IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Cas.H. (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Cas.H., Cal. H., and Cay.H. (collectively, the “Children”) are the biological children of A.H. (“Mother”) and P.H. (“Father”). The Children were removed from Mother's care because of her substance abuse. Following several months of Mother's failure to complete or even make meaningful efforts in court-ordered services, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to the Children. Mother now challenges that termination and presents two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 30, 2015, Cas.H. was born to Mother and Father.¹ On June 22, 2021, Cal.H. was born to Mother.² On February 23, 2022, the trial court determined Cas.H. and Cal.H. to be CHINS,³ in part based on findings (1) Mother had used illegal drugs, including while pregnant with Cal.H. and over two or three days in January 2022; (2) Mother had been discharged as unsuccessful from a prior informal adjustment; (3) Mother and Father had been arrested for domestic violence; and (4) Mother had “shown and stated that she does not intend to cooperate with services offered by DCS to address the reasons [Cas.H. and Cal.H.] were removed”, Appellant's App. Vol. II at 35. On March 9, 2022, the trial court issued a dispositional decree regarding Cas.H. and Cal.H., which in part required Mother to do the following: (1) complete a substance abuse assessment and complete recommended services; (2) submit to random drug screens; (3) complete a parenting assessment and follow any recommendations; and (4) participate in supervised visits.

[4] On August 13, 2022, Cay.H., a child of Mother and Father, was born “outside of the hospital” while Mother was under the influence of drugs. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 35. On August 15, 2022, DCS removed Cay.H. from Mother's care due to allegations of abuse and neglect. On October 28, 2022, the trial court adjudicated Cay.H. a CHINS based in relevant part on Mother's history of drug use, noting that Mother had “two open cases on two other children related to substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect.” Id. at 35. On November 30, 2022, the trial court entered its dispositional order as to Cay.H. with similar requirements to those in the siblings’ dispositional order, and the court combined the three CHINS cases.

[5] On July 10, 2023, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. The trial court conducted evidentiary hearings on November 28 and December 20, 2023, and February 8, 2024. On April 1, 2024, the trial court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights as to the Children (the “TPR Order”). In the TPR Order, the trial court made several findings regarding Mother's (1) “lengthy history of substance abuse,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 36; (2) failure to complete recommended substance abuse treatment; (3) failure to submit required drug screens, completing only 24 of 81 possible screens during the case; (4) failure to complete a course of domestic violence education; (5) failure to exercise visitation when able to do so; and (6) failure to adequately communicate or cooperate with DCS. The court also found that Cas.H. and Cal.H. “have health struggles due to being positive for substances at birth,” id. at 38, and that Cay.H. was born “outside of the hospital” while Mother was under the influence of drugs, id. at 35. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights to the Children Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[6] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over the Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[7] To terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that, among other things,

(B) one of the following is true:

(i) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied,

(ii) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of Mother's relationship with the Children poses a threat to the well-being of the Children, or

(iii) the Children have, on two separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) termination is in the best interests of the Children; and

(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children.

See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023); id. § 31-37-14-2.

[8] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[9] On appeal, Mother argues that DCS failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to removal would not be remedied, the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to the well-being of the Children, and termination is in the best interests of the Children. However, Mother does not specifically challenge any of the trial court's findings. As a result, we take all the trial court's findings as true. See R.M.., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Mother's arguments can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, those arguments are merely requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642).

[10] “[E]vidence of a parent's pattern of unwillingness or lack of commitment to address parenting issues and to cooperate with services demonstrates the requisite reasonable probability that the conditions will not change.” L.M. v. Ind Dep't Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied). The findings reveal that, during Mother's history with DCS, she had a pattern of either being unwilling or unable to deal with her substance abuse and domestic violence issues. The findings show that DCS demonstrated a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal would not be remedied.⁴

[11] Our supreme court has described the best interests in parental rights termination cases as follows:

Deciding whether termination is in the children's best interests is ‘[p]erhaps the most difficult determination” the trial court must make. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647. To make this decision, trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.) Central among these interests is children's need for permanency. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Indeed, “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648.

Ma. H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Here, the trial court supported its termination order with findings (not disputed on appeal) showing Mother was unlikely to remedy the conditions resulting in the Children's removal and the Children are “in a home that offers stability and safety, which also provides for their needs.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 42. The CASA recommended adoption and believes the same to be in the Children's best interests, and DCS and Cas.H.’s therapist also recommended termination and adoption. Indeed, Cas.H's therapist testified it would not be in the child's best interests to delay permanency to give the Mother additional time to comply with the service recommendations. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49.

[12] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied and the termination of the parent-child-relationships is in the Children's best interests. We affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights as to the Children.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father executed a consent to adoption and is not a party to this appeal.

2.   Paternity of Cal.H. was not established during the CHINS or termination proceedings.

3.   Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27, we have taken judicial notice of the filings in the underlying CHINS cases because Mother did not provide file-stamped copies of those documents in her appendix, see Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A).

4.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023) was written in the disjunctive. Therefore, having determined that DCS demonstrated a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal would not be remedied, we need not address Mother's argument that DCS failed to show reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. See id.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur. Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.