BROWN v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] While in jail for two alleged probation violations, Nathan Brown punched two jail officers and headbutted a third. The State alleged these acts of battery were also probation violations, and the trial court agreed. Brown now appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erroneously admitted certain evidence at his fact-finding hearing, wrongly concluded that the batteries occurred during his probationary period, and denied him due process by failing to explain the reasons for its revocation decision. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2018, Brown was convicted of two counts of Level 6 felony battery against a public safety official and sentenced to four years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). While serving this sentence at the Miami Correctional Facility, Brown attacked another inmate and was charged with Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. Brown pleaded guilty to the charge in 2020 and was sentenced to an additional four years in DOC, with two years suspended to probation.

[3] The terms of Brown's probation required that he not commit any criminal acts. But while serving the executed portion of his sentence in 2023, Brown allegedly attacked a DOC officer with a sharpened piece of metal. The State charged Brown with Level 4 felony possession of a dangerous device by an inmate and Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official. The State also filed a petition to revoke Brown's probation, alleging he committed two new criminal acts (First Petition).

[4] Brown completed the executed portion of his sentence a few months later. But upon his release from DOC, he was immediately arrested for the probation violations alleged in the First Petition. Brown was taken to the Miami County Jail, where he attacked three jail officers while awaiting his initial hearing. Brown was soon returned to DOC for safekeeping, and the State charged him with three counts of Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official. The State also filed a second petition to revoke Brown's probation, alleging he committed three new criminal acts (Second Petition).

[5] At a fact-finding hearing on the First and Second Petitions, the State offered into evidence the probable cause affidavits and other charging documents for the five alleged criminal offenses underlying Brown's purported probation violations. The State also offered a surveillance video of Brown attacking three Miami County Jail officers, as alleged in the Second Petition. Brown objected to these exhibits on hearsay and authenticity grounds, but the trial court admitted them into evidence. Additionally, the three Miami County Jail officers whom Brown attacked testified at the hearing without objection.

[6] According to the jail officers’ testimony, Brown's attack occurred after he hung a picture of one of his prior battery victims in the window of his jail cell door. The picture was facing outward and partially obscured the jail officers’ view into Brown's cell. When one of the officers entered the cell to remove the picture, Brown charged at the officer and punched him in the head. The officer pushed Brown back and began wrestling him to the ground; meanwhile, a second officer came to assist. Brown struck the second officer in the back of the head during the scuffle and later headbutted a third officer while being restrained.

[7] After the fact-finding hearing, the trial court concluded that the State failed to prove the allegations of the First Petition but successfully proved the allegations of the Second Petition. Thus, the court found that Brown violated the terms of his probation by committing new criminal acts—batteries against the three Miami County Jail officers. As a sanction for these violations, the court revoked Brown's probation and ordered him to serve the previously suspended two-year portion of his sentence in DOC. Brown appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). “Accordingly, we review a trial court's decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion.” Neidhamer v. State, 213 N.E.3d 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.

[9] Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the charging documents and surveillance video and by concluding he committed new criminal acts during his probationary period. Brown also argues that the court denied him due process by failing to explain the reasons for the court's revocation decision. None of these arguments prevail.

I. Evidence Admissibility

[10] Brown claims the charging documents were inadmissible hearsay under Indiana Evidence Rule 802 and that the surveillance video was not properly admitted as substantive evidence under the “silent witness” theory. See generally Kirby v. State, 217 N.E.3d 575, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (observing the silent witness theory to be a special application of the authentication requirement of Indiana Evidence Rule 901). But the Indiana Rules of Evidence do not apply to probation revocation proceedings. Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2)). Judges presiding over such proceedings “may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999).

[11] Still, even if the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the charging documents and surveillance video, reversal would not be required unless the errors affected Brown's “substantial rights.” Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Here, the charging documents and surveillance video were cumulative of the three Miami County Jail officers’ testimony that they were battered by Brown. Thus, any error in the exhibits’ admission was harmless. See id. (“The erroneous admission of evidence may also be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted.”).

II. Probationary Period

[12] Brown does not challenge the sufficiency of the three Miami County Jail officers’ testimony to prove he battered them. Instead, he claims the three batteries do not constitute probation violations because they occurred before his probationary period began. In support of this claim, Brown points to the following portion of the trial court's Order of Probation as providing that his probationary period did not begin until his release from DOC:

Exhs. p. 6.

[13] We reject Brown's claim for several reasons. First, it is well settled that a person's probationary period “begins immediately after sentencing, even if his or her actual probation begins at a later date.” Kopkey v. State, 743 N.E.2d 331, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, “[p]robation may be revoked at any time for a violation of its terms,” including “prior to the start of probation.” Champlain v. State, 717 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. 1999).

[14] Second, Brown signed an acknowledgement at the bottom of the trial court's Order of Probation that stated: “I understand my period of probation begins today.” Exhs. p. 8. He also filled in “Today's Date” on the acknowledgement as February 25, 2020, the date of his sentencing. Id. The batteries occurred years later, on June 26, 2023.

[15] And third, the evidence presented at Brown's fact-finding hearing showed that he completed the executed portion of his sentence and was released from DOC custody on June 19, 2023. Thus, even if Brown's probationary period did not begin until his DOC release, that period would have begun by the time he battered the three Miami County Jail officers a week later.

III. Due Process

[16] Finally, Brown claims he was denied due process because the trial court failed to adequately explain why it decided to revoke Brown's probation. “[D]ue process in the probation revocation context requires, among other things, a written statement by the factfinder containing the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.” Mumford v. State, 651 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). However, this requirement is met when, “in the probationer's presence, the trial court orally makes findings of fact, revokes probation, states the reasons for revocation, and the statement from the bench is later reduced to writing in the transcript of the hearing.” Id.

[17] Brown contends the trial court's oral statements at his fact-finding hearing were insufficient to meet the requirements of due process. But the court stated the following with respect to its finding that Brown violated his probation:

In regard to the [Second] Petition, uh the allegation being that on July 11, 2023[,] ․ the Defendant violated Rule one by his commission of offense of three counts of Battery [o]n a Public Safety Official on or about June 26, 2023 in Miami County, Indiana, under, indicated under cause 52D02-2307-F5-282, uh that being the [Second] Petition allegation the Courts going to find the State has met it's burden. In, in regard to those allegations find that Mr. Brown did violate the rules and conditions of his Probation.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 36-37. Later, the court also stated the following with respect to its decision to revoke Brown's probation:

Well in review of the prior Presentence [Investigation Report], in this cause the Court notes at least five prior instances where at least Probable Cause was found to believe that a Battery was committed by Mr. Brown, uh he was on Probation in this cause for Battery uh, Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury. Again, the Court having found that violation of Probation based upon the [Second] Petition, and based upon the evidence presented uh, having found a violation again due to Battery on a Public Safety Official, I, I think imposition of the balance of the suspended sentence is appropriate. So the Court is going to order the imposition of the balance of two years [in DOC].

Id. at 41.

[18] These oral statements, read in conjunction with the State's Second Petition and the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing, clearly indicate the trial court's finding that Brown violated the terms of his probation by battering the three Miami County Jail officers. The statements also show that Brown's history of committing batteries was the reason the court revoked his probation and reinstated his suspended sentence. Because the court's statements were reduced to writing in the transcript of the hearing, the writing requirement was satisfied. Thus, Brown's due process rights were not violated.

[19] Affirmed.

Weissmann, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.