IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Al.C. and Ar.C. (Minor Children) and N.C. (Father) and T.P. (Mother) (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] N.C. (Father) and T.P. (Mother) (collectively the Parents) appeal the trial court's involuntary termination of their parental rights to their minor children Al.C. and Ar.C. (collectively the Children). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Mother are the married parents of Al.C., born in March 2019, and Ar.C., born in March 2020. The Parents also have three older minor children who are not subjects of this proceeding. Mother has two adult sons in their early twenties who live in the Parents’ home. Father was born in Mexico, and his first language is Spanish. The family was involved in a prior child in need of services (CHINS) proceeding, during which the caseworker for the Department of Child Services (DCS) got Father an interpreter. That case closed successfully in May 2021.

[3] In May 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were CHINS on the basis that Al.C. was “found naked and unaccompanied in his neighborhood” and “[i]t took more than an hour to locate [his] parents.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 126. According to the petition, “[o]nce the family was located, [a DCS employee] observed the home to be in an unsanitary condition with the children sleeping 0n discolored mattresses, trash covering the floor, animal feces being spread throughout the home, and mold growing in the refrigerator.” Id. The petition noted that the family had “a history of involvement with [DCS], including a substantiated assessment for lack of supervision and a previous CHINS case that opened, in part, due to deplorable home conditions.” Id. DCS removed the Children from the Parents’ home. The Parents were charged with neglect of a dependent, and a no-contact order was issued between Al.C. and the Parents. The CHINS petition was amended to reflect these developments, and an initial hearing was held in June 2022. Father and Mother were each represented by counsel, and the trial court appointed a court appointed special advocate (CASA) to represent the Children.

[4] In August 2022, the Parents entered into a facilitated agreement with DCS, pursuant to which the Parents admitted that the Children were CHINS “because of an ongoing criminal case through which there is a No Contact Order between each parent and [Al.C.] and that services would be beneficial for the family.” Id. at 100-01. The Parents also agreed to the entry of dispositional orders requiring them to engage in certain services and fulfill certain obligations to DCS. Among other things, both Father and Mother were ordered to participate in family preservation services, complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations, participate in supervised visitation with Ar.C., abide by the no-contact order regarding Al.C., keep in contact with the DCS family case manager (FCM), and notify the FCM of changes. Mother was ordered to submit to random drug screens. The permanency plan was for reunification.

[5] In November 2022, after a modification hearing, Father was ordered to submit to random drug screens, participate in a substance abuse assessment, and successfully complete all treatment recommendations. Mother was ordered to complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations. In March 2023, on DCS's motion, the trial court suspended visitation between Mother and Ar.C. In June 2023, the court suspended visitation between Father and Ar.C. due to sobriety concerns, and the permanency plan was modified to include a concurrent plan of adoption.

[6] In August 2023, DCS filed petitions to terminate the Parents’ parental rights. The initial hearing was held on August 28. Mother appeared remotely from the Madison County Jail, and Father appeared in person. The trial court asked Father “how far” he went in school. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. Father replied, “I was in Mexico I don't know probably eighth [grade].” Id. The court asked Father if he could “read, write, and understand English[,]” and he replied, “No perfectly.” Id. The court asked, “Would you prefer to have a Spanish interpreter during these proceedings?” Id. at 8. Father responded, “If you could it would be a lot better.” Id. The court asked, “Do you understand what I am saying today?” Id. Father replied, “Yeah yeah but I want to understand perfect you know what I mean.” Id. The court advised Mother of her rights, appointed counsel for her, and set the final hearing for October 17. The court then appointed counsel for Father and continued his initial hearing so that an interpreter could be present.

[7] That hearing was held on September 20. Through an interpreter, Father testified that he was able to read, write, and understand English “[a] little bit” and that he had an “okay” understanding of the termination petition, which was printed in English. Id. at 28. The trial court advised Father of his rights, and Father indicated that he understood them. At that point, the court told Father, “I am going to ask that since you asked for an interpreter that you wait for the interpreter to finish asking the question in Spanish before you respond.” Id. at 32. The court confirmed the final hearing date and asked if Father had “any questions about anything [they had] gone over today[.]” Id. at 34. Father said that he did not.

