ROWE v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION IDOC ISP (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jeffrey Allen Rowe (“Rowe”) appeals, pro se, the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) and other prison officials. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 10, 2023, Rowe, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison, filed a complaint against the DOC and other officials. The State appeared on behalf of the defendants, whom we hereafter collectively refer to as the State.¹ Rowe's complaint focused on an offender grievance (“the Grievance”) he submitted on April 14, 2023. In the Grievance, Rowe said he requested “a Kosher diet that regularly contain[ed] clean/Kosher red meat, poltury [sic], and fish, as opposed to the regular Kosher diet (that is vegan or vegetarian),” but “was [just] started on [the] regular ․ Kosher diet,” which was “inconsistent with [his] sincerely held religious beliefs.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 121. In Rowe's complaint, as amended, Rowe claimed that the State violated the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) and the Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) “in the way(s) [it] dealt with” the Grievance regarding “a Kosher diet that regularly contains Kosher red meats, fish, and poltury [sic].” Id. at 68. Rowe further alleged that he “sincerely believe[d] that as an Israelite he must eat a Kosher diet that contains clean and kosher red meats, or fish, or poltury [sic] regularly (i.e., with every meal), and that if he cannot or does not have such a diet, it would profoundly and adversely [a]ffect [his] abilities to ․ practice his religion.” Id. at 69. In seeking relief under RLUIPA and RFRA, Rowe indicated that he was seeking “three ․ meals daily” that contained “at least one” qualifying animal-based product. Id. at 72. Rowe further asserted that he had “exhausted all ‘available’ administrative remedies for the claims brought in th[e] case.” Id. at 71.

[3] Rowe filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, alleging that, based on his sincerely held religious beliefs, he “must eat a certified Kosher diet, and that each meal must contain one or more of the following items: clean/Kosher red meat, clean/Kosher fish, and clean/Kosher bird/poltury [sic].” Id. at 37. He specifically sought a preliminary injunction “requiring [the State] to provide [him] a Kosher diet that contain[ed] one or more of the following items as part of every meal: Kosher red meat, Kosher fish[,] and Kosher poltury [sic].” Id. at 35. On September 19, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Rowe's motion. At the hearing, Rowe testified that he received two eggs for breakfast on most Sundays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays, but otherwise did not receive food items derived from animal products. See Tr. Vol. 2 pp. at 13–14. When Rowe was asked if the eggs fulfilled his religious requirements for those meals, he responded, “They do fulfill that because that's part of the poultry.” Id. at 15. Rowe then specified that, pursuant to his religious beliefs, he was “supposed to eat either meat, fish, or poultry as part of every — every meal.” Id. at 16.

[4] On October 30, 2023, the trial court denied Rowe's motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 12–15. In its written order, the trial court differentiated between the claim in the Grievance, which was “that his religious beliefs required him to regularly eat meat” and Rowe's “new claim,” which was that “his religious beliefs would be satisfied if he were provided with non-meat, animal products, regularly.” Id. at 13. The trial court concluded that Rowe “never made any attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his new claim[.]” Id. The court also concluded that Rowe “ha[d] not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits” because he “acknowledged that his religious beliefs would also be satisfied if the diet he was provided regularly contained non-meat animal products such as hard-boiled eggs.” Id. at 14–15.

[5] On September 15, 2023, the State moved for summary judgment, alleging Rowe could not prevail because he failed to satisfy a requirement that, before bringing suit, he must first exhaust all available administrative remedies. See id. at 123–24. Rowe filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, claiming there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he exhausted all available administrative remedies. Rowe focused on designated evidence indicating that he lacked access to a form necessary to pursue further administrative remedies. See id. at 152–53. The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion for summary judgment. On December 6, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, ultimately concluding that Rowe “failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies[.]” Id. at 16. Rowe now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Rowe sought relief under RLUIPA and RFRA, which are laws providing a cause of action for individuals whose religious exercise has been substantially burdened by government action. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2; Ind. Code §§ 34-13-9-8, -9. Under RLUIPA, the government may not impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of an institutionalized person unless it demonstrates that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RFRA provides similar protections at the state level. See I.C. § 34-13-9-8.

