Kevin E. Hatfield, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Kevin E. Hatfield (“Hatfield”) was convicted of murder,¹ a felony, and he admitted to being a habitual offender,² which led to a sentence of seventy-eight years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Hatfield appeals, presenting the following two restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

A. part of a recorded 911 call where Hatfield's mother said that she was “sure [her] son ha[d] done it”; and

B. a photograph of a knife similar to one given to Hatfield as a gift; and

II. Whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to find that Hatfield's mental health issues and struggles with substance abuse were mitigating factors.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History  3

[3] Hatfield was married to Jasmine Hatfield (“Jasmine”), and they lived together in Knox County. On June 11, 2021, Hatfield's mother, Wilma Lee (“Lee”), discovered Jasmine deceased in the home Hatfield shared with Jasmine. Lee called 911 and stated: “Her and my son have been fighting. I'm sure my son has done it.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 48; State's Ex. 2 at 0:35–0:38.

[4] When the police arrived, they found Jasmine face down in a pool of blood with multiple stab wounds. Dr. James Jacobi (“Dr. Jacobi”), a forensic pathologist, later determined that Jasmine had suffered twenty-three stab wounds, including fatal wounds to her neck and heart. Dr. Jacobi concluded the manner of death was homicide. He said that, based on the size and shape of the stab wounds, the injuries were consistent with a knife having a blade approximately an inch and a half wide.

[5] Earlier that day, Lee had spent time with Hatfield. Lee observed that Hatfield was agitated and appeared to be under the influence of drugs. Lee took Hatfield to run errands but eventually dropped him off at his and Jasmine's home after he became increasingly paranoid. Later that day, around 4:20 p.m., Jasmine's daughter spoke to Jasmine on the phone and overheard an argument between Jasmine and Hatfield. Hatfield sounded “[a]ggressive[,]” and Jasmine sounded “[t]errified.” Tr. Vol. 5 p. 32. Hatfield later showed up at an acquaintance's home in Jasonville, which was about forty minutes away from Hatfield's residence. Hatfield was breathing heavily and seemed to be panicking. He asked the acquaintance to help “get [him] out of here.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 174. The acquaintance told Hatfield to leave. Around 8:00 p.m., Hatfield was apprehended driving Jasmine's car while wearing bloody clothing. DNA testing revealed Jasmine's blood on Hatfield's hand and clothing.

[6] The State charged Hatfield with murder, a felony, and alleged he was a habitual offender. A jury trial was held in June 2023. At trial, Hatfield objected to the admission of Lee's statement on the 911 call, arguing it violated Evidence Rule 701 and was improper opinion testimony under Evidence Rule 704. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the statement. Hatfield also objected to the admission of a photograph of a knife that was similar to one a friend had given Hatfield as a wedding gift. The friend testified at trial, and Hatfield pointed out that the friend said the knife in the photograph was “not the knife” given to Hatfield. Id. at 179. Hatfield questioned the probative value of the exhibit, arguing that the photographed knife was “not even the same type of knife” given to Hatfield “other than the brand[.]” Id. at 180. The State responded that the witness “said this [was], in fact, the same brand, the same model. This [was] the same as the knife ․ that he gave [Hatfield].” Id. at 181. The State asked the witness a clarifying question, at which point the witness indicated that the photographed knife was the same type of knife he gave to Hatfield, but the photograph was not “life sized.” Id. at 182. At that point, the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the photograph of the knife.

[7] The jury found Hatfield guilty of murder. Hatfield then admitted to being a habitual offender. A sentencing hearing was held in October 2023. At sentencing, Hatfield presented testimony from Dr. Celestine DeTrana (“Dr. DeTrana”), a clinical and forensic psychiatrist, who opined that Hatfield was having an episode of dissociative amnesia when he killed Jasmine. Dr. DeTrana characterized dissociative amnesia as a “complex medical ․ phenomenon” where, “when people are exposed to extreme overwhelming stress,” they “have [the] potential to ․ essentially leave their consciousness so that ․ they continue to move but they're not consciously present.” Tr. Vol. 5 p. 203. There was also evidence that Hatfield struggled with depression as well as a substance abuse disorder, with Dr. DeTrana testifying that she “believe[d] [Hatfield] had a genetic disorder that made him vulnerable to substance abuse.” Id. at 202, 207. Dr. DeTrana opined that Hatfield's “mental health issues did affect what happened.” Id. at 206. Hatfield asked the court to “consider the dissociative episode” as a mitigating factor. Id. at 223. Hatfield also asked the trial court to “separately consider as a mitigating factor” evidence of his drug addiction. Id.

