MBANDI v. CONREX ML PORTFOLIO 2019 01 OPERATING COMPANY LLC (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Achashverosh Adnah Ammiyhuwd Ngola Mbandi (a/k/a Oscar Washington) and Yashiyah Mika'al Yashar'al (a/k/a Eric Gilbert) (“Appellants”) appeal the small-claims court's judgment for Conrex ML Portfolio 2019-01 Operating Company, LLC (“Conrex”) in this action for possession of real property. We affirm and, because this appeal is frivolous, remand for an award of damages to Conrex under Appellate Rule 66(E).

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Conrex owns the house at 10219 Sutters Court in Indianapolis (“the House”). In February 2024, Conrex filed a small-claims Notice of Claim for Possession of Real Estate against “John Doe” and “Any and all other occupants,” alleging that unknown and unauthorized people were occupying the House. Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 8-11. Appellants—two of the occupants—filed several documents in response to Conrex's notice, including a demand for a jury trial and a “counterclaim” against Conrex's attorneys and the small-claims judge. Id. at 12-106. They claimed that the House had been chosen as the “headquarters” of the “Hebrew Israelite Kingdom”:

[Appellants] are in physical allodial custody possession of the keys, utilities and property referred to as 10219 Sutters Ct. Indianapolis, Indiana, the 1963 Zone Improvement Plan (zip) code [46229] exempt [DMM 602 1.3e] as applied to this matter, the address of their Hebrew Israelite Kingdom/nation's headquarters HQ, where they planted and raised their Hebrew Israelite Kingdom/Nation flag interchange of thought, opinion, and symbolic expression, North America Real Land. Non-Domestic-Without US, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1).

Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 35-36.

[3] At the hearing on the matter, Mbandi claimed that Conrex could not be granted possession of the House because Appellants are “allodial occupants,” meaning they “have superior authority over any landlord, in a landlord tenant action.” Tr. p. 14. He also claimed that Appellants’ possession of the House was not unlawful because they “were never charged with trespassing or anything like that” and someone named “Mosai” said they could be there. Id. at 15, 16.

[4] After the hearing, the small-claims court issued an order ruling for Conrex on all issues. Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 6-7. Specifically, the court (1) dismissed Appellants’ “counterclaim” against Conrex's attorneys and the small-claims judge because those individuals aren't plaintiffs in the case and therefore aren't subject to a counterclaim, (2) denied Appellants’ demand for a jury trial because Conrex's possessory action is equitable and therefore triable by the court, and (3) awarded Conrex a writ of eviction and possession of the House.

[5] Appellants, pro se, now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Appellants purport to make five arguments, but we can't make sense of any of them. The first argument touches on a wide variety of legal topics—subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the particular case, standing, the right to a jury trial, Indiana's Declaratory Judgment Act, Indiana Trial Rules 3, 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 38, and 39, and Indiana Code sections 32-20-4-1, 32-30-3-1, 32-30-3-2, and 32-30-3-6—but never coherently connects any of those topics to the facts of this case. Appellants’ Br. pp. 28-38. The second argument concerns personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the particular case. Id. at 38-41. The latter concept has been abolished by our Supreme Court, see K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 2006), and Appellants’ personal-jurisdiction argument focuses on whether they were “doing business” in Indiana, which is irrelevant to this case. Appellants’ third argument addresses the federal “extraterritoriality doctrine” but doesn't explain how it has any application to this case. Appellants’ Br. pp. 41-44. In their fourth argument, Appellants contend they are entitled to a jury trial because the case involves “Allodial/Allodium possession” and “allodial/Allodium defense of land.” Id. at 47-48. They don't expand on those concepts or cite any relevant authority. Appellants’ fifth argument is that, under Indiana Code section 32-30-3-6, Conrex was required to file a bond to protect against the possibility of an erroneous order of possession. Id. at 49-57. But that statute applies only to preliminary or temporary orders of possession, not final orders like the one issued here. Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of South Bend, 204 N.E.3d 940, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[7] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) provides that an appellant must support each of its contentions with “cogent reasoning.” Failure to abide by this requirement results in waiver. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023). Appellants’ arguments are completely devoid of cogent reasoning and are therefore waived. We affirm the small-claims court's judgment for Conrex.

[8] Conrex requests an award of damages under Appellate Rule 66(E), which provides that an appellate court may assess damages, including attorney's fees, “if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith.” Conrex argues that this appeal “is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, and vexatiousness.” Appellee's Br. p. 50. Appellants didn't respond to this argument in their reply brief.

[9] Damages under Rule 66(E) are appropriate when “a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 346-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). That perfectly describes Appellants’ briefs in this case. Therefore, we grant Conrex's request for damages and remand this matter to the small-claims court to determine the appropriate amount.

[10] Affirmed and remanded.

Vaidik, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.