[8] The final hearing began as scheduled on October 17. Father and Mother appeared in person and by counsel, and CASA Katherine Childers appeared in person. FCM Nicole Hendrick and Childers testified, and both recommended termination and adoption. At the conclusion of their testimony, the court continued the hearing to October 31. FCM Hendrick asked the court to order both Father and Mother to undergo a drug screen “before [they leave the] building today[,]” which the court did. Id. at 115.

[9] At the October 31 hearing, FCM Hendrick testified that Mother had “tested positive for cocaine at 660 ng/ml” and for “benzoylecgonine[, a metabolite of cocaine, at] 572 ng/ml” and that Father had tested positive for cocaine at “12.4 ng/ml” and for “benzoylecgonine [at] 6.4 ng/ml.” Id. at 121. Father's counsel argued that the test protocol was not followed, but the trial court admitted the test results over objection. Counsel then called Father to testify. On crossexamination, DCS's counsel observed that Father was “actually answering the questions that [she was] asking [him] before the interpreter finishe[d] interpreting[.]” Id. at 163. When DCS's counsel asked Father if he would “separate permanently from [his] wife” if that was the only way to get his “children back[,]” Mother “abruptly” left the courtroom. Id. at 171, 172. The trial court took the matter under advisement.

[10] In February 2024, the trial court issued an order with the following relevant findings of fact:¹

MOTHER'S INVOLVEMENT

7. Mother's participation has been minimal, and the services offered at no cost to Mother have not resulted in any significant advancement in Mother's demonstrated parenting skills.

8. Included among the services made available to Mother were:

a. Family preservation services;

b. Parenting assessment and any recommended treatment;

c. Random drug screens in support of her sobriety;

d. Substance Abuse Evaluation and any recommended treatment (both in-patient and out-patient treatment models);

e. Supervised visitation with Ar.C. (no visitation being available in light of the criminal case no-contact order between the parents and Al.C.); and

f. A mental health assessment.

9. As a part of her Facilitated Agreement, Mother agreed and was ordered to comply with a number of terms, including those to

a. Contact the Family Case Manager (FCM) every week;

b. Notify the FCM of any changes;

c. Keep all appointments;

d. Maintain suitable housing;

e. Maintain a legal and stable source of income;

f. Meet the children's personal medical and mental health needs.

10. Mother's criminal case disallowed her to have any contact with Al.C. during the pendency of the CHINS case, even up to the evidentiary hearings in this case.

11. Mother had supervised visitation with Ar.C. for a time, but the CHINS Court ordered that her visitation be suspended on March 23, 2023. It was never reinstated.

12. Mother began, but did not complete, a parenting assessment that would have tailored services to meet her individual needs.

13. She failed to maintain weekly contact with FCMs and likewise failed to keep appointments scheduled for her with providers.

14. The CHINS Court found, after the June 13, 2023, Permanency Hearing, that Mother has, “not complied with the children's case plan. Mother has not completed any services in several months. She did not do her substance abuse screen. She does not keep in contact with [DCS]. She has not completed her psychological evaluation.”

15. Mother failed to engage in every random [drug] screen for which she was scheduled between April 3, 2023, and August 29, 2023.

16. Mother's substance abuse history mostly includes use of cocaine and buprenorphine.

17. Immediately after the first day of the hearing, Mother submitted a substance screen upon this Court's order. That screen reflects that Mother was positive for both cocaine and benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of cocaine) at the time of trial.

18. She also failed to engage in a requested mental health evaluation that would also allow the tailoring of services to meet her unique needs.

19. Ultimately most of Mother's service referrals were closed out due to her non-compliance/non-engagement.

20. The family's housing is also insecure, an action for eviction having been filed by Aardvark Rentals against Mother on August 15, 2023 ․.

