IN RE: the Civil Commitment of: M.C. Appellant-Respondent (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.C. appeals the trial court's order extending his regular commitment to Madison State Hospital (“Madison”). M.C. raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it held a review hearing over video despite M.C.’s objection. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 24, 2022, M.C. was admitted to the emergency department at Community Health Network East (“Community”). Dr. Christine Hopp examined M.C. and determined that he was likely suffering from schizophrenia, that he was dangerous to himself and others, and that he was gravely disabled. In particular, Dr. Hopp noted that M.C. had “threatened to assault or kill several staff members and patients” while at the hospital and that he had “started a fire in his apartment[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 20. As a result, on December 29, a representative of Community filed an application for emergency detention alleging that M.C. was gravely disabled and a danger to himself because he had “severe disorganized behavior and thought[s]” and he would “continue to decompensate without intervention.” Id. at 22. The accompanying physician's statement alleged that M.C. needed “immediate inpatient hospitalization to stabilize mental health concerns.” Id. at 23.

[3] The court held a hearing on Community's application on January 4, 2023. During that hearing, M.C.’s sister testified that M.C. was unable to obtain his own food and that, without medication, she had “concerns for [her] safety[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 13. She also testified that, prior to his commitment, M.C. would not regularly bathe or eat but that he had improved since his admission to the hospital. Dr. Hopp testified that M.C. was experiencing hallucinations and that he was not taking care of himself. She also testified that M.C. had been transferred to the “highest level of psychiatric care” due to his “aggression” and his threats to harm staff and other patients. Id. at 28. She testified that she did not believe M.C. would be able to “independently provide for his essential human needs[.]” Id. at 29. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court concluded that M.C. suffered from schizophrenia and was gravely disabled. Accordingly, the court entered an order of temporary commitment not to exceed ninety days.

[4] On March 13, Community filed a request to extend M.C.’s temporary commitment and alleged that he needed care or treatment in a facility for a period in excess of ninety days. In an accompanying physician statement, Dr. Syed Hasan stated that M.C. “continue[s] to exhibit rapid thoughts, loose association, intrusive behavior, agitation, and irritability.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 51. Dr. Hasan also stated that M.C. lacks “insight into his illness and need for treatment” and that he needs “supervision for medication compliance.” Id. at 52. Dr. Hasan requested a regular commitment for M.C.

[5] On March 16, the court scheduled a video hearing on Community's motion for March 20. That same day, M.C. filed his objection to the video hearing, which objection the court sustained. The next day, Community filed an emergency motion for video hearing. In that motion, Community asserted that good cause existed to hold the hearing remotely because “holding the hearing in person would be harmful to [M.C.’s] health and wellbeing, would interfere with his treatment, and would pose a risk of danger to others.” Id. at 77. In particular, Community asserted that M.C.’s presence at the hearing would be a risk to others because his “behaviors are unpredictable”; he requires “near-constant supervision by hospital staff”; and M.C. “has been frequently intrusive of others,” which required Community to initiate “sexual safety protocol.” Id. at 78. Community further asserted that M.C. is a “flight risk” and that M.C. may become “agitated” to the point of requiring treatment with medications that “will be unavailable outside of the unit.” Id. Community also requested a virtual hearing because the testifying physician would be unable to attend an in-person hearing “due to his work obligations” with other patients. Id. The court granted Community's request.

[6] At the beginning of the March 20 hearing, the parties again discussed the need for the video hearing. Dr. Ishrat Bhat testified that holding an in-person hearing could be harmful to M.C.’s health and well-being, that there is a risk that M.C. would need medications that would not be available at the courthouse, that M.C. was on “line of sight” and “sexually acting out behavior” protocols, and that his presence could pose a risk to himself and others. Tr. Vol. 2 at 50. The court found that M.C. has a “past inclination towards flight risk” and that he “continue[s] to be under strict supervision” for “sexual conduct” and “elopement[.]” Id. at 55. As such, the court concluded that the “safest way” to hold the hearing was to “have the hearing online” over his objection. Id. The court then proceeded with the video hearing, during which M.C. was present and represented by counsel. The court heard evidence regarding M.C.’s mental illness. After the hearing, the court found that M.C. remained gravely disabled “in his reasoning and judgment” and that he “will lose even his modest gain in function if discharged” prematurely. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 89. The court then ordered a regular commitment. Shortly thereafter, M.C. was transferred from Community to Madison.

[7] On April 12, M.C., pro se, filed a request for a commitment review hearing. The same day, the trial court scheduled a video hearing for April 24 at 9:15 a.m. and appointed counsel for M.C. On April 23, at 3:36 p.m., M.C., again represented by counsel, filed an objection to the video hearing. At the beginning of the hearing on April 24, the court noted the “late arriving request for a hearing in person” but stated that it “couldn't possibly grant that with an hour before close of business yesterday[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 98. The court therefore denied his request because it “was not timely” and proceeded with a video hearing. Id.