[8] Regarding evidence of Hatfield's mental illness, the trial court stated: “I'm ․ not going to give any weight to [Dr. DeTrana's] testimony about any sort of dissociative episode and don't feel that even if such a thing did happen before or after ․ the murder itself that [such an episode] would require any sort of mitigative response.” Id. at 226. In the end, the trial court identified a single mitigating factor, which was Hatfield's admission to being a habitual offender. Id. at 225. As for aggravating factors, the court found that Hatfield's criminal history, violation of bond conditions, and the nature of the offense were aggravators. Regarding the nature of the offense, the court reflected on “the harm, injury, loss[,] and damage suffered by the victims, not just [Jasmine] herself but also her family,” noting the harm was “significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the crime.” Id. The trial court ultimately imposed sixty-two years with a sixteen-year enhancement, for an aggregate term of seventy-eight years in the DOC. Hatfield now appeals.

Discussion

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before the trial court. McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022).

A. Statement on 911 Call

[10] Hatfield challenges the admission of Lee's recorded statement that “I'm sure my son has done it.” State's Ex. 2 at 0:35–0:38. He argues that this statement was inadmissible for multiple reasons, including because the statement was an impermissible opinion on guilt. Hatfield directs us to Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b), which prohibits witnesses from testifying to “opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” He also cites Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213 (Ind. 1999), where the Indiana Supreme Court determined that a detective's statement in a police interview—“I thought it was you”—constituted an inadmissible opinion on guilt. 721 N.E.2d at 217.

[11] We agree with Hatfield that the recorded statement was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 704. As our Supreme Court has explained, opinion testimony is admissible so long as it “stop[s] short of the question of guilt.” Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. 2015). However, opinion testimony goes too far when it speaks to every element of the offense, “leaving nothing for the jury to decide.” Id. at 582; cf. id. at 583 (indicating that testimony would be admissible if the testimony “merely impl[ied] guilt by addressing some of the elements” of the offense, rather than conclusively addressing all of the elements). Here, the State charged Hatfield with the offense of murder, which required proof that Hatfield “knowingly or intentionally kill[ed] another human being[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. In attempting to prove that Hatfield murdered Jasmine, the State introduced evidence that Lee called 911 after encountering Jasmine's body in a pool of blood with multiple stab wounds, and told the dispatcher that she was “sure [her] son has done it.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 48; State's Ex. 2 at 0:35–0:38. Lee's recorded statement conclusively indicated that Lee thought Hatfield murdered Jasmine. Because this statement spoke to every element of the offense and did not stop short of the question of guilt, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the statement over Hatfield's objection.

[12] Nevertheless, we will not reverse evidentiary error if we conclude that the error was harmless under the circumstances. As the State points out on appeal, our standard for harmless error centers around whether the evidentiary error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Ind. Trial Rule 61; Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a); Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). “In determining whether [the] error ․ affected the defendant's substantial rights, we must assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the jury.” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. In general, error was harmless if there was substantial independent evidence of guilt sufficient to satisfy us that “there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction[.]” Id.

[13] In this case, the State presented ample independent evidence of Hatfield's guilt, including evidence that Hatfield (1) argued with Jasmine earlier in the day; (2) contacted his acquaintance and, while panicked, asked the acquaintance to help “get [him] out of here,” Tr. Vol. 4 pp. 173–74; and (3) was apprehended while driving Jasmine's car, with Jasmine's blood on his hand and clothing. This was substantial independent evidence of Hatfield's guilt such that we are satisfied that Lee's recorded statement to the 911 dispatcher did not contribute to Hatfield's conviction for murdering Jasmine. Cf. Williams, 43 N.E.3d at 583–84 (determining that the erroneous admission of an opinion on guilt ultimately constituted harmless error because “the jury ․ heard ample evidence to independently convict” the defendant of the offense). We therefore conclude that the error in admitting Lee's recorded statement was merely harmless error.

B. Photograph of Knife

[14] Hatfield also challenges the admission of the photograph of a knife similar to one he received as a gift. Hatfield argues that, under the circumstances, the evidence “had no legitimate probative value” and was unduly prejudicial, warranting exclusion under the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Appellant's Br. p. 21. We begin by observing that evidence is relevant, and therefore admissible, if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Evid. R. 401. However, even if evidence is relevant, Evidence Rule 403 provides that the trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” As for the balancing test in Evidence Rule 403, “[t]rial courts are given wide latitude in weighing probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, and we review that determination for abuse of discretion.” Dunlap v. State, 761 N.E.2d 837, 842 (Ind. 2002).