21. Mother has repeated contact with the criminal justice system, both before and after the opening of the most recent CHINS cases, including [neglect of a dependent (Al.C.), a level 6 felony, upon which judgment of conviction was entered on September 27, 2023; neglect of a dependent, a level 6 felony, upon which judgment of conviction was entered on October 2, 2023,and such sentence being ordered consecutive to that imposed for the conviction involving Al.C.;2 operating a vehicle while intoxicated (prior conviction), a class D felony, upon which judgment of conviction was entered on April 16, 2013, and upon which Mother failed to successfully complete her sentence; and operating a vehicle while intoxicated (with minor), a class D felony, upon which judgment was entered on July 14, 2010].

22. Mother's conviction history illustrates that the birth of her children did not result in a significant change in Mother's criminal activities or bring her substance abuse disorder into remission.

23. FCM Hendrick did not go to Mother's home to see the condition because of Mother's abusive attitude toward the FCM and the FCM did not want to go to the home by herself.

24. Mother's attitude was prevalent at the fact-finding hearing when she left the courtroom in the middle of testimony at the October 31, 202[3] hearing.

25. Mother's unregulated emotionality is one of DCS’ concern[s] for the children.

26. Mother claims that she participated in substance therapy at Groups, a treatment facility primarily focused on medication-assisted treatment. However, she provided neither this Court nor [DCS] any evidence other than her self-serving statements to support that claim.

27. Mother remains insistent she does not use illegal drugs, despite credible evidence to the contrary. The Court finds that without an acknowledgement of a problem, Mother cannot move forward toward recovery.

FATHER'S INVOLVEMENT:

28. Father was a party to the Facilitated Agreement entered by the parties and accepted by the CHINS Court on August 10, 2022.

29. The services ordered by the CHINS Court for Father via the Facilitated Agreement are the same as those ordered for Mother.

30. Father admitted at trial that he has failed to comply with those orders, including to:

a. Complete a parenting assessment and follow its recommendations;

b. Maintain weekly contact with the FCM and to notify him/her of changes;

c. Keep all appointments.

31. Between April 3, 2023, and August 29, 2023, Father missed 20 random substance tests that were ordered by the CHINS court.

32. On October 25, 2022, Father submitted a screen at the Randolph County Office of [DCS] that tested positive for cocaine, benzoylecgonine, and buprenorphine.

33. On October 17, 2023, he submitted a screen at the Madison County Juvenile Center ․ immediately following the initial presentation of evidence in this matter. The certified analysis report indicates Father's sample was positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine.

34. The screens of October 25, 2022, and of October 17, 2023, belie Father's assertion at trial that he had not violated the CHINS Court's orders to not use illegal substances, when he affirmatively stated that he had not used cocaine or any other illegal substance.

35. Father was convicted of Neglect of a Dependent [Al.C.] ․ at a hearing [held] on November 30, 2022.[3]

36. Father also failed to complete a parenting assessment and related training as ordered by the CHINS court.

37. While he had (for a period) supervised visitation with Ar.C., Father continues to be barred from visitation with Al.C. via a no contact order entered in the Neglect of a Dependent criminal case.

38. Father has not maintained weekly contact with the FCM and has not kept all appointments with providers and DCS workers.

39. Father has failed to consistently obey the law as ordered by the CHINS Court, both by having possession of cocaine (as evidenced by his positive analysis for the substance in a sample he submitted on October 17, 2023) and by being convicted of Neglect of a Dependent in November 2022.

40. Father at trial declined to say that he would separate from the children's mother if that were what the Court found necessary to protect them from Mother's maladaptive parenting behaviors.

41. Father remains insistent he does not use illegal drugs, despite his positive test for cocaine on October 31, 202[3]. Without acknowledging substance use, Father cannot move toward recovery.

