Derek Meeker, Appellant-Petitioner v. Leslee Walker, Appellee-Respondent (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Derek Meeker (“Father”) moved for a rule to show cause and additional relief, alleging Leslie Walker (“Mother”) should be held in contempt of court. After a hearing, the trial court declined to find Mother in contempt and denied Father's other requests for relief. Father now appeals, raising three issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err by ordering Father to pay vehicle expenses for the parties’ oldest son incurred before his emancipation?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to find Mother in contempt of court?

3. Did the trial court err by declining to award Father attorney fees?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother (collectively, “Parents”) were married in 2003 and had three sons: A. (born 2004), S. (born 2007), and X. (born 2009) (collectively, “Children”). The trial court dissolved Parents’ marriage and approved a mediated marital settlement agreement in 2019 (the “Agreement”). The Agreement provided for the division of Parents’ real and personal property and for child support, custody, and parenting time. Parents shared joint legal and physical custody of Children, with parenting time operating on a 5-2-2-5 schedule (five days with Father, two with Mother, two with Father, and then five with Mother).

[4] The Agreement provided, in relevant part:

The parties shall extend one another the Opportunity for Additional Parenting Time, as defined in the [Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines], for any period during which the party would require childcare for five hours or more, including but not limited to travel.

* * *

When the children begin driving, they shall receive the Ford Contour (if operable) for their use. [Father] shall pay 75% and [Mother] shall pay 25% of the costs of the children's driver's education, car registration, car insurance, vehicle maintenance, and all other driving/vehicle-related expenses for the children.

* * *

The parties each agree to inform one another about any information regarding the children, including without limitation information relating to the occurrence of any serious accident or physical or mental illness, substantial changes in academic performance/progress, or any other circumstances in any way affecting or pertaining to the health or welfare of the children.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32, 34.

[5] After Father petitioned to modify the Agreement, the parties entered into a mediated agreement (the “Agreed Entry”) in 2021, which superseded the Agreement on certain issues. For issues not addressed by the Agreed Entry, the Agreement remained effective. In relevant part, the Agreed Entry provided:

10. Mother and Father agree that they shall individually and cooperatively oversee and supervise the children's homework with the goal that the children shall timely complete it and turn it in. For long-term or weekly assignments/projects, the parents shall exercise due diligence in having the long-term or weekly assignments/projects completed over the term for which it is assigned.

Id. at 63–64. Father also received an additional Tuesday night of parenting time on alternating weeks, resulting in a 6-2-2-4 schedule.

[6] In March 2023, Father moved for a rule to show cause, alleging Mother violated the Agreement and Agreed Entry. Among other complaints not at issue here, he alleged Mother: (1) failed to adequately supervise Children's education,¹ (2) failed to keep Father informed about Children's healthcare and medical visits, and (3) interfered with Father's parenting time. In the same motion, Father also petitioned to terminate child support and other obligations for A. on A.’s upcoming nineteenth birthday in September, and to modify custody and parenting time in part based on Mother's alleged failure to help with Children's education. He requested the trial court award him attorney fees. Mother responded, generally denying Father's allegations of misconduct and also requesting attorney fees.² In December 2023, Father again petitioned to modify child support based on A.’s emancipation.

[7] Prior to the hearing, Father moved for a continuance on issues of custody and parenting time because the parties had been working with a parenting coordinator on those issues with some success. The trial court granted Father's motion. The parties subsequently reached an agreement on the child support modification, leaving only the issues of pre-emancipation financial obligations for A., contempt, and attorney fees for the trial court to decide.

[8] At the time of the hearing in January 2024, A. was nineteen years old and emancipated; S. and X. were aged sixteen and fourteen, respectively. Father and Mother testified. Chief among Father's concerns was his allegation Mother failed to supervise Children's schoolwork and A.’s driver's education, leaving Father to supervise a disproportionate amount. He testified Mother stopped giving X. daily medication without Father's knowledge or consent, although Parents later agreed to stop giving it to X. Father was also concerned Mother took A. to a counseling session of which Father was unaware. Father alleged Mother interfered with his parenting time “on multiple occasions” by scheduling activities for Children during his parenting time. Tr. Vol. 2 at 14. For example, he described two times when Mother arranged for S. to work a paying job for a friend of hers on one of Father's days. Father also described a time when “there was a miscommunication” and Mother scheduled a trip on Father's time, although he did not think it was intentional. Id. at 16.

