WOODS v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Delangley Corneilous Woods, Jr. (“Woods”) appeals his convictions for Level 3 felony criminal confinement,¹ Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon,² and Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child.³ Woods presents the following restated issues for our review:

I.  Whether we should disregard the victim's testimony under the incredible dubiosity rule; and

II. Whether there was sufficient evidence that Woods confined the victim and used a deadly weapon.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In early August 2022, Woods and Jaela Jacobs (“Jacobs”) were living together in an apartment they shared with Jacobs's two-month-old daughter, N.W., whom Woods believed to be his daughter. Although Woods and Jacobs had previously dated, their romantic relationship ended in the previous year, and they were living together as co-parents. On August 5, 2022, Woods and Jacobs began arguing when Woods was planning to leave on a date. The argument escalated into a physical altercation in the bedroom, where Woods repeatedly pushed Jacobs onto the bed. N.W. was in the room during this incident. Woods then began to leave the apartment. Jacobs followed and confronted him about injuring her lip. At that point, Woods “started clutching his gun and ran back up the stairs” toward the apartment. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 57. Jacobs ran inside. Woods followed her and entered the bedroom where Jacobs was sitting on the bed, holding N.W. At that point, Woods had his gun out and “was arguing at [Jacobs],” telling her to “stand up.” Id. at 59. Jacobs remembered “going from sitting down to standing up” with Woods “just telling [her] to put the baby down[.]” Id. Woods then held the gun to Jacobs's head and told Jacobs to “open [her] mouth so that he could put the pistol in [her] mouth.” Id. at 60. Jacobs kept her head still and refused to open her mouth. While Woods held the gun to her head, Jacobs did not feel free to leave and feared for her life. Jacobs said that Woods took the gun away from her head after “maybe ․ two minutes or something.” Id. at 61. Jacobs described the gun as a “P80” that Woods made himself by ordering parts online and assembling them. Id. at 59. Jacobs said the gun “resemble[d] the same functions as a Glock” with a “double trigger, no safety.” Id. Jacobs and Woods later exchanged text messages, with Woods telling Jacobs he hoped she died. Jacobs responded that, if Woods wanted her dead, he “should've pulled the trigger when [he] had that gun to [her] head[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 10. Woods then replied: “[I] should've.” Id.

[4] After the incident, Jacobs went to Woods's mother's house for several hours before returning to the apartment that night. She testified that, on the date of the altercation, she did not feel that it was safe for her to leave the apartment. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 86. Jacobs waited two days to move out, testifying that Woods “was off work for the next couple of days” and she “stayed the next couple of days because [she] knew [she] wanted to pack up and leave once he went to work for [a] 12-hour shift.” Id. at 63. On August 16, 2022, Jacobs told her mother what happened, and her mother called the police. Jacobs said that she waited to report the violence because she had been “keeping it from [her] mom” and was “scared to do it.” Id. at 80. Jacobs said she avoided telling her mother because she knew her mother was “not going to take it too light[ly]” and that, if she told her mother, she “better be serious this time about not going back.” Id.

[5] The State charged Woods with Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 5 felony intimidation,⁴ Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, and Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child. Woods waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was held on September 28, 2023. At trial, the intimidation charge was dismissed. The trial court found Woods guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and ultimately sentenced Woods to ten years for the lead count of Level 3 felony intimidation, with the sentence consisting of six years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction, one and one-half years directly placed with Community Corrections, and two and one-half years suspended to probation. As to the remaining counts, the trial court imposed fully concurrent sentences, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of ten years. Woods now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Incredible Dubiosity

[6] Woods invokes the incredible dubiosity rule, asking us to disregard Jacobs's testimony as insufficient to support his convictions. See Appellant's Br. pp. 18–22. The incredible dubiosity rule is a limited exception to our obligation to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2015). This rule applies “only in exceptionally rare circumstances,” allowing us to disregard witness testimony that was “inherently improbable, unimaginable, or otherwise outside the realm of human experience.” McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 559–560 (Ind. 2018). The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply when there was circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. Thompson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (Ind. 2002).

[7] In invoking the incredible dubiosity rule, Woods argues that Jacobs's testimony was inherently contradictory when it came to the paternity of her child. See Appellant's Br. p. 21. He focuses on Jacobs's claim that her romantic relationship with Woods ended in mid-2021, but she “believed [he] was the father of her child – the child who she testified was two months old on August 5, 2022 – and ․ believed this up until August 22, 2022[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 22. Woods goes on to argue that, “because human gestation is forty weeks,” it “could not possibly be true” that he was the child's father. Id. at 19. Apart from this paternity-related argument, Woods directs us to portions of Jacobs's testimony indicating that Jacobs (1) first told Woods's mother about the violence, not her own mother; (2) returned to the apartment after leaving with Woods's mother; (3) continued to reside with Woods for two days; and (4) waited more than a week to speak with the police. See Appellant's Br. p. 18. Based on these aspects of the testimony, Woods essentially argues that no reasonable person would have responded to domestic violence this way, and therefore, we should disregard Jacobs's testimony as incredibly dubious.