FINDING[S] RELATED TO FATHER'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES:

1. DCS employees report that Father consistently spoke to them in English and made no request for or suggestion that he needed an interpreter to facilitate his understanding of the CHINS proceedings or any documents arising from those proceedings.

2. FCM Hendrick had interactions with Father in English. To her, he never spoke Spanish. To her, he never appeared not to understand her, and he never asked for an interpreter.

3. FCM Hendrick did not think that Father needed any English to Spanish interpretation and did not request any interpreter services on the CHINS case. He first requested interpretation at the Initial Hearing on September 20, 2023. The CHINS case had been open since May 4, 2022.

4. On October 17, 202[3], the Court notes that Father excused Interpreter Krebs from remaining with him to translate as DCS personnel administered the drug screen immediately following the first day of testimony.

5. From this, the Court infers that Father did not believe translation assistance was needed for him to accurately complete the court-ordered screen.

6. Father presented no independent evidence at trial that he notified any potential providers that he desired interpreter services.

7. Neither did Father present anything other than his own self-serving statement that he wanted, let alone requested, translation assistance at any point in the current, or the previous, CHINS action, although he named the persons (and had subpoena power to bring them on his behalf) to whom he purportedly made these statements.

8. Father attended all of his underlying CHINS hearings on the currently pending cases, on [six occasions, including the initial hearing on May 2022 and the permanency hearing in June 2023,] without requesting interpretation services or suggesting the need for such[.]

9. If Father required translation of the CHINS orders or hearings, the attorneys representing him at those hearings would have raised that issue. There is no record that either attorney Paul Baylor or [Michael] Price, who also represents Father in this termination action, did so as a part of their representation in either set of CHINS cases.

10. At the October 31, 2023, evidentiary hearing in this case, Father testified with the assistance of an interpreter. The Court observed signs that Father comprehended the questions being posed in English prior to interpretation into Spanish. Specifically Father would give a head nod and begin answering the question as soon as the English version of the question had ended, even though the interpreter had not yet fully interpreted the question into Spanish. This occurred at least twelve times. Furthermore, Father answered some questions in English, including his house being ‘one story,” his employment as “laying block,” his salary as “35 or 36,” and that, regarding “visitation,” “I want to see them.”

11. Father has been employed in the United States as a mason for fourteen years.

12. Despite attempting to show otherwise, Father's testimony demonstrated he had an understanding of the CHINS Court Dispositional Order.

13. Under the criminal cause [for neglect of Al.C.], Father was represented by counsel[, was examined by the court at three hearings,] and did not request an interpreter until the disposition hearing ․.

AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS:

14. DCS's staffed recommendation is that TPR be granted as to both parents so that the children can achieve permanency via adoption.

15. CASA Kat Childers also recommend that termination of both parents’ rights is in the children's best interests.

16. The CASA program took into account the children being well bonded with each other and into their current placement in making its recommendation.

17. CASA also expressed concern with Mother's minimal progress in services and her ongoing active substance abuse.

18. CASA notes that Mother is routinely emotionally unregulated when CASA attempts to talk with her, including Mother using pejoratives toward CASA as a result of her inability to maintain sufficient emotional stability to even converse with child-safety workers to successfully parent these children.

19. CASA has observed the children to be impacted by the trauma caused by Mother's unhealthy behavior, including Ar.C., a preschooler, hitting placement and herself and labeling herself a “b***h,” one of the pejoratives Mother frequently directs in anger to others.

ADEQUACY OF PERMANENCY PLAN FOR THE CHILD/REN

20. Ar.C. and Al.C. both have proposed pre-adoptive parents.

21. The children have weekly contact with their proposed pre-adoptive parents, who are members of the same faith group as are her current foster parents ․.

22. Both children are bonded with each other and with their placement and pre-adoptive families.

23. DCS's permanency plan of adoption is appropriate for these children.

SUMMATION OF ANALYSIS

24. The family has been involved in a prior CHINS action ․. That action ultimately closed ten months later via reunification and wardship termination. The case underlying this termination action is the family's second set of CHINS case interventions.