[9] On the other hand, Mother testified she helped Children with their homework during her parenting time and spent “hours and hours” teaching A. to drive. Id. at 47. As to medical issues, she said she offered X. medication every day and encouraged him to take it, although he did not always comply. In her telling, the counseling session to which she took A. was with her medical provider to help her better understand A.’s behaviors.

[10] Mother also requested Father reimburse her for certain driving and vehicle-related expenses she incurred for A.³ Father testified he did not need to reimburse Mother because the Agreement only contemplated expenses related to a Ford Contour, which he received in the divorce. According to Father, the Agreement stated “there was going to be a Contour that was going to be provided for the kids, if it was operable. At the time it wasn't operable[,] and it was never operable.” Id. at 19. In his view, if not operable, “I don't have to provide another car or pay expenses on another car.” Id. at 21.

[11] After the hearing, the trial court entered an order providing, in relevant part:

6. Father admitted the parties are presently in agreement regarding medication. Mother explained credibly that the only appointment she attended without telling Father was one for her to learn more about a health condition of the oldest child (now emancipated), and the provider met with that child in order to offer Mother better insight. It would have been better if Mother had invited Father to participate but the Court does not find it is necessary to sanction or admonish Mother. The parties are reminded that they are joint legal custodians of the minor children, and therefore must make decisions together concerning health, education, and religion. Effective communication is essential. Both parents should have the opportunity to attend all appointments, parent-teacher conferences, etc.

* * *

8. Father argues that Mother does not provide adequate oversight for the children's homework, but the evidence does not support a finding of contempt. The parties are ORDERED to submit the issue of homework management to the Parenting Coordinator (PC) to assist in identifying realistic expectations for both parents.[ ] Included in such discussions should be whether and for how long parents should monitor homework, and when it is appropriate to let the children discover the natural consequences of not meeting deadlines or expectations.

9. Father's complaint that he had to provide more driving instruction for the parties’ oldest child puzzles the Court. It is not unusual for one parent to do more driving instruction with a child, just as it is not uncommon for one parent to be the natural homework-helper, or healthcare manager, or chief hug-giver. This is a division of parental labor that perhaps Father doesn't like, but the Court does not find that Mother is necessarily lacking. For the younger children, it would be best if both parents participate in providing driving practice time for the child. It will be impossible to divide the time perfectly in half. It would be more helpful for each parent to consistently spend time driving with the child, as opposed to counting exact minutes. The parties are ORDERED to submit the issue of driving time to the PC when it is appropriate and timely.

10. Father requests the Court order Mother to offer Father extra parenting time under the “right of first refusal.” The Court finds that the ․ Agreement already contains a provision related to the Opportunity for Additional Parenting Time, requiring it be offered anytime a parent is not available for a period in excess of five hours. Father did not articulate a change in circumstances that would justify a modification to this provision, and the Court notes that as children get older, it is more likely the Court would remove such a provision.

* * *

15. The [Agreement] is not vague. If the Ford was operable, it was to be for the children's use. The addition of “if operable” suggests the parties contemplated that it would not be. Likewise, the addition of “all other driving/vehicle-related expenses” signals that there could be other vehicle costs incurred.

16. Pursuant to the ․ Agreement, Father owes Mother reimbursement for all auto-related expenses incurred for [A.] through the date of [A.]’s emancipation ․, and shall reimburse Mother his share of the same within thirty (30) days.

* * *

19. Father alleged in his Petition for Rule to Show Cause that Mother has interfered with his parenting time, but did not offer significant evidence concerning the same at [the] hearing. Father's petition contains inadmissible hearsay and the Court does not consider it. The Court declines to find Mother in contempt on this issue, but reminds the parties that they should not be scheduling activities with the children during the other parent's parenting time. Additionally, as the children get older, both parents should be aware that teenagers enjoy spending time with their friends and participating in activities that do not involve either parent, and the parties should not be surprised by or blame the other parent for it when the child elects to do something else.

* * *

22. Both parties made requests for attorney fees, but the Court finds that both parties contribute to conflict, misunderstanding, and discord. Both parties’ requests for attorney fees are DENIED.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22–27.

Standard of Review

[12] We first note Mother has not filed an appellate brief. When an appellee has not filed a brief, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “[W]e will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted). If an appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm.

