Justin A. Holman, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Justin Holman appeals his conviction for kidnapping resulting in serious bodily injury, as a Level 3 felony.¹ He raises two issues, but we address only the dispositive issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Finding that there was not, we reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At or around 4:00 p.m. on February 18, 2021, Holman drove his girlfriend's Pontiac G6 vehicle to 38th Street and Mitthoeffer Road to buy cigarettes and go to the liquor store. Holman had been drinking alcohol that day and was intoxicated. Shanel Smith, who had also been drinking alcohol and was intoxicated, was outside the liquor store when Holman arrived. While Holman was parked in the lot between the liquor store and an adjacent laundromat, Smith got into Holman's vehicle, presumably to get out of the cold.² Smith sat in the vehicle with Holman for several minutes.

[3] At approximately 4:10 p.m., Holman pulled the Pontiac G6 out of the liquor store parking lot with Smith still in the vehicle. Holman then drove the vehicle to an alley behind the nearby laundromat and stopped the car. Holman leaned over the passenger seat and opened the passenger side door from the inside. Holman then exited the vehicle from the driver's side, walked around to the passenger side, pulled Smith out of the vehicle, and laid her on the ground in the snow alongside the alley. Holman also removed Smith's personal property—including a jacket, backpack, and winter hat—from his vehicle and threw it on the ground next to Smith. Holman got back into the driver's seat of the vehicle and drove away.

[4] During the next seven hours, Smith remained in the snow where Holman had left her. During that time, Smith periodically sat up, looked around, repositioned herself and her jacket, and grabbed a nearby beer can. Thus, Smith was “alive for at least seven hours after ․ she [was] removed from Mr. Holman's car.” Tr. v. IV at 137. Also during this time, a number of people walked or drove by Smith but did not touch, move, or otherwise help her.³

[5] At “around midnight,” Jesus Torres, who worked at the nearby laundromat, drove his vehicle behind the laundromat to check whether snow was covering the ground. Tr. v. III at 135. Torres saw Smith lying in the snow and drove to the front of the laundromat to speak with a security officer. Torres and the security officer walked back to where Smith was lying and called 9-1-1. Emergency personnel arrived and pronounced Smith dead at approximately 1:50 a.m. on February 19, 2021. At “about” 4:30 a.m. that same day, the temperature was recorded as ten degrees Fahrenheit, id. at 167, and “the wind [had been] blowing very hard” that night, Tr. v. IV at 109.

[6] An autopsy disclosed that Smith had a blood alcohol content of .297 at the time of her death. A pathologist determined that Smith's “main cause of death was environmental cold exposure,” with “contributing factors” of “acute and chronic alcoholism.” Tr. v. IV at 10.

[7] Officers identified and located the Pontiac G6 Holman had driven on February 18, 2021, at Holman and his girlfriend's house. Holman agreed to speak with the officers and was taken downtown for an interview. Officers noticed that Holman was wearing a jacket and hat that looked like the ones worn by the man who left Smith in the snow as shown on the surveillance cameras. During the interview, Holman stated that he had little recollection of the previous day due to his intoxication, but “vaguely” recalled a woman sitting in the Pontiac he drove at the liquor store on February 18. State's Ex. 34 at 17:50. He speculated that the woman got in his car to get out of the cold. Holman remembered driving with the woman out of the parking lot but stated that he did not remember anything that happened after that. He stated that, if the woman had refused to get out of the car or passed out, he would have pulled her out rather than go back to his girlfriend's house with an unknown woman in the car.

[8] The State charged Holman with reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony,⁴ and kidnapping resulting in serious bodily injury. Holman argued at trial that he had acted in defense of his property. The jury found Holman guilty, as charged, of reckless homicide and kidnapping. Holman later admitted to being a habitual offender at sentencing. The Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”), sentencing order, and abstract of judgment all state that the “conviction” in Count I, reckless homicide, “merged” into Count II, kidnapping. App. v. II at 8, 24, 26. The trial court sentenced Holman to an aggregate term of twenty years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”), with ten years on the kidnapping count enhanced by ten years for being a habitual offender. Id. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Holman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove kidnapping ⁵ and to disprove his defense of property claim.

