Brittany Baylor, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Brittany Baylor appeals the Clark Circuit Court's order denying her application for a bail reduction. Baylor presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her application.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 6, 2022, Baylor was babysitting a six-month-old boy (“Child”) when he began throwing up and then went limp. Baylor was Child's sole caregiver that day. Baylor began CPR and called 9-1-1. The responding officer also attempted CPR but accidentally dropped Child. After his transport to a local hospital, Child was pronounced dead. An autopsy showed that Child had died as a result of “a closed head injury sustained in an assault” and that the “amount of force” it would take to produce the injury was equivalent to a fall from a second-story window. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 14-15. The pathologist also concluded that Child had sustained the injury at some point after his parents had dropped him off at Baylor's house that day. Officers interviewed Baylor but did not charge her with a crime at that time.

[4] In February 2023, Baylor was babysitting a two-month-old infant, K.G., who sustained a broken leg while in Baylor's exclusive care. A medical examination indicated that the fracture was of a type that is usually the result of “inflicted child physical abuse.” Ex. p. 34. As a result, in August, the Department of Child Services substantiated a claim of abuse against Baylor.

[5] In May 2024, at the behest of the Clark County Prosecutor's Office, Dr. Melissa Currie, a physician with Norton Children's Pediatric Protection Specialists, issued a comprehensive report regarding the cause of Child's death in July 2022. In her report, Dr. Currie listed the multiple sources of information she had examined including medical records, the autopsy report, photographs, audio recordings of interviews with Baylor and witnesses, and officer body cam footage. At the conclusion of her fifteen-page report, Dr. Currie concluded in relevant part:

To be very clear, [Child's] injuries are definitively diagnostic for fatal abusive head trauma, which included blunt impact to the top of the head with associated skull fracture. The forces required to cause this type of fracture and the subdural hemorrhages are violent and far beyond the capabilities of another young child. Further, these are not injuries that would occur in the setting of less significant forces consistent with birth, typical household falls, bumping a baby's head against something accidentally, etc. ․

Regarding timing of injury, there is significant medical literature that supports the determination that when abusive head trauma results in severe neurological consequences (including death), then it is not plausible that the infant was at any time awake, calm, and behaving normally after the fatal head injury occurred. [Baylor] confirms that [Child] was calm, awake, and not crying during the time parents were talking with her prior to drop-off. Therefore, the medical evidence clearly indicates that the injuries occurred at some point after parents left the home. The description of the “gasps” preceding the infant becoming limp and unresponsive is exceedingly common in cases of abusive head trauma, and those observed “signs” are indicative of the acute result of concussion, and they occur immediately (within seconds) after the violent injury occurs.

Id. at 28 (emphases omitted). Dr. Currie also concluded that, “[w]ithout question,” Child's death was not caused by the officer's dropping him from a height of one or two feet. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 15.

[6] On June 4, the State charged Baylor with Level 1 felony aggravated battery resulting in death and Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. The next day, following a hearing, the trial court set Baylor's bail at $1 million cash. Baylor filed a motion for bond review and an application for release on recognizance or reduction of bail. Following a hearing, the trial court denied her application for release or reduction of bail. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Baylor contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her application for a bail reduction. Our standard of review is well settled.

As a general matter, the setting of the amount of bail is within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Winn v. State, 973 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We therefore review the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to reduce bail for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The denial of a motion to reduce bail is a final judgment appealable as of right. Id. at 1256 n.1.

Lopez v. State, 985 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[8] Indiana Criminal Rule 2.6 provides:

(A) If an arrestee does not present a substantial risk of flight or danger to self or others, the court should release the arrestee without money bail or surety subject to such restrictions and conditions as determined by the court except when:

(1) The arrestee is charged with murder or treason.

(2) The arrestee is on pretrial release not related to the incident that is the basis for the present arrest.

(3) The arrestee is on probation, parole, or other community supervision.