[13] In addition, “there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quotation omitted). As an appellate court, we are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript and conclude the trial judge—who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand—did not properly understand the significance of the evidence. Id. As such, appellate courts shall not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility, and we view the evidence most favorably to the judgment. Id.

1. The trial court did not err by ordering Father to pay a portion of Children's driving and vehicle expenses.

[14] Father first argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay any vehicle expenses not associated with the Ford Contour. He argues the plain meaning of the Agreement language “all other driving/vehicle related expenses” extends only to the Contour.

[15] Settlement agreements are contractual in nature and binding if approved by a trial court. Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Ind. 2012). When a party asks a court to clarify a settlement agreement, the court interprets the agreement according to the general rules of contract construction. Id. at 363–64. Unless the contract terms are ambiguous, we give them their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 364 (citation omitted). Clear and unambiguous contract terms are considered conclusive; when they are present, we will not construe the contract or look to extrinsic evidence, but merely apply the contractual provisions. Id. (citation omitted).

[16] The only provision in the Agreement addressing driving and vehicle expenses for Children is as follows:

When the children begin driving, they shall receive the Ford Contour (if operable) for their use. [Father] shall pay 75% and [Mother] shall pay 25% of the costs of the children's driver's education, car registration, car insurance, vehicle maintenance, and all other driving/vehicle-related expenses for the children.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34.

[17] The Agreement is clear and unambiguous. Father received exclusive ownership of the Ford Contour in the divorce. If operable when Children began driving, he agreed to provide Children with that car. In the next sentence, the Agreement contemplates expenses not specific to the Contour, such as driver's education, and expenses that apply whether or not Children have a dedicated car to drive, such as insurance. Nothing in that sentence limits the expansive language “all other driving/vehicle-related expenses for the children” to those associated with the Contour. For those expenses, the parties agreed to split them, with Father paying seventy-five percent of the total and Mother paying the remainder. The trial court did not err in ordering Father to reimburse Mother for his portion of A.’s driving and vehicle-related expenses incurred before A.’s emancipation.⁴

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find Mother in contempt of court.

[18] Father next argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find Mother in contempt of court. He alleges the evidence shows Mother failed to supervise Children's education, did not communicate with him about Children's medical issues, interfered with his parenting time, and failed to offer him additional parenting time.

[19] Contempt of court involves disobedience of a court or court order which undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016). Contempt may be direct or indirect. Id. Indirect contempt involves those acts committed outside the presence of the court which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass, or prevent the due administration of justice. Id.

A person who is guilty of any willful disobedience of any process, or any order lawfully issued:

(1) by any court of record, or by the proper officer of the court;

(2) under the authority of law, or the direction of the court; and

(3) after the process or order has been served upon the person;

is guilty of an indirect contempt of the court that issued the process or order.

Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1 (1998).

[20] It is soundly within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. “Crucial to the determination of contempt is the evaluation of a person's state of mind, that is, whether the alleged contemptuous conduct was done willfully.” Id. at 129 (citation omitted).

A. Education Supervision and Medical Issues

[21] Father first argues the trial court should have found Mother in contempt for failing to supervise Children's education and communicate with Father about Children's medical issues. On these points, the parties presented conflicting testimony. Both parties testified they helped Children with homework and teaching A. to drive, although Father asserted he did more work than Mother. It seems Father “hoped that once [Mother] moved out that she would take over half of the responsibility” for education. Tr. Vol. 2 at 23. But nothing in the Agreed Entry says the parties must share equally in the educational supervision, just that they must “individually and cooperatively oversee and supervise” it. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 63. As to X.’s medication, Father alleged Mother unilaterally stopped administering it. But Mother testified she offered and encouraged X. to take it. Mother also testified the appointment to which she took A. without Father's knowledge was with her counselor and for her benefit. The trial court credited Mother's testimony about the appointment. On appeal, we cannot reweigh evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Mother in contempt where there was evidence to show Mother participated in Children's education and did not withhold medical information from Father.

B. Interference with Parenting Time

[22] Father next argues the trial court failed to find Mother in contempt for interfering with his parenting time. He testified Mother scheduled events for Children during his parenting time without his consent, such as arranging for S. to work a light construction job for one of Mother's friends. He also explained one instance of interference occurred due to miscommunication and a scheduling mix-up. The trial court found Father “did not offer significant evidence” of interference and admonished both parties “they should not be scheduling activities with the children during the other parent's parenting time.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26. Essentially, the trial court found Father failed to carry his burden to show Mother was willfully disobedient such that her actions undermined the court's authority.

