T.K. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Z.W. (the “Child”) is the biological child of T.K. (“Mother”) and B.W. (“Father”). A child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition was filed because, at the time of the Child's birth, Mother admitted to using methamphetamine during her pregnancy and she was homeless. Mother admitted the Child was a CHINS, and a dispositional order was entered. Mother failed to sufficiently comply with that order, and a termination of parental rights petition was filed. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to the Child.¹ Mother now challenges that termination and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In late 2021 and early 2022, the Child's siblings were adjudicated CHINS after Mother admitted to using methamphetamine and Father admitted to committing domestic violence against Mother, including punching Mother in the face. On September 19, 2022, the Child was born. The same day, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother had admitted to using methamphetamine while pregnant with the Child and stated that she had been living in a tent with Father. As a result, DCS immediately removed the Child from Mother's care and placed the Child in foster care. When a DCS family case manager spoke to Mother that day, she stated she last used methamphetamine in May 2022; however, Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine in August 2022.

[4] On September 21, 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging the Child was a CHINS based in large part on the report it received, Mother's August 2022 positive drug screen, and two August 2022 drug screens for Father that were positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine. On November 29, 2022, Mother admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition. After a dispositional hearing on December 21, 2022, the trial court ordered Mother to (1) participate in home-based case work to find safe and affordable housing, (2) maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income, (3) participate in homemaker services to learn effective and sanitary housekeeping skills, (4) undergo a substance abuse assessment and participate in all recommendations therefrom, (5) not use illegal substances, (6) submit to random drug screens, (7) obey the law, (8) undergo a domestic violence assessment and participate in all recommendations therefrom, (9) participate in weekly supervised visits with the Child, (10) participate in parenting classes, and (11) participate in a clinical interview and assessment.

[5] Nine months later, on June 21, 2023, the trial court changed the Child's permanency plan to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. On June 23, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to the Child. On December 8, the trial court held the evidentiary hearing on DCS's termination petition.

[6] On March 26, 2024, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to the Child. In its order, the trial court found that Mother completed the required clinical interview and assessment but failed to participate in the recommendations stemming therefrom, including completing a “comprehensive psychoparenting evaluation.” Appellant's App Vol. II at 52. Mother failed to participate in home-based case management because she “did not want the service and would take care of it” herself. Id. at 53.

[7] The trial court further found that Mother completed the required substance use assessment, but she failed to complete the recommended two-phase outpatient treatment program, having been discharged unsuccessfully from that program five times. Of the 83 drug screens Mother took between October 8, 2021, and November 21, 2023, she tested positive for methamphetamine 23 times. During that same time period, Mother failed to call the drug screen servicer 110 times; had she called in, she would have had to submit to an additional 48 drug screens. Mother was also referred to domestic violence treatment program, but she was discharged unsuccessfully from that program three times.

[8] In September 2023, Mother began residing at the YWCA, and she completed substance abuse treatment there. Regarding this change in Mother's circumstances, the trial court stated:

While the Court recognizes and appreciates Mother's recently completed substance abuse program, when balancing Mother's “habitual pattern of conduct to determine where there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation,” the Court finds that Mother's substance abuse history, domestic violence history, and prior unsuccessful CHINS matters as it relates to [the Child's siblings] demonstrates [sic] that there is a substantial and severe risk to [the Child.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 57. The trial court determined that Mother's short-term partial compliance with the dispositional order was “simply too little, too late.” Id. at 58.

[9] Furthermore, the trial court found that Mother's relationship with Father, including their recent engagement in August 2023, was “[o]f even more concern” because Father was still using illegal substances and had failed to complete substance abuse treatment, domestic violence treatment, and a psychological evaluation. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 58. The trial court determined that “Mother is either unwilling or unable to address the domestic violence issues with Father.” Id. at 60.

[10] Based on these findings, among others, the trial court concluded in relevant part that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Child's removal from Mother's care would not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Child posed a threat to the Child's well-being. The trial court also concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Child's best interests and DCS had a satisfactory plan for the Child's care. Mother now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights to the Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[11] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over the Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied. To terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that, among other things, there is a reasonable probability that (1) the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied or (2) the continuation of Mother's relationship with the Child poses a threat to the well-being of the Child. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (2023); id. § 31-37-14-2.

[12] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[13] On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied and (2) continuation of Mother's relationship with the Child is a threat to the Child's well-being. In making these arguments, Mother does not specifically challenge any of the trial court's findings; consequently, we take all the trial court's findings as true, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Mother's arguments can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For instance, Mother argues that the “changes she made to her lifestyle since the filing of the TPR” constituted a “significant difference from the past,” thereby rendering inaccurate the trial court's statement that these changes were “too little too late.” Appellant's Br. at 11. A trial court balances changed conditions against habitual patterns of conduct. K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643). As the unchallenged findings show, Mother has a demonstrated pattern of substance abuse; she repeatedly failed to engage in or otherwise complete services, including an outpatient drug treatment program; and she failed to gain insight into her often-violent relationship with Father.

[14] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied and that continuation of Mother's relationship with the Child is a threat to the Child's well-being. We therefore affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to the Child.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated Father's parental rights to the Child, but he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother fails to support with citations to the record numerous statements of fact in her Statement of Facts and Argument, which is required by Indiana Appellate Rules 46(A)(6)(a) and 46(A)(8)(a), respectively. Mother also fails to include all relevant facts in her Statement of Facts, which is required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). Because the issues in this case concern Mother's relationship with the Child and because her noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 does not substantially impede our review of the claims, we choose to address the merits of her arguments. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015); In re M.I., 127 N.E.3d 1168, 1171 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child., 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)).

Memorandum Decision by Judge Felix

Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur. Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.