(B) In determining whether an arrestee presents a substantial risk of flight or danger to self or other persons or to the public, the court should utilize the results of an evidence-based risk assessment approved by the Office of Judicial Administration, and such other information as the court finds relevant. The court is not required to administer an assessment prior to releasing an arrestee if administering the assessment will delay the arrestee's release.

(C) If the court determines that an arrestee is to be held subject to money bail, the court is authorized to determine the amount of such bail and whether such bail may be satisfied by surety bond and/or cash deposit. ․

[9] And Indiana Code section 35-33-8-4(b) provides:

(b) Bail may not be set higher than that amount reasonably required to assure the defendant's appearance in court or to assure the physical safety of another person or the community if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community. In setting and accepting an amount of bail, the judicial officer shall consider the bail guidelines described in section 3.8 of this chapter and take into account all facts relevant to the risk of nonappearance, including:

(1) the length and character of the defendant's residence in the community;

(2) the defendant's employment status and history and the defendant's ability to give bail;

(3) the defendant's family ties and relationships;

(4) the defendant's character, reputation, habits, and mental condition;

(5) the defendant's criminal or juvenile record, insofar as it demonstrates instability and a disdain for the court's authority to bring the defendant to trial;

(6) the defendant's previous record in not responding to court appearances when required or with respect to flight to avoid criminal prosecution;

(7) the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential penalty faced, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance;

(8) the source of funds or property to be used to post bail or to pay a premium, insofar as it affects the risk of nonappearance;

(9) that the defendant is a foreign national who is unlawfully present in the United States under federal immigration law; and

(10) any other factors, including any evidence of instability and a disdain for authority, which might indicate that the defendant might not recognize and adhere to the authority of the court to bring the defendant to trial.

[10] In DeWees v. State, 180 N.E.3d 261, 265 (Ind. 2022), our Supreme Court stated that the predecessor to Criminal Rule 2.6 ¹ codified “a new theory of detention—one that relies on actuarial models of prediction and evidence-based practices to determine offender risk.” The Court observed that, “[a]t its core, the Rule aims to reduce pretrial-detention expenses for local jails (and taxpayers generally), enable defendants awaiting trial to return to their jobs and support their families, and enhance the benefits of reduced recidivism and improved public safety.” Id. at 265-66. But the Court also stated that the “recent bail-reform measures enhance, rather than restrict, the broad discretion entrusted to our trial courts.” Id. at 266.

[11] Here, the trial court set Baylor's bail at $1 million cash. In support of its denial of her motion to reduce bail, the court found in relevant part as follows:

2. Indiana Code [section] 35-33-8-4 sets the standard for bail stating: “Bail may not be set higher than that amount reasonably required to assure the defendant's appearance in court or to assure the physical safety of another person or the community if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community.”

3. Indiana Code [section] 35-33-8-5 states: “When the defendant presents additional evidence of substantial mitigating factors, based on the factors set forth in section 4(b) of this chapter, which reasonably suggests that the defendant recognizes the court's authority to bring the defendant to trial, the court may reduce bail. However, the court may not reduce bail if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant otherwise poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community.” [Emphasis added.]

4. At the hearing, [Baylor] did produce evidence on the factors set forth in I[.]C[.] [§] 35-33-8-4(b). She has resided in Clark County most of her life; she was employed full-time at the time of her arrest; the gallery of the courtroom was filled with [Baylor's] family and friends; she has only a prior misdemeanor conviction from when she was 19 years of age; and her family would be the source of any funds used to post bail.

5. [Baylor] knew of the investigation into the death of a child in her care in July 2022; she consulted with an attorney at the time and was told of the possible consequences; she remained in Clark County despite this information. She also continued to care for children in her home.

