SOTO v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Felipe Ramon Soto pleaded guilty to Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, and the Lake Superior Court ordered him to serve twenty years executed in the Department of Correction. Soto appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances when imposing his sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In April 2021, law enforcement officers suspected Soto of dealing drugs and conducted surveillance of his activities. On April 22, after an officer observed Soto commit several traffic infractions while driving his vehicle, the officer initiated a traffic stop. Soto initially refused to stop his vehicle. While the officer pursued him, Soto threw an item from the driver's side window. Thereafter, an assisting officer conducted “a pursuit intervention technique” on Soto's vehicle, which caused the car to stop. Appellant's App. p. 16. After law enforcement officers arrested Soto, officers searched the area where the item was thrown and discovered a clear plastic bag. Inside that bag were multiple small clear plastic bags containing a white powdery substance. The substance, weighing approximately ten grams in total, later tested positive for cocaine.

[4] The next day, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant for Soto's residence. During the search, they found over sixty grams of cocaine, two firearms, ammunition, two digital scales, and cash totaling $160,526.50.

[5] On August 3, 2021, the State charged Soto with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 3 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. Soto agreed to plead guilty to Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.¹ Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court.

[6] On May 3, 2024, the trial court ordered Soto to serve twenty years executed in the Department of Correction. In support of its sentencing decision, the court considered that Soto was out on bond when he committed the offenses in this case and that Soto was engaged in a “substantial criminal enterprise.” Appellant's App. p. 68. The court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed Soto's guilty plea, the only mitigating circumstance. The court declined to find Soto's medical conditions to be mitigating because his “ailments” were not “so debilitating that they stopped the defendant from engaging in criminal activity[.]” Id.

[7] Soto now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Soto appeals his twenty-year sentence and argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Initially, we observe that the trial court was authorized to impose a sentence anywhere between ten and thirty years, and the advisory sentence for a Level 2 felony is seventeen and one-half years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5.

[9] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. For example, a trial court may abuse its discretion by:

(1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law.

Id. “In cases where the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing only ‘if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.’ ” Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007)).

[10] We first address Soto's claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered the $160,526.50 in cash found during the search of Soto's residence as evidence that he was involved in a substantial dealing operation. Specifically, the court found as an aggravating circumstance that “this was a substantial criminal enterprise where the defendant had all the ingredients to repeatedly deal drugs and not just a one time dealing as exhibited by the multiple baggies, scales, quantity of drugs and large amount of cash.” Appellant's App. p. 68.

[11] At sentencing, Soto claimed that the cash was received as a personal injury settlement and inheritance from his mother. Soto's counsel also informed the trial court that the federal government had seized the cash. Tr. pp. 33-34. Given the discovery of the cash totaling $160,526.50 during the search of Soto's home, and the evidence that he was under surveillance prior to the search because he was a suspected drug dealer, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to infer that the cash was related to Soto's dealing activities. But even if that inference was improper, there was more than enough evidence that Soto was engaged in a “substantial criminal enterprise.” See Appellant's App. p. 68. The over sixty grams of cocaine, numerous baggies, and scales established that Soto was repeatedly dealing significant quantities of cocaine. For all of these reasons, Soto has not convinced us that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered this aggravating circumstance.

[12] Soto also claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to find his medical condition to be a mitigating circumstance. It is well settled that “[a] trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and a trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant.” Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “A trial court does not err in failing to find a mitigating factor where that claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance.” Id. “An allegation that a trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant on appeal to establish that the mitigating evidence is significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id.

[13] Soto's numerous medical issues are supported by evidence in the record. While Soto concedes that the Department of Correction provides medical treatment as needed by the inmates, he argues that “it is far from clear that the DOC can treat such multitudinous maladies.” Appellant's Br. at 9-10. Yet, Soto did not present evidence that the DOC is unable to provide the medical treatment he needs, and his medical conditions, which include heart issues and diabetes, are not unusual.

[14] The trial court observed that Soto's medical conditions did not prevent him from engaging in criminal activity. And Soto contends that the trial court's reasoning for rejecting his proposed mitigating circumstance was flawed. However, given that Soto failed to present evidence that treating his medical conditions would be difficult or impaired due to his incarceration, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to find Soto's illnesses as a mitigating circumstance.²

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On the date Soto committed the offenses in this case, he had pending charges for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine and Level 4 felony possession of cocaine. Appellant's App. p. 43. Those pending charges (case number 45G04-1910-F2-66) were also dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement in this case.

2.   Even if the trial court had abused its discretion in this regard, we believe the court would have imposed the same twenty-year sentence given the aggravating circumstances the court properly considered and its decision to ascribe “little [mitigating] weight” to Soto's guilty plea. Appellant's App. p. 68.

Mathias, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.