[23] As Father observes on appeal, the evidence Mother scheduled activities for Children on Father's time was uncontroverted. But a trial court “possesses unique knowledge of the parties before it and is in the best position to determine how to maintain its ‘authority, justice, and dignity’ and whether a party's disobedience of the order was done willfully.” Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Ind. 2012). Again, we cannot reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility on appeal. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. Nor will we substitute our judgment about the willfulness of Mother's conduct for that of the trial court. Id. at 129 (affirming trial court's denial of a motion for contempt and reminding the Court of Appeals it “should not have substituted its judgment about whether [the parent's] conduct was willful for that of the trial court”). The fact the trial court admonished Mother (and Father) regarding parenting time interference does not change our analysis. See id. (affirming denial of contempt finding where the trial court “noted communication problems with both parents” and “admonished both parties to communicate directly with each other”).

C. Additional Parenting Time

[24] Father also argues Mother failed to offer him additional parenting time under the Agreement. The Agreement states a party must offer the other parent additional parenting time “for any period during which the party would require childcare for five hours or more[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32. Father testified there were times when Mother left Children alone for more than five hours. The trial court found no relief was necessary because the Agreement already provided guidelines for the parties to exercise additional parenting time.

[25] On appeal, Father argues the trial court misconstrued his testimony as a request for modification of the extra parenting time provision; he argues he sought relief in the form of a contempt citation. Yet Father did not request the trial court sanction Mother for failing to offer additional parenting time in his motion for rule to show cause. And in any case, Father presented no evidence Mother left Children alone for periods that would require childcare, particularly since Children are teenagers.

[26] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to find Mother in contempt.

3. The trial court did not err in declining to award Father attorney fees.

[27] Finally, Father argues he was entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement, which states a party must pay the other parent's attorney fees if the party breaches the Agreement or is found in contempt of court.

[28] The trial court made no finding either party breached the Agreement or was in contempt. In fact, the trial court found both parties had contributed “to conflict, misunderstanding, and discord” and reminded Parents multiple times in the written order to uphold their contractual obligations to each other. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26. Father contends the trial court's admonishments amount to a finding Mother breached the Agreement and Agreed Order. See Appellant's Br. at 34 (“If Mother's conduct did not violate any portions of any agreement, there would be no reason for the trial court to remind the parties.”). But Father presents no legal authority for his contention. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to award Father attorney fees for bringing an unsuccessful contempt action against Mother.

Conclusion

[29] The trial court did not err in ordering Father to reimburse Mother for some of A.’s driving and vehicle expenses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Mother in contempt. And the trial court did not err in denying Father's request for attorney fees.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the motion, Father alleged he supervised the completion of a “disproportionate” number of S.’s school assignments; Mother did not arrange for X. to complete detentions during her parenting time; Mother “substantially refused to supervise [A.’s] driver's education” and was doing the same for S.; Mother allowed A. to play video games rather than work on summer school classes when at her house; Mother failed to help with the writeup and presentation of X.’s science fair project; Mother did not help X. finish writing a school paper; Mother left for work rather than help A. and S. get their student identification cards at school orientation; and Mother did not ensure X.’s attendance at a band concert. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 68–69.

2.   Father did not include Mother's response in his appendix. We remind Father, who is an attorney, the appendix shall include “pleadings and other documents ․ that are necessary for resolution of the issues raised on appeal[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f).

3.   Mother itemized the expenses on a spreadsheet introduced as Respondent's Exhibit C. The expenses included A.’s six-month car insurance premium, sales tax for a vehicle Mother purchased for A. to drive, tag and title fees, dealer service fees, new tires, roadside assistance, and repairs to the headlights, air conditioner, and starter. She listed the price of A.’s car, but did not request reimbursement for it.

4.   Father also contends that, if we determine he was obligated to pay driving and vehicle-related expenses under the Agreement, the trial court erred by failing to order Mother to pay expenses related to a car Father owned and used to give S. driving lessons. Father did not present evidence of what those expenses were, nor did he ask the trial court to order Mother to pay them in his motion for rule to show cause. We decline Father's invitation to award him unknown vehicle expenses on appeal.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Felix and DeBoer concur. Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.