6. In this case [Baylor] is not charged with Murder, but is charged with Level 1 Felony Aggravated Battery and Level 1 Felony Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in Death of six-month-old [Child]. She faces a potential penalty, if convicted, of 40 years’ imprisonment on both counts. The State presented evidence from the Medical Examiner that the death of [Child] “is due to a closed head injury sustained in an assault.” [State's Exhibit 1]

7. In this case the child was “dropped” by the responding officer from a height of one to two feet per the officer's body cam footage. The State presented evidence that “Without question, that drop cannot account for the skull fracture, the diffuse subdural hemorrhages, or—perhaps most importantly—it cannot account for why [Child] became unresponsive in the first place.” [State's Exhibit 2]

8. At the hearing the State presented evidence [that Baylor] is currently under investigation for an injury that occurred in February 2023, seven months after the death of [Child], to a two-month-old child in her care. The State presented an Assessment of Alleged Child Abuse or Neglect from the Department of Child Services substantiating “the allegation of physical abuse against Brittany Baylor.” [State's Exhibit 3] If charged for said offense, [Baylor] potentially faces a Level 3 Felony Battery Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury to a person less than fourteen (14) years of age. A Level 3 Felony carries a potential sentence of up to 16 years’ imprisonment. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Baylor] poses a risk to the physical safety of others.

* * *

11․ [T]his Court has analyzed the statutory factors [and] finds the nature and gravity of [Baylor's] charges (and potential charges) are severe and tend to increase the risk she will fail to appear. Yes, she stayed in town even after she knew an investigation was ongoing. However, as the State argued at the hearing, potential charges and actual charges are different and now [Baylor] actually knows the consequences she faces, if convicted.

12. Further, this Court has analyzed the second factor to consider in setting bail—the risk to the physical safety of another person or the community. [Baylor] continued to care for other children in her home apparently up until her arrest on these charges. Another infant was injured in her home during this time period, and that is being investigated. This Court is not convinced that the risk to the physical safety of others is something this Court can ignore.

13. Here there is the death of a six-month-old child. If this were a murder charge, [Baylor] would be held without bond. This Court believes the $1,000,000.00 bond previously set is appropriate to ensure [that Baylor] appears for future court dates and to protect the physical safety of others in the community.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 45-48.

[12] Baylor argues that her $1 million cash bail “is unreasonable and excessive because there is insufficient evidence to show that Baylor presents a risk of nonappearance or danger to a person or the community which would justify that amount.” Appellant's Br. at 10. In support, Baylor cites the evidence relevant to the Indiana Code section 35-33-8-4(b) factors that supports a bail reduction, including: her IRAS score was “category one” showing a “low” risk to reoffend; she has lived in the community for decades, is employed, and has the support of family and friends; her inability to afford bail; evidence of her good character, including testimonials by parents of children she has cared for; and her minor criminal history consisting of a single misdemeanor conviction in 2008. Tr. p. 3. But Baylor's argument amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do on appeal.

[13] As the trial court observed, Indiana Code section 35-33-8-5(c) provides that the court “may reduce bail” if a defendant presents evidence of “substantial mitigating factors,” but “the court may not reduce bail if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the defendant ․ poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community.” (Emphases added). Here, the trial court's denial of Baylor's application for reduced bail is supported by clear and convincing evidence that she poses a risk of safety to the community, namely, children in her care. That is, as the trial court found, after Child's death in 2022, Baylor continued to provide childcare in her home, and DCS substantiated a claim of child abuse perpetrated by Baylor that resulted in a two-month-old's broken leg.²

[14] Finally, as the trial court observed, Baylor faces a sentence of up to forty years for causing Child's death and up to sixteen years for causing the two-month-old's broken leg in February 2023. As our Supreme Court stated in DeWees, “a potentially lengthy sentence ‘tends to increase the risk that [the defendant] will fail to appear for trial’ and this ‘cuts substantially against [the] argument that the trial court abused its discretion’ by denying a motion to reduce bail.” 180 N.E.3d at 270 (quoting Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b)(7)). Here, given the significant sentences Baylor faces, the trial court was within its discretion to find an increased risk that she would fail to appear in the future.

[15] For all these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Baylor's application for a reduction in bail.

[16] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Criminal Rule 26 was recodified as Criminal Rule 2.6 in January 2024.

2.   In August, the State charged Baylor with two Level 3 felonies related to that incident.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges Brown and Kenworthy concur.