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. The evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction. We affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone so long as there are reasonable inferences enabling the factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lawrence v. State, 959 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[10] To convict Holman of kidnapping as a Level 3 felony, the State was required to prove that: (1) Holman (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) removed Smith (4) by force (5) from one place to another (6) resulting in serious bodily injury. Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(a), (b)(3). Holman does not dispute that he knowingly used force to remove Smith from his vehicle, as the video evidence shows him doing so. However, he contends that there was insufficient evidence that his forceful removal of Smith is what caused her injury/death. Holman notes that Smith was alive and moving around for up to seven hours after he removed her from his car and that other people saw Smith during that time but did not help her.

[11] As this Court has noted,

[t]he concept of causation in criminal law is similar to that found in tort law. Like in tort law, the criminal act must be both 1) the actual cause (sometimes called the “cause-in-fact”); and 2) the legal cause (sometimes called the “proximate cause”) of the result.

Bowman v. State, 564 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 577 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 1991). Cause-in-fact requires that “but for” the antecedent conduct, the result would not have occurred. Id. Proximate cause is

a distinct concept, speaking not to the physical relationship between the actor's conduct and the result, but instead embodying a value judgment as to the extent of the physical consequences of an action for which the actor should be held responsible. Thus, proximate cause questions are often couched in terms of “foreseeability”; an actor is not held responsible for consequences which are unforeseeable. In Indiana, a result is deemed foreseeable if it is a “natural and probable consequence” of the act of the defendant.

Id. (citation omitted).

[12] However, often there is more than one cause which precipitates the result. In those circumstances, our Supreme Court has noted a distinction between a “contributing” cause and a proximate cause. Moore v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Abney v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied. A “contributing” cause is “ ‘a factor that—though not the primary cause—plays a part in producing the result.’ ” Id. (quoting Abney, 766 N.E.2d at 1178). It is “a well-settled rule ․ that causation for purposes of a criminal conviction must be proximate, rather than contributing.” Id. at 1108. Moreover, if “an unforeseen action by the victim, a third party, or a non-human actor ․ interfere[s] with and break[s] the chain of causation stemming from the defendant's original action, ․ the defendant is not responsible for the result.” Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Bowman, 564 N.E.2d at 313)). In order for such an intervening cause to break the chain of criminal responsibility, “it must be so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the [defendant] responsible for the actual result.” Cannon v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1039, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[13] Here, it is not clear that Holman's removal of Smith from his car to the alley was a contributing factor to her ultimate death, much less the proximate cause. Smith's “main” cause of death was “environmental cold exposure.” Tr. v. IV at 10. But it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that, “but for” Holman's actions, Smith would not have remained outside for the next seven hours. Bowman, 564 N.E.2d at 313. Smith was outside in the cold when she got into Holman's vehicle, apparently because she had nowhere else to go. Thus, even if she had not entered Holman's vehicle and been subsequently removed from it, it is possible that she nevertheless would have remained outside for the next seven hours.

[14] There also is insufficient evidence that Holman's actions were the proximate cause of Smith's death. It was not a “natural and probable consequence” of removing Smith from the vehicle that she would remain outside for the next seven hours. Moreover, Smith's apparent periodic awakening during those seven hours and her decision to remain where she was rather than seek shelter was an extraordinary and unforeseeable intervening cause of her ultimate death due to cold exposure. Thus, regardless of the merits of Holman's defense of property claim, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the crime charged, i.e., kidnapping resulting in serious bodily injury.⁶

[15] Holman also maintains that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut his claim that his actions were necessary—and, therefore, justified—in order to terminate Smith's unlawful trespass in his occupied vehicle, as provided in Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(d).⁷ That statute provides, in relevant part:

(d) A person:

(1) is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, against any other person; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry of or attack on the person's dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle.