[15] In arguing that the trial court should have excluded the photograph of the knife, Hatfield points out that a murder weapon was never found. He argues that the knife in the photograph was not the actual murder weapon or the exact knife given to him. Appellant's Br. pp. 20–21. Moreover, Hatfield also points out that “[t]here was ․ no evidence presented that [he] even still had that knife near the time of [Jasmine's] death.” Id. at 21. Hatfield ultimately argues that the photograph “had no legitimate probative value[.]” Id.

[16] We disagree that the photograph of the knife lacked any probative value. As the State points out on appeal, the “evidence was probative because it illustrated the size and shape of the blade of a knife that Hatfield had in his possession” at some point before the murder, which was consistent with the weapon that inflicted Jasmine's injuries. Appellee's Br. p. 15. As for the risk of unfair prejudice, to the extent Hatfield focuses on potential differences between the photographed knife and the type of knife given to him as a wedding gift, the witness testified that the knife was the same type of knife, but the picture itself was not life-sized. Furthermore, on cross-examination, Hatfield elicited testimony indicating that the friend who gave him the knife “ha[d] no idea” whether Hatfield still had the knife or whether it “was even the knife” that inflicted Jasmine's injuries. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 184. This line of questioning helped place the evidence in context, tempering the risk of jury confusion or prejudice.

[17] Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion to conclude that the probative value of the photograph of the knife was not substantially outweighed by one of the risks identified in Evidence Rule 403. We therefore discern no error in the admission of the photograph.

II. Sentencing

[18] Hatfield challenges his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to identify his mental health and struggles with substance abuse as mitigating circumstances. See Appellant's Br. pp. 22–23.

[19] The trial court has discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See generally Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement that includes a “reasonably detailed recitation of the ․ reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. If the sentencing statement “includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id. “[T]he reasons given, and the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 491.

[20] When the defendant claims “the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor,” the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 493. However, “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)). Further, to the extent a defendant claims a court “abused its discretion in failing to give his proffered mitigating factor greater weight, this claim is not available for appellate review.” Id. at 493–94. Indeed, “[t]he relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Id. at 491.

[21] Regarding his mental health, Hatfield focuses on Dr. DeTrana's opinion that, when Hatfield killed Jasmine, Hatfield was experiencing a dissociative episode that impacted the crime. Hatfield cites Archer v. State, 689 N.E.2d 678, 684–86 (Ind. 1997), and Weeks v. State, where our Supreme Court identified “several considerations that bear on the weight, if any, that should be given to mental illness in sentencing.” 697 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998). Those considerations are: “(1) the extent of the defendant's inability to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime.” Id. Focusing on these considerations, Hatfield asserts that Dr. DeTrana established a clear nexus between the proffered mitigator and the commission of the crime. Appellant's Br. p. 22. Hatfield ultimately argues that the trial court did not properly consider his mental health as a mitigating factor or provide an adequate explanation for rejecting the proffered mitigator. Hatfield also briefly argues that the trial court should have identified his substance abuse as a mitigator, pointing out that there was evidence “this was due, at least in part, to a genetic disorder” and “that it was directly connected to the crime.” Id. at 23.

[22] Archer and Weeks identified considerations that “bear on the weight, if any, that should be given to mental illness in sentencing” and underscored the necessity of giving careful consideration to mental health evidence, which is not to be ignored. Weeks, 697 N.E.2d 28 at 30. Critically, however, this case does not present the scenario where the trial court ignored the defendant's mental health evidence. Rather, here, the trial court's remarks indicate that it considered Hatfield's proffered mitigating evidence and ultimately declined to regard the evidence as significantly mitigating under the circumstances. See Tr. Vol. V p. 226; cf. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.”); id. at 493 (noting that, where the record indicated that the sentencing court considered the defendant's mental health evidence, it was “the trial court's call” to conclude the evidence “was not significant and thus would not be a factor influencing the trial court's sentencing decision”). All in all, Hatfield has not identified an abuse of discretion with regard to mitigators.

Conclusion

[23] The trial court should have excluded Lee's recorded statement, but this evidentiary error was harmless because there was substantial independent evidence of Hatfield's guilt. As to the photograph of the knife, Hatfield has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Moreover, we cannot say that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J. and Felix, J., concur.