[19] Goodner did not file any response to M&T's summary judgment motion in the 30 days following its filing. She waited until more than a week after her response was due under Trial Rule 56(C) to seek an extension. Then, beginning on the day that the trial court signed the order granting summary judgment, Goodner filed variously titled motions that served the same purpose as a summary judgment response: attacking M&T Bank's claim that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its foreclosure claim.

[20] For instance, through her motions, Goodner sought a determination that M&T Bank had no enforceable interest in the Property based on the alleged defect in GVC's power of attorney and the “VOID” stamp on the Note. Given that M&T Bank claimed it was entitled to enforce the Note as a matter of law, these contentions in Goodner's motions directly attacked M&T Bank's summary judgment claims.

[21] Thus, Goodner's claims in her motions—raised under the guise of Trial Rule 60(B) and the declaratory judgment statutes—were, in fact, belated arguments against summary judgment. Simply changing the caption does not transform a tardy summary judgment response into a cognizable argument. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hill v. Jones-Elliott, 141 N.E.3d 1264, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (finding that a party's motion to withdraw admissions could not be considered because it was filed after the party failed to respond timely to a motion for summary judgment that was based on the admissions).

II. Goodner Has Forfeited Her Challenge to the Trial Court's Ruling on Her Motion to Correct Errors

[22] The trial court also properly declined to consider the merits of Goodner's motion to correct error, which challenged the entry of summary judgment. The court noted that Goodner's motion to correct error had earlier been deemed denied under Indiana Trial Rule 53.3(A). This rule specifies, in pertinent part:

In the event a court fails for forty-five (45) days to set a Motion to Correct Error for hearing, or fails to rule on a Motion to Correct Error within thirty (30) days after it was heard or forty-five (45) days after it was filed, if no hearing is required, the pending Motion to Correct Error shall be deemed denied.

Tr. R. 53.3(A).

[23] Goodner did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the deemed denial of her motion to correct error and therefore has forfeited her appeal of the denial of her motion. See id. (providing that “[a]ny appeal shall be initiated by filing the notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 9(A) within thirty (30) days after the Motion to Correct Error is deemed denied”). Even if she had timely initiated her appeal, Goodner waived any error relating to the motion to correct error ruling by failing to include any cogent argument in support of such a challenge in her appellate brief. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that each contention in the appellant's brief be supported by cogent argument and citations to applicable authority and to the record). Goodner's only mention of the motion to correct error is in her claim for relief at the end of her brief when she simply asks this Court to grant it.

[24] As Goodner has failed to show that she is entitled to relief, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   M&T moved for summary judgment earlier, and the trial court initially granted that motion. However, after Goodner alleged inadequate notice, the court vacated the judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Foley concur. Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.