25. Mother's behavior, including her failure to demonstrate advancement of her parenting skills through services offered to her without cost, shows that she is unwilling or unable to provide Ar.C. and Al.C. with a safe and stable home, with stable parenting, now or in the near future.

26. DCS has not been able to return the children to the parents’ home as, even if all other issues were resolved, there is no stable and safe caregiver for the children while Father is at work; the adult children in the home also tested positive for illegal substances at the time of the removal on this occasion and therefore are not stable, safe and sober potential caregivers for these toddlers.

27. Both Father and Mother tested positive for cocaine on the first day of trial, reflecting that the family's struggles with substance abuse disorder are not in the past.

28. The Court finds there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.

29. The Court further finds that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the children in that it leaves them, as uniquely vulnerable children, dangling in the child-welfare system a second time, without a permanent home and without any realistic hope of achieving a permanent, safe living arrangement with their parents.

30. It is in the child[ren's] best interest that Mother's and Father's parental rights be terminated so that Al.C. and Ar.C. are free to be adopted.

31. The Court rejects Father's argument that termination of his rights should not be granted due to his failure to receive CHINS documents or CHINS hearing activity translated into Spanish.

32. The Court finds that Father has a sufficiently clear understanding of English to understand and appropriately respond to questions posed to him.

33. While use of Mr. Krebs’ interpretation services was warranted to avoid even the appearance of a due process violation, the Court does not find that failure to translate written documents into Spanish or to translate all testimony and argument at the CHINS hearings deprived Father of an ability to actively participate in those hearings.

34. Even if Father was unable to understand a portion of the evidence or proceedings in the CHINS cases, a failure to request an interpreter is a waiver of that issue, and it cannot be raised for the first time in the termination of parental rights cause as a substantive due process violation warranting dismissal of the TPR.

35. The Court finds that no fundamental error occurred regarding affording Father an opportunity to actively and knowingly participate in those hearings notwithstanding being a non-native speaker of English.

36. It is in the children's best interest that both Mother and Father's parental rights be terminated so that the children can achieve permanency with an adopting family that is able to meet their need[s].

․.

CONCLUSIONS:

․.

The children have been removed from the parent(s) for at least six (6) months under a disposition decree, or the children have been removed from the parent(s) and been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) of the last twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the children were removed from the home as a result of the children being alleged to be children in need of services or delinquent children;

There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by the parent or that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the children;

Termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights is in the children's best interest;

There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children, that being adoption.

The Court must terminate the parent-child relationship as DCS has proven the elements of [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. 31-35-2-8.

Appealed Order at 2-9. The Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – Father was not deprived of due process.

[11] Father first contends that he “was deprived of his due process right to an interpreter throughout the underlying CHINS proceedings, depriving him of a fair opportunity to participate in the CHINS proceedings and resulting in the termination judgment by the trial court.” Father's Br. at 16. It is well settled that “[t]he State must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship.” S.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 37, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. This entails providing “the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982). “Due process in parental-rights cases involves the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing government interest supporting the use of the challenged procedure.” S.E., 15 N.E.3d at 43. “The private interest affected by the proceeding is substantial—a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child.” Id. “And the State's interest in protecting the welfare of a child is also substantial.” Id. “Because the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the proceeding, we focus on the risk of error created by DCS's actions and the trial court's actions.” Id. “[P]rocedural irregularities in a CHINS proceeding may be of such significance that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to the termination of his or her parental rights.” Id.

[12] “[T]he fundamental requirement of procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012). For this constitutional protection to have meaning for a litigant with limited English proficiency, “due process must include not only the opportunity to be heard but also the opportunity to hear.” Ponce v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1265, 1268 (Ind. 2014). In the criminal context, which also implicates significant due process concerns, our supreme court has stated that “[a]n indigent defendant who cannot speak or understand English has a right to have his proceedings simultaneously translated to allow for effective participation.” Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 1989).