Id. Thus, a valid claim of defense of property “is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Huls v. State, 971 N.E.2d 739, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[16] When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, it is the State's burden to negate at least one of the necessary elements. Hughes v. State, 153 N.E.3d 354, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999)), trans. denied. “The State may meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by relying on the sufficiency of the case-in chief.” Id. Whether the State has met its burden is a question for the trier of fact. Id. “If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, an appellate court will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied.

[17] Under the defense of property statute, a person may use reasonable force to terminate another person's trespass even if the alleged trespasser has not engaged in a “breach of the peace.” Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). However, the amount of force used by a defendant claiming defense of property must be “reasonable in light of the urgency of the situation.” Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the State may disprove defense of property by showing that the defendant used “more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances.” Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted), trans. denied. In determining whether the amount of force used was reasonable, the jury must consider both what the defendant actually believed was necessary under the circumstances and what an ordinary “reasonable person would believe if standing in the shoes of the defendant.” Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342, 349 (Ind. 2013).

[18] Here, there was substantial evidence of probative value that Holman had allowed Smith to enter his vehicle to get out of the cold weather and that Smith subsequently had either passed out or fallen asleep in Holman's vehicle and, therefore, would not leave it. At that point, Smith was trespassing in Holman's vehicle, and he had a statutory right to use reasonable force to terminate the trespass. See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(d). There was also substantial evidence of probative value that Smith used the minimum amount of force reasonably necessary under the circumstances to cure the trespass; he simply moved Smith out of his vehicle and placed her back outside, from where she had come. That is, Holman used minimal, reasonable force to place Smith back into the situation she was in before her entry and subsequent trespass in his vehicle. Thus, as a matter of law, the facts do not support Holman's kidnapping conviction.

[19] Because there was insufficient evidence to support Holman's kidnapping conviction, we reverse and remand for sentencing on the reckless homicide verdict.

[20] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

[21] Juries play a crucial role in our system of criminal justice. See, e.g., U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, §§ 13 & 19. While fulfilling this role, juries are often entrusted to make difficult decisions. This case is no exception. As an appellate court we are not to substitute our judgment for that of the jury. That is, in applying our deferential standard of review, we defer to a jury's decision rejecting a defendant's claim of defense of property so long as sufficient evidence supported the decision. Because that bar was met here, I would not disrupt the jury's verdict and respectfully dissent.

[22] At the outset, it is important to focus on what Holman actually argues on appeal. Holman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut his defense of property claim—specifically attacking the element of forcible removal. Holman did not argue the evidence was insufficient to show he caused Shanel Smith's death until his reply brief, thereby waiving appellate review of the issue. See Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1179–80 (Ind. 2016) (explaining issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived). Because Holman waived the issue, we should not address it, let alone reverse a jury's verdict on that basis. After all, “an appellate court's role is an impartial adjudicator, not an advocate.” Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 283 (Ind. 2022); see also Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (reminding that appellate courts should “not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf,” because doing so strays from an appellate court's task of solving disputes and legal questions presented and argued by the parties before it). I would heed our Supreme Court's frequent reminders and hold that Holman waived any appellate claim concerning causation by not first raising it in his initial appellate brief.

[23] Turning to Holman's preserved appellate claim, Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(d) justifies a person's use of reasonable force against another person “if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry of or attack on the person's ․ occupied motor vehicle.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d) (2019). Once Holman raised a defense of property claim with evidentiary support, the burden shifted to the State to disprove at least one element of Holman's defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (considering a claim of defense of property “analogous” to a claim of self-defense). The State can carry its burden “by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Lilly v. State, 506 N.E.2d 23, 24 (Ind. 1987)).

[24] We review whether the State has carried its burden using the same standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). Under this “deferential standard of review ․ we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). And “we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. Doing so preserves the “jury's primacy” in determining whether the State has met its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022).

