C.J., Appellant-Respondent v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.J. (“Mother”) appeals a post-adoption order from the Marion Superior Court transitioning K.P.M. (“Child”) into Mother's custody contrary to Mother's requests that the Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) action be dismissed upon notification of the adoption and that Child's custody be immediately transferred to Mother. She presents the sole issue of whether her due process rights were violated.¹ Concluding that this appeal is moot, we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 20, 2022, the Marion County Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from the custody of her biological mother and placed Child with C.G., a family friend. DCS alleged Child to be a CHINS due to parental substance abuse; on February 23, 2023, the CHINS court adjudicated Child a CHINS based upon parental admissions. The initial permanency plan was reunification with a parent.

[3] Mother, a maternal relative of Child, petitioned to adopt Child, who had remained in the care of C.G.² Each biological parent consented to Child's adoption, and the probate court ruled that the consent of DCS was not required. On May 10, 2024, the Hamilton Superior Court granted Mother's petition to adopt Child. Mother then filed a petition to intervene in the CHINS case. She also filed a motion to dismiss the CHINS case, attaching a certified copy of the decree of adoption.

[4] On May 14, 2024, the CHINS court conducted a remote permanency hearing, at which argument of counsel was heard. The court did not swear in any witnesses but heard representations made by a visitation facilitator and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”). The visitation facilitator stated that Mother's visits with Child had gone “very well,” and they were bonded; however, the visitation facilitator noted that Child, aged two, had a propensity for “throw[ing] her fits.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 15.) The GAL opined that a gradual transition was “better” due to Child's “behavior” and her “bond with current placement.” (Id. at 16.) Mother argued that the objectives of the CHINS case had been met and the CHINS court was required to dismiss the CHINS action, with an immediate transfer of Child's custody from C.G. to Mother. DCS instead requested a “timeline for transfer” to permit the introduction of overnight visits. (Id. at 6.)

[5] At the conclusion of the hearing, the CHINS court granted Mother's motion to intervene and denied her motion for immediate ³ dismissal. The court advised the parties that the permanency plan would remain reunification, but with Mother's substitution as the parent with whom reunification would occur. The court acknowledged the validity of the adoption decree but stated that Child's best interests were the paramount concern in effecting the custodial transfer. Finally, the court set a transfer deadline of no later than June 14, 2024. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Mother contends that the CHINS court was required to dismiss its case involving Child pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-11, which provides:

When the juvenile court finds that the objectives of the dispositional decree have been met, the court shall discharge the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

The CHINS court did not make the predicate finding that the objectives of the dispositional decree had been met but rather substituted Mother as the parent with whom reunification would occur. According to Mother, the failure of the CHINS court – upon notification of the adoption – to order a contemporaneous dismissal and transfer of Child's custody deprived Mother of her parental rights without due process afforded parents in CHINS proceedings. DCS contends that the issue is moot because Mother has full custody of Child; Mother does not address the claim of mootness in her reply brief.

[7] Indiana courts have followed a long-standing rule that a case is deemed moot and should be dismissed when the controversy has been disposed of in some manner such that the court can provide the parties no effective relief and thus it is unnecessary to decide the question at issue. T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019). However, “Indiana recognizes a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, which may be invoked when the issue involves a question of great public importance which is likely to recur.” Matter of Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991). The ensuing decision is, for practical purposes, an advisory opinion. I.J. v. State, 178 N.E.3d 798, 799 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam). Additionally, “an appeal may be heard which might otherwise be dismissed as moot where leaving the judgment undisturbed might lead to negative collateral consequences.” In re F.S., 53 N.E.3d 582, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[8] Recently, a panel of this Court has considered the application of both the public interest exception and the collateral consequences doctrine to an otherwise moot appeal. See J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 222 N.E.3d 1020, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The appeal in J.F., which did not “address a novel issue, present a close call, or provide an opportunity to develop case law on a complicated topic,” was not “appropriate to invoke the public interest exception to reach the merits of [the] appeal.” Id. Additionally, the Court clarified that the collateral consequences doctrine should be applied “only when the appellant demonstrates a particularized collateral consequence” flowing from the [ ] order.” Id.

[9] Here, we can afford Mother no practical relief. She has not urged the application of the public interest exception to mootness. She has identified no negative collateral consequence of the CHINS court's decision to effect a transitional change of custody for Child, then aged two. Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits of Mother's deprivation of due process claim.

Conclusion

[10] Because the order for a transitional change of custody is moot and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies, we dismiss.

[11] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother claims that her substantive due process rights were violated because of a deprivation of her rights to direct the care, custody, and control of Child, and that her procedural due process rights were violated due to a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard in the CHINS proceedings.

2.   The petition was filed by three maternal relatives but two were subsequently dismissed as petitioners.

3.   The CHINS case has subsequently been closed.

Bailey, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.