[13] The court has further stated,

Whenever a trial court is put on notice that a defendant has a significant language difficulty, the court shall make a determination of whether an interpreter is needed to protect the defendant's due process rights. A trial court is put on notice of a potential language barrier when a defendant manifests a significant language difficulty or when an interpreter is specifically requested. The court's decision as to whether an interpreter is needed should be based on factors such as the defendant's understanding of spoken and written English, the complexity of the proceedings, issues, and testimony, and whether, considering those factors, the defendant will be able to participate effectively in his defense. Absent such indications, however, the court is under no obligation to inquire into the defendant's need for an interpreter.

Arrieta v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1238, 1243 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Nur v. State, 869 N.E.2d 472, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (2008)); see also S.E., 15 N.E.3d at 44 (citing Arrieta in addressing parent's challenge to trial court's use of sign-language interpreter at termination hearing).

[14] “A trial court's decision whether to appoint an interpreter is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Nur, 869 N.E.2d at 480. “An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is against the logic of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. “Where no request is made for an interpreter and the record shows that the defendant has no significant language difficulty, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint an interpreter.” Id.

[15] Assuming, without deciding, that the foregoing principles also apply to cases involving the termination of parental rights, we note that Father did not request an interpreter at any point during the underlying CHINS proceeding, even though he was aware of this option.⁴ Furthermore, the trial court made over a dozen findings in its termination order to support its implicit conclusion that Father has no significant difficulty understanding either spoken or written English. Father's lengthy argument to the contrary is simply an invitation to reweigh evidence and reassess witness credibility in his favor, which we may not do. See Wilfong v. Cessna Corp., 838 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ind. 2005) (noting that “it is not within the province of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence or to reassess the credibility of the witnesses”).

[16] The mere fact that a trial court offers, and a litigant accepts, the appointment of an interpreter is not itself dispositive of whether the litigant has a significant language difficulty. Based on the trial court's findings, which Father does not even mention in this section of his brief,⁵ we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing an interpreter at an earlier stage of the proceedings and that Father was not deprived of due process as a result. For the same reasons, we are unpersuaded by Father's related argument that the administration of the October 17, 2023 drug test without the assistance of the interpreter—whom Father specifically excused from duty—violated his due process rights.

Section 2 – Father has waived his argument that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting certain evidence at the final hearing.

[17] Next, Father contends that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting certain evidence at the final hearing, namely, his October 17, 2023 drug test results, FCM Hendrick's testimony regarding the drug test results of Mother's adult children, and her testimony that she had found no documentation in the DCS file that Father “had a legal and stable source of income[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 61. Father's brief does not include “a concise statement of the applicable standard of review” as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b). More critically, Father does not cite a single case or evidence rule to support his argument as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․.”). Consequently, we find his argument waived. See Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (finding appellant's argument waived where he failed “to develop a cogent argument or provide[ ] adequate citation to authority” and failed to “include a statement of an applicable standard of review”).⁶

Section 3 – Father has failed to establish that the termination order is clearly erroneous.

[18] Finally, and more generally, Father challenges some of the findings and conclusions in the trial court's termination order. We acknowledge that “a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[19] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[20] We accept unchallenged factual findings as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). And if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “[W]e will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of clear error that leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” J.M. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Family & Child., 802 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[21] Among other things, a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).⁷ DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. If the trial court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[22] Unlike Mother, Father fails to acknowledge our well-established rubric for reviewing findings and conclusions on each applicable element of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). See, e.g., K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (“We engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether the conditions that led to the Children's placement outside the home will not be remedied.”). Instead, he simply disputes individual findings. We respond to Father's arguments accordingly.⁸

[23] Father first challenges findings 33, 34, 39, and 41 regarding his involvement, all of which relate to his positive test for cocaine on October 17, 2023. We have already determined that Father waived his argument regarding the admissibility of the test results, so this challenge is a nonstarter.⁹