[7] Rowe's RLUIPA claim implicates the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that a prisoner exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before suing to challenge prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to all claims brought under federal law, including RLUIPA. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The purpose of this requirement is to give corrections officials a chance to address grievances internally before the initiation of a lawsuit. Id. at 524–25. As to Rowe's state law claim under RFRA, this Court has generally required the exhaustion of administrative remedies before a prisoner may seek judicial review. See Higgason v. Lemmon, 818 N.E.2d 500, 502–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[8] In seeking relief under RLUIPA and RFRA, Rowe focused on the Grievance, wherein he sought “a Kosher diet that regularly contain[ed] clean/Kosher red meat, poltury [sic], and fish, as opposed to the regular Kosher diet (that is vegan or [vegetarian]).” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 121 (emphasis added). However, in the complaint, Rowe used different language and sought “three ․ meals daily” that each contained “at least one” of those animal-based products. Id. at 72. Rowe signaled that the need to “regularly” consume those types of products actually meant that he needed to consume them “with every meal[.]” Id. at 69. This distinction affects our analysis of the rulings on the motion for a preliminary injunction and the motion for summary judgment, which we address in turn.

I. Preliminary Injunction

[9] We review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794, 800 (Ind. 2011), cert. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. Moreover, Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) provides that the trial court must make special findings without request when granting or refusing a preliminary injunction. Under this rule, we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless “clearly erroneous,” and we give “due regard ․ to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A finding is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence supporting the finding. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2016). Furthermore, although we defer to the fact-finder's interpretation of the evidence, we owe no deference to legal conclusions. See generally Howard Reg'l Health Sys. v. Gordon, 952 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ind. 2011). Thus, to the extent the judgment turned on a question of law, our review is de novo. See generally id.

[10] To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success at trial; (2) the remedies at law are inadequate; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by granting the requested injunction. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d at 801. Here, Rowe sought a preliminary injunction on the basis that he was entitled to a diet containing certain animal-based products.

[11] In seeking a preliminary injunction, Rowe suggested that he was seeking an order providing him with animal-based products at every meal. Indeed, at the preliminary injunction hearing, Rowe asserted that he was “supposed to eat either meat, fish, or poultry as part of every — every meal.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 14. However, the Grievance was limited to whether Rowe was entitled to regularly consume these types of animal-based products. Thus, the expanded claim (i.e., that every meal must contain animal-based products) fell outside the scope of the Grievance, and therefore, Rowe failed to initiate any administrative review of his claim for animal-based products at every meal. Indeed, because Rowe requested a preliminary injunction requiring the State to provide animal-based products at every meal—a request distinct from the scope of the Grievance, which merely sought a diet that “regularly contained” animal-based products—we conclude that Rowe's claim was procedurally defective, and the trial court did not err in determining that Rowe failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. As to the claim encompassed in the Grievance (i.e., that Rowe was entitled to regularly consume animal-based products), Rowe testified that he received eggs on most Sundays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays, and he acknowledged that eggs fulfilled his religious dietary requirements. Given this testimony, which indicates that Rowe's dietary needs were being satisfied, the evidence supported the trial court's determination that Rowe was not likely to succeed in showing a violation of RLUIPA or RFRA. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a preliminary injunction.

II. Summary Judgment

[12] We next address the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for the State. We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, summary judgment is appropriate only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” T.R. 56(C).

[13] As earlier discussed, to the extent Rowe was claiming he is entitled to receive animal-based products with every meal—rather than on a regular basis—this claim fell outside the scope of the Grievance. Moreover, with the complaint and the designated evidence revolving around the Grievance, the record on summary judgment indicates that Rowe failed to exhaust administrative remedies for this type of expanded claim. Thus, Rowe was not entitled to relief under RLUIPA or RFRA for any such expanded claim. We therefore affirm summary judgment as to any claim that fell outside the scope of the Grievance.

[14] Regarding the Grievance, the State concedes that summary judgment was improper as to Rowe's claim that he was entitled to have regular access to certain types of animal-based products. See Appellee's Br. p. 22. Indeed, the State concedes there was genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rowe exhausted his administrative remedies, in that Rowe claimed there were no other remedies available to him because he lacked access to certain forms. Id.

[15] Although the State concedes summary judgment was improper, the State suggests we “remand for further proceedings as to the issue of whether Rowe exhausted all available administrative remedies.” Id. at 25; see also id. at 22 (“[V]acating the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion would be inappropriate without further factual development.”). We note, however, that by conceding summary judgment was improper, the State effectively acknowledges that it failed to carry its burden on summary judgment. In light of a genuine issue of material fact as to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, we conclude that reversal is the appropriate procedure in this scenario. We therefore reverse summary judgment as to the claim encompassed in the Grievance and remand for further proceedings.

Conclusion

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Rowe's motion for a preliminary injunction and affirm summary judgment for the State as to any claim outside the scope of the Grievance. As to the claim encompassed in the Grievance, due to a factual dispute regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, we reverse summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

[17] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The named defendants were the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”); David Liebel, the DOC's Director of Religious Services; and an individual identified as Chaplain Walker of the Indiana State Prison.

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.