J.T., Appellant-Petitioner v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Appellee-Respondent (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.T. appeals two decisions of the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development concerning his ineligibility for unemployment benefits. Because J.T. has waived his claims by failing to make a cogent argument on appeal, we affirm.

Facts

[2] J.T. was employed by DirectEmployers Association, Inc. (Employer) and worked there for roughly four years before he was terminated.

[3] In the days preceding his termination, J.T. sent a company executive a series of lengthy text messages about a purely personal matter. The messages described a legal conspiracy involving J.T.’s father and discussed DNA tests from the FBI, Napoleonic law, citizen's arrests, and presidential pardons. J.T. appeared to be asking for Employer's assistance in resolving this issue. The executive responded that he had “no idea” what the messages meant and instructed J.T. not to involve the company in his personal matters. Rev. Bd. No. 1224, Exhs. p. 34 (cleaned up). But J.T. continued to send messages, so the executive reiterated: “[Employer] cannot be involved.” Id. at 43.

[4] Despite these warnings, J.T. sent to one of Employer's business partners multiple lengthy emails that detailed J.T.’s family matter. The business partner found the emails confusing and strange, so he reported them to Employer. Employer then terminated J.T.’s employment.

[5] J.T. applied for unemployment benefits and was initially determined to be eligible by the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (DWD). But Employer appealed, and a hearing proceeded before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that J.T. was discharged for just cause, citing his inappropriate messages to Employer's business partner and his failure to follow the reasonable instruction to keep Employer out of his personal matters. Accordingly, J.T. was determined to be ineligible for unemployment benefits.

[6] Shortly thereafter, a different ALJ affirmed DWD's one-week suspension of the benefits which J.T. received when he was originally deemed eligible, finding the suspension justified by J.T.’s failure to attend a required reemployment training. J.T. appealed both ALJ decisions to DWD's Review Board, and both were affirmed. J.T. appeals again.¹

Discussion and Decision

[7] At the outset, we note that J.T. proceeds pro se. It is well settled that pro se litigants are “held to the same standards as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural rules.” Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[8] J.T.’s appellate brief violates numerous procedural rules. Though we prefer to decide cases on the merits, we deem alleged errors waived where an appellant's noncompliance with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure is “so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors.” Ramsey v. Review Board of Indiana Dept. of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). J.T.’s rule violations render his arguments incoherent and therefore waived.

[9] The brief does not include a statement of facts, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). This critical omission leaves us to wonder about his references to an alleged cybersecurity threat, a “fraudulent protective order case,” and “previous wrongful convictions,” none of which appear to be at issue in his unemployment benefits case. Appellant's Br., p. 15. It does not help that J.T. also fails to include any citations to the record, in violation of Appellate Rule 22(C), and does not provide an appendix.

[10] While J.T.’s brief includes some required structural elements, its substance strays from the relevant considerations. Instead of addressing the one-week suspension of his benefits or the actual reasons given for his termination, J.T. argues he was subject to unspecified religious discrimination and deserves protection as a whistleblower in an unexplained matter. He also claims “Super Due Process” and ethical violations, but does not cite any cases on the topics or explain the underlying facts. Appellant's Br., pp. 17-18. Though in some places he makes an effort to include United States Supreme Court precedent, he offers no analysis as to how the cases relate to his own claim.

[11] Because he does not provide the necessary context, analysis, or citations to relevant authority, J.T.’s arguments unfortunately cannot be understood. His brief violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which requires all contentions be “supported by cogent reasoning” and citations to authorities relied upon. An appellant cannot make “conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support.” Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[12] By failing to provide a cogent argument on appeal, J.T. waives any claim of error.² See Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to consider assertion on appeal without cogent argument supported by authority and references to record). An appellate court will not become a party's advocate by considering arguments “too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[13] We affirm the decision of the Review Board.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The two ALJ decisions that J.T. appeals stem from two separate cases. But because he submitted identical appellate briefs for both, his cases were consolidated.

2.   Even if we were able to address the substance of J.T.’s appeal, it appears unlikely that the result would change. The evidence shows that J.T. sent inappropriate communications to a business partner of Employer after being explicitly instructed not to involve the company in his personal matters. And J.T. admitted at his hearing that he did not attend the required reemployment training session because he was busy and forgot. These actions could support the ALJ's and Review Board's determinations regarding just cause for discharge and temporary suspension of J.T.’s benefits. However, we emphasize that the lack of cogent argument in J.T.’s brief prevents us from conducting the thorough review of this case necessary to make a definitive conclusion on the merits.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Felix concur. Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.