[24] Father then contests findings 14 through 23 and 30 regarding DCS's and the CASA's recommendations and the permanency plan. He questions the findings’ focus on Mother, while disregarding other findings regarding his illegal drug use, his failure to comply with services and maintain contact with the FCM, his apparent unwillingness to separate from Mother to protect the Children from her “maladaptive parenting behaviors[,]” and the lack of a “stable and safe caregiver” for the Children while he is at work. Appealed Order at 4, 6. He also poses numerous rhetorical questions about the Children's potential adoptive placements, without acknowledging that “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent[,]” and that “it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[25] Next, Father challenges summation finding 26. This challenge is also a nonstarter because Father waived his argument regarding the admissibility of the evidence that his stepsons tested positive for illegal substances.

[26] Father then disputes summation findings 34 and 35, claiming that they “misstate Indiana law, in that due process violations in the CHINS proceeding can and frequently do lead to the undoing of termination judgments ․.” Father's Br. at 29. Having found no due process violation, we conclude that any error in these findings is harmless.

[27] And finally, Father challenges summation findings 28 and 29. Father claims that he has “obeyed all controls on his contact with the Children, while maintaining housing, employment, visitation while allowed, and no showing of harm that he poses to the Children outside of an erroneously admitted drug screen late in the case, which is itself unreliable based on the screening company's own rules.” Id. Father disregards that his visitation was suspended due to concerns about his sobriety, which were validated by the positive drug test, that he missed twenty random drug screens ordered by the CHINS court, and that he failed to complete services and maintain contact with the FCM. Also, Father does not challenge the trial court's finding regarding the pending eviction action against Mother, which necessarily affected him as well,¹⁰ or the finding that he “declined to say that he would separate from [Mother] if that were what the Court found necessary to protect [the Children] from Mother's maladaptive parenting behaviors.” Appealed Order at 4. In sum, Father has failed to demonstrate clear error that leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Accordingly, we affirm the termination order as to Father.

Section 4 – Mother has failed to establish that the termination order is clearly erroneous.

[28] Mother first contends that the trial court clearly erred in finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied. As stated above, “[w]e engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether the conditions that led to the Children's placement outside the home will not be remedied.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. “First, we must ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention in foster care.” Id. “Second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010)). In the second step, we judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted), trans. denied. The evidence presented by DCS “need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, DCS need establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.” In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[29] Mother argues that “DCS failed to demonstrate the basis for DCS involvement in this matter whereby the Court did not allow the admission of the [CHINS petition] for the truth of the matter that was asserted within each petition.” Mother's Br. at 10. This argument ignores Mother's facilitated agreement with DCS, in which she admitted that the Children were CHINS because of a pending criminal case in which there was a no-contact order between the Parents and Al.C. and that the coercive intervention of the trial court was necessary. Mother further argues that, while she “did have a substance use disorder[,] she was participating in a substance abuse program at Groups.” Id. But the trial court specifically found that Mother failed to present “any evidence other than her self-serving statements to support that claim.” Appealed Order at 3. Mother also contends that “DCS did not put in referral for services until nearly the end of June of 2023 which was two months prior to the filing of the Petition to Terminate the Parent-Child Relationship.” Mother's Br. at 10. This contention is contradicted by the trial court's November 2022 periodic case review order, which states that “Mother was referred home-based casework through One Sensible Solution, but that referral was closed out at the beginning of October due to non-compliance.” Ex. Vol. at 51. And Mother further asserts that she “had a healthy relationship with her children as observed by the visitation supervisor.” Mother's Br. at 10-11 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 104). The cited transcript page does not support this assertion, which is contradicted by the CASA's testimony that Mother negatively impacted Ar.C., who acted out against herself and her foster mother.

