I.H., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Seventeen-year-old I.H. was adjudicated a delinquent for committing Level 6 felony sexual battery if committed by an adult, stemming from sexual acts committed against his younger half-sister (Sister). I.H. appeals the trial court's dispositional order awarding wardship of him to the Indiana Department of Correction (the DOC).

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] A.H. (Mother) and A.H. (Father) (collectively, Parents) adopted I.H. and Sister when I.H. was around eight years old. I.H. began sexually abusing Sister in 2019, when he was thirteen and she was nine. The abuse continued with regularity over the course of several years, occurring when Parents were not home. Sister disclosed the abuse to Parents in the fall of 2023 and told them that I.H. had threatened to harm her and Parents if she told anyone. Mother contacted the police.

[4] On November 3, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging I.H. was a delinquent for committing what would be Level 3 felony rape (Count I), Level 3 felony child molesting (Count II), and Class A misdemeanor intimidation (Count III), if committed by an adult. I.H. remained in detention, and the trial court ordered that he submit to a psychological evaluation, which was performed in late November by licensed clinical psychologist Jill Miller.

[5] Miller's report to the court reflected that I.H. had been psychiatrically hospitalized on three occasions since September 2023 and diagnosed with depression, ADHD, and PTSD associated with physical abuse and neglect perpetrated by his biological mother. At the time of the evaluation, he was taking psychiatric medications for ADHD and depression but was not participating in counseling. Miller's testing also indicated a diagnosis of moderate oppositional-defiant disorder. Parents reported to Miller that I.H. was disobedient and would disrespect them, question them, and blame others for his behavior. Mother noted that I.H. would act “in an intimidating manner” in the home, causing Parents to have safety concerns for themselves and Sister. Appendix at 8. I.H. advised Miller that he had been involved in two physical altercations while in juvenile detention. I.H. reported, and Parents confirmed, that they were “not willing to accept [I.H.] back into their home at this time.” Id. at 23.

[6] Miller's recommendations included: a safety plan in any setting in which I.H. would be in contact with other children; a referral for a psychosexual evaluation; and a referral for specialized residential treatment, which would provide a needed higher level of structure, access to multiple services such as psychiatric medication management, individual and group psychological intervention, life skills development, and academic programming. Miller “strongly recommended” that Parents be included in the treatment process and that an aftercare plan be implemented for I.H. upon discharge. Id.

[7] At a January 18, 2024 hearing, the parties advised the court that they had reached an agreement under which the State would amend Count II from child molesting to Level 6 felony sexual battery, and, in exchange for I.H.’s admission to Count II, the State would dismiss the other two counts. I.H. testified to engaging in sexual contact and intercourse with Sister between June 2020 and June 2023, and he admitted that, to gain her cooperation, he told her he would harm Parents if she refused. Finding an adequate factual basis to support I.H.’s admission to amended Count II, the court dismissed Counts I and III. As part of the agreement, I.H. agreed to undergo a psychosexual evaluation, after which the matter would proceed to disposition, which was left open to the trial court.

[8] Mother and Father, who expressed opposition to the plea arrangement, each gave a victim's impact statement. Mother described that I.H. “kept [Sister] in constant fear.” Transcript at 18. He also “manipulated” Parents in various ways, including regaining use of his phone, claiming he needed it for work training, and thereafter charging $300 to porn sites. Id. at 19. He also used the phone to invite girls unknown to Parents over to the home to have sex with him. Mother described the “grotesque” things he did to Sister over the years and, as result, Sister “has to be imprisoned in her mind for the rest of her life.” Id. at 21. Father stated that Sister, who had already suffered a traumatizing situation with her biological mother, was further traumatized by I.H. as he “raped her all over the house.” Id. at 22.

[9] In late January 2024, licensed mental health counselor Jacob Biancardi, who possessed special youth sexual abuse accreditation, performed the psychosexual assessment, which included interviewing I.H. and Mother. Each of them reported that I.H. was social and had friends and did not exhibit behavioral issues at school. Mother told Biancardi that, although a previous psychological report indicated that he was “lower functioning,” she did not trust the testing as she considered him “capable of doing well” and possessing an ability to manipulate. Appendix at 29. I.H. acknowledged to Biancardi that he knew what he was doing was wrong and that he did it when Parents were not home, but he also suggested that sometimes Sister would ask him to engage in sexual acts such that he wondered why “he is the only one that is in trouble.” Id. at 30.

[10] I.H. received elevated scores in anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress, and in the sexual concerns scale. Biancardi opined that I.H. demonstrated a lack of empathy and compassion, as well as a lack of understanding as to why his sexual behavior was wrong, which Biancardi noted “should be considered a serious cause for concern.” Id. at 37. Utilizing specific testing for sexual offenders, Biancardi opined that I.H. received “the highest level of risk for sexual offense recidivism” and recommended residential treatment, where I.H. could receive treatment with a focus on problematic sexual behaviors. Id. Biancardi noted “safety concerns in the home as well as the safety of the community.” Id. He submitted his report to the court in February 2024.