[8] During the hearing, M.C.’s mother testified that M.C. was unable to “stay on his own and take of himself” and that he “can't maintain staying on his own.” Id. at 101. Dr. Mary Bouldin, M.C.’s psychiatrist at Madison, testified that M.C. needs “more supervision just to manage day to day functions[.]” Id. at 108. She also testified that M.C. “would not be able to” manage his medications, money, or a bus schedule. She further testified that his judgment is impaired “to the extent that it affects his ability to function independently” and he would be “unlikely” to comply with his medication schedule if released. Id. at 111, 120. Following the hearing, the court issued its order of regular commitment, in which it again found that M.C. was suffering from a mental illness and was gravely disabled.

Discussion and Decision

[9] M.C. contends that the trial court violated Indiana Administrative Rule 14 when it held the April 24, 2024, review hearing remotely over his objection. Indiana Administrative Rule 14(C) provides that a “court must conduct all testimonial proceedings in person except that a court may conduct the proceedings remotely for all or some of the case participants for good cause shown or by agreement of the parties.” Commentary to the rule provides: “Presenting live testimony in court remains of utmost importance.” Admin. R. 14. And our Supreme Court has stated that “in-person evidentiary hearings are vital in certain proceedings, such as involuntary civil commitment hearings, where a party's liberty interests are at stake.” B.N. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360, 365 (Ind. 2022).

[10] On appeal, M.C. contends that that the court violated Administrative Rule 14(C) when it held the April 24, 2024, review hearing remotely because the court “failed to find good cause before proceeding[.]” Appellant's Br. at 11. We interpret de novo what constitutes good cause under Administrative Rule 14, but we review a trial court's good-cause determination for an abuse of discretion. See B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 363.

[11] M.C. asserts that, at the start of the hearing, the court simply “greeted the parties, denied [his] objection to a remote hearing, and proceeded with the hearing without specifying any fact or reason for proceeding remotely besides its finding that [his] objection was untimely.” Id. We agree with M.C. that the court did not make any specific finding of good cause prior to proceeding with the remote hearing but rather overruled his objection as untimely. However, we need not determine whether the court abused its discretion when it conducted the hearing remotely over M.C.’s objection because we hold that any error was harmless.

[12] A trial court's error is harmless when “its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Ind. App. R. 66(A). In B.N., our Supreme Court considered whether a trial court's failure to make an adequate finding of good cause for a remote hearing constituted harmless error and ultimately found that it did. In reaching that conclusion, the Court stated:

Here, ․ B.N. was present throughout her commitment hearing and actively participated by testifying and by conferring with counsel in a separate virtual room. And ․ B.N.’s virtual proceeding included only one minor, quickly resolved technical difficulty. Additionally, the record reveals that B.N.’s counsel skillfully objected to witness testimony and vigorously cross-examined each of Eskenazi's witnesses. And those witnesses provided ample evidence supporting the trial court's decision to impose a regular commitment. Nevertheless, B.N.’s counsel emphatically argued in closing that Eskenazi failed to meet its burden of proof or, in the alternative, that only a temporary commitment was necessary. In sum, the probable impact of the court's error—in light of B.N.’s active participation during the virtual hearing, the lack of technological issues which may have adversely impacted her, and counsel's zealous advocacy—was sufficiently minor such that we conclude it did not affect B.N.’s substantial rights.

B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 365.

[13] Similarly, here, M.C. was present throughout the entire hearing and actively participated by testifying on his behalf. Further, there were no technical issues that impeded M.C.’s ability to hear or participate in the proceedings. And M.C.’s counsel objected to witness testimony and cross-examined each of Madison's witnesses and argued that M.C.’s improvements while at Madison warranted a dismissal of the commitment. In addition, Madison's witnesses provided ample testimony to support the trial court's decision to continue the regular commitment. Indeed, the court heard evidence that M.C. was not able to live on his own, that he was unable to manage his medications or money, and that his judgment was impaired such that he could not function independently.

[14] In light of M.C.’s active participation during the hearing, the lack of technological issues, and his counsel's advocacy, we conclude the probable impact of any error in the court's decision to hold the hearing remotely over M.C.’s objection was sufficiently minor such that it did not affect his substantial rights. And while we agree with M.C. that in-person hearings should “be the norm, not the exception,” B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 365-66, we cannot say that this remote hearing requires reversal. Because any error in holding a remote hearing was harmless, we affirm the court's order.

[15] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Foley concur. Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.