[30] Mother does not challenge any specific finding and instead complains that “[t]he majority of the findings of fact are based on the underlying child in need of services orders without any evidence to support the orders.” Mother's Br. at 12-13. But Mother cites no pertinent authority for the proposition that the trial court could not rely on its orders (as opposed to DCS's filings) in the CHINS proceeding, which were based on evidence elicited at hearings, to support its termination order.¹¹ And the findings in that order establish that after Mother admitted that the Children were CHINS based on a pending criminal case that resulted in a no-contact order against her as to Al.C., she failed to complete or even participate in parenting- and mental-health-related services; failed to maintain contact with and was abusive toward FCM Hendrick; was abusive toward the CASA; negatively impacted Ar.C., who acted out against herself and her foster mother; was the subject of an eviction proceeding; failed to undergo multiple random drug screens; and tested positive for cocaine and left the courtroom during the termination hearing. From this, the trial court could readily conclude that there is a reasonable probability that Mother's behavior will not change.

[31] Mother also contends that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination is in the Children's best interests. To determine whether termination is in a child's best interests, the trial court must look to the totality of the evidence. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “[C]hildren cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification—and courts ‘need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.

[32] Here, both FCM Hendrick and CASA Childers recommended that Mother's parental rights be terminated, and we have already concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied. Consequently, we affirm the termination order as to Mother.

[33] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Where appropriate, we have replaced the parties’ names with their aforementioned designations.

2.   The record indicates that the second conviction was based on educational neglect and that Mother received an eighteen-month suspended sentence on each conviction. Ex. Vol. at 137, 154, 186.

3.   The record indicates that Father was sentenced to eighteen months suspended to probation. Ex. Vol. at 154.

4.   At the final hearing, Father testified that he asked for an interpreter “[a]t the beginning” of his prior CHINS case and that his “case worker got [him] an interpreter.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 165. Father cites no authority for his suggestion that a litigant who requests and is appointed an interpreter in one proceeding is automatically entitled to the appointment of an interpreter in a subsequent unrelated proceeding. We note that the court in the subsequent proceeding might not be aware of the prior appointment for any number of reasons and that the litigant's English language facility might have improved substantially in the interim.

5.   Father does address these findings in his general challenge to the termination order, but his complaints are merely requests to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, including his own. Consequently, we do not address those complaints (or related complaints regarding other findings) in Section 3 below.

6.   By contrast, DCS's brief includes the applicable standard of review as well as cogent argument and multiple citations to authority to support its position that the trial court did not commit error, let alone reversible error, in admitting the challenged evidence. We find DCS's position persuasive.

7.   Our legislature made significant changes to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 in 2024. DCS filed its petitions in 2023, under the prior version of the statute.

8.   DCS points out that “[t]his portion of Father's brief contains lengthy single-spaced arguments, in violation of India[na] Appellate Rule 43(E).” Appellee's Br. at 28 n.3.

9.   Father says,Paragraph 39 additionally adds that Father has failed to obey the dispositional term of obeying the law by citing to Father's conviction of child neglect. However, this is erroneous as the incident is the same event that led to the CHINS proceeding being filed, at which time Father was not under a dispositional order.Appellant's Br. at 26. Father is correct on this point, but this portion of the finding is harmless surplusage and therefore not grounds for reversal. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

10.   In his statement of facts, Father says that he “testified without contradiction that he had secured different housing and needed only to finish painting the home and installing new carpeting, which would take two weeks to complete.” Father's Br. at 13. We note that, “[a]s a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.” Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). The trial court made no finding that Father's testimony on this point was credible.

11.   Mother asserts that “[m]any juvenile hearings are conducted informally, and are not strictly governed by the [evidence] rules.” Mother's Br. at 12. She cites Indiana Evidence Rule 101, which provides that the evidence rules, “other than those with respect to privileges, do not apply in ․ preliminary juvenile matters[.]” Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2). But Mother cites no authority for her suggestion that a postadjudication CHINS hearing is a preliminary juvenile matter for purposes of the rule, and she instead relies on cases and statutes involving juvenile delinquency proceedings. Regardless, Mother does not specifically assert, let alone establish, that any of the findings in the orders at issue were based, either in whole or in part, on evidence that would have been inadmissible at trial.

Crone, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Tavitas concur.