[25] When interviewed by police the day after Smith's death, Holman repeatedly denied having any recollection of Smith ever being in his car. In fact, Holman's interview was riddled with instances of Holman explaining he could not remember interacting with Smith in any fashion that day—especially pulling her out of his car—because he was intoxicated at the time. Only after learning Smith had died did Holman mention Smith “must have passed out,” thus, in his eyes, justifying his act of removing her from his car. Ex. Vol. 1 at 70.

[26] Looking at the facts most favorable to the jury's verdict, Holman allowed highly intoxicated Smith to enter his vehicle and remain in the car with him for thirty to forty minutes. Deciding he was not going to return to his girlfriend's home with a different woman in his car, Holman drove into a secluded alley behind a laundromat. After making sure the coast was clear, Holman pulled an unresponsive Smith out of his vehicle. Smith was not dressed appropriately for the cold weather, but Holman chose to place her on a snow pile near a dumpster on a “really cold,” “really windy” winter evening. Tr. Vol. 4 at 33; see also id. at 14 (noting temperatures were around eleven degrees Fahrenheit that evening). Holman then tossed Smith's coat, hat, scarf, backpack, and a beer can next to Smith's body, moved Smith's legs out of the road, and left. Smith died from “environmental cold exposure” while lying in the same spot Holman put her. Id. at 14.

[27] During an autopsy conducted hours later, Smith's BAC was 0.297. From the coroner's perspective, Smith's intoxication made her “more vulnerable to dying due to the cold” because alcohol can cause the human body to “lose heat more rapidly.” Id. at 12. The coroner also explained that as hypothermia sets in and the human body's efforts to conserve heat wane, a cold-exposed individual may become “stuporous,” “feel very hot,” and as a result, “very strangely undress in cold weather.” Id. at 12. Quite simply, an intoxicated individual may “not [be] able to get out of the cold.” Id. at 11.

[28] In my view, the jury acted reasonably and well within its purview when it rejected Holman's defense of property claim and found the combination of his actions resulted in Smith's death. Because this decision was supported by sufficient evidence, I would leave it intact. Our role as an appellate court demands such deference. I therefore respectfully dissent.⁸

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(a), (b)(3).

2.   There is no direct evidence that Smith entered Holman's vehicle for the purpose of getting out of the cold. Rather, Holman speculated in his police interview that that was probably the reason. However, both parties state it as fact that Smith entered the vehicle “to get out of the cold.” Appellant's Br. at 5; Appellee's Br. at 6.

3.   All of the above actions were recorded on local businesses’ video surveillance cameras, which law enforcement subsequently retrieved and introduced into evidence at Holman's jury trial. The video evidence began recording at 4:03 p.m. on February 18, 2021.

4.   I.C. § 35-42-1-5.

5.   Thus, the dissent is mistaken to the extent it contends Holman did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove kidnapping until his Reply Brief. See Appellant's Br. at 11-12 (arguing in part “[t]he State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict Holman of the crime of kidnapping․”). And, [w]hile we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, in every case where that issue is raised on appeal we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial was, in fact, sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

6.   We note that the dissent fails to address the sufficiency of the evidence to prove all the elements of the crime the State, in its discretion, chose to bring, i.e., kidnapping resulting in serious bodily injury, which includes the element of causation.

7.   We address this claim because it is relevant not only to Holman's Level 3 kidnapping charge, but also to the charge of reckless homicide, of which the jury also found Holman guilty. In addition, the defense of property claim would be relevant to any lower-level kidnapping charge the State might pursue.

8.   My resolution would necessarily require us to address Holman's second appellate issue: did the trial court reversibly err in refusing his tendered jury instruction as an inaccurate statement of the law?

Bailey, Judge.

Judge Felix concurs. Judge Kenworthy dissents with separate opinion. Felix, J., concurs. Kenworthy, J., dissents with separate opinion.