[11] A dispositional hearing was held on March 20, 2024. A probation department representative (Probation) recommended that I.H. be made a ward of the DOC, noting that two residential programs, Oaklawn and Pierceton Woods Academy (Pierceton), had accepted I.H. but neither had a bed available until later in the spring at the earliest. In addition to the lack of current availability, Probation expressed concern about how treatment would operate at such a facility in the absence of family involvement such as was the case here, where Parents did not desire to participate. Specifically, neither Oaklawn nor Pierceton could provide Probation with a plan for how to keep I.H. progressing while his peers would be going on home-passes or doing family sessions or family visits. Given that Parents did not view reunification as an option, Probation was also concerned about the situation following any residential treatment, noting that Oaklawn did not offer a step-down program afterward. Probation advised the court that the DOC, upon I.H.’s completion of programming, would provide I.H. with the option of being released to a step-down facility. Agreeing with Probation's position on placement, the State asked the court to order I.H. placed with the DOC to receive programming that would include sexual maladaptive therapy.

[12] After expressing that Oaklawn or Pierceton would have been the preferred placement had there been immediate availability, counsel for I.H. stated, “we're not objecting” and “reluctantly, we would be in agreement with [the DOC]” to receive treatment in the sexual maladaptive behaviors program. Transcript at 32. Counsel also requested that I.H. have the option of participating in the DOC's GED program.

[13] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court awarded wardship of I.H. to the DOC. The court explained that Probation had explored lesser restrictive alternatives such as residential placement at Oaklawn or Pierceton but that having I.H. wait in detention for thirty days or more for availability, while receiving no rehabilitation services, “would be inconsistent with [I.H.’s] best interest.” Id. at 36. In contrast, the use of immediate availability of the DOC for maladaptive rehabilitation therapy “would be consistent with” I.H.’s best interest. Id. at 40. In addition, the court noted its concern about success after discharge from Oaklawn or Pierceton given that reunification was not an available permanency plan. The trial court explained that upon I.H.’s release from the DOC, which the court suspected would most likely be beyond his eighteenth birthday, there would be a parole program available for I.H. and allow for continued monitoring of him. For those several reasons, the court concluded that the DOC offered the most appropriate and available level of care in the lease restrictive environment.

[14] I.H. now appeals. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

[15] I.H. appeals the trial court's dispositional decision to grant wardship of him to the DOC. The trial court is accorded wide latitude and great flexibility in its dealings with juveniles. M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. The court's discretion is subject to the statutory considerations of the child's welfare, community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition. J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id.

[16] Indiana Code § 31-37-18-6 sets forth the following factors that the trial court must consider when entering a dispositional decree:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

[17] I.H., who has no prior juvenile history, contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted wardship of him to the DOC rather than retaining him in the county's juvenile detention center until a bed became available at Oaklawn or Pierceton. He argues that “[s]uch placement would be the least restrictive and most appropriate setting available” and consistent with the recommendations of Miller and Biancardi. Appellant's Brief at 7. We reject I.H.’s argument for multiple reasons.

[18] As an initial matter, I.H. had no objection at the dispositional hearing to placement at the DOC and, indeed, expressly agreed to it, albeit reluctantly. Thus, I.H. has waived any claim of error associated with the trial court's decision to place him in the DOC. See e.g., C.H. v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1086, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that juvenile waived review of restitution order, and he invited error, where he not only failed to object but affirmatively agreed to pay it), trans. denied. Waiver aside, placement at a residential facility was not, in fact, currently available, contrary to I.H.’s suggestion, as neither of the two locations that had accepted I.H. had availability for at least several weeks and potentially longer.

[19] Furthermore, I.C. § 31-37-18-6 requires placement in the least restrictive setting only “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.” The statute thus recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement because commitment to a public institution is in the best interest of the juvenile and society. M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 459. Here, all parties agreed at the hearing that I.H. was in need of rehabilitative treatment. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that it was not in I.H.’s best interests for him to keep waiting in the local juvenile detention facility for an additional likely period of thirty days or more, getting no treatment, until a bed became available at Oaklawn or Pierceton. Further, as noted by Probation at the hearing, placement in the DOC would allow I.H. the opportunity, if desired, to pursue his GED under a DOC program rather than try to independently compile sufficient credits through a traditional high school diploma process, which could be difficult for I.H. as he had been in an out of different schools and homeschooled for a time.¹

[20] Lastly, we observe Probation's specific concern at the dispositional hearing about the care prospects for I.H. following residential treatment, given that I.H. likely would be over eighteen years old at that point and Parents were not willing to participate in treatment or allow I.H. back into their home. Placement of I.H. with the DOC addressed that concern because, upon completion of DOC programming, I.H. would have the option of a step-down facility, such as a group home setting. In addition, the DOC would provide continued monitoring of I.H., which would be consistent with community safety – a relevant consideration as testing placed I.H. at “the highest level of risk for sexual offense recidivism.” Appendix at 37. In sum, we agree with the State that the DOC was “the least restrictive placement available to provide [I.H.] with the rehabilitative services he required ․ while protecting his family and community.” Appellee's Brief at 15.

[21] The trial court's decision to grant wardship of I.H. to the DOC was not an abuse of discretion.

[22] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record reflects that I.H. was in ninth grade at age seventeen.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Crone, Sr.J., concur.