[8] We disagree that the incredible dubiosity rule applies. We initially observe that, because the State presented evidence that Woods and Jacobs texted about him holding a gun to her head, there was circumstantial evidence of his guilt. In any case, as to Woods's argument about the paternity of the child, we cannot say it is inherently improbable, unimaginable, or otherwise outside the realm of the human experience that two adults living together could end their formal romantic relationship but at times be physically intimate. In short, we decline to conclude that Jacobs's testimony was incredibly dubious simply because Jacobs and Woods regarded N.W. as their child under the circumstances. Furthermore, we cannot say that Jacobs's testimony about the violent conduct, or her response as a victim living with Woods, was inherently improbable, unimaginable, or otherwise outside the realm of human experience. Jacobs gave consistent testimony about Woods's violent actions in the apartment. As to her response to the violent episode, Jacobs said that she told Woods's mother, rather than her own, because his mother was familiar with their relationship, and she wanted to avoid disclosing the incident to her mother. Jacobs also testified that she wanted to move out when Woods was at work, so she waited until he started a twelve-hour shift. Moreover, Jacobs said she was fearful to make a police report. All in all, because Woods has not demonstrated that the incredible dubiosity rule applies, we will not disregard Jacobs's testimony.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] Woods challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Specifically, Woods challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of criminal confinement and whether the State proved he used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offenses. Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of the witnesses. E.g., Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). Considering only the evidence supporting the judgment—“not evidence that might undermine it”—we affirm if there was substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

A. Confinement

[10] Woods claims there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for Level 3 felony confinement because the State did not prove that he confined Jacobs.⁵ The offense of criminal confinement requires proof that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally confine[d] another person without the other person's consent[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a). Under Indiana Code section 35-42-3-1, “ ‘confine’ means to substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.”

[11] On appeal, Woods focuses on three cases: McFadden v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), Cunningham v. State, 870 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), and Ryle v. State, 549 N.E.2d 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). According to Woods, these cases collectively illustrate that (1) the State must present evidence that the victim subjectively felt confined and (2) the duration of the defendant's conduct is a factor bearing on whether there was a substantial interference with the victim's liberty. Drawing on these cases, Woods essentially claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Jacobs felt subjectively confined for a sufficient duration of time. Woods also questions whether Jacobs felt compelled to submit to his demands because she “refused to open her mouth when he told her to do so,” and whether there was evidence of a substantial interference with Jacobs's liberty because Jacobs's “recollection of the length of time seems very fuzzy.” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[12] Regarding Jacobs's subjective belief of confinement, Woods's argument overlooks that the State specifically asked Jacobs: “At any point, did you feel like you were free to leave the bedroom from [sic] the gun was to your head?” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 60. Jacobs said: “No.” Id. Moreover, the State also questioned Jacobs about the timeline involved, asking: “When did ․ Woods take the gun away from your head?” Id. at 61. Jacobs responded: “I want to say – I can't really recall how long. It maybe was like, I don't know, two minutes or something.” Id. Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could determine that Woods substantially interfered with Jacobs's liberty. Woods's claims to the contrary amount to requests to reweigh evidence, which we must decline. All in all, we identify sufficient evidence of confinement.

B. Deadly Weapon

[13] The State sought an elevated conviction for criminal confinement on the basis that Woods committed the offense while “armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 23; I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(3)(A). The State also sought an elevated conviction for domestic battery on the basis that Woods committed the offense “with a deadly weapon, that is: a handgun.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 23–24; I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(c)(2). On appeal, Woods challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the elevation of these offenses, claiming there was insufficient evidence that he used a deadly weapon.

[14] Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-86 defines the term “deadly weapon” so as to include “[a] destructive device, weapon, device, ․ or other material that in the manner it: (A) is used; (B) could ordinarily be used; or (C) is intended to be used; is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.” Whether an object is a deadly weapon is a question of fact determined “from a description of the weapon, the manner of its use, and the circumstances of the case.” Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In short, the State must present sufficient evidence that “the defendant had the apparent ability to injure the victim seriously through his use of the object during the crime[.]” Id.

[15] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Woods points out that no weapon was recovered. As to Jacobs's testimony about a “P80” gun that Woods assembled from parts he ordered online, Woods notes that there was “no evidence regarding what material from which the created gun was constructed[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 16. Woods also claims that the testimony failed to establish that the gun was “capable of holding ammunition” or “being fired[.]” Id. According to Woods, the record is ultimately devoid of “evidence to establish whether the created gun was a deadly weapon.” Id. at 17.

[16] We disagree that the evidence was deficient. Jacobs testified that the device held to her head “resemble[d] the same functions as a Glock” with a “double trigger” and “no safety.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 59. Further, in text messages, Woods indicated that the device was capable of killing a person. That is, when Woods told Jacobs he hoped she died, Jacobs responded that, if Woods felt that way, Woods “should've pulled the trigger when [he] had that gun to [her] head[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 10. Woods then said: “[I] should've.” Id. Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Woods was armed with a device capable of causing serious bodily injury. Cf. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-86. We therefore identify sufficient evidence of Woods's use of a deadly weapon.

Conclusion

[17] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply, and there was sufficient evidence that (1) Woods confined Jacobs and (2) Woods used deadly weapon.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(A).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(2).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(2).

4.   I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(A).

5.   At times, Woods seems to suggest that the State improperly characterized the element of confinement when arguing the case to the trial court. We note, however, that Woods did not object to any aspect of the closing argument and he at no point alleges that the State's argument was prejudicial. Under the circumstances, we limit our analysis to whether the evidence presented satisfied the statutory elements of the criminal offense.

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.